Germany's anticipation of and response to ISIS' rise to power: overview of open-source knowledge claims and policy responses¹

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Timeline: 1 July 2013 – 9 June 2014

This period is relevant for an understanding of how the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) gradually established itself as a powerful and destructive actor in Iraq and Syria and how it reached beyond its core conflict zone. The chronological overview starts with crucial developments in Syria (ISIS expanding its footprint in northern Syria and tightening its grip on Raqqa while increasingly fighting other rebel groups) and in Iraq (July 2013 marked the successful conclusion of ISIS' "Breaking the Walls" campaign, the beginning of its "Soldier's Harvest" campaign and a sharp increase in violent attacks against predominantly Shia targets). The overview ends with the beginning of ISIS' northern Iraq offensive and on the day before Mosul and its international airport fell to ISIS. By then, Europe had just experienced its first terrorist attack (Jewish Museum Brussels) linked to ISIS and to the phenomenon of returning foreign fighters, highlighting the immense challenges for European intelligence cooperation and counterterrorism.

The Iraqi army's defeat at Mosul and the fall of the city to ISIS on 10 June 2014 are often portrayed as a highly surprising turn of events. Reconstructing knowledge claims and policy responses to the evolving crisis prior to this allows for an investigation of earlier surprises, or the sum of surprises, knowledge producers and decision-makers had experienced by this specific turning point. This overview identifies eight notable events after which the situation developed for the worse. Each provided indications that the likelihood of ISIS causing serious harm, based on its capability, intent and exploitation of structural vulnerabilities, was increasing.

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Methodology:

This overview is based on a systematic analysis of open-source data published during this time. Three groups of non-governmental experts have been selected as authoritative sources of knowledge:

- researchers at international NGOs (International Crisis Group/ICG, Human Rights Watch/HRW, Amnesty International),
- journalists reporting for German media organisations (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung/FAZ, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Die Welt, Der Spiegel, Die Zeit*),
- analysts at a German think tank (German Institute for International and Security Affairs/SWP).

These experts shaped policy debates in Germany during the period under study by writing or being quoted about ISIS' activities and structural vulnerabilities. Examples of the latter were: growing rebel infighting in the Syrian civil war, Sunni-Shia tensions in Iraq and the region, ISIS' appeal to radical Islamists in Europe, and the weakness of the Iraqi security forces and Iraqi government. Overall, almost 400 expert publications have been gathered and evaluated. 236 contained relevant knowledge claims, of which 180 were drawn from press articles, 40 from NGO reports and 16 from think tank analyses. They are considered relevant as they provided knowledge related to the meaning of events, enabling conditions in which ISIS could thrive, likely future developments, and/or offered evidential claims about key facts and/or prescriptive action-focused claims. Some of the claims are contradictory. This was at least partly due to the highly uncertain situation, speed of dynamics on the ground, limited access for knowledge producers, and disinformation by ISIS and the Iraqi and Syrian governments.

A total of 140 policy-relevant documents have been reviewed. These included:

- parliamentary publications (minutes of Bundestag debates, motions, answers to opposition inquiries),
- government publications (statements on meetings and summits held, policies adopted, action taken),
- speeches and interviews by decision-makers.

35 sources were useful for an understanding of how German decision-makers were influenced by knowledge claims and how they responded to the evolving crisis. In addition, 28 documents have been selected as background information on Germany's Syria and Iraq policies and for an evaluation of how the perceptions of decision-makers and the opposition evolved.

The keyword search for NGO outputs focused on 'Syria' and 'Iraq'. The keyword search for all other (German-language) documents focused on 'Syrien', 'Irak', 'Islamischer Staat', 'ISIS', 'Al-Qaida/Al-Kaida im Irak'. It should be noted that the Arabic acronym Da'esh was rarely used in

German sources under study here and that experts still frequently referred to al-Qaeda in Iraq when discussing ISIS. Also, at times experts failed to distinguish clearly between ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra. Throughout this document, the acronym ISIS is used. The group had adopted this name in April 2013, after expanding into Syria, and a later name change (Islamic State) only occurred in late June 2014.

Date	Notable events including	Expert knowledge claims about ISIS' activities,	Impact of claims at decision-making
	turning points	enabling conditions for its rise to power and likely	level and broader policy responses
		future developments	
01/07/2013		Human Rights Watch (HRW) reports that the Iraqi	
		government had closed the al-Qa'im border	
		crossing in Anbar province in August 2012 due to	
		concerns that 'al-Qaeda operatives might use it to	
		enter Iraq'.	
02/07/2013		Der Spiegel highlights that violence linked to	
		Islamist terrorism in Iraq has sharply increased since	
		January and continues unabated. On 2 July, over 50	
		were killed and more than 100 were injured in a	
		series of coordinated bombings and shootings	
		across Iraq, especially in Baghdad.	
03/07/2013		Florian Peil states in Süddeutsche Zeitung that	
		Islamist groups with vague links to al-Qaeda	
		continue its fight and are particularly successful in	
		Iraq. These groups no longer coordinate their	
		activities with al-Qaeda's headquarters and do not	
		necessarily follow Zawahiri's leadership. He claims	
		that while Al-Qaeda disintegrates, its ideology	
		remains a powerful weapon which increasingly	
		motivates individuals in the West to opt for jihad.	

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ntegrated in the <u>highlights</u> that the 60 German citizens
vith more individuals who have reportedly joined Jihadi
adi activities. The groups in Syria pose a danger upon
and al-Qaeda's their potential return to Germany and

	promotion of individual jihad since June 2011, which constituted a strategic reorientation, have facilitated online radicalisation.	would need to be treated and monitored accordingly. He suggests an EU-wide immigration platform modelled upon the U.S. system. Such a joint database to monitor the movements of non-European foreigners could help mitigate the threat stemming from foreign terrorists.
11/07/2013	SWP's Heiko Wimmen <u>warns</u> that weapons deliveries to Syrian rebels could easily fall into the	
	hands of Islamist terrorists due to the lack of	
	leadership among the Syrian opposition and blurred	
	boundaries between various groups.	
12/07/2013	Der Spiegel reports that ISIS killed a high-ranking FSA commander to expand its influence in northern Syria. ISIS also reportedly announced that it seeks to kill all members of the FSA's military council. Der	
	Spiegel claims that the power struggle between militia groups has escalated and that the assassination marks the end of the FSA and ISIS	
13/07/2013	fighting the Syrian regime together.Der SpiegelIdlib and that the opposition is deeply fragmented.ISIS has become more powerful and concentrates itsefforts on expanding its control in northern Syria. Italso consolidates in influence in occupied areas byestablishing Sharia courts and administrativestructures.	

	Der Spiegel reports that the conflict between Sunni and Shia groups in Iraq has escalated further, with more than 100 people killed on 11-12 July in a series of coordinated bombings in Kirkuk, Mosul and next	
14/07/2013	to a Shia shrine in Dujail. <u>Der Spiegel</u> highlights that Iraq is at a crossroads and might soon become engulfed in civil war due to tensions between Sunnis, Shia and Kurds running high. In further coordinated attacks on 13 July, 31 people were killed in Kut and Parra	
16/07/2013	people were killed in Kut and Basra.Sonja Zekri argues in Süddeutsche Zeitung that tensions are growing between radical Islamist groups in Syria, with ISIS becoming more powerful than Jabhat al-Nusra, and that Assad benefits from rebel infighting. She further reports that fighting broke out between ISIS and other militia groups in southeast Aleppo and that ISIS is regularly looting factories and public facilities.	
17/07/2013		In a detailed <u>response</u> to an opposition inquiry on foreign fighters in Syria, the government reports that more than 70 German jihadists have left for Syria and that German authorities are using social media intelligence to respond to the radicalisation and recruitment of German nationals.
18/07/2013	HRW reports that the conflict in Iraq is 'becoming more viciously sectarian than ever' and that 'Syria's civil war has helped fuel the sectarian tensions coursing through the region'. It further warns:	[background on broader Syria policy: the government <u>increases</u> its humanitarian aid for Syrian refugees.]

	'President Bashar Assad and his cronies exacerbated	
	the sectarian divide by demonizing pro-democracy	
	activists as extremists and jihadists. Now their	
	bogeyman is becoming real. The uprising has	
	morphed into an armed rebellion increasingly co-	
	opted and dominated by armed Sunni Islamist	
	groups, including foreign fighters, some with overtly	
	sectarian agendas.' HRW concludes that	
	sectarianism in Iraq and Syria is 'partly a	
	consequence of upheaval' and partly 'a product of	
	resilient patterns of authoritarianism, discrimination	
	and impunity'.	
	Der Spiegel reports that a suicide bomber killed	
	more than 20 people in a Sunni mosque in the Iraqi	
	town of Al-Wajihiyah.	
	Der Spiegel reports that at least 30 people were	
	killed in a series of car bombings in predominantly	
	Shia districts in Baghdad.	
In an <u>attack</u> on Abu Ghraib	Der Spiegel and FAZ report that at least 65 people	
high-security prison, ISIS	were killed in a series of 17 attacks in Baghdad. FAZ	
facilitates a mass breakout of	highlights that more than 520 people have to date	
at least 500 prisoners. Most	been killed in terrorist attacks in Iraq in July and	
escapees are senior	that al-Qaeda was likely responsible. FAZ warns of a	
members of al-Qaeda who	return to the years 2006-2007 when radical Sunni	
have received death	and Shia were fighting each other and argues that	
sentences. In a simultaneous	the escalation is partly caused by Maliki's anti-Sunni	
attack on Taji prison, the	policies and that the Syrian civil war increases	
escape of inmates can be	mistrust between Shia and Sunni.	
prevented. A total of 26 Iraqi		
security forces and over 20		
	high-security prison, ISIS facilitates a mass breakout of at least 500 prisoners. Most escapees are senior members of al-Qaeda who have received death sentences. In a simultaneous attack on Taji prison, the escape of inmates can be prevented. A total of 26 Iraqi	the sectarian divide by demonizing pro-democracy activists as extremists and jihadists. Now their bogeyman is becoming real. The uprising has morphed into an armed rebellion increasingly co- opted and dominated by armed Sunni Islamist groups, including foreign fighters, some with overtly sectarian agendas.' HRW concludes that sectarianiam in Iraq and Syria is 'partly a consequence of upheaval' and partly 'a product of resilient patterns of authoritarianism, discrimination and impunity'.Der Spiegel reports that a suicide bomber killed more than 20 people in a Sunni mosque in the Iraqi town of Al-Wajihiyah.Der Spiegel reports that a least 30 people were killed in a series of car bombings in predominantly Shia districts in Baghdad.In an attack on Abu Ghraib high-security prison, ISIS facilitates a mass breakout of at least 500 prisoners. Most escapees are senior members of al-Qaeda who have received death sentences. In a simultaneous attack on Taji prison, the escape of inmates can be prevented. A total of 26 IraqiDer Spiegel and FAZ report shat at Bay Suni and Shia were fighting each other and argues that the escalation is partly caused by Maliki's anti-Sunni

22/07/2013	civilians are killed in both attacks. The prison breaks have been meticulously prepared for over a year and officially end ISIS' "Breaking the Walls" campaign. The attacks highlight that ISIS can successfully carry out sophisticated military operations by exploiting the vulnerabilities of Iraq's security forces and that it has gained manpower.	Der Spiegel and Die Zeit report that four high- ranking al-Qaeda commanders escaped during the Abu Ghraib prison break and that both prison	
		attacks were started by several car and suicide bombings. <u>Der Spiegel</u> states elsewhere that at least 22 soldiers and 3 civilians died in a suicide bombing on a military convoy in Mosul.	
23/07/2013		Rudolph Chimelli argues in <u>Süddeutsche Zeitung</u> that the escalation of violence in Iraq has been facilitated by increased cooperation between Syrian and Iraqi jihadists and that the Sunni-Shia divide is the underlying driver of conflict. Citing the outgoing UN envoy to Iraq, <u>Martin Kobler</u> , Chimelli warns that the 'battlefields in Iraq and Syria are growing together'.	

