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Canada’s Naval Strategy: The Strategy of a Client State

Nicholas Tracy
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Key Points

Ken Booth was mistaken when in 1977 he wrote, “it is only the greatest navies which have important foreign policy implications.”

- The Royal Canadian Navy, over a hundred years, has employed naval forces in what James Cable labeled “Definitive” roles in order to achieve “Purposeful” objectives.
- Managing the relationship with the United States has been the central concern, in the context of wider concerns.
- Canada’s naval strategy of “alliancemanship” shares characteristics with those of all other middle-power.

Dr. Tracy’s contribution to scholarship has been in the discipline of History, with a focus on Naval History that concentrates on the relationship between navies and foreign policy, but has also extended to technical study of naval tactics, to general maritime history, and to the place of the navy in cultural history. This work began with Navies, Deterrence, and American Independence, which is a study of British defence policy in the 1760s and 1770s that describes a system of deterrence based on naval strength, and its collapse under the psychological stress of the American revolution. Dr Tracy subsequently devoted more than a decade working on one aspect of naval strategy that was published as Attack on Maritime Trade in 1991. This, and further work on Canadian defence history led to the publication of two monographs with particular relevance to Canadian naval policy: Pro-Active Sanctions, a New/Old approach to Non-violent Measures, and Canada’s Naval Strategy: Rooted in Experience, and to publication of two document collections for the Navy Records Society: in 1997 The Collective Naval Defence of the Empire: 1900 to 1940, and in 2005 Sea Power and the Control of Trade, Belligerent Rights from the Russian War to the Beira Patrol. All of these precursors have contributed to his most recent book, a cap-stone volume published by McGill-Queens University Press and the Carleton Library, A Two-Edged Sword: The Navy as an Instrument of Canadian Foreign Policy.

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The Journalist is expected to answer for his or her readers the five questions: who, where, how, why, and when. Canadian naval scholarship has exhaustively answered three of those questions, but the questions of why Canada needs a navy and how it uses it to protect Canadian interests have not been so easy to settle. At the time of the formation in 1910 of the Royal Canadian Navy Frederick Monk, Conservative Member of Parliament, condemned the idea of “a navy which will be Canadian when it has to be paid for, in order to be Imperial when it is required for use.”¹ This Canadian concern about the paradox of constructing a national force to serve national needs by participating in multi-lateral strategies is enduring. In September 1963 the Chief of Operational Research, Dr Robert J. Sutherland, wrote in a confidential report: “it would be highly advantageous to discover a strategic rational which would impart to Canada’s defence programs a wholly Canadian character. Unfortunately, such a rationale does not exist and one cannot be invented.”² This is sometimes taken to mean that Canada has no strategic objectives beyond recognition that Canada’s place in the world is fundamentally tied to her international partnerships. But when Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau asked the rhetorical question in 1969 whether Canada’s “defence policy was more to impress our friends than frighten our enemies” he was posing a false dichotomy.³ The Canadian diplomat John Holmes was certainly correct when he wrote in 1981 that “Alliancemanship is ... not enough.” Alliancemanship, however, is part of the equation that constitutes what might be thought of as Canada’s way of defence.⁴ “We shall,” he continued, “have to develop muscles, our bargaining power, our capacities to use prudently what we have to offer, and to increase where we can American dependence on us... The art of
alliancemanship is what we shall need most.” Sutherland himself had
employed the word, writing that “no other nation ... is so much dependent
upon the art and science of alliancemanship.”

Prime Minister Sir Wilfred Laurier’s decision in 1910 that Canada should
establish its own navy followed in the wake of Kaiser William II’s 1897
commission to Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz to construct a High Seas Fleet
of forty-one battleships.5 Tirpitz’s declared strategic objective was to create a
“risk fleet” that Britain could only defeat with losses to its own battle fleet that
would inevitably leave it vulnerable to a coalition of France and Russia.
Canadians had such close family and business ties with the Imperial mother
country that any threat to its security was of immediate consequence to
Canadians, and Canadian maritime interests would be at risk were the Imperial
navy to be defeated.6 But the German threat was only the last straw that led to
Laurier’s decision - it was not the fundamental interest.

