


Corbett Paper

No 5

**Securitisation of Piracy off the Horn
of Africa:
Are there implications for Maritime
Terrorism?**

Charles Reid



KING'S
College
LONDON

University of London

Securitisation of Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Are there implications for Maritime Terrorism?

Charles Reid

Key Points

- So far, the distinction between pirate and insurgent has been maintained. Somali pirates remain essentially rational actors operating in pursuit of their own survival and self-interest and not in pursuit of ideologically inspired fundamentalist aims.
- The prospect of Somali pirates engaging in maritime terrorism in the future will depend on the nature of the developing relationship between pirate and militant groups. In this respect, a number of emerging factors may result in a blurring of the motivational issue for members of pirate groups. The thin line that distinguishes pirate attack from terrorist attack may be closer to being crossed than hitherto thought.
- In relation to the wider contemporary security environment, the crisis in Somalia shows that this is becoming increasingly complex. When dealing in future maritime security it is no longer appropriate to categorise the threat into terrorist or piracy stove-pipes. Instead we must consider the development of a threat continuum where there may be considerable over-lap with indistinct boundaries between terrorist, criminal and insurgent groups and their facilitators.

Captain Charles Reid RN is a former Commanding Officer of the submarines HMS *Vigilant* and HMS *Victorious* and has subsequently held a number of key staff appointments within the naval hierarchy. He holds Masters Degrees in Defence Studies (KCL) and Terrorism Studies (St. Andrews). This paper was delivered in October 2010 at a Corbett Centre symposium.

The analysis, opinions and conclusions expressed or implied in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the JSCSC, the UK MOD, The Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies or King's College London.

Securitisation of Piracy off the Horn of Africa:

Are there implications for Maritime Terrorism?

Charles Reid

Introduction

Although the origins of the most recent wave of Somali piracy can be traced back to the 1990s, it is only in the last few years that it has become a major security concern for the international community. In 2007, ships delivering World Food Programme (WFP) humanitarian aid had to be escorted as pirate attacks threatened the distribution of vital relief supplies. In 2008, attacks doubled and became increasingly sophisticated. They increased again in 2009, despite a reduction in global shipping activity and the presence of a multi-national maritime force tasked with containing piracy in the region,¹ netting the pirates an estimated \$82² million in ransom payments.³ Of more concern were the numbers of attacks involving the use of firearms which had increased by 200 per cent from the previous year.⁴

The international response was to frame piracy as a security issue claiming that the associated disruption of aid supplies and trade represented a threat to human, environmental, economic and energy security.⁵ Additionally, there is growing evidence of cooperation between pirate groups and Islamic militants. To date, this cooperation appears to be limited to mutually beneficial activity at an operational level, such as the provision of training or supply of weapons. However, as the International clampdown on piracy takes effect, there is a danger that pirates may be driven into closer cooperation with militants as they seek alternative sources of income. This could have potential implications for maritime terrorism particularly since some commentators already claim that there is 'credible intelligence' that the insurgent group, al-Shabaab, is trying to create a small naval force of its own.⁶

Causes of Somali Piracy

Puchala observed that piracy is a cyclical phenomenon usually beginning with spates of sporadic, small-scale attacks which mount in frequency and intensity as pirates become more organised.⁷ Piracy in Somalia is no different; over the last two decades it has evolved from aggrieved fisherman seeking to defend their livelihood into a sophisticated and highly lucrative (though illicit) industry.

The most recent wave of piracy can be traced back to the early 1990s and the erosion of governance as the Barre regime collapsed. This, it is claimed, resulted in an increase in illegal fishing activity and the alleged dumping of toxic waste in Somali waters⁸ which prompted local fisherman to take up arms to protect their livelihood.⁹ Genuine economic hardship and a sense of grievance against foreign exploitation of Somalia's maritime resources thus motivated many pirates and served to legitimise their activities in the eyes of their communities.¹⁰ As ransom monies increased, however, grievance gave way to greed, and environmental issues became of peripheral importance.¹¹ With a safe environment from which to operate and ready access to strategic shipping lanes, the rich pickings on offer fuelled a piracy boom.

The continuing prevalence of piracy can be attributed to the lack of an effective government; Somalia simply lacks the capacity to interdict pirates and secure its territorial waters.¹² After two decades of civil war, the economy has collapsed and an absence of the rule of law has allowed criminality to flourish undeterred.¹³ Efforts to restore peace and security are critically undermined by a corrosive war economy that corrupts and enfeebles State institutions. Piracy is a symptom of this war economy; in Mudug province it thrives as a product of statelessness and warlordism, in Puntland it has benefited from the patronage of State institutions in return for a share in the profits.¹⁴

Motivation stems from the massive ransoms obtained; in a single attack a working-level pirate might earn \$15,000,¹⁵ a sum that could take over five years to earn through honest endeavours.¹⁶ In a region where instability and violence make death a real prospect, the dangers of engaging in piracy must be weighed against the potentially massive returns. Legal and jurisdictional weaknesses compound the problem, ironic given that international law provides a uniquely favourable framework for the suppression of piracy. Under the doctrine of Universal Jurisdiction, any nation can capture and try pirates it finds on the high seas. However, second-order international legal rules, norms, and expectations pull in the opposite direction, making prosecution and detention so costly that setting pirates loose often seems preferable.¹⁷ Consequently, a policy of 'catch and release' is common, with pirates released without trial, having first had their equipment confiscated. Whilst this may put them out of business for a short period of time, it does not provide a long-term deterrent.