	Der Spiegel reports that ISIS claimed responsibility	
	for the recent prison breaks in Iraq and that it had	
	prepared them for months.	
	SWP's Guido Steinberg argues that ISIS exploits	
	tensions between Sunnis and Shia in the Middle	
	East and that these are also exacerbated by Saudi	
	Arabia's anti-Iran stance.	
24/07/2013	Rudolph Chimelli reports in Süddeutsche Zeitung	
	that some prison guards cooperated with ISIS during	
	the recent breakouts and that this was a major	
	enabling factor. He considers it a surprising	
	admission by the Iraqi government that its security	
	sector has been infiltrated by ISIS. Chimelli reports	
	that the Iraqi government is facing the most serious	
	terrorist challenge in years and that it	
	underestimated the strength and reach of ISIS. He	
	highlights that ISIS has a broad operational basis	
	due to its expansion in both Iraq and Syria, that it	
	disposes of significant resources and that it poses a	
	clear threat to Assad and Maliki.	
25/07/2013	Kurt Pelda reports in <u>Der Spiegel</u> that many jihadist	
	fighting in northern Syria came from Chechnya. He	
	also highlights that foreign sponsors (esp. Saudi	
	Arabia and Qatar) have been supplying ISIS with	
	weapons and that ISIS has acquired a significant	
	number of weapons on the Syrian black market.	
29/07/2013	Der Spiegel reports that more than 86 people died	
	in a series of 14 bombings in predominantly Shia	
	districts in Baghdad and southern Iraq on 29 July.	
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20/07/2012	Budalah Chimalli raparta in Süddautach a Zaitura	[]
30/07/2013	Rudolph Chimelli reports in <u>Süddeutsche Zeitung</u>	
	that a leading Iraqi politician, the speaker of the	
	parliament, has warned for the first time that Iraq	
	could be sliding back into civil war. Shortly after his	
	press conference on 29 July, at least 67 people were	
	killed in 17 car bombings in Baghdad, Tikrit and	
	Anbar province. Chimelli argues that the Abu Ghraib	
	prison breakout allows ISIS to strengthen its ranks	
	and fill leadership positions and that this will have	
	consequences for Syria's opposition and ISIS'	
	terrorist activities in Iraq. He also highlights that ISIS	
	is starting to establish its own control posts in Iraq.	
	Referring to an appeal by UN Secretary General Ban	
	Ki-moon to Iraqi political leaders 'to bring the	
	country back from the brink and to leave no space	
	to those who seek to exploit the political stalemate	
	through violence and terror', Christoph Sydow	
	warns in Der Spiegel that Iraq is set to slide back	
	into civil war. He argues that ISIS will do what it can	
	to overthrow Maliki's Shia-dominated government	
	and continuously exploit Sunni grievances. Maliki's	
	non-reconciliatory stance and policies, many of	
	which are failing to address the basic needs of	
	_	
100/2012	Iraqis, are driving more people to ISIS.	
July 2013	The International Crisis Group (ICG) <u>reports</u> that July	
	2013 was the deadliest months in Iraq since April	
	2008, with more than 1000 people killed in	
	insurgent operations and sectarian attacks.	<u> </u>

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01/08/2013	SWP's <u>Guido Steinberg</u> highlights how violence in	
	Iraq has gradually, since April 2013, reached a new	
	level of escalation. He sees Maliki's authoritarian	
	style with his exclusion of Sunni and secular groups	
	as the root cause for this development and	
	emphasises that radical Sunni groups can build upon	
	the support of the Sunni population, especially in	
	the western and northern provinces. He also	
	discusses how it became evident during attacks in	
	late 2011 in Aleppo that AQI/ISI was becoming	
	active in Syria.	
	Der Spiegel warns about growing self-radicalisation	
	in Germany after a prominent German jihadist,	
	Denis Cuspert, who had been influenced by	
	converted Islamist Pierre Vogel and has settled in	
	Syria posted a video in which he encouraged suicide	
	attacks.	
	Alfred Hackensberger reports in Die Welt that the	
	Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) in northern	
	Syria has declared war against ISIS and Jabhat al-	
	Nusra after weeks of intense infighting and after a	
	prominent Syrian Kurdish politician was killed in a	
	car bombing in late July. The PYD is mobilising	
	support amongst the Kurdish population to counter	
	ISIS. Hackensberger claims that other Syrian	
	opposition parties won't turn against ISIS as the	
	latter are better equipped and willing to die as	
	martyrs and are as such needed on the front lines.	
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		He also mentions that ISIS has repeatedly sought to control Kurdish oil fields in northeastern Syria and already controls some near Deir ez-Zor in eastern Syria.	
03/08/2013			[background on broader Syria policy: international development secretary Dirk Niebel <u>announces</u> additional humanitarian aid worth EUR 20 million for Syrian refugees, especially those based in Iraq.]
04/08/2013	ISIS launches a military offensive on Alawite villages in Latakia, Syria, together with four other Jihadi groups. HRW <u>suggests</u> that ISIS was in charge, providing evidence that at least 190 civilians were killed and over 200 hostages seized. The incident highlights ISIS' indiscriminate use of force.	Rainer Herrmann argues in FAZ that while Syria continues to disintegrate, the Levant has become one battle zone. He claims that ISIS and al-Nusra are the most effective Syrian rebel groups. He further holds that the recent escalation of violence in Iraq is also a consequence of the Syrian civil war spillover.	
05/08/2013	A coalition of rebel groups, reportedly led by ISIS, captures Menagh military air base near Aleppo from Syrian regime troops after ISIS launched a sophisticated suicide attack. Menagh is the biggest helicopter base in the region and as such of	Thomas Avenarius warns in <u>Süddeutsche Zeitung</u> that al-Qaeda's ideology and method continue to pose a very real threat. Radical Islamists all over the world can adopt these without being part of al- Qaeda's structure. Whether they have pledged allegiance to Zawahiri or not is less significant than the common objective they pursue – a Sunni state under Sharia law. Avenarius argues that al-Qaeda has been declared dead prematurely and is	

	high strategic relevance. The	benefiting from the situation in Egypt, among	
	incident shows how heavily	others.	
	other rebel groups are		
	relying on ISIS. It also	SWP's Guido Steinberg argues that the Syrian civil	
	highlights ISIS' military	war has facilitated the latest escalation of violence	
	capability and its use of	in Iraq, but that Maliki's authoritarian style and his	
	suicide bombings to gain	anti-Sunni policies are the root of the problem. He	
	tactical advantage.	suggests that while Iraq will remain unstable for	
		years and while Maliki is set to continue his	
		'paranoid' course if he gets re-elected in 2014, a	
		new civil war remains an unlikely prospect due to	
		the strength of the Iraqi security forces. Steinberg's	
		analysis also implies that the future of Iraq depends	
		on how ISIS performs as part of the Syrian	
		opposition.	
07/08/2013		Die Welt reports that Menagh military air base fell	
		under the control of ISIS-led rebels after intense	
		fighting against Syrian regime troops. The air base	
		had previously been used by Assad's troops for	
		attacks against rebel troops in the north.	
10/08/2013		Der Spiegel reports that at least 50 people were	
		killed in a series of eight car bombings in	
		predominantly Shia districts in Baghdad as people	
		were celebrating the end of Ramadan.	
11/08/2013		HRW reports that ISIS has claimed responsibility for	
		the series of attacks in Iraq over the past four	
		months. It argues that ISIS' 'systematic policy of	
		killing civilians' amounts to crimes against humanity	
		and that 'no political goal or grievance can possibly	
		justify this widespread and organized murder	

	campaign, which is wreaking terrible suffering on	
	Iragis.' HRW highlights that the attacks also	
	targeted military installations and state institutions.	
	Referring to figures provided by the UN Mission in	
	Iraq (UNAMI), HRW reports that 1057 Iraqis were	
	killed during the month of July and that 2326 were	
	wounded, making it the bloodiest month in over	
	five years. Among the dead were 333 police and	
	security forces. HRW also reports that the acting UN	
	Special Representative for Iraq warned that July's	
	violence may herald a return to civil war.	
12/08/2013	Süddeutsche Zeitung reports how Raqqa, the only	Der Spiegel suggests that the coalition
	provincial capital held by rebels (with ISIS being the	is divided over its Syria policy. Deputy
	dominant force and having roughly 1500 fighters in	chairman of the CDU, Armin Laschet,
	town), has been bombed by Syrian regime troops	accused foreign minister Guido
	but how ISIS' base was not targeted.	Westerwelle of providing non-lethal
		equipment and humanitarian aid to the
	Florian Flade argues in <u>Die Welt</u> that al-Qaeda had	wrong rebel groups in Syria by saying:
	been declared dead prematurely after the death of	'it is absurd that we are supporting the
	Osama bin Laden in May 2011. While it is doubtful	same people in Syria that we are
	that Zawahiri is as influential within the organisation	fighting in Mali, namely the terrorist
	as his predecessor, al-Qaeda members continue to	organisations al-Nusra and al-Qaeda,
	be driven by the resolve to commit terrorist acts in	who are being financed by Saudi Arabia
	the West and will use any chance of doing so. Al-	and Qatar, who are introducing Sharia
	Qaeda's expansion, among others in Iraq and Syria,	courts and fighting religious diversity in
	will continue, among others due to the	Syria'. Laschet calls upon the
	deterioration of political contexts following the Arab	government to make deliveries
	spring. As such, Al-Qaeda is becoming increasingly	conditional upon the respect of human
	influential within Europe's neighbourhood.	rights by Syrian rebel groups. He also
		argues for a more active and critical

	Die Welt reports that at least 24 people were killed	stance to prevent further abductions
	in a series of suicide attacks in Iraq.	and help free those who have been abducted by Jihadi groups.
	Christoph Reuter argues in Der Spiegel that al-	
	Qaeda has successfully withdrawn to local	
	battlefields and that ISIS has become Al-Qaeda's	
	most powerful affiliate. He emphasises that	
	Zawahiri is unable to control and reunite all	
	affiliates. He claims that the biggest terrorist threat	
	stems from those who commit attacks after self-	
	radicalising and from al-Qaeda affiliates using post-	
	Arab spring conflicts. As such, the Syrian civil war	
	has given fresh impetus to al-Qaeda by becoming	
	the most popular destination for foreign jihadis.	
	Reuter further claims that Turkey is doing nothing	
	to stop foreign jihadists from entering Syria. He also	
	highlights that, due its 'diffuse ideology', al-Qaeda	
	has the tactical advantage over its opponents of	
	taking part in different conflicts simultaneously. In	
	Iraq, ISIS is benefiting from Maliki's anti-Sunni	
	policies. In Syria, it is gradually taking over foreign	
	fighters from Jabhat al-Nusra without letting	
	Zawahiri help settle the conflict between the two al-	
	Qaeda affiliates.	
13/08/2013		A foreign office spokesperson responds
		to Laschet's accusations (see
		12/08/2013) by saying that the
		government supports only those rebel
		groups who share Western values and

		not those who adhere to terrorist
		ideologies.
14/08/2013	The ICG warns that 'with frustration at a boil,	
	unprecedented Sunni-Shiite polarisation in the	
	region and deadly car bombings surging across the	
	country since the start of Ramadan in July, a revived	
	sectarian civil war is a serious risk' in Iraq. It traces	
	the origins of the crisis and discusses how it has	
	been escalating since April 2013. The ICG	
	emphasises that ISIS is resurgent, exploits political	
	grievances and has claimed responsibility for	
	coordinated attacks as early as 19 March 2013 – on	
	the 10 th anniversary of the U.S. led invasion of Iraq.	
	It recommends that the Iraqi government and	
	provincial councils prioritise counter-ISIS measures	
	and police the Syrian border to prevent the crossing	
	of Iraqi fighters.	
15/08/2013	Der Spiegel reports that at least 25 people were	
	killed in a series of bombing attacks in Baghdad and	
	that 17 were killed north of Baghdad the previous	
	day.	
19/08/2013	Michael Waltz argues in <u>Der Spiegel</u> that the recent	Foreign minister Guido Westerwelle
	prison breaks in Iraq, Pakistan and Libya were linked	assesses the situation in Syria as
	and part of al-Qaeda's tactics. He claims that the	follows: 'I do not believe that fewer
	organisation has gained strength and acts highly	lives will be lost if more arms are sent
	effectively. He warns about prison radicalisation and	to Syria. We are only supporting those
	argues that the U.S. has turned a blind eye to the	forces with which we share
	resurgence of al-Qaeda due to a desire to bring an	fundamental values. The fact that an
	end to the war on terror in Iraq and Afghanistan.	al-Nusra terrorist is fighting against
		Assad does not make him our friend.