The main reason Laurier decided to establish a national navy, despite the
practical advantages of contributing to the Royal Navy which had supported
Canadian independence for two hundred years, was the growth of the United
States Navy, and the truculent attitude of the American government to
Canadian autonomy within the British Empire. The 1895 Venezuela boundary
dispute in which British interests had been opposed by the United States had
raised the specter in Ontario of the United States invading Canada to punish
Britain, and had forced Laurier to consider the need for local naval defence on
the lakes. At the 1897 Colonial Conference Laurier, echoing an earlier
statement by Sir John A Macdonald, asserted that any differences with the
United States were “family troubles which mean nothing very serious,” and
reportedly he told General Douglas Cochrane, Earl of Dundonald, arriving in
Canada in 1902 to take charge of the Militia, that Canada was quite comfortable
relying upon the “Monroe Doctrine” for her defence.7 But the reality was
somewhat different.
The United States Navy demonstrated its new naval power in the Spanish-American war. The spoils of war included the American acquisition of the Philippines and Guam, the establishment of naval bases on Puerto Rico, Cuba, Guam and at Subic Bay, and the annexation of independent Hawaii. Vancouver wondered whether it might be the next to experience American naval power. In 1902 President Theodore Roosevelt made it clear that Canadian interests in the outcome of the Alaska boundary dispute were hostage to British good behaviour in the Venezuela debt crisis, and the 1903 Alaska boundary arbitration largely ignored Canadian claims. The following year Roosevelt issued a “corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, proclaiming that the United States as a “civilized nation” would serve as the “international police power” in the Americas.  

The world cruise of the US Navy’s “Great White Fleet” in 1907 heightened concern about the undefended nature of the Canadian Pacific coast. Laurier’s deputy-minister of Labour, William Lyon Mackenzie King, the future prime minister, noted in his diary that he was opposed to Roosevelt’s suggestion the American fleet should visit Vancouver. He did not think it “desirable that we should encourage a sentiment of dependence on the United States or to strengthen the annexationist feeling in the west ... if there was to be any fleet in our waters we would prefer to have the British fleet.” The situation, he added “reveals to me...the necessity of our doing something in the way of having a navy of our own.”

This perception was shared by the Conservative former minister of the Marine and Fisheries, George E Foster. When in 1909 he started the parliamentary process that led to the formation of the Royal Canadian Navy, Foster made it clear that Canadian relations with the United States was central to his line of thought: “Mr Speaker, the Monroe Doctrine and the United States of America might guarantee our safety from foreign invasion, but ... the price we would have to pay would be continual demand, continual concession until at last absorption finished the craven course.”
Only with the advantage of a century of hindsight is there anything surprising about a nation creating an armed force to meet a threat from its neighbour - but the disparity between Canadian and American economic resources, even in 1910, was such that it was, and is, puzzling to answer the question of “how” a Canadian navy could ever serve its intended purpose. Boldly stated, Canada needed to have its own navy simply because it was a distinctly national force that could act in local matters without involving the Royal Navy in a confrontation with the United States. That national navy was so small, however, it could only do its task if it were closely partnered with the Royal Navy, and at first a close partnership was also inevitable for constitutional reason. Strategic reasons also required a close partnership because, it the lingo of the time, “the sea is one.” Naval strategy was framed around the conviction that wars were won or lost according to the success with which dispersed resources could be concentrated for a decisive battle.

No one was entirely happy with this reality. The Conservative Frederick Monk was joined by the ultra-nationalist Henri Bourassa in objecting that the Liberals were in fact creating a rod for their own backs, whatever their intentions. Bourassa, who had left the Liberal party at the time of the South African war and was now the leader of the Nationalist party, objected that if Canada constructed a navy of value to the Empire it would be impossible for Canadians to resist the request for military assistance even if they disagreed with Britain’s policy at the time. On that platform the Nationalists defeated the Liberals in Quebec, and the argument has resonated in Canada’s strategic debate over the rest of the 20th century, and into the 21st.

In looking for answers to the question of “how” a Canadian navy could address the paradox, it is useful to look at the seminal study of “gunboat diplomacy” by Sir James Cable, published in 1971. Cable created a taxonomy of the mechanisms by which naval force may be applied to national objectives. His focus was on circumstances short of war, but the same concepts are no less
applicable to all military action. Cable labeled the direct application of force as “Definitive force,” and gave the name “Purposeful force” to military action that persuades a foreign government to change its policy. “In its purposeful application force does not itself do anything: it induces someone else to take a decision which would not otherwise have been taken.” But labels can be Procrustean. The creation and employment of the Canadian Navy has served, and still serves, a purposive role vis-à-vis Canada’s American neighbour, but it has done so by undertaking definitive roles of collective defence.