Piracy Business Model

The aim of Somali pirates is to secure a sizable ransom which is frequently delivered directly to the pirates on-board the captured ship.¹⁸ The average ransom has increased from roughly \$1 million in 2008 to \$2 million in 2009 and looks set to increase further in 2010. This is a reflection of the willingness of governments and shipping companies to pay for the release of their vessels and crews as the sums are relatively small compared with the value of a ship and its cargo.¹⁹

In contrast, it costs around \$10,000 to mount a basic pirate operation²⁰ with costs usually borne by investors.²¹ There are three general models of funding. The most basic involve what Hansen describes as *subsistence pirates* - most commonly poor fishermen, engaged in piracy closer to the coast in order to survive.²² The operation is funded by a single leader who provides the boat, equipment and food. Other pirates are recruited on a percentage basis if a

ship is captured. In the second model, the leader is generally the owner of the boat, but other investors are involved to meet the running expenses of the group. Investors tend to be mid-level businessmen mostly from the clans of the respective pirate groups who join in a structure which resembles a shareholding company.²³ The third model is similar but includes a fund raiser who collects money from investors, who may be off-shore, to fund pirate missions.²⁴

Hansen refers to these as *professional pirates*.²⁵ Leaders invest money in profit-driven enterprises, developing highly advanced regional networks in the process. It is estimated that there are seven separate, but linked, syndicates financed and brokered largely from within Somalia and the wider Diaspora.²⁶ As pirates push their operations further out to sea, these networks are becoming more important due to the increasing logistic requirements involved and the need to handle substantially bigger ransoms. The formation of these broad criminal networks, based on mutual benefit and driven by greed, is beginning to erode the importance of clan traditions within piracy groups.

The Somali Pirate Cycle – Advanced Phase

From the above it is clear that Somali pirates have entered the advanced phase of Puchala's cycle.²⁷ In previous periods in history the international community would have taken decisive military action and crushed the pirates, both at sea and their networks ashore. Navies today, however, are constrained by international humanitarian and human rights laws which prevent such action.²⁸ Consequently, whilst the international community has assembled an impressive array of maritime power, this has achieved little more than contain the levels of piracy. It may also have made pirates more violent and more professional.

As counter-piracy efforts make attacks more difficult, pirates are becoming more aggressive and increasingly likely to use weapons to get vessels to

stop. Last year there were 114 ships fired upon off Somalia, up from 39 incidents in 2008. This included more than twenty attacks using rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) some of which were against oil or chemical tankers.²⁹ This trend is expected to continue with pirates becoming more ruthless in their efforts to secure the enormous rewards available. This not only increases the risk to life of the crews involved but also increases the risk of environmental catastrophe, both of which serve to increase political pressure within the international community to stop the attacks.

Pirates are also becoming increasingly professional and branching out into other criminal activity. The pirates have studied the patterns of the patrolling warships and adapted their tactics accordingly. They also appear well versed in the legal and political limits that are constraining the efforts of Western warships to stop them.³⁰ Their organisation ashore is becoming more sophisticated and is protected by well-armed militias, many of which rival established Somali authorities in terms of their military capabilities.³¹ Bruno Schiemy, former chairman of the UN monitoring group on Somalia, believes that pirates are forming decentralized confederations with other criminal groups with whom they have developed symbiotic relationships.³² This may include provision of specific expertise and logistical support, protection, and involvement in other illegal activities to make money. There is evidence that pirates in both Puntland and in central Somalia have engaged in people smuggling, arms dealing and drug trafficking.³³ Some commentators also claim that the pirates have formed alliances with Islamic militant groups such as al-Shabaab. Pirates provide a source of revenue or smuggle arms and foreign fighters into Somalia in exchange for military training and the right to operate safely from areas of coastline under militants' control.³⁴ This does not necessarily point towards the pirates becoming more ideologically aligned with the Islamic militants. It does, however, indicate that they are willing to engage in other forms of criminal activity for financial or other benefits.³⁵ The fact that some pirate groups have also tried to exchange crew members held hostage for imprisoned pirates clouds the issue further.³⁶ When one considers this, the prospect of pirates selling hostages to al-Shabaab for the rights to operate on their coast does not seem so unlikely. As Lehr has already

identified there is considerable scope for a move towards political piracy.³⁷

Future Trends

Piracy is a dynamic activity mutually dependent on global economic development, government policies, corporate strategies and actions of regional and local players. An assessment of future trends must therefore include an analysis of the security dynamics within Somalia and the relationship between pirates and other key actors.