		Damascus is just a stop on the road to Jerusalem for these people. That constitutes a threat to open society in Europe too. () In a country like Syria, the solution cannot be military; only a political solution can bring lasting peace and stability, as the country comprises various ethnic and religious groups.'
20/08/2013	Die Welt reports that Iraqi security forces have launched a major counterterrorism operation in which they have arrested 116 ISIS members, killed five, secured weapons and destroyed two ISIS training camps.Alfred Hackensberger reports in Die Welt how foreign jihadists, among others from Germany, play an increasingly influential role in Syria's civil war and are one of the reasons why three al-Qaeda affiliates (ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra, Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar) have become more powerful than moderate forces in Syria. He claims that at least nine journalists have been abducted by jihadists in July and August in Syria and that systematic abductions are a symptom of their growing influence. He quotes an opposition activist in Aleppo as saying that 'nobody can stop the jihadists now' and 'they can do what they want'. Hackensberger reports that jihadists are the dominant force in northern and eastern Syria and	

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		that they have the most money and best weapons	
		among opposition fighters. Jihadists are also often	
		perceived as elite fighters among rebel groups. He	
		refers to the concerns of domestic intelligence	
		analysts that those German citizens who join Jihadi	
		groups as foreign fighters in Syria will be fully	
		radicalised terrorists upon their return to Germany.	
		He further highlights that the Kurdish Democratic	
		Union Party (PYD) is the only rebel group to actively	
		counter the influence of jihadists in Syria.	
23/08/2013		Der Spiegel reports that at least 25 people were	Foreign minister Guido Westerwelle
		killed in a suicide attack in Baghdad while 7 people	urges caution in response to French
		lost their lives in earlier attacks outside of the	calls for the use of force in Syria:
		capital that day.	'Before speaking of consequences we
			must first have clarification.' Der
			Spiegel argues that 'Germany has gone
			from foot-dragging () to putting its
			foot down against French involvement
			in Syria', and that 'German
			obstructionism also reveals the
			consensus across the German political
			spectrum that an Islamist regime in
			Syria is to be avoided.' Der Spiegel also
			emphasises that 'Germans long refused
			the French assessment that the
			occupation of northern Mali by al-
			Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
			presented a threat against Western
			interests'.

25/08/2013	Der Spiegel reports that at least 48 people were	
	killed in a series of attacks across Iraq that day.	
26/08/2013	Die Welt reports that six people were abducted and killed in Tarmiyah, north of Baghdad.	[background on perceptions of decision-makers: foreign minister Guido Westerwelle <u>describes</u> the
	Der Spiegel reports how experts warn of heightened risks of Islamic terrorist attacks worldwide, severe implications for regional security in the Middle East, and an escalation of the refugee crisis should	Arabellions as the biggest challenge for Europe and highlights that the situation is 'at its most dramatic' in Syria.]
	Western states decide to launch a military intervention in Syria.	
27/08/2013		[background on German preferences: German politicians across all parties reportedly <u>prefer a political solution in</u> <u>Syria</u> to participation in a military
28/08/2013	Der Spiegel reports that at least 40 people were killed in a series of car bombings and suicide attacks	intervention.] Foreign minister Guido Westerwelle highlights that Germany's legal position
	in predominantly Shia districts in Baghdad that day.	prevents it from supplying arms to Syrian rebels. He further states: 'We
	Süddeutsche Zeitung highlights that al-Qaeda members in Iraq and Syria have merged into one entity and that terrorism in Iraq 'has become almost	want to support the moderate opposition forces in Syria. Just because a terrorist is fighting against Assad and
	as bad as during the most severe sectarian strife'. It argues that 'regime change in Syria and victory by jihadists is the last thing Maliki wants'.	his regime, that doesn't make him our ally. Arms supplies must not end up in the hands of terrorists and extremists.'
		When asked whether there are any moderate rebels left, he replies: 'There
		are, and we can provide them with support. Reducing our whole bag of

foreign policy tools down to military
options alone will not do. We have set
up a project office on the Turkish side
of the border region, for instance, to
help with reconstruction – from
infrastructure to schools – in the areas
under opposition control. We are
establishing an international trust fund
to collect money for reconstruction
and see that it reaches the opposition.
All these things are measures that can
help improve the moderate opposition
forces' standing among the people of
Syria. Moreover, Germany is one of the
countries doing the most to provide
humanitarian aid.' He further argues: 'I
have been warning that this conflict
could spread and engulf the whole
region ever since war broke out in
Syria. That danger makes it all the
more important to weigh up every
decision with great care, looking not
only at what seems the right thing to
do in the short term but also at what
will really serve the long term interests
of the Syrian people and peace and
stability in the region as a whole. One
reason why I am opposed to arming
radical opposition forces is that I am
afraid those weapons could at some

		point end up being turned on us and on our closest ally, Israel. For some jihadists and terrorists, Damascus is just a stopover on the way to Jerusalem.'
29/08/2013	Sonja Zekri argues in <u>Süddeutsche Zeitung</u> that Syria has turned into a state which is run by militias, with Jihadi groups being particularly powerful, and that the ousting of Assad's regime would prompt a new war. Alfred Hackensberger claims in <u>Die Welt</u> that Jihadi groups in Syria have moved their headquarters and weapons depots in anticipation of potential Western air strikes against Syrian regime targets out of fear that their positions would also be bombed.	Based on an assessment of ISIS' activities, particularly during its "Breaking the Walls" campaign, the domestic intelligence service concludes in its <u>annual report</u> that ISIS is a powerful actor in Iraq and will continue to launch severe attacks. It states that it is not yet known whether ISIS has active cells in Germany. The report also highlights that ISIS is seeking to exploit the situation in Syria to increase its influence in the region.
31/08/2013	 Markus Bickel claims in FAZ that ISIS and al-Nusra have become the most powerful forces in northern and eastern Syria, specifically around Aleppo, Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor, and that Syrian regime troops have largely lost control of the borders with Turkey and Iraq. <u>Süddeutsche Zeitung</u> reports that ISIS claimed responsibility for the recent series of bombing attacks in Iraq and that these have been carried out in retaliation for the execution of 17 al-Qaeda detainees in August. 	

John Hulsman argues in Süddeutsche ZeitungthatU.S. airstrikes against the Syrian regime wouldstrengthen Jihadi groups as the most powerful	
strengthen Jihadi groups as the most powerful	
members of the Syrian opposition. It would be more	
in line with U.S. interests to let Jihadi groups	
continue the fight against Assad, Iran and the	
Hezbollah.	
Aug 2013 The ICG <u>reports</u> that the security situation has	
continued to deteriorate in Iraq, that Prime Minister	
Maliki has linked terrorism in Iraq to the Syrian civil	
war and warned about further attacks in the	
broader region. The government launched a	
counter-terrorism operation on the outskirts of	
Baghdad in early August in which it made over 670	
arrests. The Iraqi foreign minister requested U.S.	
weapons and intelligence support for counter-	
terrorism measures. On Syria, the ICG reports that	
ISIS strengthened its positions along the northern	
and eastern fronts, which prompted alarm among	
opposition fighters and political activists amidst	
'continued reports of repressive governance in ISIS	
strongholds Aleppo and Raqqa'. It also estimates	
that '40,000 mostly Syrian Kurds fled to Iragi	
Kurdistan starting mid-Aug due to increased fighting	
between Kurdish militias and Islamist extremist	
rebel factions in Kurdish areas of NE Syria'.	
01/09/2013 [background on perc	eptions of
decision-makers: for	
Guido Westerwelle e	-
concern that the Syri	

		spill into the broader region. Germany will continue to support the reconstruction efforts by moderate rebel groups and provide humanitarian aid to Syrian refugees.]
02/09/2013	Sonja Zekri reports in <u>Süddeutsche Zeitung</u> that Jihadi groups in Syria prepared themselves for potential U.S. airstrikes by moving bases, weapons and vehicles, and by taking extra precautionary measures to protect their leaders.	[background on broader Syria policy: after meeting with the chairman of the Syrian National Coalition, foreign minister Guido Westerwelle signs a Framework Agreement together with the United Arab Emirates for the Syria Recovery Trust Fund through which Germany and the UAE make an initial contribution of EUR 10 million to the Syrian National Coalition. Westerwelle <u>argues</u> : 'If people in Syria put their trust in moderate elements of the opposition because they are visibly and actively forging ahead with reconstruction in areas that they control, then this will bolster their role in securing a political solution and a peaceful future for Syria.']
03/09/2013	Der Spiegel reports that at least 40 people were killed in a series of 11 coordinated car bombings in predominantly Shia districts in Baghdad. Nine further people were killed in shootings in Baghdad and Mosul. Among those were a member of the (anti-ISIS and pro-government) tribal militia Sahwa together with his wife and children. 12 further	The government expresses its <u>concern</u> about the escalation of violence in Iraq and calls upon Iraqi political leaders 'to work together constructively and responsibly to build stability and thereby deny terrorism any chance to take root and flourish'.

	Sahwa members were reportedly killed the previous	
	day.	[background on broader Syria policy: the Bundestag <u>discusses</u> the situation in Syria in detail, with Chancellor Angela Merkel providing an overview of Germany's policy and pushing for an intake of more Syrian refugees by Germany (in addition to the planned acceptance of 5000) and other European countries. Leader of the opposition Frank-Walter Steinmeier argues that Germany will need to assume more responsibility and international leadership to help end the Syrian civil war and address broader implications.]
04/09/2013	Sonja Zekri claims in <u>Süddeutsche Zeitung</u> that Iraq would fall apart if the Syrian state collapsed, that Iraqi security forces have been unable to protect the population since the withdrawal of U.S. troops and that the desperate situation in Iraq is 'the best argument against any Western interference in Syria'. She argues that ISIS would be the only winner in such a scenario. According to Zekri, the often- brutal response and provocation by Iraqi security forces triggers hatred among the marginalised Sunni population which ISIS exploits. She argues that Maliki is part of the problem and that his policies have failed.	

