Maritime Security and the Southern Cone: Argentina, Brazil and Chile

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**Key Points**

- The Southern Cone is a maritime environment of geopolitical importance which will see further development during the twenty-first century. Argentina, Brazil and Chile seem determined to resolve a number of traditional and non-traditional maritime security challenges through a process of mutual cooperation through bi-lateral engagement within the region and with global powers, in particular the United States. There remains much scope for further cooperation and engagement, perhaps through the medium of a formal regional security infrastructure.

- As an emerging power, Brazil is at the forefront of regional maritime procurement though the full impact of the global financial crisis on their procurement plan remains to be seen. Nevertheless, of the three nations considered here, it is Brazil that is, and will remain, most overt at using ‘hard’ power military assets for ‘soft’ power aims, primarily through humanitarian operations.

- Argentina, Brazil and Chile all have vital national interests in the maritime environment or reliant upon the maritime environment and, for Brazil and Chile in particular, maritime strategy and procurement is intrinsically linked to their national political aims within and beyond the region.

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Introduction

This Corbett Paper seeks to bring together South American maritime challenges and developments within a wider construct of traditional and non-traditional definitions of security. It is hoped it will add a maritime dimension to the regional/area security literature while proving a useful case study for the application of maritime thinking to the region. It will identify maritime security challenges, both specific and common, and identify measures, both implemented and those with potential, to address those challenges. The paper will focus on the key countries of the Southern Cone; Argentina, Brazil and Chile. Many issues these countries face stretch beyond the national territorial and maritime borders into neighbouring states, yet responses to such challenges are undertaken on a country by country basis with some cooperation either through bilateral or multilateral agreements or using existing security architecture.¹

The paper will commence by defining key issues (for instance what exactly is ‘maritime’ both as a concept and in practice) and how this can be applied to the challenges faced by the nations of the Southern Cone. The approach will then assess specific responses to maritime security issues. In other words, how those countries try to achieve their maritime policy aims and the ways and means for securing such, before tackling a number of key transnational issues – both within the region and with regard to links to the wider world. The transnational nature of such challenges leads to the inevitable conclusion that the progress achieved has been due to a number of bilateral and multilateral initiatives based on cooperation, with much scope for further progress along similar lines. Ultimately, perhaps, leading to an enhanced security structure for the region.
It is not the intention to cover every single maritime security challenge facing the countries of the Southern Cone in great depth, for that requires a book length study. Instead this paper will highlight a number of the key challenges facing Argentina, Brazil and Chile and how they have been or could be addressed. It is hoped this provides both depth and breadth across a range of maritime challenges. Yet, it must be recognised that in the Southern Cone, as in many other regions of the globe, there are imbalances of power and that the nations of the region do have a number of different policy objectives derived from what they consider as vital national interests.

There are a range of security issues facing the nations of the Southern Cone though there is little external threat from a hostile power, as recognised by Chipman and Lockhart Smith: ‘The need for the region to defend itself against an external threat, or to preserve its integrity against the competitive diplomacy of two or more hostile powers, is not there’. Hence, relations with outside powers relate to territorial claims or issues of ‘interest’ (the security of the citizens and economic interests of those outside powers). For instance, much of the United States effort in Latin America is concentrated in the north, especially in Mexico and Columbia, and overall the region has seen a recent change in US influence from the ‘perceived complacency and neglect of the Bush administration’ to one of relationship building under President Obama. Perhaps this coincides with the declining influence of American power across the globe which, looking further into the future, might impact upon US policy towards Latin America (though a detailed examination of relations between the Southern Cone and the USA is beyond the scope of this paper). Concurrent is the growing (or reassertion) of global influence from Russia and China, especially with regard to their relations with Brazil. Despite this, the US is still a major player in Latin America though one cannot help but feel some sympathy for Obama’s statement of August 2009 noting: ‘the irony [is] that the people that were complaining about the US interference in Latin America are now complaining that we are not interfering enough’.

Cooperation and negotiation between the countries of the Southern Cone have led to the settlement of a number of key security issues. With a spirit of
cooperation existing in the region, it can be argued that none of the remaining security disputes possess the same potential for serious conflict as the Venezuela-Columbia dispute to the north. Yet, such an inter-state conflict in the wider South American region could have the potential to impact upon the Southern Cone due to the many economic and cultural links between South American nations. Apart from the Venezuela-Columbia dispute, the other major dispute with the potential for conflict exists within the maritime environment: the situation between Argentina and the UK over the Falkland Islands. To the south, the Antarctic Treaty System has provided environmental protection and prevented the militarisation of the region, yet there may be increased demand for access to the Antarctic for economic exploitation. This is of particular importance for Chile and Argentina, as well as a range of other powers. It is hard not to agree with the assessment that:

A scramble for Antarctica is unlikely. However within the defined treaty limitations there may be significant competition for energy and fishing resources in the Southern Oceans, with the rising and emerging power challenging the existing patterns of exploitation.6

As we shall see, while military conflict in the Southern Cone is unlikely, the question of good governance (a vital factor in a cooperative approach to security), remains high on the agenda as the region completes a cycle of national elections. The year 2010 witnessed the election of Dilma Roussef as Brazilian President and Seabastian Pinera as the first right-wing Chilean President since Pinochet. Argentina will complete the cycle with elections in late 2011. All three nations have faced various crises over the past few years, from the 2005 Brazilian corruption scandal to the Chilean earthquake of 2010, to which can be added the backdrop of a global economic crisis. While Chile and Argentina both have recent experiences of military rule, the progressive march of democratic principles seems to be moving the Southern Cone away from their recent history and towards more stable governance. Concurrent is a trend for greater cooperation in meeting security challenges, particularly as many of those are not traditional hard power issues, such as border disputes,
but are instead non-traditional ‘soft’ power issues such as economic and human security.