Political Security

The International community, who are driven by individual and often contradicting interests, must shoulder some responsibility for the current crisis within Somalia. Ethiopia's attempts to impose a government more favourable towards Addis Ababa eroded the Transitional Federal Government's (TFG) support base and provided a rallying cry for diverse opposition groups; calls for foreign peacekeepers to bolster the TFG made it appear ineffectual, and US efforts to contain foreign al-Qaeda operatives has accelerated the radicalisation of Islamist forces and made Somalia a potential safe haven for al-Qaeda.³⁸ In addition, the international coalition has failed to deliver the finances required for essential development, reconstruction and security sector reform. It may be argued, therefore, that the International community has placed inflated expectations on a government that has neither the resources nor the capacity to deliver. The international community expects strategic gains but remains reluctant to invest sufficient diplomatic and financial capital or to take the levels of risk required to produce them. Nor are they willing to let the Somali factions solve their problems alone for fear of a revolutionary Islamist takeover. Whilst far from ideal, it may be argued that the current situation is a minimally acceptable outcome for many key actors.³⁹ It enables key figures within government to continue to benefit from counter-

terrorism, state-building, and humanitarian relief projects. For al-Shabaab, the prolonged conflict with a Western backed government increases its stature and saves the leadership from making potentially divisive decisions should it ever actually gain power. The status quo may also be good for International actors. No Western government wants to be linked to a policy which culminates in the formal collapse of the TFG;⁴⁰ nor do they want to be responsible for politically and economically reconstituting a Somalia in which the revolutionary Islamists have been defeated.⁴¹

Barring strategic shock, such as a major al-Shabaab attack within a Western state, decisive intervention by the international community seems a remote prospect. The political preference is the continued support of the TFG and the maintenance of a status quo that avoids the need to commit ground forces in large numbers. This situation is likely to continue at least in the short to medium term thus constraining the TFG's capacity to extend effective governance to the extent required to curb piracy, at least within southern and central Somalia.

A more optimistic forecast may be possible in the north. In Somaliland, the authorities have already taken a firm stance against piracy. Although Puntland authorities have been less robust in the past, there are signs that they are responding to international pressure and taking a firmer stance. Whether this is merely positioning to gain political advantage or a genuine attempt to curb piracy remains to be seen. Initial signs are encouraging, however, and those involved in counter-piracy operations have noted a change in attitude amongst Puntland authorities and a greater willingness to cooperate.

Regional stability remains fragile, however, as both Puntland and Somaliland have suffered increasing spill-over from the conflict in the south as Islamic militants, who view the administrations as un-Islamic, seek to destabilise the region. Furthermore, Somali unionists oppose the continued independence of Somaliland and are actively engaged to undermine the government.⁴² Meanwhile, in Puntland, money buys influence and the government's apparent shift in attitudes towards piracy may be reversed.

Whilst both governments are holding firm, there is concern that governance and the rule of law in the region could be undermined. Should this be the case then there is a risk that pirate groups would be free to operate along the whole northern coast. However, a growing number of analysts are supporting policies which expand support to existing regional polities⁴³ and this is mirrored in the international community which appears more inclined to engage in regional capacity building backed by policies which reward strong governance.⁴⁴ The most likely scenario, therefore, is that security will improve in the north potentially leading to a gradual displacement of pirate gangs to central and southern Somalia.

Military Security and Piracy

At a time of increasing budgetary pressures, the effectiveness of maritime forces to combat piracy is being challenged. The combined maritime forces can claim some success; in 2009 they disrupted 411 pirate operations of 706 encountered; delivered 269 pirates for prosecution (of whom forty six were jailed); and killed 11.⁴⁵ A combination of the military response and the implementation of Best Management Practice (BMP) by the shipping industry have also reduced the success rate of pirate attacks from 60 per cent in 2007 to 23 per cent in 2009.⁴⁶ This success, however, must be set against the fact that, despite the buildup of naval forces in the region, pirate activity continues to increase.⁴⁷

Although analysts point to the fact that there are simply too few warships to cover the vast area of ocean where ships are at risk from attack,⁴⁸ the real issue is that efforts at sea are not being matched by similar activity ashore. To be effective, maritime forces must be empowered to conduct supporting operations ashore but this is beyond the range of current policy options.⁴⁹ Contributing Governments fear that expanding the military strategy into Somalia could destabilize the region further, drawing them into the civil war and risks an escalation in violence against merchant shipping as pirates seek

revenge.⁵⁰ The current military strategy is therefore to contain the threat to a level which can be tolerated by the international community. Arguably, this is being achieved but the cost effectiveness of the strategy is questionable and may not be sustainable in the current financial climate. The most likely outcome is that naval forces committed to future counter-piracy operations will reduce at a time when more individuals are being drawn to piracy.