	FAZ reports that at least 64 people have been killed	
	in a series of 11 attacks in predominantly Shia	
	districts in Baghdad on 3 September.	
09/09/2013	Martin van Creveld argues in Die Welt against	
	counter-terrorism in Iraq and Syria with	
	conventional military means and plans (i.e.	
	targeting one centre of gravity). He further suggests	
	that if the West decided to intervene military	
	against Assad, this would trigger years of religiously	
	motivated war into which other countries in the	
	Middle East would be drawn as well.	
	Christoph Reuter reports in <u>Der Spiegel</u> about three	
	German citizens who had been taken hostage by	
	jihadists (presumably Jabhat al-Nusra) in northern	
	Syria in mid-May 2013. Two escaped in early July	
	and the third one escaped in early September.	
	Based on an interview with one of them, Reuter	
	provides insights into how the abduction was	
	organised and how powerful Jihadi groups have	
	become in northern Syria. At that point, more than	
	20 Western journalists and humanitarian workers	
	had been abducted by jihadists since November	
	2012, in addition to many Syrians.	
10/09/2013		In response to an opposition inquiry,
		the government <u>confirms</u> that it is
		monitoring ISIS' involvement in armed
		clashes in northern Syria but facing
		many unknowns. It argues that both
		ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra 'pursue al-

		Qaeda's goals', that most of ISIS' foreign fighters are from Arab states and that it does not have evidence related to the involvement of German jihadists. It further says to have unconfirmed information that ISIS is seeking to establish a caliphate 'at the local level in Raqqa province'.
11/09/2013		[background on broader Syria policy: the government organises a <u>first</u> <u>chartered flight for 107 Syrian refugees</u> to Germany. The decision to give temporary refuge to 5000 Syrians had been taken in March 2012.]
12/09/2013	Wolfgang Bauer reports in <u>Die Zeit</u> about fragile alliances between jihadists and the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and how the former have gradually come to spearhead most efforts by opposition fighters. Bauer highlights that many activists and local fixers of foreign journalists, including the person who helped him during his last three trips to Syria, have been abducted and tortured by ISIS. He reports how the FSA negotiates attacks against Syrian regime troops with ISIS. On his most recent trip to Syria, Bauer joined the FSA commander in Aleppo, Abdul Jabbar Akaidi. They passed the village of Herbel where ISIS fighters had ousted FSA fighters three days earlier and had opened fire on the local population, killing four and arresting 20. He describes the situation as 'a war within a war'.	

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	Bauer emphasises that it is highly uncertain on	
	whose side people are. After spending time at the	
	FSA headquarters in Aleppo, Bauer claims that ISIS	
	is better organised than the FSA and that it has	
	taken over vital areas of public life in Aleppo –	
	controlling the distribution of flour, gas, organising	
	waste collection, establishing Sharia courts, running	
	schools and providing financial assistance to parents	
	whose children attend those. He reports that ISIS	
	has only about 5000 fighters in Syria but that these	
	are better equipped and trained, and more	
	motivated than other opposition fighters. Bauer	
	also claims that the FSA is dependent on ISIS	
	fighters, but that it expects them to leave Syria after	
	the war, and that FSA commanders have repeatedly	
	urged ISIS fighters to spare the civilian population.	
	ISIS fighters are reportedly also killing Syrian regime	
	troops who want to surrender and join the FSA.	
	Bauer reports that ISIS is ousting Jabhat al-Nusra	
	from northern Syria and that some experts see it as	
	'the transnational terrorist organisation of the	
	future'.	
13/09/2013	Florian Flade reports in Die Welt that a German	
	jihadist has been killed in Syria and that roughly 120	
	German jihadists have left Germany for Syria since	
	late 2012. As a result, ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra have	
	released more German-language propaganda via	
	YouTube, Facebook and Twitter from Syria.	
15/09/2013		In a relatively vague <u>report</u> , the
		domestic intelligence agency discusses

		Islamist tendencies in Germany and the impact of Islamist activities and offers abroad (e.g. participation in training camps), among others by ISIS. It highlights the central role of the internet for the self-radicalisation of predominantly young people and how German jihadists are trying to commit attacks in Germany and how they are supporting Jihadi activities abroad, e.g. by facilitating radicalisation, spreading propaganda or providing logistical support. The report warns especially about those who return to Germany after spending time with jihadists abroad.
18/09/2013	SWP's Petra Becker describes how the Syrian regime has used the presence of foreign Jihadi fighters to characterise the Syrian protest movement as organised by radical Sunni from abroad and how the intelligence services have conveyed this message to minorities in Syria – suggesting they have a choice to either opt for Assad or a radical Islamic state. She claims that this propaganda strategy has been successful, and that fear of Jihadi groups has prevented the international community from supporting the opposition. This has led to a vicious circle in which Western states fear the spread of radical Islam if the Syrian regime is ousted and in which Jihadi groups	[background on broader Syria policy: foreign minister Guido Westerwelle <u>outlines</u> how Germany seeks to contribute to the destruction of Syria's chemical weapons: by supporting the work of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons with EUR 2 million and offering technical assistance.]

10/00/2012	will become more powerful if Assad stays in power. She argues that the jihadists are about to seize the Syrian revolution for their own objectives by claiming that the West is indifferent to the fate of those Syrians who hope for a better future. She also highlights how the people of Raqqa had, in vain, been asking for weapons to oust ISIS from their town and how moderate rebel groups cannot gain the upper hand over ISIS due to a lack of money and weapons.	On Suria, foreign minister Suide
19/09/2013	Markus Bickel reports in FAZ that tensions among Syrian rebel groups have grown, especially between Jihadi groups and members of the Supreme Military Council, with ISIS and the FSA and al-Nusra and the PYD increasingly clashing. He refers to Charles Lister's warning that moderate Islamist groups in Syria could become increasingly radical.	On Syria, foreign minister Guido Westerwelle <u>argues</u> : 'Some people still believe that a military solution is possible. I don't. A military solution would only lead to more terror and create a failed state. Armed groups would go underground, regardless of who won the civil war. A new wave of terrorism would erupt. These terrorists would threaten Turkey and even us in central Europe. That's a serious concern I have. Iraq has shown us some of what can happen.'
22/09/2013	FAZ reports that at least 65 people have been killed in a combined suicide attack and car bombing at a funeral in Baghdad.	Head of domestic intelligence, Hans- Georg Maaßen, <u>reports</u> that roughly 170 German jihadists have left for Syria and that it remains a highly attractive country for jihadists. He expresses concern that those who have been to Syria might carry out terrorist attacks

		and spread propaganda upon their return. Maaßen views Islamist extremism and terrorism as the main security threat in Germany and claims that 42.000 German citizens could potentially become radicalised.
24/09/2013	Based on the claim that ISIS and al-Nusra were responsible for every major rebel victory in the Syrian civil war over the past year, <u>FAZ</u> predicts that these two will continue to be the most powerful Syrian rebel groups.	
25/09/2013	Sonja Zekri reports in <u>Süddeutsche Zeitung</u> how the rift between the political opposition and armed groups has deepened in Syria. 13 militia groups, including Jabhat al-Nusra as well as moderate Islamists and regular units of the FSA, have denounced their loyalty to the Syrian National Coalition and have instead sworn unity under an Islamic framework and agreed to implement Sharia Law. However, ISIS is not part of this fragile alliance and ISIS and the FSA continue to clash in northern Syria. Zekri suggests that moderate groups have been more willing to support Jihadi groups due to the dwindling prospects of a U.S. military intervention against Assad. According to Zekri, it has become obvious that Jihadi groups in Syria are not first and foremost interested in regime change and national liberation, but perceive Syria as stepping stone for the expansion of a transnational Islamic state.	

26/09/2013		<u>HRW</u> highlights that 'Syrian opposition forces are indeed responsible for serious crimes in their conduct of war, including attacks against civilians,	
		summary executions, kidnappings, torture, and	
		other abuses', and that the activities of radical	
		Islamists are especially concerning.	
28/09/2013			Foreign minister Guido Westerwelle discusses the escalation of violence and the effects of the Syrian civil war on the security situation in Iraq with his Iraqi counterpart.
29/09/2013	The capital of Iraq's		
	autonomous Kurdistan		
	region, Erbil, is hit for the		
	first time in six years by a		
	series of coordinated attacks		
	in which at least six Kurdish		
	security forces are killed.		
	This comes as a shock to		
	many as Kurdistan had		
	largely been spared the		
	violence other regions were		
	experiencing. It had further		
	been considered more stable		
	and prosperous, had		
	attracted substantial foreign		
	investment and had just		
	announced the results of its		
	parliamentary elections. Iraqi		
	government officials and		

	members of parliament		
	suggest that the attacks are		
	linked to the Syrian civil war		
	where ISIS is battling Kurdish		
	fighters and that it had been		
	carried out by ISIS fighters		
	based in Mosul. According to		
	the <u>NYT</u> , the attacks in Erbil		
	'demonstrated that no place		
	in Iraq was truly safe, as the		
	war in Syria increasingly		
	spills over its borders and as		
	Iraq's own Sunni insurgent		
	groups accelerate their		
	attacks'.		
30/09/2013		Markus Bickel reports in FAZ about the terrorist	
		attacks in Erbil on 29 September. He links the	
		attacks to clashes between ISIS and the PYD in the	
		Syrian civil war and claims that acts of revenge by	
		ISIS against Iraqi Kurds had been predicted. He also	
		refers to a report by the ICG (see 14/08) and its	
		warning that a renewed sectarian civil war has	
		become a serious risk in Iraq.	
Sept 2013		The ICG <u>reports</u> that ISIS and the FSA agreed to a	
		fragile truce on 20 September after ISIS had	
		captured the town of Azaz. In mid-September, ISIS	
		killed an aid worker who had been affiliated with	
		the Salafi group Ahrar al-Sham, prompting criticism	
		from Salafi militants. On Iraq, the ICG reports that	
		among the attacks in September with over 660	

01/10/2013	 reported deaths the series of bombings in Erbil on 29 September stood out as the first terrorist attacks in the autonomous Kurdish north since 2007. Further major attacks occurred across Iraq on 20, 21, 24, 25 and 30 September. HRW reports how Syrian regime forces dropped fuel-air explosive bombs on Raqqa in an (unsuccessful) attempt to oust ISIS from Raqqa after the latter had strengthened its control of the city. HRW also reports that its staff have not been able to return to Raqqa since April due to security concerns. 	Foreign minister Guido Westerwelle responds to the latest series of attacks in Iraq on 29-30 September after violence reached the once-calm area of Kurdistan: 'We condemn the appalling attacks in Iraq in the strongest terms. I appeal to all those with positions of responsibility in Iraq to leave no stone unturned in their efforts to put an end to the wave of terror which has been plaguing the country for several months. A concerted effort is now
		and its people and prevent it from
07/10/2013	Peter Steinbach reports in <u>Die Welt</u> how ISIS and	descending into civil war.'
	Jabhat al-Nusra have been trying to take control of	
	Kurdish areas in northeastern Syria for the past six	
	months and how they regularly clash with Kurdish	
	People's Protection Units (YPG). The region is of	
	high strategic relevance due to large oil and gas	
	reserves. A YPG commander recalls how 400 Jihadi	
	fighters took control of Alouk one night and how his	
	unit eventually recaptured it after killing 39	
	jihadists. ISIS and al-Nusra fighters have reportedly	