There are existing security frameworks in South America. While the Common Southern Market (MERCOSUR - Mercado Común del Sur) remains, and will probably do so for the foreseeable future, an economic organisation the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR - Unión de Naciones Suramericanas) has recently taken up the role of ‘regional security management’ and certainly Chipman and Lockhart Smith see that body, and the Defence Council of UNASUR in particular, as the main multilateral organ for addressing South American security challenges with the potential for the Defence Council ‘to cultivate a more common strategic culture among South American States’.7

The fact that Brazil, Chile and Argentina are all members bodes well for future cooperative policies – at least in theory. There are a number of complications, however. As the largest and most populous state in South America the growing economic power of Brazil places it clearly as an emerging power which ‘will alter the balance of power in the Americas’.8

The question now for South America is: can the various disputes and antipathies that still exist between states be resolved within a regional framework to allow all the nations of South America to prosper from development within the region? To do so involves meeting the many maritime security challenges faced by the nations of the Southern Cone.9

**Maritime Security**

Definitions and terminology are important, for the term ‘maritime’ has been and is used in a number of ways. In military definitions, maritime security is one of the roles fulfilled by maritime power. NATO defines maritime power as ‘military, political and economic power exerted through the use of the sea, and exercised by sea, air and land resource’.10 This is a rather precise definition but as Geoffrey Till has pointed out, maritime is:
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…sometimes taken to concern only navies, sometimes navies operating in conjunction with the ground forces, sometimes navies in the broader context of all activities relating to the commercial, non-military use [sic] the sea, and sometimes inevitably the word ‘maritime’ covers all three possibilities!11

For the purpose of this paper the latter definition will be utilised, that the concept of maritime challenges covers all activities, political, commercial and military, undertaken in the maritime environment (i.e. that take place on, below or above the surface of the sea, and which includes activities below the sea bed) by state and non-state actors. Hence, it is more than just the security of a nation’s formal maritime territory and more than just the use of naval assets. However, one problem is that maritime activities also take place on land (maritime insurance and the securing of finance for maritime activities, for example) so what is required is an even wider definition of ‘maritime’ which considers all activities undertaken which involve interaction with the maritime environment it pursuit of policy objectives – in other words the vital national interests of stakeholders that interact with the sea, whether they are governments, state sponsored militaries, or non-state actors such as multinational corporations or organised criminals. This wider definition of maritime includes not only ports, rivers and other access points, offshore installations and sea lines of communication within a nation’s territorial waters (in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) out to 200 nautical miles) but also a nation’s wider ‘informal’ interests in the modern globalised world such as the interests of citizens and economic and cultural interests, sometimes at great distance overseas. This is an intentionally wide definition, which goes far beyond traditional military definitions of maritime security. It certainly does risk dilution of the term from the more precise military definitions outlined above. Yet, maritime security relates to issues of vital national interests and is a policy issue requiring a top down understanding – at the very least this approach can enable a discussion of maritime security to set off on the right tack.
Therefore, this paper can be seen as tying together a number of apparently disparate issues through an assessment of ends, ways and means; linking together maritime policy objectives and how to meet them through strategy and defence policy. This is important for some maritime challenges, piracy for example, are generally symptomatic of a lack of order or governance at sea but primarily on land and hence are issues of security in a wider sense rather than existing purely as a specific ‘maritime’ issue. So maritime security is more than just the physical environment of the sea (the littoral, river networks, maritime territory and the global commons) as a concept it also includes those businesses, services, resources and goods which interact with or rely upon the maritime.

With this wider definition outlined it is clear what must be addressed here are maritime security challenges. There are many ways to define security, from the Copenhagen Schools five elements of modern security (military/state, political, societal, economic, and environmental\(^\text{12}\)) to a more threat based approach as, for instance, outlined in the European Security Strategy of 2003 which identifies terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflict, failed states, and organised crime as the main threats.\(^\text{13}\) Some work has already been undertaken to frame a regional security approach for South America, of particular note is an article in *Survival* from November 2009 by John Chipman and James Lockhart Smith.\(^\text{14}\) They identified a number of challenges for the region under the headings ‘Domestic and transnational security issues’, ‘Territory and resources’ and the regions relations with ‘Outside powers’ before proposing a future regional security agenda for South America. Clearly, there is much scope for issues to overlap these broad definitions, and although such a framework provides a suitable starting point for further analysis, this paper will instead utilise a traditional (hard) and non-traditional (soft) framework. It is hope this will bring together the two concepts of ‘maritime’ and ‘security’ to identify some of the challenges facing the Southern Cone and possible measures to address them.
The Southern Cone as a maritime environment

In raw physical terms the Southern Cone is a maritime environment. Argentina, Brazil and Chile all have extensive coastlines, large urban conurbations in the littoral (typically those land, adjacent sea and air space areas within 100km of the coast that are susceptible to influence or support from the sea)\textsuperscript{15} and indigenous maritime resources such as fish, oil and gas.

Table 1. Southern Cone Maritime Statistics\textsuperscript{16}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Argentina</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Chile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coastline (km)</td>
<td>8,397</td>
<td>33,379</td>
<td>78,563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of population within 100km of the sea</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of continental shelf (km(^2))</td>
<td>798,474</td>
<td>711,536</td>
<td>218,880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial sea (up to 12 nautical miles) (km(^2))</td>
<td>142,508</td>
<td>218,102</td>
<td>271,884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claimed Exclusive Economic Zone (km(^2))</td>
<td>925,362</td>
<td>3,442,548</td>
<td>3,415,864</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of course there is more to this than just raw statistics. The International Maritime Organization estimates that more than 90 per cent of global trade is carried by sea.\textsuperscript{17} Within this global context, examining trade figures for the Southern Cone highlights the importance of global maritime trading networks, in other words ‘sea lines of communication’, (SLoC) for those nations. Maritime trade figures for 2005 show that South America in total exported 710 metric tonnes (mt) and imported 209mt of cargo.\textsuperscript{18} Recent figures (2007) show both Chile (4\textsuperscript{th}) and Brazil (20\textsuperscript{th}) feature in the list of top 25 countries using the Panama Canal as a transit route between origin and destination of cargo.\textsuperscript{19} For Argentina, although Brazil remains the most important
merchandise trading partner, accounting for over 20 per cent of Argentinean exports and in return providing 29 per cent of Argentinean imports, the second most valuable is the European Union, which provides 16.9 percent of Argentinean imports and is the destination for 18.5 per cent of exports. China and the United States both also appear in the top five destinations for exports and the origins of imports. Trade was responsible for 42.6 per cent of Argentinean GDP (2007-2009). For Brazil, trade accounted for 24.8 per cent of GDP (2007-2009) with the European Union the most important partner (exports 22.3 per cent and imports 22.9 per cent) followed by China the United States, Argentina and Japan. While China is the most common destination for Chilean exports, imports mainly come from the United States with the European Union as the second most frequent origin and destination of Chilean trade. With trade accounting for 77.8 per cent of Chilean GDP, clearly maintaining its overseas trading interests is fundamental to the wellbeing of the Chilean economy; 80 per cent of Chilean total foreign trade utilises maritime transportation. Clearly sea access to and from South America to point of origin and destination is crucial for trade, with particular emphasis on the sea lines of communication to the European Union, the United States and China.