Economic security

The full extent of the economic impact is difficult to assess as estimates are highly sensitive to assumptions used in their calculation. Some calculations consider only the direct impact whilst others try to be more holistic and include indirect effects, such as the supply of items needed for just-in-time manufacturing. Consequently there is considerable variation in the figures produced and no definitive breakdown of the true economic cost of piracy, either in absolute or relative terms.

Approximations range from \$1 billion to as much as \$50 billion. Whilst significant, it is argued that piracy is not a threat to international maritime trade (with annual revenues in excess of \$7 trillion) let alone global trade where piracy accounts for less than 0.1 per cent of the total value.⁵¹ Consequently, critics question the appropriateness of the current international naval response (at an estimated annual cost of \$200-350 million⁵²) arguing that it is out of proportion to the problem and a misallocation of resources which could be used more usefully to address the socio-economic factors that cause piracy in the first place.⁵³

However, recent analysis questions the validity of these estimates as previous studies generally treated piracy as a static activity detached from the influences of global economic development, corporate strategies and government policies. Fu *et al* argue that this is a critical shortcoming in quantitative modelling, and that existing research has yet to tackle the

economic impact of maritime piracy effectively.⁵⁴ Their analysis concludes that costs of counter-piracy operations within the area are justified from the perspective of global economic development. It should also be borne in mind that the effects of piracy fall disproportionately on regional states most affected by the phenomenon.⁵⁵ For example, the Kenyan Shipping Council estimates that piracy has increased the cost of doing business on the Kenyan coast by over 40 per cent, adding an extra \$34 million onto the monthly costs of its exports and imports whilst in Egypt, Suez Canal revenues are expected to fall from \$5.1 billion in FY08 to \$3.6 billion in FY10.⁵⁶ Similarly, the inflationary effects of money laundering, combined with the trade of illegal goods smuggled by pirates, undermine legitimate commerce and add to the financial hardship of those not involved in piracy, making their lives increasingly difficult.⁵⁷ Globally, therefore, whilst the cost of piracy may appear insignificant, at a regional level it represents a significant threat to economic security.

Societal security

Somali society is primarily organized along Clan lines. Such is the strength of the clan tradition that the Islamic Awakening Movement was, to a degree, constrained by the view that Islamic identity should compliment, not challenge, the primacy of clannism.⁵⁸ There are signs, however, that two decades of civil war have weakened clan society in two important areas. Firstly, al-Shabaab has been able to curtail the influence of clan loyalty among its followers as illustrated by the leadership which represents a clan diversity of surprising proportions by Somali standards. Minority clans have been empowered and then encouraged to use their newfound power against traditionally oppressive clans. Additionally, the group recruits very young fighters who are less deeply rooted in clan dogma and thus more easily indoctrinated into the global Jihadist ideology. Consequently, al-Shabaab operates largely unconstrained by the complex clan system that curtailed al-Qaeda's earlier attempts to gain traction in the region and are thus more able to exploit the peoples' collective yearn for unity.⁵⁹

Pirate groups have also transcended clan structures. This started in 2003 when Mohamed Abdi Hassan 'Afweyne', introduced the business model subsequently adopted by most pirate groups.⁶⁰ Movement into other areas of organised crime and the formation of decentralized, criminal confederations have further marginalised clan ties.⁶¹ Consequently, mutually beneficial relationships with other criminal groups are developing unfettered by traditional clan ties. At the moment, there is no evidence to suggest that pirate groups are becoming ideologically aligned with the Islamic militants. Pirates remain essentially rational actors operating in pursuit of their own survival and self-interest and not in pursuit of ideologically inspired fundamentalist aims.⁶² It is of note, however, that an increasing number of youths are being lured into piracy who, without the constraining influence of clan traditions, may be more susceptible to jihadist propaganda. The Islamic Courts Union (ICU) emerged on the crest of a widely shared aspiration for a new generation of Somali leaders to take over from the generation tainted by civil war,⁶³ and this undercurrent of a generational struggle persists within Somali youth.⁶⁴ This may be an area which militants can exploit. A potential future outcome, therefore, of the growing diversity of criminal activity amongst pirate groups is a blurring of the motivational issue for young pirates.⁶⁵

Implications for Piracy

Securitisation of piracy has, arguably, given it a higher profile than the scale of the problem warrants. Whilst this may be the case, it is unlikely that there will be a reversal in policy over the next few years and pressure will be maintained for the international community to respond to the threat. Whilst economic pressures may result in a reduction in force levels allocated to counter piracy missions it should be possible to offset this through greater cooperation amongst donor countries, improved coordination and more effective employment of maritime assets.⁶⁶ This, combined with a wider and more rigid application of the International Maritime Organisation's (IMO) best management practices, will help to reduce the number of vulnerable targets at risk. However, pirates are able to counter this by extending their area of

operations (further into the Indian Ocean and the Red and Arabian Seas) and it is unlikely that a shortage of vulnerable targets will impact on levels of piracy in the short to medium term.