In the two world wars the Royal Canadian Navy undertook “definitive force” to support the ability of the Empire and Commonwealth, with its allies, to protect the shipping upon which depended every aspect of defence and ultimately counter-attack. This operational purpose rolled together the primary and secondary functions of sea power, defence against assault and defence of trade, and the “definitive” actions of the Canadian navy also served the secondary and “purposive” function of supporting recognition of Canada’s autonomous character.

The part Canada played in the First World War, mostly on land and in France but also at sea, was indeed to establish Canada’s full sovereignty within the Commonwealth, made explicit by the Balfour Declaration at the 1926 Imperial Conference. But it was one thing to persuade London, and another to persuade Washington. Washington only reluctantly recognized Canada’s right to send a delegate to the Geneva Disarmament Conference in 1927.

In the inter-war period the need to reassure Washington that Canada could defend its neutrality in the event of a war between Japan and the United States was the primary operational task of the Royal Canadian Navy, one that required both an independent ability and partnership with Imperial forces. The transformation of the United States into the champion of democracy during the second world war, and guarantor of Canadian security, was of vital importance but it was also recognized even before the US became a belligerent that
American support came at a price, which could only be managed if Canada were able to provide significant defence of her own territory and seas.

The role of the Canadian Armed Forces in this relationship had been restated by the Canadian military historian, Colonel C.P. Stacey, in an academic paper in November 1938: “Canada no longer arms against the United States, but the proximity of the great republic still profoundly affects her military position... If, in a crisis, Canada is obliged to beg help from the United States, she must also accept whatever policies the United States may choose to dictate.”13 The conclusion of an influential group of “20 Canadians” who met at the Chateau Laurier in July 1940 was that “Co-operation with Washington is going to be either voluntary on Canada’s part, or else compulsory; in any event it is inevitable.” As the US would have to provide the heavy naval support in the event of British defeat, Canada, they believed, needed to put in place local and harbour defence, and coastal forces.14

The Canadian government of Mackenzie King saw continental defense as, inevitably, subordination to a new imperium, but did what it could to leverage the support provided by the United States into effective support for Britain. Canada, having moved from autonomy to sovereignty, nonetheless continued to regard the strategic support of Britain as essential - and did what she could to ensure that it survived. During the war Canadians gave to Britain five times as much per-capita as Americans lent Britain under lend lease, and Washington only commenced Lend Lease after Britain had exhausted all its financial reserves and sold all its American holdings.

The Canadian Navy did much more than local defence, carrying the war to the enemy across the Atlantic. It participated in the direct defense of Britain from invasion, and supported the return of allied forces to European soil through a massive effort to escort merchant convoys across the Atlantic in the face of German submarine attacks. The fleet expanded from a force in 1939 of six destroyers with a seventh joining, to a peak of over 365 ships by the spring of
1945. More Canadian warships took part in operation Neptune than did American, with some ten thousand Canadian sailors. Canadian coastal forces and minesweepers helped the Royal Navy clear paths to the beaches, Canadian corvettes hunted submarines, and Canadian destroyers engaged German destroyers and bombarded gun emplacements.

Britain’s financial exhaustion at the end of the war and America’s wealth made inevitable a reorientation of Canadian interests when it became apparent that the Soviet Union was determined to expand its control in Eastern Europe, and threaten a third world war. Canada’s partnership with the United States came to replicate the degree of integration that existed within the British Empire and Commonwealth, but unlike the situation that prevailed in that family of nations, the United States showed no interest in Canadian participation in the formation of a common foreign policy.¹⁵