**Traditional Maritime Security**

Within the Southern Cone perhaps the most serious territorial and resource issue is the Chile-Bolivia dispute over access to the Pacific Ocean which dates back to the War of the Pacific (1879–1884) when Bolivia lost its Pacific coastline. Now landlocked, Bolivia is blessed with natural gas resources as well as zinc, tin and silver and desires a natural gas pipeline to sell gas into the Pacific region and a port to export other resources directly (rather than through Chilean territory). Until recently there had been little movement between Chile and Bolivia on the access issue. In 2006 a 13 point plan was agreed between Chile and Bolivia and more recently Peru’s offer of a 99 year access lease for 1.38 square miles of Peruvian territory in October 2010
initially seemed to offer a stable solution to the problem, granting Bolivia the right to build port facilities. ‘This opens the door for Bolivians to have an international port, to the use of the ocean for global trade and for Bolivian products to have better access to global markets,’ Bolivian President Evo Morales stated after signing the historic deal. Bolivia has also made it clear it intends to use the port as a naval base, initially for training through the establishment of a naval school, and to provide security for Bolivian maritime interests through the building of naval dockyard support facilities and, potentially, a coastguard force.

A change in government in Chile in January 2010 marked a return to a right wing government under President Sebastian Pinera who has expressed concerns over the integrity of Chilean sovereign territory, with specific regard to Chilean borders and the proposed Bolivian access issue. Bolivia will not give up its quest for direct maritime access, as it would cut the distance exports have to travel into the Pacific market by 40 per cent, and Chile remains concerned that this would be the first in a line of Bolivian attempts to reclaim territory lost to Chile. Yet, Chile seems willing to work with Bolivia to find a solution to the dispute with Foreign Minister Alfredo Moreno stating in December 2010 that although sovereignty was not up for discussion, Chilean policy was to ‘collaborate with Bolivia on an issue that has many years and that is to help its access to the sea’.

Chile also remains in dispute with Peru itself over the question of maritime borders. In 2008 Peru filed a lawsuit at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague against Chile over maritime territorial rights. At stake in this ongoing dispute is a substantial amount of maritime territory, around 10,000 square miles, and the control of access to rich fishing grounds and an important source of protein. The ICJ is set to rule on the dispute sometime in 2012. Resolving the complexities of the Chile-Peru-Bolivia triangle remains a key policy driver for all involved, encompassing as it does not only resource and food issues but also questions of sovereignty, both on land and at sea. There is potential for the use of force in such disputes, perhaps not outright war, but certainly in support of diplomacy and policy. Whatever happens in
2012 there is the potential for one side in this long running dispute to feel aggrieved, and grievances sometimes lead to the use of force either to obstruct or to enforce (akin, perhaps, to the situation between Iceland and the UK in the ‘Cod Wars’ of the 1950s-1970s).27

In order to protect its maritime interests the Chilean navy implements a ‘Three Vectors’ strategy, related to defending sovereignty and territory, promoting maritime interests and meeting maritime responsibilities, and an international role to help maintain world order and stability.28 The ‘Three Vectors’ is the manifestation of a controversial Chilean outlook: the concept of the Presencial Sea. The concept, added to Chilean legislation in 1991, outlines a nation’s interest in the high-seas or global commons, which are adjacent to its exclusive economic zone. In fact it was Chile’s 1947 unilateral declaration of this zone which was later the basis for the UNCLOS definition of the EEZ. The Presencial Sea concept provides for the right to take action against threats to those interests in this wider maritime area. Translated into reality, the Chilean Presencial Sea forms an area of 26,476,005km² stretching from the traditional EEZ down to Antarctica and west out to Easter Island. This concept reflects Chile’s concern for the seas which it feels as a nation it has responsibility for, and hence would include such responsibilities as provision of search and rescue assets and marine conservation; on this latter point one of the drivers was the Chilean concern with illegal fishing in this region.29

It is no surprise that Chilean defence spending has been increasing, from 1.42tr Chilean Peso (US$2.73bn) in 2008 to 1.58tr Chilean Peso (US$2.85bn) in 2009. Recent moves, however, to repeal or reform the Chilean ‘Copper Law’, by which ten per cent of the value from the state mining company exports, would clearly have an impact upon Chilean defence spending.30 Yet, for the maritime at least, the navy is approaching the end of a procurement and upgrade programme to meet the aims of the ‘Three Vectors’ strategy. This programme has included the purchase of second-hand vessels alongside the building of indigenous craft, all with the purpose of replacing older less effective vessels and with the aim of meeting the demands of Chilean policy. It is primarily a sea-denial defensive force, based
around an extremely capable surface fleet comprising eight modern frigates purchased from the Netherlands and the UK and four diesel-electric attack submarines, including two French-built Scorpène class. The deployment of Chilean fast missile attack boats into two distinct commands is clearly symptomatic of where the Chileans consider the greatest risks to lie. Three former Israeli boats, now called the Casma class, are deployed to the south near its maritime borders with Argentina while four German-designed Type 148 craft form the northern command near the Chilean/Peruvian disputed waters.  

Although stating that it wishes to play an international maritime role to safeguard Chilean interests, Chile clearly does possess some desire to be seen as a great power acting on the world stage yet is comfortable and confident it its role as a regional player and its naval forces reflect that. While possessing some power projection capabilities it is expected that the extremely capable Chilean navy will remain mainly for the defence and security of Chilean interests. There are inherent problems to all this, however, as the nature of operations within the different waters (for insistence operating in the Pacific is very different to operating in the Southern Archipelago) will continue to require the Chilean navy to operate a range of capabilities.

To the south Chile is also looking to its maritime territory for resources, opening up Tierra del Fuego for oil and gas exploration in 2007. The reason is simple, Chile can only supply five per cent of its oil and 20 per cent of its gas needs and is reliant on Argentinean imports. This reliance can be used as a ‘soft’ power weapon, for instance in 2002 Argentina cut off gas supplies while there were less nefarious interruptions to the supply in 2008. Moreover, due to the dispute over Pacific access Bolivia refuses to supply gas to Chile. In mid-2010 GeoPark Holdings revealed encouraging test results from the Chilean continental shelf near the Atlantic entrance to the Magellan Straits.