The security analysis above predicts that improving security in the north will result in a gradual displacement of pirate groups to southern Somalia. This will require the pirates to reach an understanding with Islamic militants to enable operations to be conducted from areas under their control. In theory the ideological motivations of al-Shabaab should point to condemnation of pirate activity. Within 'professional' terrorist groups, however, simply perpetuating their cadres becomes a central goal, and what started out as a moral crusade becomes a sophisticated organisation. Al-Qaeda has already shown that flexibility and willingness to forge broad, and sometimes unlikely, alliances can enhance survival.⁶⁷ Al-Shabaab have learnt this lesson and appear willing to compromise morality to ensure a funding stream, supply of weapons and a safe passage for foreign fighters willing to join the jihad.⁶⁸ There are already signs that closer cooperation between pirate and insurgent groups is taking place as witnessed by the pirate operations being mounted from the coast south of Mogadishu.

A Developing Pirate-Insurgent Nexus?

Academic opinion is divided on the issue of a 'crime-terror nexus'. The predominant view is that criminals and terrorists only engage in marriages of convenience to further their methods, but their motives maintain long-term separation.⁶⁹ Picarelli challenges this view by arguing that two forms of the crime-terror nexus exist.⁷⁰ The first concerns a 'state-centric nexus', comprised of patterns of collaboration joining sovereign-bound crime and (nationalist) terror groups, which tend to support the predominant 'methods not motives' argument. The second form concerns the development of a 'multi-centric' nexus, comprised of transnational crime and terror groups. The

global outlook of these groups means that they have greater operational and organisational similarities and are more likely to develop into a true nexus.

The nature of the relationship developing between pirate and insurgent groups will be shaped by the extent to which they are reliant on each other. From the pirates' perspective, they may be forced to extend their operations into southern Somalia due to improving security in Puntland, the success of counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden or a combination of both. In exchange for a safe operating base they may be faced with a number of demands from militant groups including increased levels of logistic support, provision of maritime training, trading of Western hostages and direct involvement in acts of maritime terrorism. The level to which pirates are prepared to cooperate may depend upon the future nature of the insurgency and relative strengths of competing militant groups.

In the current, multi-polar insurgency, rival insurgent groups are not only fighting with Government and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces but they are also competing with each other on a regional level for the control of territory and access to resources. In this scenario it is unlikely that militant groups will become sufficiently powerful to dictate terms; pirate groups will be able to choose which areas they operate from, depending on which insurgent group offers the most favourable deal. The 'methods not motives' argument is likely to prevail and the pirate groups will maintain mutually beneficial relationships based around the provision of logistical support.

Should the insurgency become polarised, however, with a single insurgent group becoming dominant, the pirates will not be able to play one group against another. In this scenario there is the potential for the insurgents' demands to migrate towards the more extreme end of the spectrum in terms of the involvement of pirate groups. As discussed earlier, the prospects of pirates trading hostages in exchange for a safe base is not inconceivable. Of more concern, however, is the potential for pirate groups to support maritime terrorism, either indirectly, by providing training, or direct participation in operations.

Al-Shabaab has already demonstrated both the intent and capability to extend the conflict and strike at the perceived 'backers' of the TFG. Frustration with the on-going stalemate, or possible political and military reverses, may prompt further attacks, including acts of maritime terrorism.⁷¹ Alternatively, al-Shabaab may respond to calls from al-Qaeda for assistance to block the Bab-el-Mandeb strait.⁷² In such a scenario it is not inconceivable that the pirates' cooperation in such an attack might be the price demanded for the continued use of bases within al-Shabaab controlled areas. Whether this is a price that pirates are willing to pay, however, remains to be seen. Pirate groups are well aware that participation in an act of maritime terrorism would result in more robust action by international maritime forces, including the use of force ashore to destroy their bases. From the narrow perspective of self-enrichment, therefore, pirates should try to remain as close as possible to 'business-as-usual'. By balancing the demands of the insurgents against the perceptions of the international community it may be possible for the pirates to engage in a relationship which is close enough to be mutually beneficial but sufficiently distant to avoid provoking the international community to take forceful action ashore on the grounds of counter-terrorism. Rational choice theory again tends to support the 'methods not motives' argument and pirate groups are unlikely to be persuaded to engage in or support acts of maritime terrorism.

This narrow interpretation assumes that individuals will act selfishly and does not allow for altruistic goals to be pursued. With a broader interpretation of rational choice theory, behaviour that benefits not only the individual but also a group that the individual feels loyal to, may also be considered as rational.⁷³ Lehr alludes to this in his analysis of the politicization of Somali piracy and the emergence of a 'mujahideen at sea'.⁷⁴ The prospects of pirates engaging in acts of maritime terrorism may therefore depend on the nature of the pirate/insurgent relationship. Before considering this relationship in more detail it is important to note that there is greater potential for pirate groups to form Picarelli's 'multi-centric' nexus with al-Shabaab, than with Hizbul Islam.⁷⁵