Paradoxically, the need to meet the threat posed by the Soviet Union served to address Canadian concern about American intentions. Canada had been an early and consistent supporter of the formation of the United Nations Organization, first envisaged when Churchill met Roosevelt at Argentia in 1941, but the Soviet Union rendered it all-but powerless by its use of the veto. To compensate for the weakness of the UN, the provision in its charter, Article 51, which permitted states the right of self-defence, was used to create a multi-lateral alliance of the western European democracies with Canada and the United States.¹⁶ The best hope was to help create a strategic environment that would permit the United States to draw its defensive perimeter well beyond Canadian territory, and which would minimize the risk of war. In the words of Hume Wrong, Canadian Ambassador in Washington from 1946 to 1953, “if the North Atlantic is bridged by a new defensive alliance, the problems of North American defence would become a small part of the larger plan, the purpose of which would be the means of defeating the larger enemy.”¹⁷ In an August 1947 memorandum Escott Reid, Lester Pearson’s second in the Department of External Affairs, expressed his fear that war on any scale would lead to the
“Free World” developing into “an American empire.” He bluntly declared that “in the event of war we shall have no freedom of action in any matter which the United States Government considers essential ... In peacetime our freedom of action will be limited but it will not be non-existent.”

For the next three decades the task of the Canadian Navy, and for the Army and Air Force, was to help to ensure that NATO continued to make possible the strategic linkage of Western Europe and North America. Employing Cable’s taxonomy, Canada’s military contribution to the alliance throughout the Cold War served a definitive purpose vis-à-vis the Soviet threat, and a purposive one with respect to Canada’s relationship with the United States.

In Ottawa there was concern that Washington’s New Look strategic policy of “Massive Retaliation” announced by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in 1952 amounted to a lurch back to isolationism, with the obvious implications for Canadian independence, and which might, it was feared, lead to irresponsible unilateralism. In February 1954 Dana Wilgress, who had succeeded Heeney as Canadian ambassador to NATO, predicted that “Canada must inevitably be part of the fortress ‘America;’ and it is not difficult to foresee that a greater part of our military effort than hitherto will have to be devoted to the integrated defence system of the American continent.” This prospect was anathema to External Affairs. Lester Pearson argued in a radio address that nuclear weapons were such a game changer that they should never be employed without extensive consultation, and when that was ignored, warned the Washington Press Club in March 1954 that “an important factor in determining the attitude of Canadians to things American, is the feeling that our destiny, so soon after we achieved national independence from colonial status, may be decided, not by ourselves, but across our border ‘by means and at places not of our choosing,’ ... It is essential that we work together in any new defence planning and policy ... if the great coalition which we have formed for peace is not to be replaced by an entrenched continentalism which, I can assure you, makes no great appeal to your northern neighbour as the best way to prevent
war or defeat aggression, and which is not likely to provide a solid basis for
good United States-Canadian relations. In a briefing note three weeks later
to Prime Minister St Laurent, Pearson was more explicit. “The new strategy
may result, therefore, in greater rigidity, rather than greater flexibility, of policy.
If it becomes a question of the atomic bomb and all-out war, or nothing, it may
be, too often, nothing.” He warned that the United States could be heading
towards a maritime strategy, abandoning most of western Europe as it was not
providing adequately for its own defence.

Pearson’s role in developing the concept of the United Nations Peace Keeping
force at the time of the Suez crisis in 1956 was an important effort for Canada,
as a middle power, to mitigate the limitations of its situation. First and
foremost, it defused an Anglo-American crisis that could have broken the
strategic linkage between Canada’s two allies - and left Canada on the glacis of
“Fortress America.” In the context of the Cold War, Peace Keeping proved to
be a valuable tool of international stability, and addressed the effects of proxy
wars. But peace keeping operations could do little to modify the actions of the
super-powers.

The degree of Canadian success in managing its defence relations with the
United States and NATO in general is open to discussion. David Bercuson
has argued that a factor in the decline of Canadian defence spending from 1952
was the discovery that it generated little direct influence in allied capitals.
However much was spent, it was always too little. “For Canada, NATO
membership always had an important symbolic meaning, but being a key player
– really making a difference militarily - was too costly for too little return.”
Writing in 1965 before his appointment as Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger
observed that “in an alliance of sovereign states, a country’s influence requires
that its effort be considered essential and that its partners do not take it for
granted. In determining an ally’s real – as opposed to his formal – role, one
can do worse than inquire what its choices are in case of disagreement.”
This dictum sets the bar rather high for Canada.
The 1962 Cuban missile crisis, during which the Navy and Air Force undertook important roles despite the lack of leadership in Ottawa, revealed just how correctly Escott Reid had judged the minimal influence Ottawa would be able to exert on a near-war situation. Sutherland’s assertion that no rationale could be found for a Canadian defence program outside of the context of alliance was made in the aftermath from the Cuban missile crisis, and a month later, in October 1963, when testifying before the House of Commons Special Committee on Defence, the Canadian academic John Gellner asserted that Canada had “so far, not developed a national defence policy.” Canadian forces, he asserted, have gone to war “in accordance with foreign patterns, plans, and strategic and tactical concepts.” Both of these observations, although they differ in emphasis, are true.