These have been troublesome waters with previous spats over Tierra del Fuego and the Beagle Channel starting in the nineteenth century and culminating with Vatican intervention by Pope John Paul II in 1978 to prevent
all out war. Since that low point, Chile-Argentina relations have been a little more cordial, culminating in the 1984 Treaty of Peace and Friendship. In 1994 the Chilean and Argentinean navies approved a number of practical measures to improve cooperation including increased meetings between commanders in the region, educational exchanges and port visits.\textsuperscript{34} Currently the two navies operate a combined Antarctic Naval Patrol while an agreement signed in April 2010 signalled a new phase in cooperation. In the agreement the Argentinean shipbuilder Tandanor will help with reconstruction work in the Chilean shipyards wrecked by the 2010 earthquake and Tsunami while a separate agreement was reached for Southern Cross, a joint force to act in support of UN missions in Latin America.\textsuperscript{35} Argentina could implement such direct help to the Chilean navy after the re-nationalisation of the Tanador shipyards in 2009 which marks a growing trend for centralisation of defence production and which is politically driven to revitalise the defence industry.\textsuperscript{36} For these traditional rivals addressing such issues through enhanced cooperation contributes to a general warming of relations between Chile and Argentina.

A crucial issue for Argentina remains its claims to the Falklands Islands. This dispute with the UK remains the sole example of a sovereignty dispute with an external power for the nations of the Southern Cone.\textsuperscript{37} As we approach the 30\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the 1982 Falklands conflict one can only expect the rhetoric to increase. The background to this is the potential for resource exploitation. Although test drilling was halted in 1998, it commenced again in 2007 with scientific opinion estimating the possible presence of oil reserves up to 60 million barrels. Since then test wells have provided mixed results. In 2010 Rockhopper struck oil to the north of the Falklands but in mid-2010 Falklands Oil and Gas shares fell after a test well failed to find oil or gas, a failure which was repeated by Desire Petroleum drilling in December 2010 (though reports in early April 2011 suggest significant finds by Rockhopper).\textsuperscript{38} Despite the failures, the very act of exploratory drilling ensures the issues remain on the agenda, and even if exploitation of the resources proves uneconomical, there is little sign of Argentina giving up the claim.
Argentina has a continued interest in exploiting its maritime hydrocarbon resources and has plans to conduct exploratory drilling off Tierra del Fuego in the Malvinas basin. The initiative will take the form of a joint venture between Repsol-YDF (which includes the former Argentinean state-owned YPF), Petrobras and Pan American Energy.\(^{39}\) The Argentinean fishing fleet trawls these waters leading to concerns of overfishing and its potential impact upon the economy of the Falklands Islands. In 2006 a Falkland Island flagged fishing vessel was detained by the Argentinean coast guard, the latter accusing the captain of illegally fishing in Argentinean waters. While GPS and navigation charts backed up the captain’s claim he was outside of Argentinean waters, the owners had to pay $400,000 to free the ship while the Argentineans have subsequently barred any ship carrying a Falkland Island licence from their waters.\(^{40}\)

In February 2010 Argentina approached the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to ask the UK to enter into talks regarding the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands.\(^{41}\) Unlike 1982 Chile is not hostile to Argentina and Buenos Ayres has many friends, in fact all 32 Caribbean and Latin American nations appear to support Argentinean policy with Brazil taking the lead as then President Lula stated ‘What is the geographic, the political or economic explanation for England to be in Las Malvinas? Could it be because England is a permanent member of the UN's Security Council they can do everything and the others nothing?’\(^{42}\) Moreover, unlike President Reagan’s backing to the UK in 1982, the commitment to a position of neutrality given by the Obama Administration could be seen as a move which distances the US from the UK’s view of the dispute.\(^{43}\)

The Argentinean approach was followed by a 24 June 2010 statement from the UN Special Committee on Decolonization which called for ‘direct negotiations between Argentina and the United Kingdom’.\(^{44}\) The Brazilian refusal to allow HMS Clyde, the Royal Navy’s Falkland Islands patrol vessel, to dock in Rio during January 2011 could be viewed as evidence of this feeling of solidarity between the Southern Cone nations with regard to the Falklands dispute. Argentina has categorically stated that, unlike 1982 when
ruled by a military junta, it will not resort to military measures to obtain possession of the islands and is committed to a peaceful resolution. Argentina has also utilised UNASUR as a means to provide support to its claims, a Presidential meeting in Guyana in November 2010 released a statement declaring all UNASUR ports closed to Falkland Island flagged vessels. The UK’s position on the issue was summoned up by Prime Minister David Cameron’s 2010 Christmas Address to the islanders: ‘we have no doubts whatsoever about the United Kingdom's sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. And there can and will be no negotiations on the sovereignty of the Islands unless you, the Falkland Islanders, want them'. The UK’s commitment to the security of the Falkland Islands at least into the 2020s was specifically mentioned in the 2010 SDSR with the UK land, sea and air forces in the South Atlantic classified as on deployed on operations (though with recent cuts in the UK armed forces it remains to be seen if the rhetoric continues to be realised).

With continued oil exploration and the approach of Argentine elections in late 2011 the issue will remain at the forefront of Southern Cone security. Clearly the apparent Argentine policy of negotiation and seeking support from its friends in the region might in part be due to the inability of the Argentine armed forces to provide for another attempt at a military solution. The Argentinean defence budget increased from 6.37bn Argentinean Peso (US$2.03bn) in 2008 to 8.52bn Argentinean Peso (US$2.22bn) in 2009. Yet, as recognised by the Argentine Model for the Defense System Modernization defence spending has declined by 58.7 per cent from 1983-2003, a trend which has continued down to 2009. This is concurrent with a greater desire for working with regional partners, in particular Brazil and Chile. Moreover, as with all nations of the Southern Cone the Argentines are keen to work with the USA. In 2009 Argentina participated in amphibious training exercises with the US Navy while some fleet exercises formed part of ‘Southern Seas 2010’ during March 2010, a component of U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command Partnership of the Americas. Yet the Argentine navy is nowhere near the capability levels of 1982, when it could have been regarded as the regions premier naval force. Based around an ageing fleet of surface combatants, the
majority of which were commissioned into the navy during the 1980’s, and three SSKs (one of 1970’s vintage and two commissioned in the 1980’s) it seems to be a largely defensive force aimed at sea-denial. Although lacking an aircraft carrier (the Veinticinco de Mayo was decommissioned in 1997) the Argentinean navy does, however, possess land based naval air assets in the Super Etendard. There are doubts over the air worthiness of several of the airframes hence plans are underway to modernise or, funds permitting, replace them, possibly with French Rafale’s. Argentinean procurement of the Rafale would make sense if the Brazilians also purchase the aircraft; lacking a carrier, Argentinean pilots have utilised the Brazilian São Paolo for training. This is just one instance of increased naval cooperation between the two countries which has also taken the form of joint exercises and officer exchange initiatives. While the construction of four new Argentinean patrol boats is underway, there seems little prospect for the replacement of surface combatants in the short and medium term hence serious questions must be asked of Argentinean capabilities.52