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	beheaded more than 20 people in Kurdish areas.	
	Steinbach reports that Jihadi groups have overall	
	become stronger than other opposition forces but	
	that the YPG is for the moment still holding its	
	ground. YPG fighters argue that Turkey allows all	
	foreign fighters to enter Syria from its territory and	
	supports Jihadi groups as they are waging war	
	against the Kurds.	
08/10/2013	Reiner Burger reports in FAZ how the city of Bonn	
	has long become an arena for Jihadi Salafists in	
	Germany and how the spokesperson of a local	
	Muslim council, who had been invited to help with	
	the launch of a new preventive and integrative	
	programme, had covertly supported Jihadi groups in	
	Syria. Burger further reports that 170 German	
	jihadists have travelled to Syria, 90 of whom were	
	from North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), and that	
	German security services are monitoring 1500	
	Salafists in NRW.	
10/10/2013	In a detailed report, HRW presents evidence that at	
	least 190 civilians were killed and over 200 hostages	
	were taken during a military offensive in Alawite	
	villages in Latakia province on 4 August 2013. The	
	offensive had been launched by ISIS and four other	
	Jihadi groups and HRW suggests that ISIS had been	
	in charge. The hostages, most of whom are women	
	and children, are still being held by ISIS and Jaish al-	
	Muhajireen wal-Ansar. ISIS has reportedly	
	contacted some family members of the hostages	
	and asked for ransom. Abu Ayman reportedly	
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	commanded ISIS during the offensive and Abu	
	Jaafar was deputy commander. HRW argues that	
	the actions, which were carefully planned and	
	systematically executed, amount to war crimes and	
	crimes against humanity.	
11/10/2013	HRW's Erin Evers <u>reports</u> that Iraqi officials have	
	executed 42 people on 9-10 October and that	
	violence is sharply escalating on all sides. Terrorist	
	attacks in Iraq have killed over 4950 people in Iraq	
	in 2013 so far and the latest suicide attack targeted	
	a playground, killing 11 children.	
	Der Spiegel's Raniah Salloum and FAZ's Markus	
	Bickel refer to HRW's findings regarding the Latakia	
	massacre in August 2013 (see 10/10). Salloum	
	reports how the perpetrators announced and	
	documented their offensive on social media. Bickel	
	reports that the Syrian National Coalition responded	
	to HRW's report by condemning ISIS and other	
	Jihadi groups and warning that they were becoming	
	increasingly powerful.	
13/10/2013		[background on broader Syria policy:
		the foreign office and ministry of
		defence run a <u>training course</u> for 25
		civilian OPCW experts who are part of
		the UN mission overseeing the
		_
		destruction of Syria's chemical
		weapons.]

17/10/2013	Die Welt reports that at least 66 people were killed in a series of 13 attacks in and around Baghdad and near Mosul.The ICG describes group in Syria which 'has generated strong criticism for the track of the series	
	from activists for its authoritarian tactics, public executions, ideological extremism and vicious sectarianism, and has been accused of firing on peaceful demonstrators, bombing a rival faction's headquarters and detaining activists for offences ranging from non-violent dissent to smoking cigarettes during Ramadan'. The ICG conducted interviews with Syrian activists who had been abducted by ISIS and emphasises how strong ISIS' hold of Raqqa has become. It reports that ISIS has become 'the most powerful group in northern and eastern Syria and was benefiting from control of oil	
	fields it had wrested from Jabhat al-Nusra when it split from the group in April 2013'.	
21/10/2013		Der Spiegel reports how the domestic intelligence service has become increasingly concerned about the influx of roughly 200 German jihadists to Syria, overall radicalisation and the threat this could pose to Germany.
23/10/2013	Peter Steinbach reports in <u>Die Welt</u> how ISIS has been attempting to capture the predominantly Christian and Kurdish Hasakah province in eastern Syria for the past six months and how the Sotoro, a	The president of the Federal Criminal Police (BKA) <u>describes</u> the internet as the 'distance-learning university of religiously-motivated terrorism' and

	Christian militia, and the Kurdish YPG have jointly been countering the offensives. Steinbach also reports how ISIS fighters are regularly abducting members of the Christian community in an attempt to terrorise the local population and receive ransom. ISIS fighters are also advancing on another predominantly Christian area, Wadi al-Nasara in Western Syria. They are launching daily offensives from their headquarters at the historic Crusader castle of Krak des Chevaliers.	discusses how Jihadi groups have increasingly been using it for propaganda and recruitment in Germany. The BKA has been developing new techniques for structured analysis of foreign-language big data to respond to these challenges and is, among others, able to evaluate information in the Kurdish Sorani dialect.
29/10/2013	Karen Krüger reports in <u>FAZ</u> how Denis Cuspert became the poster boy of German-grown jihadism and a highly successful propagandist of ISIS in Syria after becoming radicalised in 2010. She further reports that roughly 200 German jihadists are now in Syria of whom 8 have died.	
	HRW argues that 'Iraq does face serious security threats, but the government's failure to make urgently needed reforms and hold officials accountable for terrible abuses like torture has made Iraq less safe, not more. In fact, the government's heavy-handed approach is contributing to greater instability and exacerbating sectarian tensions'. HRW further describes these tensions due to Maliki's failed policies as follows: 'The escalation in executions after trials in which people are convicted on the basis of coerced confessions and secret evidence—for the most part in the name of counterterrorism—have done	

	nothing to address the crisis. On the contrary,	
	numerous Iraqis, Shia and Sunni, have told Human	
	Rights Watch that authorities' failure to hold	
	perpetrators accountable regardless of their sect	
	has polarized Iraq's population, particularly in Sunni	
	areas where people see the government's failure to	
	hold Shia-dominated security forces accountable as	
	confirmation that policies remain rooted in	
	sectarianism.'	
30/10/2013	HRW argues that 'more Syrians will be drawn to the	
	brutality of the Islamic extremists who are in	
	ascendancy among the rebels' should all conflict	
	parties continue to commit atrocities.	
Oct 2013	<u>SWP</u> 's Petra Becker highlights that 'the (Syrian)	
	National Coalition and its Supreme Military	
	Command have faced defections of major rebel	
	forces, which may lead to a major shift towards	
	Jihadi Salafism and the marginalization of moderate	
	forces on the ground'.	
	The ICG <u>reports</u> that ISIS fought rebel groups on 2	
	October in Azaz and lost the Yaaroubiyeh border	
	crossing to a Kurdish militia on 27 October. But it	
	overall continued its expansion in northern and	
	eastern Syria. On Iraq, the ICG reports that October	
	was the deadliest month since April 2008 with more	
	than 900 people killed. Terrorist attacks led, among	
	others, to 'some 35 killed in 10 car explosions in	
	predominantly Shia areas in Baghdad 27 Oct; at	
	least 19 police and 3 civilians killed 22-23 Oct in	

	series of bomb attacks in Anbar; 13 children killed 6
	Oct in attack on school in Qabak; string of car and
	roadside bombings 14 Oct killed at least 44.'
01/11/2013	SWP's Volker Perthes argues that Russia's support
	of the Syrian regime stems, among others, from a
	fear of Jihadi groups among the Syrian opposition
	and concerns that Islamic-inspired revolutions could
	spill over and reach the Caucasus and Central Asia.
	Perthes suggests that Jihadi forces in Syria benefit
	from the loss of credibility by the West as this helps
	them to strengthen and spread their anti-Western
	propaganda and to demonstrate that the 'true Jihad
	does not even lack ammunition'.
03/11/2013	Rudolph Chimelli reports in <u>Süddeutsche Zeitung</u>
	that 66 people were killed in a series of car
	bombings in Baghdad and northern Iraq that day
	and that over 7000 people have so far died in
	terrorist attacks in 2013. He highlights that ISIS in
	Iraq has been strengthened by the influx of foreign
	fighters and that it is operating in Iraq and across
	the border in Syria from camps in western Iraq.
	Chimelli claims that corruption within the Iraqi
	security apparatus facilitates ISIS' activities.
	Der Spiegel reports that at least 36 people were
	killed in a series of suicide attacks, car bombings
	and shootings in Sharqat, Mosul, Baquba and west
	of Kirkuk.
04/11/2013	[background on broader Iraq policy:
	The Bundeswehr is organising a

		training course for <u>Iraqi chemical</u> <u>weapons</u> experts at its Research Institute for Protective Technologies and NBC Protection, training them to use German technology to destroy chemical weapons stockpiles left over from Saddam Hussein's regime. It further announces the deployment of a mobile laboratory for the detection and analysis of chemical warfare agents to Iraq. Germany had agreed on the assistance following Iraq's accession to the international Chemical Weapons Convention in 2009.]
09/11/2013	Raniah Salloum reports in <u>Der Spiegel</u> how ISIS has become the most powerful actor in northern Syria and how it plans to establish an Islamic state in its captured areas. Salloum argues that ISIS benefits from other Syrian militia being fragmented, decentralised and under-resourced. She emphasises that ISIS is going to stay in Syria and that it has launched a brutal campaign against anyone who is in its way, among others by assassinating Syrian journalists and activists. Salloum claims that ISIS seemed almost defeated in Iraq, but that Maliki's polarising policies and the Syrian civil war opened a new window of opportunity which allowed for a resurgence in 2013. She argues that ISIS remains popular, especially among foreign fighters, despite Zawahiri's statement that ISIS should be abolished	

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	and that al-Baghdadi should confine his group's	
	activities to Iraq. She claims that ISIS has higher	
	chances of success in Syria than AQI during the	
	previous decade in Iraq as it has learned important	
	lessons – such as providing basic services to the	
	local population and engaging in charitable	
	activities. She argues that these enabling activities	
	are higher on the priority list than the fight against	
	Assad.	
14/11/2013	Der Spiegel reports that more than 30 people were	
	killed that day in a series of suicide attacks and car	
	bombings targeting Shia pilgrims during the Ashura	
	celebrations.	
15/11/2013	HRW argues that the surge in terrorist attacks	[background on broader Syria and Iraq
	across Iraq should be deterred with investigations	policy: The government agency
	and preventive measures, and not by harassing the	Technisches Hilfswerk, a civil protection
	Sunni population, e.g. through indiscriminate	organisation, starts supporting the
	arrests. The latter would further alienate the Sunni	build-up of <u>camps for Syrian refugees in</u>
	population and spark anger among them which	Iraq's Kurdistan region.
	could fuel rather than prevent future attacks by	
	Sunni insurgents. HRW also reports that a suicide	
	bomber targeted another group of Shia worshippers	
	on 13 November, killing eight. HRW highlights that	
	violence by Sunni insurgents against Shia	
	worshippers on holy days is not a new phenomenon	
	and that similar attacks happened on Ashura in	
	2012, killing 62, or in 2004, killing 180 Shia pilgrims.	
	Yet, compared to previous years, insurgent attacks	
	against predominantly Shia targets have escalated	

	drastically after Iraqi security forces attacked a	
	protest camp in Hawija in April 2013.	
19/11/2013	HRW documents unlawful killings of civilians during	
	a joint offensive against regime forces by ISIS and	
	five other groups in the Christian village of Sadad,	
	northeast of Damascus, from 21 to 28 October	
	2013. The insurgents had entered the village	
	claiming not to harm civilians but executed many	
	and used others as a human shield.	
20/11/2013	Süddeutsche Zeitung and FAZ report that at least 12	
	people were killed in a series of attacks in Baghdad.	
	Further, a high-ranking Iraqi official was shot in his	
	house in the Kurdish city of Sulaymaniyah.	
21/11/2013	Der Spiegel reports that at least 25 people were	
	killed in a car bombing in Diyala province in eastern	
	Iraq. The previous day, 59 people were killed in a	
	series of attacks across Iraq.	
22/11/2013	Markus Bickel reports in FAZ about the 'war within	
	the civil war' due to complex and rapidly changing	
	power structures in northern Syria and the presence	
	of 'thousands of foreign jihadists'. He argues that	
	those moderate Syrian rebel groups who feel	
	abandoned by the West have come under increased	
	pressure to develop a more radical Islamist profile	
	to receive funding for much-needed weapons from	
	Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait. Bickel claims that	
	moderate rebels will lose ground to ISIS and al-	
	Nusra unless the West supports them more	
	adequately.	