A number of points are pertinent in any relationship which develops between pirates and al-Shabaab. Firstly, there has been a gradual erosion of clan traditions which would previously have been a constraining influence. Secondly, an increasing number of impressionable young men are being drawn to piracy who may have a heightened perception of a generational struggle within Somalia and who may therefore be more vulnerable to indoctrination. Thirdly, there remains a perception amongst Somalis that Western warships are more concerned with protecting illegal fishing vessels and ships dumping toxic waste in Somali waters, than in preventing piracy.⁷⁶ Finally, it has been noted that during internal conflict, greed can become a dominant influence.⁷⁷ This may be a greed for money, political power, status, or attention and is equally true for terrorist and pirate alike.⁷⁸ For pirate leaders, who have already amassed a fortune from ransom monies, the attraction of additional power may be irresistible. Some have already succumbed; Abshir Abdillahi (also known as Boyah) and Mohamed Si'ad (also known as ATOM) are both former pirate leaders who have been linked with al-Shabaab. If al-Shabaab becomes dominant, more individuals may be moved to meet their demands in order to gain influence and favour. Similarly, international intervention against al-Shabaab could ignite grievances within impressionable young pirates who may already feel persecuted by Western warships. These factors, either in isolation or when combined, could result in a blurring of the motivational distinction between the two groups. The thin line that distinguishes pirate attack from terrorist attack may, therefore, be closer to being crossed than hitherto thought.

In relation to the wider contemporary security environment, the crisis in Somalia shows that this is becoming increasingly complex. When dealing in future maritime security it is no longer appropriate to categorise the threat into terrorist or piracy stove-pipes. Instead we must consider the development of a threat continuum where there may be considerable over-lap with indistinct boundaries between terrorist, criminal and insurgent groups and their facilitators.

Endnotes

- ¹ Hanson, S. (2010, January 7). *Combating Maritime Piracy*. Retrieved 28 May 2010, from www.cfr.org: <http://www.cfr.org/publication/18376/>
- ² All monetary values are USD.
- ³ UN Monitoring Group. (2010). *Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1853 (2008)*. United Nations.
- ⁴ Hanson, S. (2010, January 7). *op. cit.*
- ⁵ Middleton, R. (2008). *Piracy in Somalia: Threatening global trade, feeding local wars*. London: Chatham House.
- ⁶ Pham, J. P. (2008, November 21). *The Pirates of Somalia*. Retrieved June 2, 2010, from www.pbs.org: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/forum/africa/july-dec08/pirates_11-192.html
- ⁷ Puchala, D. (2005). 'Of Pirates and Terrorists: What Experience and History Teach'. *Contemporary Security Policy*, 1-24.
- ⁸ Mwangura. (2009). 'Sea Piracy and Pirate Fishing in Somalia'. *Controlling Maritime Piracy*.
- ⁹ Middleton, *op.cit.*
- ¹⁰ UN. (2008, December 10). S/2008/769. *Letter dated 10 December 2008 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia addressed to the President of the Security Council*. United Nations.
- ¹¹ UN Monitoring Group (2010). *op.cit.*
- ¹² UNSC. (2008, December 16). *Security Council Authorizes States To Use Land-Based Operations In Somalia, As Part Of Fight Against Piracy Off Coast*. Retrieved June 4, 2010, from www.un.org: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9541.doc.htm>
- ¹³ Ross, S., & Ben-David, J. (2009). 'Somali Piracy: An Escalating Security Dilemma'. *Harvard Africa Policy Journal*, 55-70; Rotberg, R. (2010). *Combating Maritime Piracy: A Policy Brief with Recommendations for Action*. Cambridge, MA: World Peace Foundation; and Kraska, J. (2009). 'Coalition Strategy and the Pirates of the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea'. *Comparative Strategy*, 197-216.
- ¹⁴ UN Monitoring Group . (2010), *op. cit.*
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁶ Kraska, *op. cit.* and Rotberg, *op.cit.*
- ¹⁷ Kontorovich, E. (2010). "A Guantanamo on the Sea": The Difficulties of Prosecuting Pirates and Terrorists'. *California Law Review*, 234.
- ¹⁸ Rotberg, *op. cit.*
- ¹⁹ Chivers, P. (2010, June 24). Captain Royal Navy, Chief of Staff Op ATALANTA. (C. Reid, Interviewer)
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*