Nowhere is the link between national interests and maritime security more evident than with Brazil. In February 2011 Royal Dutch Shell announced plans to drill seven new offshore oil wells in the Campos Basin around 60 miles off the Brazilian coastline, estimates place the cost of the next round of drilling somewhere near the $2.5bn mark representing a considerable investment with the president of Shell Brazil. Andre Araujo stated foreign investors could look upon ‘Brazil as a country that delivers. This is a great comfort’.53

Araujo’s confidence is based upon a number of factors. Exploitation of Brazil’s offshore petroleum reserves began with the discovery of the rich deposits in 1985. Today the largest field, Marlim, produces over 500,000 barrels per day, while Petrobras is the world’s third largest energy company, daily producing 1.9 million barrels of oil and 422,000 barrels of gas.54 Investment in the Marlim field represents a total of $5bn over the course of 15 years with all indicators pointing to continued and expanded investment in Brazil’s offshore reserves. For example, Shell’s production in the Parque das Conchas (BC-10) fields exceeded estimates by 30 per cent. Exploitation of the Parque das
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Conchas fields is a classic case of state and private sector investment. The fields, which lie 110km off the Brazilian coast, contain an estimated 400 million barrels of heavy crude and exploitation is divided between the state owned Petrobras (35 per cent), the Indian state owned Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) (15 per cent) and Shell as the largest stakeholder (50 per cent). By late 2010 Shell were producing 95,000 barrels of oil equivalent per day in the Parque das Conchas and the Bijupira-Salema fields, making them the second largest oil producer after Petrobras.55 Previous to the discoveries nearly half of all Brazilian gas needs were met by Bolivian imports, hence the ability for Brazil to supply its own resources might lead to a loosening of ties with Bolivia.56

Key to continued and expanded investment is confidence and that comes from security. Stability and security on land and at sea provides a safe environment for offshore installations and the exploitation of natural reserves. Here comparisons can be drawn with the Niger Delta, where instability on land and poor governance have led to attacks on oil installations and the kidnapping of personnel by a number of armed groups, of which the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) is only the most visible. Such activities have forced the Nigerian authorities to enforce security through the exercise of military power in order to maintain a steady flow of foreign investment. Yet, the threats from armed groups in the Niger Delta remain with many active at time of writing.57

Interestingly, Shell’s decision to go public with their increased investment in Brazilian resources comes as a wave of instability sweeps across the Middle East and North Africa leading to an increase in oil prices; Brent crude reached a 30-month high of $109 a barrel on 22 February 2011. This has prompted some experts to raise the spectre of a wider oil crisis as revolutions and instability affect a number of countries rather than just individual producers, a worrying prospect as Paul Horsnell of Barclays Capital has pointed out when the ‘world has only 4.5m barrels-per-day (bpd) of spare capacity, which is not comfortable’.58 With increased uncertainty the apparent stability of South
American nations might prove an attractive source for western nations, yet continued stability comes from investment in stable and secure systems.

Resource, territorial and security issues are inherently linked and all this boils down to control over and access to maritime territory. In September 2010 the Brazilian government sent a clear statement of intent by attempting to extend control over its continental shelf (a move which seems to be of a different character to the Chilean Presencial Sea concept). Not only will exploration now require government approval but the Brazilian government is also trying to extend the requirement for approval beyond its current maritime territory. This follows a previous attempt in 2004 to expand Brazil’s rights over its continental shelf which was rejected by the UN which, though the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea which recognises a nation’s maritime territorial rights in a nation’s 200nm EEZ.\textsuperscript{59} The policy of securing access and security is not just evident it Atlantic waters for Peru provides an important outlet into the Pacific markets for Brazilian trade, and this will only increase with the completion of a $1.3bn highway linking São Paulo with Lima and its principal seaport of Callao.\textsuperscript{60} Hence, the future success of Brazilian policy remains inherently linked to those of its neighbours.

Exploitation and security of Brazilian oil and gas reserves is of vital national interest and so maritime security is on the Brazilian agenda, with the Brazilian Navy as the prime guarantor of that security. Brazil published its new ‘National Strategy of Defense’ in December 2008 which contained an expansive naval policy. The prime driver is the understanding that the ‘national strategy of defense is inseparable from the national strategy of development’. The continued economic wellbeing of the nation has a symbiotic relationship with those structures to provide security and defence. It is no surprise, therefore, that within the maritime environment the navy has been tasked with the core concept of ‘sea denial’; in other words to safeguard Brazilian national interests in the maritime by denying use of the sea to potential enemies. This begs the question ‘who is this strategy aimed at?’ There seems to be little tangible threat from a state actor to Brazilian land or maritime territory. Its most recent spat with a Southern Cone neighbour was during the 1970s when Argentina
and Brazil were embroiled in resource disputes centred around the River Plate, specifically the Brazilian decision to build a hydroelectric dam at Itaipú on the Paraná River, which would have had major consequences for Argentina. This issue was, effectively, if not to everyone’s satisfaction, put to rest in 1979 and since then cooperation has been the defining tenor of relations.61

A subordinate consideration is the requirement to project power in pursuit of Brazilian interests outside of Brazilian territorial waters; though this might be more the projection of ‘soft’ power or influence through ‘hard’ military capability (for instance using the military in humanitarian roles) rather than using military capabilities for ‘hard’ power objectives (such as war fighting). With this hierarchy of purpose defined, the prime objects for the Brazilian navy are:

1. Proactive defence of oil platforms, naval and port facilities and maritime territories

2. Swift and effective response to state, asymmetric or non-sate threats against SLoC

3. Capacity to partake in international multilateral peacekeeping operations

With the remit of controlling maritime access points and maritime economic interests, Brazilian naval forces continue to prioritise the Amazon River and the waters between Santos and Vitória. The strategy of 'sea-denial' is, and will continue to be, primarily enacted through the use of conventional and, in the future, nuclear-powered submarines, with additional security coming from the surface combatant fleet of one aircraft carrier equipped with an organic air and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability, plus 15 frigates and corvettes, with further enhancements to land based ASW and maritime patrol aircraft expected. The surface combatant fleet will also provide security to the out-of-area power projection tasks which will be fulfilled by a Marine Corps and the procurement of multi purpose vessels that can also be utilised as aircraft
carriers (of which, as yet, there are no specific details). Brazil already possesses deployable amphibious capability with a relatively large marine establishment. Its roles include ‘the defense of naval and port facilities, archipelagos and oceanic islands within The Brazilian jurisdictional waters’ and ‘to perform in international peacekeeping operations and humanitarian operations anywhere in the world’. Moreover, there is another aspect to this, with the Brazilian Marine Corps expected to operate and provide security along the extensive Brazilian river network. There is also planned substantial investment in 27 new 500-ton patrol vessels with five larger ships of 1,500 to 1,800 tons capable of oceanic, littoral and riverine operations, although their prime role will be the security of Brazil’s offshore oil fields. There are also plans to modernise surface combatants, including that underway on the aircraft carrier São Paulo, and for the purchase of three frigates, possibly the French/Italian Frégate multi-mission project (FREMM). Numbering 67,000 personnel, 16 surface combatants, five Hunter-Killer/ASW submarines (SSK), 35 patrol and coastal craft, 46 amphibious craft of various sizes and 39 logistic and support vessels, the Brazilian navy is, and will remain for the foreseeable future, the Southern Cone’s largest maritime force.62

Clearly this is a sign of a commitment to providing for traditional maritime security (resources and access) through investment in hard power capabilities. Moreover, it can be deduced that Brazilian politicians understand that economic prosperity comes from security and that continued prosperity requires continued investment. To fulfil this remit the Brazilian defence budget has increased from 42.7bn real (US$23.3bn) in 2008 to 58.2bn real (US$29.7bn) in 2010, though in 2009 75 per cent of the defence budget was actually spent on personnel rather than procurement of new equipment.63 While the Brazilian navy has entered into agreements with foreign companies in the past, the aim has been the purchase of capabilities specifically built for export or second-hand vessels on a customer-supplier basis. There now seems to be a desire to use Brazil’s economic prosperity to concentrate on the procurement of first-rate naval capabilities through an indigenous building programme, in other words through partnerships rather than as a customer. This is, essentially, buying knowledge and research and development, but
with capabilities built and maintained using Brazilian labour. The agreements also have knowledge transfer as an integral objective. In the Brazilian navy’s case the intention is to develop nuclear-powered submarines while building local conventional submarines and to procure surface craft and patrol vessels.

To replace its ageing *Tupi* class SSKs Brazil signed a multi-billion dollar deal (estimates vary from $8.5bn to $9.9bn) in September 2009 with the French Direction des Constructions Navales (DCNS) to purchase four enlarged *Scorpène* class submarines. Construction on the lead boat commenced in May 2010 at Cherbourg with the work being completed in Brazil, she is expected to be handed over in 2017. The remaining three will be built in Brazil under DCNS partnership; all four of the boats are expected to be in service by 2021. The agreement with DCNS also contains a commitment to develop a nuclear-powered submarine (SSN) relying on Brazilian developed nuclear technology.64 Further evidence of Brazilian naval expansion comes from the September 2010 agreement with BAE Systems for the purchase of six patrol vessels and five or six frigates similar to the Royal Navy’s Type 26 Class.65

As part of a clear outreach programme tied into procurement, at the same time the BAE deal was negotiated, the UK and Brazil signed a Defence Cooperation Treaty onboard the Royal Navy’s *HMS Ocean*, which was undertaking joint UK-Brazil amphibious exercises designed to demonstrate capabilities which could be utilised in the protection of oil installations and infrastructure.66 This was followed in November 2010 by a Joint Guidance document which signalled cooperation between the Royal Navy and the Brazilian Navy on a range of issues such as maritime security, information sharing, naval training, hydrography and logistics.67 Although, it can be argued, this latter agreement has been cast into some doubt by the Brazilian decision to refuse *HMS Clyde* permission to dock in Rio.68 Brazil has also recently signed agreements with Poland, Spain and Sweden, continuing the trend for bilateral agreements with external actors.69

It is not all good news for the Brazilian navy, however, for with procurement tied to economic prosperity problems with the Brazilian economy are
coinciding with delays to Brazilian procurement programmes. The government of Dilma Rousseff has already started to re-evaluate a number of defence contracts as part of a wider policy to curb inflation by cutting public expenditure by 50bn real ($30bn).70 Even if cuts to the procurement programmes are enforced, it is clear that Brazil sees its enhanced military capabilities as a way to acceptance into the world’s most powerful nations and to become a global actor. With regard to promoting Brazilian economic interests it is already a member of the G20 (along with Argentina) and is part of the ‘Outreach Five’ or G8+5. Brazil has also campaigned for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and is a current non-permanent member of the Security Council, a position which will expire in December 2011. In April 2010 Brazil hosted a two-day summit for the other BRIC countries. While the Brazilian nuclear-powered submarine programme has military utility, it can also be seen as a political statement, figuring prominently in the 2008 National Strategy of Defense as a symbol of Brazil’s transition from an emerging power to one capable of deploying technologically advanced military power.71

Non-traditional Maritime Security

Brazil’s recent high-profile participation in the relief operation which followed the Haitian earthquake of 12 January 2010, where her supply of 3,200 personnel was second only to the US, marks not only her commitment to project her power for humanitarian objects, but also her ability to finally, perhaps, undertake a leadership role in South America.72 Possession of a capable expeditionary capability centred on the surface and amphibious fleets provides credibility to the political willingness to utilise the options offered by maritime forces to project ‘soft’ or ‘smart’ power through the use of ‘hard’ power military assets in pursuit of vital national interest. The purpose was outlined in the 2008 National Strategy of Defense alongside more traditional ‘defence’ roles:
To ensure its power projection capacity, the Navy will also have Marines available and permanently ready for employment. The existence of these means is also essential for the defense of naval and port facilities, archipelagos and oceanic islands within The Brazilian jurisdictional waters, to perform in international peacekeeping operations and humanitarian operations anywhere in the world. In the waterways, these means will be fundamental to ensure the control of the banks during riverine operations. The Marine Corps will consolidate itself as the force of expeditionary character par excellence.73

While Brazilian intervention might be seen as projecting that power onto the global stage and, it seems, into permanent membership of the UN Security Council, Chile contributed 500 and Argentina 600 military personnel to the UN peacekeeping mission to Haiti.74 Yet, for Chile, a country with a large coastline and which has been hit by a number of natural disasters in recent years, future humanitarian operations are more likely to remain more of a domestic nature centred on the evacuation of Chileans from and the distribution of aid to regions affected by future humanitarian crises within Chilean borders. This forms an integral part of the Chilean Navy’s ‘Three Vectors’ strategy. For the Argentinians, a commitment to humanitarian operations remains an important part of their contribution to regional security, with recent assistance to Chile and Bolivia evidence of that desire.75

