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Case 6: Tactics of Naval Warfare
Exhibition curator: Katie Sambrook
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Formation to be adopted in order to avoid an engagement with the enemy, from: Paul Hoste. L'art des armées navales. Lyon: chez Anisson & Posuel, 1697.[Rare Books Collection FOL. V167.H83] |
Paul Hoste. L'art des armées navales. Lyon: chez Anisson & Posuel, 1697
Rare Books Collection FOL. V167.H83
French naval tactics for much of the eighteenth century were dominated by a belief in the importance of the correct évolutions (manoeuvres) and ordres de marche (squadron sailing formations). Supremely influential in shaping these ideas were the writings of Paul Hoste (1652-1700), a Jesuit and mathematician who served as chaplain to Vice-Admiral Anne-Hilarion de Cotentin, comte de Tourville. Although his work was published in the seventeenth century, it continued to hold sway in French tactical thinking for the next hundred years. This helps to account for the French over-reliance on formal manoeuvres, as opposed to the practicalities of sea-fights; Hoste, as a chaplain and scholar, had no practical experience of directing naval operations. The fact that he wrote L'art des armées navales in the aftermath of heavy French naval defeats at the hands of the British and the Dutch also helps to explain his emphasis on defensive tactics, an emphasis which was reflected in many subsequent French naval engagements against the British.
L'art des armées navales is illustrated with 130 engraved plates. The plate on display shows a formation to be adopted in order to avoid an engagement with the enemy.
Audibert Ramatuelle. Cours élémentaire de tactique navale, dédié a Bonaparte. Paris: Baudouin, An X [i.e. 1802]
Rare Books Collection V167.Au2
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| Formation for squadron sailing in three columns, from: Audibert Ramatuelle. Cours élémentaire de tactique navale, dédié a Bonaparte. Paris: Baudouin, An X [i.e. 1802].[Rare Books Collection V167.Au2] |
The continuing influence of Hoste's theoretical approach to naval warfare, with its emphasis on formation and manoeuvre, can be seen in this much later work, published in the brief interlude of peace which followed the signing of the Peace of Amiens between Britain and France in March 1802. By this date Nelson had inflicted a severe defeat on the French navy at the Battle of the Nile (1798). Ramatuelle acknowledges that Nelson's tactics at the Nile appear to undermine some of his own theories. For example, Ramatuelle advises strongly against attacking an enemy fleet lying at anchor, but this is precisely what Nelson did at the Nile, taking advantage of the French fleet's state of unpreparedness and the wide gaps between its ships, which enabled the British ships to pass between them and attack them from the shoreward side.
The plate on display shows a formation for squadrons sailing in three columns.
"Chart of the Bay of Aboukir, as illustrating the narrative of Lord Nelson's action". The Naval Chronicle, volume 1, January-June 1799
Rare Journals Collection
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Battle of the Nile, from: "Chart of the Bay of Aboukir, as illustrating the narrative of Lord Nelson's action". The Naval Chronicle, volume 1, January-June 1799. [Rare Journals Collection] |
Nelson's comprehensive victory over the French fleet at the Battle of the Nile on 1 August 1798 exemplified both his genius as a leader and his tactical acumen. In the weeks that preceded the battle, as his fleet scoured the Mediterranean in search of the French, Nelson held regular meetings with his captains to discuss every possible situation in which they might find the enemy and the best method of engagement to employ in each case. By briefing his captains fully and repeatedly as to his intentions, Nelson ensured that, when his fleet eventually closed with the enemy at Aboukir Bay, his captains could act quickly and decisively without the need to wait for further instructions. By sharing his plans with them and then encouraging them to take the initiative Nelson showed that he trusted his captains - and they amply repaid this trust.
In attacking the French fleet as it lay at anchor in the bay, Nelson took the
enemy by surprise, spotting the weakness in what appeared to be a French position
of strength. The French admiral, François-Paul de Brueys, had positioned
his fleet close to the shore in a bay of treacherous shoals, protected by on-shore
batteries at Aboukir Island and on the mainland. He did not expect to be attacked.
Nelson, however, perceived that where there was room for the French ships to
swing on the anchor, there was room for the British ships to pass between them
and fire on their shoreward side. Despite the risks of entering an unknown bay
at nightfall, without charts or pilots, Nelson and his captains launched their
attack on the French, opening fire at around six o'clock in the evening. By
the early hours of the following morning victory was complete; of the thirteen
French ships of the line only two escaped to fight another day and Napoleon's
army was left stranded in Egypt with no means of escape.
The plate on display illustrates an account of the Battle of the Nile by an
anonymous "Officer of Rank" which appeared in the first issue of The
Naval Chronicle. The author of this article was in fact Nelson's flag-captain,
Edward Berry (1768-1831), who was in command of HMS Vanguard, Nelson's
flagship at the Nile.
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