23/11/2013	Peter Carstens and Christoph Ehrhardt warn in FAZ	
	about the combination of German jihadists easily	
	travelling into Syria and German Jihadi groups such	
	as Millatu Ibrahim becoming better organised.	
	Roughly 220 German jihadists are now reportedly in	
	Syria of whom 9 have died. The authors quote the	
	domestic intelligence agency and SWP's Guido	
	Steinberg as claiming that only few indications	
	suggest that German jihadists engage in armed	
	clashes and become affiliated with ISIS or al-Nusra	
	once in Syria, but that the trend is alarming.	
29/11/2013	HRW reports that four journalists have been killed	
	in Mosul since October 2013 and that ISIS has a	
	strong presence there. According to interviews with	
	Mosul residents, 'the central government's policies	
	of conducting mass arrests and unlawful detentions	
	in the area have ostracized the population'. A local	
	journalist told HRW: 'Mosul has two governments	
	By day, it's the local government, but at night, it's	
	al-Qaeda.' Another observed: 'Mosul's journalists	
	are caught between two fires If they are not	
	targeted by terrorists, they're targeted by the	
	government, which considers all Mosul residents	
	terrorists.'	
	Der Spiegel reports that 28 people were abducted	
	and executed in three different locations in and	
	around Baghdad. At least 23 further were killed in a	
	series of attacks across Iraq.	

30/11/2013	Christiane Schlötzer claims in <u>Süddeutsche Zeitung</u>	
	that young Turks are increasingly joining ISIS and	
	Jabhat al-Nusra and that Turkish security forces are	
	doing nothing to stop them and others from	
	entering Syria. Facing criticism about its lack of	
	control from German officials, Turkish authorities	
	argue that it is up to Germany to prevent its citizens	
	from leaving and that it proves impossible for	
	Turkey to figure out who is travelling through its	
	territory in order to join Jihadi groups.	
Nov 2013	The ICG reports that Syrian rebels are divided over	
	the brutality and growing power of ISIS. Seven	
	Islamist rebel groups merged into the "Islamic	
	Front" on 22 November to counter ISIS' influence.	
	Kurdish militias continued their campaign against	
	ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra in northeastern Syria and	
	managed to gain control over 19 towns and villages.	
	On Iraq, the ICG reports that at least 169 people	
	were killed in a series of bombings and executions	
	between 20 and 29 November. On 25 November,	
	France offered weapons and counter-terrorism	
	training to the Iraqi government.	
01/12/2013	Der Spiegel reports how a suicide bomber in Iraq	
	killed at least ten people during the funeral for a	
	member of the Sahwa militia who had been killed in	
	a bombing attack in Baqubah the previous evening.	
03/12/2013		FAZ and Die Welt report how the
		federal state of Hesse raises the
		initiative for a nationwide early
		warning system to better prevent and
		warning system to setter prevent and

		detect Salafi radicalisation in Germany. Hesse's interior minister argues that Germany needs to raise more awareness of radical Islamists targeting pupils in secondary schools and calling for jihad on social media. He highlights the necessity of common procedures when dealing with returning foreign fighters.
05/12/2013	SWP's <u>Guido Steinberg</u> draws parallels between violence in Iraq in 2013 and the 2005-2007 Iraqi civil war and argues that the current situation has not yet reached the same level of escalation. He traces how protests began in December 2012 in Sunni areas in western and northern Iraq and how the overall situation differs from 2005-2007. He highlights how Sunni insurgents from northern and eastern Syria had been contributing to AQI's activities since 2003 and how they have been cooperating with ISIS more recently. Steinberg argues that the loss of control of security forces in western and northern Iraq enables cross-border cooperation. He predicts that Maliki will likely remain in power due to a weak opposition and that Iraq will remain unstable. But he considers it unlikely that Iraq will slide back into civil war due to the 'superiority of the Iraqi security forces'. Wolf Wiedmann-Schmidt and Yassin Musharbash report in Die Zeit about more than 220 German	

09/12/2013	citizens who have recently travelled to Syria. It is unclear how many have joined Jihadi groups, as only 10 cases and 6 deaths have been confirmed. The authors report about a 26-year old convert who left Germany six months ago and became the first German citizen to pledge allegiance to ISIS in a propaganda video from Syria. They view this as an alarming development which lends new urgency to concerted counter measures. They report how quickly German citizens can become radicalised, how easy it is for them to enter Syria and how challenging it is for German authorities to deal with those who have returned.Der Spiegel reports that at least 55 people were killed in a series of attacks across Iraq on 8 and 9 December.Der Spiegel also reports about German jihadist to join ISIS in Syria, and it claims that his radical statements could potentially provoke lone wolf attacks in Germany.Sonja Zekri reports in Süddeutsche Zeitung how the	The government <u>confirms</u> that more than 200 German jihadists have left for Syria, of whom 20 were accompanied by their spouses, and that less than 10 of those who were actively involved in armed clashes have returned to Germany. It highlights that it is paying close attention to the media channels of German jihadists in Syria, namely 'ShamCenter' and 'Al Ghurabi media', and monitoring Jihadi propaganda on various websites and online networks. German authorities <u>arrest</u> a German
	FSA, initially the strongest Syrian rebel group, is losing members and territory to ISIS and the Islamic Front.	jihadist upon his return from Syria.

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	Rainer Hermann argues in <u>FAZ</u> that Abu Bakr al-	
	Baghdadi has become more successful than Osama	
	bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi due to his	
	creation of a transnational Islamic state spanning	
	Raqqa and Anbar province and the expansion of	
	ISIS' presence in Mosul. Citing U.S. officials in Time	
	Magazine and The New York Times, he warns that it	
	is 'only a matter of time until ISIS strikes against the	
	West'. Hermann claims that Baghdadi has also	
	become more powerful than al-Qaeda's Ayman al-	
	Zawahiri since the Abu Ghraib prison break in July	
	2013 and due to ISIS' appeal to foreign fighters, and	
	that Baghdadi has a proper and bigger caliphate in	
	mind. Herman refers to Joshua Landis' Syria	
	Comment blog as a crucial source of knowledge	
	claims. He concludes that the more stable ISIS'	
	caliphate is going to be, the higher the risks for the	
	West.	
13/12/2013	Der Spiegel reports how at least 17 people have	
	been shot dead in an attack on an oil field in	
	Muqdadiyah, northeast of Baghdad.	
15/12/2013		[background on perceptions of
		decision-makers: upon leaving the
		government, Guido Westerwelle <u>takes</u>
		stock of his four years in office. He
		summarises German foreign policy
		under him as 'policy of peace' given
		that Germany did not participate in
		new wars, has been speeding up the
		withdrawal from Afghanistan and

		reduced its military presence in the Balkans once political solutions came within reach. According to him, one lesson Germany should have learned from Libya is that one cannot stabilise a conflict zone in a sustainable manner without clear political concepts. He admits that he and other Cabinet members were too optimistic during the Arab spring.]
16/12/2013	Christoph Reuter argues in <u>Der Spiegel</u> that the FSA, which has been 'abandoned by the West' and is demoralised, can do little to counter ISIS. He reports how ISIS abducts and executes hundreds of people from Raqqa and how activists are fleeing to Turkey. Anyone who resists ISIS, or is classified as an unbeliever, disappears. He highlights that ISIS maintains four prisons outside of Raqqa. Reuter argues that 'Raqqa has only been the beginning'. While ISIS was relatively unknown when it started operating in Syria, it has over the past four months taken control of several towns (Azaz, Jarabulus, Al- Dana, Atarib, Binnish, Al-Bab, Turmanin), parts of Aleppo, strategic roads, oil fields and depots. He claims that recent developments in northern and northeastern Syria could confirm worst fears and contribute to the collapse of Syria as the local population and rebel groups are unable to counter ISIS' rapid expansion. Reuter recalls how he had warned in August 2012 that the West would pay for	

	its political ignorance and hesitance vis-à-vis the	
	Syrian civil war and how it would watch while Syria	
	disintegrated and attracted Islamist terrorism. He	
	warned then that the longer the West waited the	
	sooner would others, including al-Qaeda, fill the	
	political vacuum. As a result, the West would be	
	getting all the things it had been hoping to prevent.	
	Reuter argues that the West did not want to	
	support Syrian rebels initially out of fear that al-	
	Qaeda might expand into Syria and that as a result	
	of its inaction, ISIS has become a powerful actor in	
	Syria. He claims that ISIS' success of exploiting	
	disagreement among Syrian rebel groups stems	
	from a combination of a strong central command,	
	brutality and corruption. Reuter also highlights how	
	the power struggle between Jabhat al-Nusra, ISIS	
	and al-Qaeda has strengthened ISIS, with most	
	foreign fighters having joined ISIS since. He claims	
	how ISIS has become better organised and trained,	
	has developed more effective military strength and	
	has as such become more of a serious threat since	
	the autumn. Reuter also argues that ISIS has	
	exploited the uncertain situation and the challenges	
	rebel groups face, and that it benefits from the	
	Syrian regime accepting its presence and not	
	seeking to counter it. He highlights that ISIS'	
	headquarters in Raqqa, which can barely be missed,	
	has not yet been bombed by the regime. Reuter	
	also claims that much remains unknown about the	
	strategists behind ISIS.	
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	Der Spiegel and FAZ report that at least 53 people have been killed in a series of attacks that targeted Shia pilgrim groups, predominantly Shia districts and Iraqi security forces across the country. FAZ reports that ISIS attempted a prison break in Baji in northern Iraq.	
17/12/2013	Markus Bickel reports in FAZ that a prominent Syrian human rights lawyer has been abducted, presumably by ISIS, and that 60 Syrian activists and 35 journalist have been kidnapped by ISIS.	During the handover ceremony, new foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier <u>refers</u> extensively to the Syrian civil war. His remarks suggest a more nuanced perception of conflict dynamics than his predecessor: 'Today, we know that the portrayal of a simple confrontation between autocratic regimes and democratic opposition does not always do justice to the complex nature of conflicts in the Arab world. This analysis was already wrong in Libya, and it fails spectacularly to describe the conflict in Syria. There, the longing for a democratic opposition, for freedom predominated at the beginning and it is still alive now. Yet another side of the opposition is growing, one which is no different from the regime in terms of brutality and ruthlessness. In my opinion we have overlooked the fact that from the outset, the conflict in Syria has also

		been a proxy war for supremacy in the Islamic world and is a struggle over the expansion of Sunni and Shiite spheres of influence. If that is correct then the debate which took place a few weeks ago on a military solution to the conflict was simply absurd!'
18/12/2013	 Til Biermann reports in <u>Die Welt</u> how U.S. terrorism experts Marc Sageman and Bruce Hoffman have resumed their quarrel about the strength of al-Qaeda, and now ISIS, and the threat these might pose. SWP's Guido Steinberg sees this as a problematic and attention-seeking debate. He highlights that ISIS is completely independent from al-Qaeda, but that the latter's ideology continues to influence the former and other Jihadi groups, and that chance is a huge factor for the success of Jihadi attacks in the West. Rüdiger Soldt and Reiner Burger report in <u>FAZ</u> about the arrest of two German jihadists who were on their way to Syria. They warn about quick radicalisation and recruitment processes, the return of German foreign fighters and their ability to organise terrorist attacks in Germany. Roughly 240 German jihadists have now travelled to Syria. Referring to a German convert and his video message from Syria, the authors warn about the appeal of ISIS' propaganda. 	