Trudeau’s rhetorical question in 1969 whether Canada’s “defence policy was more to impress our friends than frighten our enemies” was a false dichotomy, and with nearly forty years of hindsight it is possible to qualify, to a degree, Sutherland’s assertion. But the leverage participation in collective defense has given to Canadian strategic perceptions has never been strong.

In the decades that followed the Cuban crisis the danger of nuclear war continued to be high, and the situation became increasingly unstable as Soviet leadership became increasingly geriatric, and Soviet forces increased. The most consistent characteristic of Trudeau’s defence policy was a commitment to détente, which became the driver of Canadian defence policy. His global priorities had an early, and strong, impact on the Canadian Navy. Experience had shown that exemplary contribution to NATO forces generated little or no influence. It was logical, therefore, to try other means of bringing his voice to the attention of allies and opponents alike. The widening disconnect between national purpose as defined at the senior level of government and the transnational perspective of Canadian Armed Forces officers could be measured in the falling defence budgets, and stalled procurement. The “rust
out” of the navy during Trudeau’s early years should not be considered simply as drift, but also as a policy option. It could be seen as a concomitant to the ostentatious refocusing of Canadian defensive effort on constabulary tasks, including Arctic surveillance.

Trudeau apparently discounted the importance of the navy’s alliance roles as indirect means of supporting local defence, but the more subtle explanation is that he was in effect, if not necessarily in intention, putting the alliance on notice that Canadian support was conditional on its active pursuit of détente. In 1977 he launched at the United Nations a campaign against the structural terror of mutual nuclear deterrence, but he was unsuccessful in bringing about a comprehensive test ban on nuclear weapons.25

For several years the Department of National Defence struggled to change Trudeau’s perception, and eventually was successful. An element in Trudeau’s changing attitude to the navy appears to have been reconsideration of the implications of strategic ASW. His concern, expressed as early as his 12 April 1969 speech, that strategic ASW could accidentally trigger nuclear war, was possibly a result of a misperception fostered by the American administration’s exaggeration when seeking funds for anti-ballistic missile defences.26 Having dismissed the idea that strategic ASW could push the Soviets to use their SSBN assets rather than lose them, the Department returned to an argument made by Dr Sutherland in 1963 that an ability to track, and occasionally localize, hostile submarines was an important support for arms control agreements.

On 10 February 1982, despite terrific public opposition, the Canadian government signed an agreement to permit testing of American cruise missiles over northern Canadian terrain that resembled the conditions the air-launched missiles would have to navigate in Arctic Russia. And even before Canada’s Oberon submarines were fully refurbished for the purpose they began to undertake Operational Surveillance Patrols (OSP) that might be conceived as
at least consistent with the developing, and aggressive, US Navy “Maritime Strategy.”

The return to more traditional participation in alliance defences was a change of tactics, but Trudeau’s strategic objectives remained unchanged. The cruise missile tests, the new procurement for the Canadian navy of patrol frigates, and the more aggressive employment of Canada’s submarines, were measures of purposive force, that needed effective diplomacy to realize their purpose. Trudeau was never content to leave the serious diplomacy to others, and in his last years in office he took his diplomacy back to the world stage. He was subjected to terrific pressure from Washington, due as much to his left-leaning National Energy Program, as to his open dialogue with Communist nations. What was impressive is that, although Trudeau bowed to the pressure and recognized the need to match force with force, he continued to pursue détente when others seem to have abandoned hope.

Trudeau’s successors took less active parts in world affairs, but Brian Mulroney embarked on an initiative of hubristic proportions which may have been intended to enhance Ottawa’s influence - the construction of a fleet of a dozen nuclear submarines. At least superficially, his objective was to strengthen Canadian control of its arctic territories, but the choice of submarines for the purpose may have been intended to increase Canadian participation in the US Maritime Strategy forward deployment planning. Through increased participation Ottawa might have acquired some influence over the strategic plans. Certainly, the resistance shown by the US Navy to the prospect of Canada acquiring nuclear submarines suggests that it feared that consequence. However, in the end, Mulroney abandoned the submarine acquisition project.