-
- ²¹ UN Monitoring Group . (2010). *op. cit.*
- ²² Hansen, S. J. (2008, December 19). *Modern Piracy as a Subject of Academic Enquiry*. Retrieved May 25, 2010, from www.e-ir.info: <http://www.e-ir.info/?p=593>
- ²³ Backhaus, K. (2010, May 12). *Piracy In The Puntland Region of Somalia*. Retrieved May 25, 2010, from www.oilprice.com: <http://oilprice.com/Geo-Politics/Africa/Piracy-In-The-Puntland-Region-of-Somalia.html>
- ²⁴ Hansen, S. J. (2010, April 27). *Effective Ways of Working with the Pirates During a Hijack Situation*. Retrieved June 11, 2010, from www.hansonwade.com: http://www.hansonwade.com/events/combating-piracy-europe-2010/presentations/Stig_Jarle_Hansen.pdf
- ²⁵ Hansen (2008), *op. cit.*
- ²⁶ Rotberg, *op. cit.*
- ²⁷ Puchala, *op. cit.*
- ²⁸ Lennox, P. (2008). *Contemporary Piracy off the Horn of Africa*. Calgary: Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute.
- ²⁹ Houreld, K. (2010, March 4). *Arms race on high seas: Gunfire, RPG attacks by Somali pirates soar as crew defences improve*. Retrieved June 29, 2010, from www.570news.com: <http://www.570news.com/news/world/article/32436--arms-race-on-high-seas-gunfire-rpg-attacks-by-somali-pirates-soar-as-crew-defences-improve>; and IMB. (2010b). *Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Report for the Period 1 January - 31 March 2010*. London: ICC International Maritime Bureau.
- ³⁰ Lennox, *op. cit.*; Stockbruegger. (2010, March 6). *Somali Piracy and the International Response: Trends in 2009 and Prospects for 2010*. Retrieved June 11, 2010, from www.piracy-studies.org: <http://piracy-studies.org/?author=2>
- ³¹ UN. (2008, December 10). S/2008/769. *Letter dated 10 December 2008 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia addressed to the President of the Security Council* . United Nations.
- ³² Schiemsy, B. (2010, March 23). *Guns, drugs and terror: Somali pirates morph into polycriminals*. Retrieved June 29, 2010, from www.africareview.com: <http://www.africareview.com/Special%20Reports/%20Somali%20pirates%20morph%20into%20polycriminals/-/825444/885398/-/view/printVersion/-/hk7b7bz/-/index.html>
- ³³ Cabbage, C. (2010, April 27). *Briefing Note: Maritime Security-Combating Trans-National High Sea Piracy*. Retrieved May 28, 2010, from www.hansonwade.com: <http://www.hansonwade.com/events/combating-piracy-europe-2010/reports/BriefingNoteCombatingTransnationalPiracy.pdf> and UN. (2008, December 10). S/2008/769. *Letter dated 10 December 2008 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia addressed to the President of the Security Council*. United Nations.
- ³⁴ Pham, *op. cit.*; Lennox, *op. cit.* and Schiemsy, *op. cit.*
- ³⁵ Lennox, *op. cit.*

-
- ³⁶ Stockbruegger. *op. cit.*
- ³⁷ Acts of piracy which include political demands aimed at achieving more than just personal gain. Lehr, P. (2009). 'Somali Piracy: The Next Iteration'. *Perspectives on Terrorism*.
- ³⁸ International Crisis Group. (2006). *Africa Report N°116: Can the Somali Crisis be Contained?* Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group.
- ³⁹ Weinstein, M. A. (2010, May 25). *Somalia: A Strategic Analysis of the Istanbul Conference*. Retrieved May 26, 2010, from www.garoweonline.com:
http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/Somalia_A_Strategic_Analysis_of_the_Istanbul_Conference.shtml
- ⁴⁰ Menkhaus, K. (2010, June 17). *Horn of Africa: Current Conditions and US Policy*. Retrieved June 22, 2010, from www.foreignaffairs.house.gov:
<http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/111/men061710.pdf>
- ⁴¹ Weinstein, *op. cit.*
- ⁴² Defense and Foreign Affairs. (2010, July 1). *Somaliland Presidential Election Besieged by Well-Financed Islamists, Threatening Horn/Red Sea Stability*. Retrieved July 5, 2010, from [www.oilprice.com](http://oilprice.com): <http://oilprice.com/Geo-Politics/Africa/Somaliland-Presidential-Election-Besieged-by-Well-Financed-Islamists-Threatening-Horn/Red-Sea-Stability.html>
- ⁴³ Hansen, S. J. (2009). *Piracy in the greater Gulf of Aden: Myths, Misconception and Remedies*. Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research; Pham, *op cit.*; Menkhaus, *op. cit.*; and Bruton, B. (2010). *Council Special Report No. 52: Somalia a new approach*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations.
- ⁴⁴ NATO. (2010, January 28). *COUNTER-PIRACY: OPERATION OCEAN SHIELD: FACT SHEET*. Retrieved June 9, 2010, from www.nato.int:
http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2010_01/20100204_20100128-Fact_Sheet_Counterpiracy.pdf; Lautard, B., & Hamer, J. (2010, July 19). Political Advisors, OP ATALANTA. (C. Reid, Interviewer); and Menkhaus, *op.cit.*
- ⁴⁵ Rotberg, *op cit.*
- ⁴⁶ UNOSAT. (2010). *Spatial Analysis of Somali Pirate Attacks in 2009*. Geneva: UNOSAT/UNITAR.
- ⁴⁷ IMB. (2010). *Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Report for the Period 1 January - 30 June 2010*. London: IMB.
- ⁴⁸ Lennox, *op. cit.* and Rotberg, *op cit.*
- ⁴⁹ Lennox, *op. cit.*
- ⁵⁰ Stockbruegger. *op. cit.*
- ⁵¹ Chalk, P., Smallman, L., & Burger, N. (2009). Notes from a RAND Workshop to Discuss the Best Approaches for Dealing with Piracy in the 21st Century. *Countering Piracy in the Modern Era*. Santa Monica: RAND.
- ⁵² Gilpin, R. (2009). *Counting the Costs of Somali Piracy*. Washington: United States Institute of Peace.