Within the Southern Cone humanitarian relief remains a major consideration for the regions’ navies. The Chilean earthquake and subsequent tsunami of 27 February 2010 killed 521 people, caused damage estimated at $30bn and left many coastal communities cut off with sea and air access the only way to distribute aid.76 The Chilean navy managed to deliver 120 tons of aid to stricken communities but came in for considerable criticism for failings in the run up to and subsequent aftermath of the earthquake, some of which have been addressed with improvements to naval communications systems. The Chilean government are also looking at the procurement of another amphibious ship to enhance disaster relief capabilities alongside a more traditional power projection role. The earthquake of 27 February also directly affected Chilean naval capabilities devastating the naval base and shipyard at
Talcahuano. Also under Chilean navy command is the Directorate General of the Maritime Territory and Merchant Marine (DIRECTEMAR), a Coast Guard force of 61 coastal and patrol craft tasked with a range of duties including fishery protection, maritime patrol and rescue missions.

For the Southern Cone nations naval capabilities can also be utilised in a range of other ‘soft’ power tasks to meet maritime security challenges. Perhaps the most obvious is counter-narcotics, in conjunction with other actors. While drug-trafficking problems do not seem to be as prevalent as in the north of South America, where the maritime environment provides an accessible route into North America for around 85 per cent of South America’s drugs, recent developments have seen the growth of the route from Columbia and Peru, through Brazil and onto West Africa and from there into the European markets. Brazil now acts as an outlet for around ten per cent of the South American drug trade along two distinct routes into Western and Southern Africa and, sometimes, even direct to Europe. In 2005 Brazilian officials intercepted two shipments of cocaine awaiting shipment to Portugal. In northern Brazil the Amazon and its tributaries act as a natural outlet for smuggling with drugs often hidden onboard fishing vessels which, by the nature of their trade, can avoid ports and harbours and hence operate almost out of sight of the authorities. Associated criminal activities include money-laundering and the trafficking of people and arms. With regard to the latter, there is a drugs-for-arms trade between South America and West Africa, primarily organised by Columbian nationals to provide arms for the Columbian Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de Colombia (FARC) and using Brazil as the entrepôt.

While the challenges posed by illegal activities relate to governance on land and could be seen as the remit for law enforcement and intelligence agencies, clearly there is a maritime/naval dimension to any counter-narcotic strategy. The 2008 Brazilian ‘National Strategy of Defense’ did not overtly mention counter-narcotics, instead deciding to use language such as Brazil ‘will not allow organizations or individuals to serve as instruments for alien interests – political or economic – willing to weaken the Brazilian sovereignty. It is Brazil
that takes care of the Brazilian Amazon region, at the service of mankind and at its own service.' The intent is clear: ‘...the Navy shall be more intensely present in the region of the Amazon River mouth, and in the large Amazon and Paraguai-Paraná river basins’ with the remit of controlling maritime access to (and presumably from) Brazil.80

Moreover, in September 2010, the Brazilian navy hosted the 24th Inter-American Naval Conference with the United States, Argentina and Chile all in attendance. High on the agenda was counter-narcotics with Commandant-General of the Brazilian Navy, Admiral Julio Soares de Moura Neto pointing to the signing of Supplementary Law 106 which provides the Brazilian Navy with police powers to work with the Federal police and assist in implementing a counter-narcotics strategy. Clearly this is tied to the 2008 National Strategy of Defense which highlighted the expected contribution of the Marine Corps to riverine operations as stated by Admiral Neto in a subsequent interview: ‘The drug traffickers are increasingly present on the ocean and the rivers, and the Navy has to be in the fight’ but key to that fight would be cooperation with state and international bodies to ensure the accurate and timely passage of information and intelligence. It is a hard task as Admiral Neto recognised, ‘80% of the world’s drug traffic navigates the oceans, and only 6% of this total is detected. Confronting this threat is something very difficult and complicated for governments. Therefore, the basis for everything must be information exchange.’81

Brazil, along with the other nations of the Southern Cone, sees engagement with the United States as an integral part of a counter-narcotics strategy. The United States does maintain a commitment to maritime security in the region, through the recently re-established US Fourth Fleet based at US Naval Forces Southern Command, Mayport, Florida. A key component of partnership building with the South America is UNITAS, established in 1960 it is the USN’s longest running annual multilateral exercise, providing the USN with an opportunity to exercise regularly with all the navies of the Southern Cone. During January 2011 the United States Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV), Ray Mabus, undertook a partnership building trip to Columbia,
Peru, Argentina and Brazil with counter-narcotic work on the agenda. After engaging with Peruvian riverine activities along the Amazon, Mabus met the Argentinean Minister of Defense Arturo Puricelli and the head of the Argentinean Navy, Admiral Jorge Omar Godoy, to explore further the training links established during 2010’s multination exercise UNITAS LANT, of which Argentina hosted the Atlantic phase and Chile the Pacific phase. Mabus rounded off his 10-day trip by visiting Brazil, observing a Brazilian riverine battalion at Rio Negro. On 1 April 2011 the USN launched ‘Southern Seas 2011’ which will see the Frigates USS Boone and USS Thach working with the Chilean and Brazilian navies. The object of maintaining this commitment to securing the interests of the United States through enhanced South American maritime security is ably summed up by Commander Roy Love:

Part of the mission for U.S. 4th Fleet is to conduct theatre security cooperation exercises. This will be important, not just to protect the U.S. from terrorists who may try to come up through South America, but also in terms of drug-interdiction and the prevention of human trafficking. What we’re doing is working to solidify ties and build cooperation with South and Central American countries.