What Mulroney’s period of administration should be more noted for is the beginning of the employment of the Canadian Navy in distant water policing roles in partnership with the US Navy. Whereas during the Cold War the
Canadian Navy protected Canadian autonomy by cementing the strategic partnership with Europe, in the wake of President Bush Sr. and Michael Gorbachev’s peacemaking in 1989 the Canadian government expanded the horizon for the Canadian navy. The prominent role the Canadian Navy took in the enforcement of UN Sanctions against Iraq following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 introduced a new era, consistent with Mulroney’s negotiation of North American Free Trade. But it also raises serious questions about Ottawa’s understanding of the consequences of military actions.

Dangerous strategies, such as those that created wholesale starvation and disease in Iraq, can never make Canada safer. In 1983 Trudeau had warned parliament that “the starving refugee lying in the hot dust of the Sahel can scarcely summon the strength to help himself, let alone strike out at us. If his children survive,” he then added, “they will remember us, and with fury in their hearts, you can be sure.” Only ten years later the spiritual leader of al Quaeda, Osama bin Laden, made it clear that the Iraq sanctions had aroused just such fury. Participation by Canadian forces in such strategies is an act of folly. The light-hearted way in which Ottawa embarked on enforcement of sanctions against Iraq undermines any confidence that the Canadian government could have used to good effect the leverage the Mulroney administration’s projected fleet of nuclear submarines might have given it to influence planning for aggressive strategic anti-submarine warfare into the Norwegian Sea.

After the 9/11 attacks on the United States, Canada’s naval effort in the Persian Gulf morphed into naval support for military operations against al Quaeda, and that led to the unofficial and coerced participation of the Canadian Navy in the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. We are indebted to Wikileaks for the paper trail that shows how American pressure on the Canadian government made Ottawa weak at the knees. Despite Prime Minister Jean Chrétien’s public statements, following a meeting on 17 March 2003 at which Deputy Foreign Minister Gaetan Lavertu formally advised American and British diplomats that Canada would not
participate in the Iraq war, Political Director Jim Wright indicated that Canada would provide unofficial military support. “Despite public statements that the Canadian assets in the Straits of Hormuz will remain in the region exclusively to support Enduring Freedom, they will also be available to provide escort and will otherwise be discreetly useful to the military effort. The two ships in the Straits now are being augmented by two more en route, and there are patrol and supply aircraft in the UAE which are also prepared to ‘be useful.’ This message,” commented the US Deputy Chief of Mission in Ottawa, Stephen R Kelly, “tracks with others we have heard. While for domestic political reasons and out of a deep-seated Canadian commitment to multilateralism the GOC has decided not to join in a US coalition of the willing, they will refrain from criticism of our actions, express understanding, and focus their public comments on the real culprit, Iraq. They are also prepared to be as helpful as possible in the military margins.” During the “shock and awe” bombardment of Iraq, US Ambassador Paul Cellucci admitted in a speech in Toronto on 25 March 2003 that “… ironically, Canadian naval vessels, aircraft and personnel... will supply more support to this war in Iraq indirectly... than most of those 46 countries that are fully supporting our efforts there.”

Until the archives are opened in 2033 it cannot be known for sure that the Cabinet approved these measures. John McCallum, the Minister of National Defence at the time, later insisted to the CBC that he and his officials had an “extremely long and detailed meeting to make sure that we were not in fact committing to help the war in Iraq,” but conceded that “what happens on the high seas is not something I can prove or disprove.”

The most positive aspect of this episode is that it has further cemented a strong working relationship between the Canadian Navy and the United States Navy. Naval operations in the Gulf also involved the navies of other countries, and could be regarded as the foundation for a Global Maritime Partnership, or the “1,000 ship navy” first called for by the American Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Mike Mullen in September 2005 at the International Seapower Symposium in Newport, RI. That partnership is still a work in progress, and
the US Navy has recognized that a single “partnership” that meets all nations’ needs is impracticable. But in effect there already exists a working structure of naval co-operation that has been engaged in collective action, most notably to control the problem of piracy at the Horn of Africa.