19/12/2013	Amnesty International documents serious human	Germany introduces the 'Enable and
	rights abuses in ISIS-run detention facilities in	Enhance Initiative' at a European
	northern Syria, including in and around Raqqa,	Council meeting, with an emphasis on
	Aleppo and Idlib province. It also sheds light on the	preventing further conflict and
	rules ISIS has established in the areas it controls,	increasing the effectiveness of local
	including flogging and summary executions. Based	security and stability measures in Iraq
	on ten interviews conducted with former detainees	and four other countries (Mali, Nigeria,
	who had been held by ISIS between May and	Tunisia, Jordan).
	November 2013, Amnesty International argues that	
	most abuses, such as abductions, arbitrary	Discussing the Syrian civil war, a
	detention and torture, amount to war crimes. It	member of parliament (CDU/CSU) <u>says</u> :
	reports that children have also been held in ISIS	'if we are to believe press reports, the
	prisons. The former detainees have reportedly	opposition is gradually being taken
	'asked that the world should wake up to the plight	over by radical Islamists'.
	of those now suffering under ISIS in northern Syria'.	
	Amnesty International argues that ISIS' power has	
	grown significantly since April 2013. It sheds light on	
	how ISIS consolidated its influence in Raqqa and	
	beyond since the spring of 2013.	
21/12/2013	Markus Bickel reports in FAZ that ISIS is controlling	
	territory on both sides of the Syria-Iraqi border and	
	that the Assad regime continues to tolerate ISIS'	
	activities in Syria tacitly. Forced into a two-front	
	war, lacking equipment and losing fighters to	
	jihadist groups, moderate Syrian rebels are losing	
	ground. Bickel argues that ISIS' powerful role in	
	Syria is guaranteeing Assad's survival while its cross-	
	border activities are threatening to destabilise the	
	entire region.	

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23/12/2013	HRW's Emma Daly reports about the abduction of	
	Spanish journalists Javier Espinosa and Ricardo	
	Garcia Vilanova by ISIS. Both have been held since	
	September 2013, with ISIS refusing to negotiate	
	their release. At least 30 journalists are reported	
	missing in Syria, making it 'the most dangerous	
	country in the world for the media'. Daly highlights	
	that it is 'hard to keep track of numbers, since many	
	outlets and families choose to keep quiet about the	
	missing in the hope of negotiating a return'. The	
	FSA's Supreme Military Council has said 'that most	
	people going after the journalists were outside their	
	control'. Daly concludes that 'the world cannot	
	learn about the horrors in Syria when journalists	
	can't do their jobs'.	
25/12/2013	Die Welt and FAZ report that at least 38 people	Statement by foreign minister Frank-
	have been killed in a series of four attacks in	Walter Steinmeier: 'I utterly condemn
	Baghdad. Christians who were leaving church after a	the use of terrorist violence against
	Christmas service were among those targeted.	members of religious minorities in Iraq.
		The situation in Iraq is becoming no
		easier. And the continuing civil war in
		neighbouring Syria, with all its extreme
		brutality, is further increasing the
		instability in the country. It is therefore
		all the more important that Prime
		Minister Maliki's Government meet its
		responsibility to protect all minorities
		in the country and to tackle terrorism
		and violence with every
		determination.'

26/12/2013	Uwe Schmitt reports in <u>Die Welt</u> that the U.S. is	
	supporting the Iraqi government with more	
	effective weapons, specifically 75 hellfire missiles, in	
	its fight against ISIS and that additional deliveries of	
	drones and F-16 fighter aircraft are scheduled for	
	2014. He discusses the dilemma in which the U.S.	
	finds itself with the escalation of violence and	
	Maliki's policies, and how a high-ranking U.S.	
	security official had described the situation in Iraq in	
	March 2013 as 'the least violent in years'. He	
	highlights how the U.S. is facing competing priorities	
	with the organisation of the withdrawal from	
	Afghanistan. Schmitt further reports that the	
	commander of Iraq's 7 th division as well as two of	
	his staff had been killed in a suicide attack the	
	previous week.	
	HRW's Erin Evers argues that new U.S. weapon	
	deliveries won't address Iraq's challenges, namely	
	the fight against ISIS. These measures are 'missing	
	the point' as there is 'little evidence that Iraq's	
	failure to improve security in the country stems	
	from a lack of weapons, but rather from its short-	
	sighted approach to corruption and sectarian	
	politics, and a counterterrorism strategy	
	that targets Sunni Iraqis amounting to collective	
	punishment.' She further highlights how corrupt the	
	Iraqi security forces are, how this has facilitated	
	prison breaks by ISIS and how aptly the latter	
	exploits Shia-Sunni tensions.	

28/12/2013	Iraqi security forces arrest a	
	Sunni member of parliament,	
	Ahmad al-Alwani, after killing	
	his brother and five of his	
	guards during a raid on his	
	home in Ramadi. Alwani had	
	backed anti-government	
	protests and was a	
	prominent supporter of	
	Sunni activists who had set	
	up a camp near Ramadi. In	
	response, <u>44 members of the</u>	
	Iraqi parliament submit their	
	resignations over the next	
	two days and call upon the	
	army to release Alwani and	
	withdraw from Anbar's	
	cities. The arrest and the	
	demolishing of protest	
	camps across Anbar province	
	by Iraqi security forces on 30	
	December trigger	
	widespread unrest which	
	gives ISIS a chance to launch	
	its Anbar campaign. The Iraqi	
	government's offensive on	
	Sunni militants in Anbar was	
	'a disaster waiting to	
	happen', given that Shia-	
	Sunni tensions had long been	

	stoked by Iraqi PM Maliki's polarising policies and exploited by ISIS.		
30/12/2013		SWP's <u>Volker Perthes</u> argues that Syria needs a truce in order to contain the influence of ISIS and allow civil society to regroup. He claims that the Syrian civil war is not a war between Sunnis and Shia but a fight for power which also includes a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Explaining the rise of ISIS in Syria, he argues: 'Basically that's down to the fact that alternatives were lacking or were too weak. After studying all the groups embroiled in the conflict, an astute observer of developments would say that the Syrian conflict is no Islamist revolution. But the uprising is funded by radical Islamists, and groups like al Qaeda, the Nusra Front, and ISIS received a lot of money from private sources in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The moderate, democratic and only partially secular opposition was left more or less isolated by those who pledged support, including the European states.'	
		Der Spiegel reports about an escalation of tensions between the Iraqi government and Sunni groups in Anbar: at least ten people were killed when Iraqi police broke up a Sunni protest camp in Fallujah on 30 December. The police also found and defused two car bombs there. Other protest camps, among others in Ramadi, were also broken up. Der Spiegel	

		also reports about Ahmad al-Alwani's arrest by Iraqi	
		security forces on 28 December (see key event).	
31/12/2013	ISIS uses the explosion of		In its annual <u>report</u> , the domestic
	violence between Sunni		intelligence agency highlights that
	tribes and security forces in		Islamic terrorism has become
	Anbar's cities and the brief		increasingly globalised and
	withdrawal of the Iraqi army		individualised, and much more
	to surge into Fallujah and		complex while staying true to its
	Ramadi from the Western		ideological foundation. The agency
	desert. It <u>seizes control of</u>		argues that self-radicalisation and
	several police stations in		individual jihadism make it challenging
	Fallujah and Ramadi the next		for German authorities to counter
	day. However, it does not		preparations for attacks at an early
	fully capture Fallujah in early		stage, that Germany remains a target
	January, as often <u>claimed</u> .		of Jihadi activities, and that an
	ICG reports that these claims		emotionalisation of the Syrian civil war
	were 'greatly exaggerated'		has been promoting Islamic terrorism
	by ISIS and Iraqi PM Maliki		in Germany. It reports that more than
	(see knowledge claim		270 German jihadis have left for Syria.
	28/4/2014). More than 100		On ISIS, the agency claims that it is
	people are killed on 3		unclear how many members are based
	January in clashes between		in Germany or whether it has any
	ISIS, government forces and		formal structures there, that it remains
	local tribes. ISIS' Anbar		the most active terrorist group in
	campaign shows how it is		central and southern Iraq, and that ISIS
	exploiting Sunni-Shia		also trains children for fighting in the
	tensions and a security		Syrian civil war.
	vacuum in Anbar province.		
Dec 2013		The ICG reports that increasingly powerful Jihadi	
		groups have marginalised Western-backed rebel	

	groups in Syria. On 5 December, ISIS abducted more
	than 50 Kurdish civilians from Jarabulus and Manbij
	near Aleppo. The month of December saw
	significant clashes between ISIS and the Ahrar al-
	Sham Islamist coalition. ISIS reportedly beheaded at
	least three Alawites in Adra, near Damascus, during
	a joint offensive with Jabhat al-Nusra and the
	Islamic Front. On Iraq, the ICG reports that daily
	violence continued with over 700 killed in
	December. Attacks continued to target Iraqi security
	forces (e.g. on 21 December when 18 were killed in
	an ambush) and Shia neighbourhoods (e.g. a series
	of bombings in Baghdad on 30-31 December which
	killed 23). The Iraqi government closed its border
	with Syria on 25 December prior to the launch of an
	operation to counter ISIS in Anbar province. The ICG
	reports that 44 Iraqi members of parliament
	resigned over the demolishing of Sunni protest
	camps and arrest of al-Alwani. According to UN
	reports, 2013 became the deadliest year since 2008
	with at least 7818 civilians killed.
02/01/2014	Die Welt reports that Iraq's Anbar province has
	devolved into chaos due to ISIS re-establishing it as
	stronghold of Jihadi terrorism after al-Qaeda had
	done so a decade earlier. ISIS has gradually
	managed to control points of strategic interest in
	Ramadi, Fallujah and Al-Karmah. Fighting between
	Iraqi security forces and ISIS in Anbar is intensifying.
	The Sunni governor of Niniveh province in northern
	Iraq has accused Maliki of consciously provoking

	 chaos in Anbar. Meanwhile, residents of Fallujah are trying to wage a two-front war against ISIS in its town centre and the Iraqi army which is seeking to advance from the east. <u>Der Spiegel</u> reports that Iraqi security forces have withdrawn from Fallujah while tribal fighters have clashed with ISIS in Ramadi and have managed to expel ISIS from certain areas. It claims that ISIS exploited the unrest and chaos in Anbar following the demolishing of Sunni protest camps and the arrest of al-Alwani to advance on key cities. Rainer Hermann discusses in FAZ how ISIS has been exploiting Sunni-Shia tensions in Iraq and argues that ISIS' territorial gains in Anbar province could have been prevented. 	
03/01/2014	Rudolph Chimelli warns in <u>Süddeutsche Zeitung</u> of a new Iraqi civil war, with Fallujah and parts of Ramadi falling under ISIS' control. He claims that ISIS has freed more than 1000 prisoners in both cities. Chimelli argues that it has now become impossible for Maliki to try and find an agreement with the Sunni minority after Anbar province has descended into chaos. He predicts that Sunni members of parliament will further distance themselves from Maliki ahead of the planned parliamentary elections in April while Maliki will seek to deepen the divide.	

