5 February 2008

 

Philosophy of Biological and Cognitive Sciences

Matteo Mameli and David Papineau

Tuesdays 12-1.30 Lecture Room KCL Dept of Philosophy

KCL/LSE MSc in PHS

 

Evolution and Ethics (Continued)

 

1.  Meta-ethical options—realist vs non-realist.  Realist—naturalist vs non-naturalist.  (Naturalist realist—supervenience vs type reduction.)  Non-realist—error theory/fictionalism (Mackie) vs non-cognitivism (emotivism, prescriptivism, expressivism, projectivism).

 

2.  Naturalist realist theories.  Moore’s open question argument.  Two answers:  (i) there is a conceptual natural -> moral connection, just not obvious; (ii) natural -> moral implications are necessary but a posteriori (cf water = H20).

 

3.  Causal inertness argument.  Evolutionary explanations moral attitudes don’t invoke moral facts (Kitcher, Street, Joyce, Gibbard).  Local explanations of moral attitudes don’t invoke moral facts (Harman).

 

4.  Compare this with the causal argument against dualism:  physiological explanations of behaviour don’t invoke mental facts.  Moral non-realism = mental eliminativism.  Moral non-naturalist realism = dualist epiphenomenalism.  Naturalist realism = mental physicalism.

 

5.  Kevin B aimed to argue that, even if moral judgements were uncorrelated with the moral facts, or screened off from them by the natural explanations, this still left room for moral realism.  Interesting arguments.  But I wondered whether the moral naturalist realist need concede this much.  Why not just insist that moral judgements are caused by the moral facts on the grounds that the moral facts are simply part of the natural explanation?  (Cf behaviour just is is caused by the mental facts.)

 

6.  Maybe it helps here to distinguish moral judgements about particular situations (torturing that cat is wrong/cruel) with the general disposition to form such judgements (if an action knowingly causes needless pain, it is wrong/cruel).  The particular judgment can be straightforwardly caused by the fact it is about.  The disposition is more complicated.  But why not just say it evolved because it led to true particular moral judgements?  (Cf my general disposition to judge that snakes are dangerous evolved because it led to true judgements.)

DP 5/2/08

 

Readings

 

K. Brosnan, "Dissolving a dilemma: why Darwinian considerations don't confront moral realism with hard choices".

 

S. Street, "A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value", Philosophical Studies 127, 109-166.

 

E. Sober, "Prospects for an evolutionary ethics", in E. Sober, From a Biological Point of View, 1994.

Kitcher, P. 1995 ‘Four ways of ‘biologizing’ ethics’ in E. Sober ed Conceptual Issues in Evolutionary Biology 2nd ed MIT

Lillehammer, H. 2003 ‘Debunking Morality: moral error theory and evolutionary naturalism’ Biology and Philosophy 2003

Kitcher, P. 2005 ‘Biology and Ethics’ in D. Copp ed The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory OUP