Participation in global police work is the latest manifestation of the employment of the Canadian Navy in “definitive” measures which serve a “purposive” objective in terms of Canadian-American relations. But Frederick Monk’s concern in 1910 that the navy might only “be Canadian when it has to be paid for, in order to be Imperial when it is required for use” is as valid in the 21st century as it was at the beginning of the 20th. Canadian forces supplied a respectable proportion of those employed under NATO auspices to stabilize the revolution in Libya, including the Chief of Staff, Lt.-Gen. Charles Bouchard, 560 personnel, a frigate with a CH-124 Sea King helicopter, seven CF-188 fighters, three transport aircraft configured as in-flight refuellers, and two CP-140 Aurora long range patrol aircraft. I am not in a position to judge whether Canadian statesmen were able to exert any influence over NATO’s strategic goals in Libya, nor indeed whether any Canadians had anything to offer the North Atlantic Council in this respect. But the account of the Libyan operations written by Christopher S. Chivvis for *Survival*, the journal of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, noted only that the majority of missions “were carried out by France and Britain, with the support of a few smaller allies, including Belgium, Denmark and Norway.” How is it that so little attention is given by an American author to Canada’s efforts? There was the same reluctance to admit Canada’s role by British information officers during the Second World War. Is it any wonder public opinion in Canada is jaded by requests for assistance?

In the final analysis, it appears that little of no leverage is supplied to Canadian diplomats by Canada’s contribution to collective defense, but that its value is nevertheless not insignificant for Canada. Participation in collective action, in defense of Atlantic sea lanes or in support of the Libyan revolution, may serve
Canadian interests by making possible, or reinforcing, strategic relationships of importance to Canada. By the same measure, participation in ill-conceived strategies such as the Iraq sanctions regime, and the war on Iraq, undermines Canadian interests, and autonomy, but on occasion is an unavoidable blood-sacrifice.

This paper is specifically about Canadian strategy during the last hundred years, and is an introduction to my book, *A Two-Edged Sword, the Navy as an instrument of Canadian Foreign Policy* (Montreal - MQUP 2012-13), but the experience of other smaller states is not dissimilar. All client state strategies have similar threads. In the post-Second World War period Britain’s defence strategy has acquired elements of “Alliancemanship” which differs little from Canadian policy.

3 *Vide supra* xxx; Can., DEA, *Statements and Speeches*, 69/9.
4 Holmes, *Life with Uncle*: 85, 102.
6 As Phillip Buckner put it in his 1993 Presidential Address to the Canadian Historical Society, “Canadian historians have locked themselves into a teleological framework which is obsessed with the evolution of Canadian autonomy and the construction of a Canadian national identity and thus downplayed the significance of the imperial experience in shaping the identity of nineteenth-century British Canadians.” Phillip Buckner, “Presidential Address: Whatever Happened to the British Empire” Canadian Historical Association, 1993.
Canada’s Naval Strategy: The Strategy of a Client State

15 In March 2010 Captain Stephen W. Jordan, USN, Naval Attaché, USDAO, Ottawa, said to John Hattendorf, Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History at the US Naval War College, that the roots of the relationship between the Canadian and US Navies lie “in the day-to-day maritime operations in NATO, where we have a history of sailing together side by side for over 60 years with the NATO Standing Maritime Forces - interoperability between our navies is not a new idea. This has evolved into a relationship where Canadian warships regularly operate as an equal partner in a USN Battle Group - a compliment and honor we afford no other nation (not even the UK),” quoted in John B. Hattendorf, “Commonwealth Navies as Seen by the United States Navy, 1910–2010,” Proceedings ... From Empire to In(ter)dependence.
21 Eyrs, In defence, 4: 253, 379–82. That alarmist perspective was not shared by Wilgress who had questioned whether the ‘new look’ implies such a fundamental change.
27 Melakopides, Pragmatic idealism: 221–2. Michael Howard, the life President of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, wrote in 1991 that “all strategy is in principle teleological; military operations should be planned to achieve the political object for which the war is fought. But it is a principle honored more often in the breach than in the observance. Normally the priorities are reversed. In spite of himself the strategist finds that his plans are being shaped by immediate military and political necessities, which cumulatively shape the object of war.” Michael Howard, “British Grand Strategy in World War I,” in Paul Kennedy, ed., Grand Strategies in War and Peace, New Haven: Yale UP, 1991: 31.
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The Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies
Defence Studies Department
Joint Services Command and Staff College
Defence Academy of the United Kingdom,
Shrivenham, Swindon, SN6 8LA, United Kingdom

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