-
- ⁵³ Currently only 0.1% of ships transiting the Gulf of Aden and 0.5% of ships transiting the Indian Ocean are attacked.
- ⁵⁴ Fu, X., Ng, A. K., & Lau, Y.-Y. (2010). *The Impacts of Maritime Piracy on Global Economic Development*. Hong Kong: International Forum on Maritime Security.
- ⁵⁵ Chalk, P., Smallman, L., & Burger, N, *op. cit.*
- ⁵⁶ Due to a combination of the global downturn and re-routing of shipping due to the threat of piracy, Gilpin, *op. cit.*
- ⁵⁷ Bair, R. S. (2009, June). *Disrupting Somali Piracy via Trust and Influence Operations*. Retrieved June 28, 2010, from www.edocs.nps.edu:
http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2009/Jun/09Jun_Bair.pdf
- ⁵⁸ Combating Terrorism Centre. (2007). *Al-Qaida's (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa*. West Point: Combating Terrorism Centre.
- ⁵⁹ Aynte, A. (2010, July 8). *The Anatomy of al-Shabaab*. Retrieved July 12, 2010, from www.scribd.com: <http://www.scribd.com/doc/34053611/The-Anatomy-of-Al-Shabaab-by-Abdi-Aynte>
- ⁶⁰ Hansen, S. J. (2009). *op cit.*
- ⁶¹ Chivers, *op cit.* and Schiemy, *op. cit.*
- ⁶² Lennox, *op. cit.*
- ⁶³ Elliot, A., & Holzer, G.-S. (2009). 'The invention of 'terrorism' in Somalia: paradigms and policy in US foreign relations'. *South African Journal of International Affairs* , 215-244.
- ⁶⁴ Moulid, A. (2010, July 1). *50 years of Democracy, Dictatorship and Anarchy: What's next for Somalia?* Retrieved July 13, 2010, from www.garoweonline.com:
http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/50_years_of_Democracy_Dictatorship_and_Anarchy_What_s_next_for_Somalia.shtml
- ⁶⁵ Lennox, *op cit.*
- ⁶⁶ Lautard, B., & Hamer, J. *op. cit.*
- ⁶⁷ Stern, J. (2003). 'The Protean Enemy'. *Foreign Affairs*, 27.
- ⁶⁸ Bell, S. (2009, December 2). *Somali militants training pirates*. Retrieved July 29, 2010, from www.nationalpost.com: <http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=2295946>
- ⁶⁹ See Chapter 1: Hoffman, B. (2006). *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- ⁷⁰ Picarelli, J. (2006). 'The Turbulent Nexus Of Transnational Organised Crime And Terrorism: A Theory of Malevolent International Relations'. *Global Crime*, 1-24.
- ⁷¹ UN Monitoring Group . (2010). *op cit.*
- ⁷² Kasolowsky, R. (2010, February 8). *Yemen al Qaeda urges jihad, wants Red Sea blocked*. Retrieved July 8, 2010, from www.reuters.com:
<http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6173II20100208>
- ⁷³ van Um, E. (2009). *Economics of Security Working Paper 22: Discussing Concepts of Terrorist Rationality: Implications for Counter-Terrorism Policy*. Berlin: Economics of Security.
- ⁷⁴ Lehr, *op. cit.*

⁷⁵ Picarelli, J. (2006). 'The Turbulent Nexus Of Transnational Organised Crime And Terrorism: A Theory of Malevolent International Relations'. *Global Crime*, 1-24.

⁷⁶ Rotberg, *op. cit.*

⁷⁷ Cohen, & Felson. (1979). Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activities Approach. *American Sociological Review* , 44 (August), 588-608.

Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2004). 'Greed and Grievance in Civil War'. *Oxford Economic Papers*, 563-595.

⁷⁸ Stern, *op. cit.*

*The Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies
aims to promote the understanding and analysis of
maritime history and policy and to provide a forum
for the interaction of academics, policy-makers
and practitioners.*

Corbett Papers

Series Editor
Dr Martin Robson

Editorial Assistant
James Bosbotinis

Editorial Board

Professor Geoff Till
Professor Greg Kennedy
Dr Jon Robb-Webb
Dr Tim Benbow
Dr Andrew Gordon

The Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies
Defence Studies Department
Joint Services Command and Staff College
Faringdon Road, Shrivenham
Swindon, Wiltshire
SN6 8TS, United Kingdom

Email: corbettcentre.jscsc@defenceacademy.mod.uk
Copies of previous Corbett Papers are available from:
www.kcl.ac.uk/schools/sspp/ws/research/groups/ccmps