23 October 2007

Philosophy of Biological and Cognitive Sciences

Matteo Mameli and David Papineau

Tuesdays 12-1.30 Lecture Room KCL Dept of Philosophy

KCL/LSE MSc in PHS

Functional Explanation, Functions and Adaptionism

1. Sometimes we explain things by effects, not causes: why do leaves contain chlorophyll? to photosynthesize; why do giraffes have long necks? to eat the high leaves; . . . etc. What’s going on here?

2. Covering-law model: the sufficient condition (effect) happens to come after the cause, not before.

3. The aetiological theory (Wright). functional explanations are disguised causal explanations, invoking histories of natural selection. (Cf. intentional explanations.)

4. Cummins’ alternative account: functional analysis.

5. Biological but forward-looking functions. Bigelow and Pargetter.

6. These may be good accounts of “function”, but they don’t yield explanantions.

7. Adaptationism. Biological traits are there for a purpose. Anti-adaptationism. The spandrels of San Marco.

8. Punctuated equilibrium. Why is this anti-adaptationst? Maybe because it indicates genetic drift is important.

9. Fodor’s conceptual challenge. If spandrels and arches (size and skeleton-type) are linked, then what (absent a designer) can show there’s selection for one rather than the other? (A better question: when there is “selection for” a trait, what picks out one of its concertina of advantageous effects as its aetiological function?)

10. The empirical challenge: are most biological traits selected for advantageous effects?

11. Godfrey-Smith: empirical vs explanatory vs methodological adaptationism.

Readings

Cummins, R. “Functional Analysis” J Phil 1975

Wright, L. “Functions” Phil Review 1973

Bigelow, J. and Pargetter, R.. “Functions”. J Phil 1987

Gould, S. and Lewontin, R. “The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist Programme” Proc Roy Soc 1979

Fodor, J. “Why Pigs don’t Have Wings” LRB 18 Oct 2007

Godfrey-Smith, P. “Three Kinds of Adaptationism” in S. H. Orzack and E. Sober (eds.), Adaptationism and Optimality CUP 2001