15 January 2008

Philosophy of Biological and Cognitive Sciences

Matteo Mameli and David Papineau

Tuesdays 12-1.30 Lecture Room KCL Dept of Philosophy

KCL/LSE MSc in PHS

Mental Modularity

1. Example: vision. ‘New Look’ psychology—Bruner, Gregory. Muller-Lyer lines.

2. Fodor’s modules: encapsulated (output not affected by what we believe); unconscious; fast; shallow (we don’t have to believe the output); mandatory; develop in characteristic way/localized in brain/standard patterns of breakdown (supposed to show not learned); domain-specific. These criteria can all dissociate. Let’s focus on encapsulated and domain-specific.

3. Further examples. Other sensory systems, grammar (“more people have been to Berlin than I have”), understanding of mind, folk physics, folk biology . . . (But is even vision a clear-cut case? Churchland, Prinz.)

4. Massive modularity. Weak: some central modules. Strong: all cognition is modular.

5. Theoretical arguments for massive modularity.

(i) Evolvability. Equivocation on “module”.

(ii) Specialized problems needing special cognitive techniques. Specialized databases may serve.

(iii) Computational tractability (frame problem). But this argument presupposes computationalism (traveling salesman problem); also encapsulation not only route to tractability.

6. Empirical evidence. Wason selection task. ‘Cheater detection’ module. Alternative explanations (Sperber, Fodor). More generally, little evidence for special central modules, as opposed to special databases. (NB poverty stimulus and arguments for innateness indecisive here. Also, where are the knowingly experienced illusions with folk physics, folk biology, . . .

7. Against massive modularity: inferential holism, task range. (Cf. Fodor’s assignment problem.) Frame problem again? But nobody said we are perfect or fast.

Readings

J. Barkow, L. Cosmides, J. Tooby (eds) The Adapted Mind Chapters 1, 2 and 3, Oxford

J. Fodor The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way MIT Press

R. Samuels ‘The Complexity of Cognition’ in P. Carruthers et al (eds) The Innate Mind: Structure and Content OUP

R. Samuels ‘Is the Mind Massively Modular?’ In R. Stainton (ed) Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science Blackwell

DP 15/1/08