Of these ‘soft’ or non-traditional maritime security issues in South American waters piracy ranks low on the list, but the number of incidences is on the rise. The International Maritime Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Centre annual report for 2009 noted 37 reported incidents of piracy or armed robbery in South America, an increase from the 2008 figure of 14 reported incidents. The majority of attacks occur on ships in port and while the largest numbers occur in Peruvian waters, Brazil has also been affected. Moreover, the trend from other instances of piracy is of a widening of the operations of the pirates into other countries waters. While not on the scale of the problems off the coast of Somalia, the rise marks a disturbing trend as piracy is usually symptomatic of poor governance and the responses to piracy can be hampered by the transnational nature of the act and the legal complexities in dealing with it.
With two high profile global events on the horizon, the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the Olympic Games in 2016, all aspects of Brazilian security will be under the microscope. For a country with a large seaboard, extensive river system and offshore installations there is much within the maritime to protect from those who might wish the country or the event ill. Certainly, with global media coverage, such events have proved to be a magnet for those wishing to air grievances (1972 Munich and 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games) while the potential to use the maritime environment as an access point to spread terror in urban areas was evident in the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Facing the potential for similar threats, the UK Government’s approach to maritime security for the London 2012 Olympic Games might provide a starting point for coordinated approaches to maritime security. The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review confirmed the establishment of a multi-agency National Maritime Information Centre (NMIC). The NMIC will, it is hoped, provide ‘a comprehensive picture of potential threats to UK maritime security, in UK national waters’. The object of mutually beneficial maritime security can only be achieved through multi-agency and multi-lateral coordination – the maritime is far too complex an environment with a plethora of actors for countries to ‘go it alone’. Hence, one potential route for meeting the maritime challenges in and impacting upon security in the Southern Cone is certainly through the Defence Council of UNASUR.

**Conclusion**

This paper has not covered all the problems faced by the nations of the Southern Cone but has provided some breadth to the range of maritime challenges facing the region. Argentina, Brazil and Chile see the procurement of maritime capabilities as essential in supporting, perhaps ultimately enforcing, national rights, borders and sovereignty which are all traditional vital national interests. They face a range of challenges, ranging from issues of access to and from the sea both within the region, and with ever growing economic links to nations and regions beyond the Southern Cone, the wider
global maritime system. With regard to traditional flash points, with Chile and Argentina working with each other, the major maritime security concerns are the Chile-Peru-Bolivia dispute and the sovereignty issues between Argentina and the UK. The trend for resolving such ‘hard’ power issues is through negotiation and diplomacy, either bilaterally or through security organs such as the UN or the increasingly relevant UNASUR. Yet, there are a range of other ‘soft’ issues which might prove more problematic in the long term. The protection of and access to resources is fuelling the economies of the region, in particular Brazil, and their maritime procurement is tied into the security of those assets. The problems of illegal activity will remain, with counter-narcotics policies at the top of the agenda. With the region, specifically Brazil, hosting the globe’s two major sporting events in the next few years, security in the widest sense is on the agenda. Finally, the increases in defence spending (even if slight) and the desire from all three nations to play a role in future humanitarian operations, at least within the region, marks an encouraging trend.

Endnotes

1 The Southern Cone is traditionally defined as consisting of Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Southern Brazil and Uruguay. Literature dealing with maritime security aspects of the Southern Cone is rather sparse, though, as one would expect from an Argentinean naval officer, de la Fuente, P. L., ‘Confidence-Building Measures in the Southern Cone: A Model for Regional Stability’, Naval War College Review, Winter 1997, Vol. L., No. 1, pp.36-65 covers some of the ‘traditional’ security and maritime security issues between Argentina, Chile and Brazil but lacks an analysis of non-traditional or soft security issues such a drug trafficking. Sources such as Kelly, P., and Child, J., Geopolitics of the Southern Cone and Antarctica, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988), which covers some maritime issues in the South Atlantic, and Whitaker, A. P., The United States and the southern cone: Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ Press, 1977) are showing their age as well as, in the latter case, assessing the region from the perspective of a power outside of the region.

5 *Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2040*, (UK MOD, 2010), p. 67.
6 *Ibid.*, p. 63. DCDC Assessment of Probability provides a coarse indication for ‘likely’ as between 60% and 90% probability and ‘may’ as between 10% and 60% probability.
7 Chipman and Lockhart Smith, p.78
8 *Global Strategic Trends – out to 2040*, p. 55. DCDC Assessment of Probability for ‘will’ is greater than 90% probability.
9 Perhaps one fruitful avenue might be a comparison study between the Southern Cone and other regions, the Middle East or the South China Sea. Certainly, there seems to be much commonality between the Southern Cone and the latter where there are issues related to territorial claims, resource and communications access, and existing bilateral and multilateral security frameworks, all set against the interests and influence of global powers, one of which is also the major power within the region: China. See Snyder, C.A., *Security in the South China Sea*, (Corbett Paper No.3, 2011).
14 Chipman and Lockhart Smith, pp.77-104.
15 *Future Character of Conflict*, (UK MOD, 2010), fn 17, p. 40


34 For a good précis of the history to the dispute see Fuente, pp.49-52 and pp.57-58 for naval cooperation.


37 *Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2040*, p. 67.


http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_191634.pdf

48 The Military Balance 2010, p.64.

49 Argentine Model for the Defense System Modernization, A publication of the Ministry of Defense of the Nation, Republic of Argentina. (2009),

50 Ibid., p. 28.

51 Carl Vinson Unites with Argentina for Southern Seas 2010’, 09/03/2010,


53 ‘Shell to boost investment in Brazil’, 14/02/2011,


56 Chipman and Lockhart Smith, pp. 86-87.

57 ‘Militants kidnap 7 from Exxon platform off Nigeria’, 16/11/2010,

58 ‘Oil shock fears as Libya erupts’, 22/02/2011,

59 ‘Brazil extends sovereignty over undersea continental shelf’, 07/09/2010,


61 Fuente, pp.40-41.


64 Waters, pp.22-23. While one reason for the decision to build a nuclear-powered boat might be knowledge transfer for a domestic energy programme, a fully worked up Brazilian SSN operating in Atlantic waters raises further questions including the intelligence collecting capabilities of such a boat – in other words collecting intelligence on whom and for what purpose? If that is a foreign power the targets of intelligence collection would presumably be the USN or Royal Navy, rather than regional navies, which raises the additional question of to what purpose, for Brazilian use or for another power? Or would such a move be supported by the US and UK to free up their assets for deployment elsewhere? The target could possibly be the drug cartels whose aircraft and ships transit the region away from conventional naval assets. Possession of SSN capabilities also raises issues regarding enhanced protection of shore facilities. If the Brazilian strategy is one of pure sea denial and / or ISTAR then an SSN capability if far too capable and expensive for such a role – unless, of course, the Brazilians see potential enemies as possessing like capabilities or, perhaps, it might forward their case for permanent membership of the UN Security Council.


71 National Strategy of Defense, p. 12. All South American nations are committed to keeping the region a nuclear-weapon free zone through Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (often shortened to The Treaty of Tlatelolco) signed in 1967. Argentina initially failed to sign and only ratified the treaty in 1994.


85 UK SDSR, p. 55.
86 Chipman and Lockhart Smith, p. 78
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