	HRW calls for an investigation of violence in Anbar	
	province during the demolishing of Sunni protest	
	camps and the arrest of al-Alwani on 30 December.	
	HRW argues that 'government statements before	
	the clashes and the deployment of the army	
	seemed intended more to provoke violence than	
	prevent it'. HRW also highlights that this was not at	
	all an unexpected development as Iraqi authorities	
	'had repeatedly threatened to remove the	
	protesters in Ramadi and other largely Sunni areas'.	
	On 23 December, the commander of Iraq's	
	Counterterrorism Service had reportedly referred to	
	government operations against ISIS in Anbar on his	
	Facebook page with "I swear to God I will kill those	
	dogs and those who are with them. I will wipe them	
	out." The Iraqi state news agency had also reported	
	two days before the incident that 30 armoured	
	vehicles had been deployed outside of the protest	
	camp in Ramadi which has existed for about a year.	
04/01/2014	Rania Salloum reports in Der Spiegel how ISIS has	
	been exploiting the chaos in Syria and Iraq by	
	seizing control of several strategic points in both	
	countries including the border region and how it has	
	been enjoying the support of the Syrian regime. She	
	warns of its extremely violent nature, strong	
	organisational capability and intention to turn Iraq	
	and Syria into a transnational theocracy.	
	SWP's <u>Guido Steinberg</u> argues: 'If the situation does	
	not change, there will be areas in Iraq and Syria	

	where different jihadist groups can act without any form of control. Neither the Iraqi, nor the Syrian, governments will be able to control these areas effectively and long-term. Already today, Iraq's northwest, Syria's northeast and portions of some Syrian cities are essentially inter-connected operation areas for Iraq's al Qaeda groups. () We are witnessing a slow but steady destabilization of Iraq. Today's level of violence resembles the level in 2008 when many observers spoke of a civil war. On the other hand there is a central government that has a lot of money from oil exports at their disposal. Al-Maliki's government can pay the country's security forces with that money. That's why I don't see a realistic chance for sub-state actors to shake this state. () I think the most likely scenario is that the current situation - outbursts of violence, but a stable government - is going to continue for a long, long time in Iraq; at least as long as the civil war continues in neighboring Syria.' Rudolph Chimelli reports in <u>Süddeutsche Zeitung</u> that 8000 people had been killed in terrorist attacks in Iraq in 2013.	
05/01/2014	 FAZ reports that roughly 9000 families have fled Fallujah in recent days and that ISIS has tightened its grip of the city. Alfred Hackensberger argues in <u>Die Welt</u> that ISIS 	
	won't be able to keep up the occupation of Fallujah	

	and that this was simply a propaganda stunt. He considers it surprising that ISIS became such a powerful actor in the Syrian civil war and claims that ISIS' 'success story in Syria appears to be over' after it lost some territory in Aleppo and northern Syria. In contrast, Michael Stürmer argues elsewhere in <u>Die Welt</u> that ISIS' Anbar offensive was only the beginning.	
	Christoph Ehrhardt and Andreas Ross report in <u>FAZ</u> that tribal fighters have managed to oust ISIS from most parts of Ramadi.	
06/01/2014	 Rainer Hermann and Christoph Ehrhardt argue in FAZ that ISIS is – for the first time ever – on the defensive in Syria and Iraq. They report that heavy fighting erupted between ISIS and other rebel groups in northern Syria and the surroundings of Aleppo and that rival rebel groups stormed ISIS' headquarters in Raqqa and freed 50 detainees. Rival rebel groups reportedly see ISIS as 'agents of the Syrian regime who are seeking to undermine the revolution'. While Iraqi security forces have suffered their worst defeat since the withdrawal of U.S. troops, they are now winning the upper hand in Anbar. FAZ reports that 19 people were killed in a series of attacks in predominantly Shia districts in Baghdad on 5 January. 	

	Die Welt cites a tribal leader in Fallujah as claiming that ISIS has abandoned Fallujah and that the city is	
	under the control of tribal fighters.	
07/01/2014	In a profile of al-Baghdadi in <u>Die Welt</u> , Florian Flade argues that ISIS is the most powerful Jihadi group in Syria and that its gradual exploitation of the power vacuum in Anbar province went largely unnoticed. Flade claims that al-Baghdadi became so powerful as he knew how to exploit the lack of external	
	attention to developments in Iraq since the beginning of the Syrian civil war and especially after the US withdrawal.	
	Die Welt reports that, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), 71 ISIS members (including many foreign fighters) have been killed by other rebel fighters between 3 and 6 January in Syria but that this claim could not be independently verified. If true, this would provide further evidence of how tensions between ISIS and other rebel groups have increased.	
	Die Welt reports that the Iraqi Army delayed its plan of ousting ISIS from Fallujah due to a heightened risk of civilian deaths.	
	Rudolph Chimelli discusses in <u>Süddeutsche Zeitung</u> how ISIS has been exploiting the physical geography of Anbar province, the porous Iraqi-Syria border, the corruption of local officials and shifting loyalties	

	of Iraq's tribes to expand its territorial base to	
	include key strategic points such as Fallujah. He	
	argues, however, that ISIS won't be able to hold	
	Fallujah and Ramadi in the long run due to the	
	superiority of the Iraqi security forces.	
	superiority of the fragi security forces.	
	FAZ reports about the successful recruitment of ISIS	
	foreign fighters in German schools and how	
	teachers raise the alarm about the increasing	
	influence of Salafist propagandists among their	
	pupils and complain about the lack of resources to	
	prevent and counter this trend.	
	Raniah Salloum claims in <u>Der Spiegel</u> that ISIS has	
	abducted more activists and journalists in recent	
	weeks and that it is increasingly executing them	
	rather than holding them for ransom. She refers to	
	reports according to which ISIS killed up to 50	
	Syrians in its detention facility in Aleppo on 6	
	January. Four activists, who had been abducted by	
	ISIS on 26 December, have so far been identified.	
	Salloum reports that these executions happened in	
	response to high tensions between Syrian activists	
	and ISIS, especially after a call for resistance against	
	ISIS by the Syrian opposition on 3 January, and once	
	Syrian rebels were approaching ISIS' detention	
	facility in Aleppo.	
08/01/2014	Die Welt claims that Syrian rebels have killed 34	[background on broader Syria policy:
	Jihadi fighters in Idlib province most of whom were	the Government <u>seeks</u> to extend the
	ISIS members.	mandate for Germany's participation in

	 FAZ claims that tribal fighters have ousted ISIS from Fallujah and Ramadi (and indeed from the entire province) and that the situation in Anbar is calming down. <u>Die Welt</u> claims that fighting in Fallujah and Ramadi between ISIS and the Iraqi Army continues and that 	NATO's Operation Active Fence to protect Turkey's territory along its southern border from potential missile attacks from Syria. It <u>views</u> Germany's participation as part of broader efforts to contain the regional implications of the Syrian civil war.]
	more than 13.000 families have fled Fallujah. Raniah Salloum claims in <u>Der Spiegel</u> that fighting between ISIS and tribal fighters continues in Fallujah. Meantime, the Iraqi Army has surrounded the city but is hesitant to launch an offensive. Its	
	efforts are more successful in Ramadi where it has joined forces with tribal fighters, regained some territory and reportedly killed 25 ISIS fighters. Salloum also reports about the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Fallujah.	
09/01/2014	Based on witness statements, <u>HRW</u> describes the situation in Fallujah and Ramadi in detail. It reports how Anbar's residents are trapped in a three-front war and exposed to 'unlawful methods of fighting by all sides'. 25 Fallujah residents have reportedly been killed by army mortar shelling and 13.000 Anbari residents have fled to the Erbil area. Based on witness statements, HRW reports that ISIS entered Fallujah and Ramadi on 1 January. 'In Fallujah, witnesses said, they went to each of the city's five police stations, where they released	

prisoners and took weapons from police, who	
immediately surrendered. The fighters set the	
police stations and city government building on fire.	
The fighters then headed to Fallujah's main	
checkpoint in the eastern part of the city, manned	
by the army and local police, and based themselves	
in an industrial area close to the checkpoint. When	
SWAT and army forces returned to Anbar, they	
surrounded Ramadi and Fallujah. They controlled	
entry and exit points, and prevented fuel and food	
from being taken into the cities, but allowed several	
hundred people to flee areas of heavy fighting.' On	
6 January, Maliki ordered the army not to fire on	
residential neighbourhoods in Fallujah. He	
announced on 8 January that the army will launch	
no further military operations in Fallujah as long as	
tribal fighters continue to fight ISIS. According to	
witness statements, 500-600 ISIS fighters were	
present in five of Ramadi's neighbourhoods on 5	
January where they were fighting local groups and	
SWAT fighters while the army remained outside of	
the city. HRW reports that 'infighting between tribal	
armed groups over whether to cooperate with	
government security forces' was hampering the	
fight against ISIS in Ramadi.	
Süddeutsche Zeitung reports that ISIS has	
withdrawn from Fallujah and Ramadi after the Iraqi	
government and provincial tribal leaders reached an	
agreement on how to provide security in both cities.	

13/01/2014	Based on interviews with Syrian refugees in	A member of parliament (CDU/CSU)
	Kurdistan and Turkey, <u>HRW</u> reports how ISIS is	refers to press reports about ISIS'
	violating women's rights in areas under their contro	practices in Syria and the involvement
	in northern and northeastern Syria.	of German jihadists to warn of ISIS-
		inspired terrorist attacks in Europe and
	Christoph Reuter and Birgit Svensson argue in <u>Der</u>	call for closer European intelligence
	Spiegel that ISIS is on the defensive in Syria and	cooperation.
	Iraq. In Syria, rebels have reportedly ousted ISIS	
	from most of its bases within a week, including its	
	headquarters in Aleppo. According to the authors,	
	this happened because ISIS had gone too far with	
	the abductions and executions of Syrian activists	
	and rebels and the imposition of strict laws in its	
	controlled areas. Rebel groups fought ISIS in	
	northern Syria in 'unprecedented unity', 'depriving	
	it of its tactical strength'. As a result, ISIS fighters	
	fled to the Syrian mountains and across the Turkish	
	border. Roughly 100 ISIS fighters were reportedly	
	seen in the Turkish border town of Reyhanli. On 9-	
	10 January, ISIS and other Syrian rebels clashed in	
	Raqqa, with ISIS fighters entrenching themselves	
	plus roughly 30-40 foreign hostages there. In Iraq,	
	Sunni groups have been unwilling to join forces with	
	ISIS, engaging them in a two-front war. The authors	
	argue that the demolishing of the protest camp in	
	Ramadi was a sudden move which paved the way	
	for ISIS' Anbar campaign. The authors claim that ISIS	
	is not as powerful in Anbar as claimed by Maliki but	
	that it continues to pose a serious threat in Iraq's	
	cities.	

15/01/2014		[background on broader Syria policy: the government <u>announces</u> to increase its humanitarian assistance for the victims of the Syrian civil war by 80 million euros, and interior minister Thomas de Maizière <u>confirms</u> that a total of 10.000 Syrians will be given temporary refuge in Germany.]
21/01/2014	 In its annual report, <u>HRW</u> discusses how sectarian tensions have deepened in Iraq, with ISIS carrying out 'nearly daily attacks against civilians, making 2013 the bloodiest of the last five years'. It accuses the Iraqi government of responding to 'largely peaceful demonstrations with violence and to worsening security with draconian counterterrorism measures'. Florian Flade reports in <u>Die Welt</u> that a 19-year old German convert to Islam who had travelled to Syria to join ISIS had been killed in armed clashes between ISIS and the FSA. Flade further reports that at least 17 people have been killed in a series of five car bombings in Baghdad. 	
22/01/2014		Speech by foreign minister Frank- Walter Steinmeier at the Syria peace conference in Switzerland: 'The ongoing violence has created spaces for terrorism which has become a serious problem in Syria. We commend the efforts of the Syrian opposition

		groups to fight groups linked to al- Qaida, such as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. We expect the government in Damascus to also take a strong stance against these groups.'
23/01/2014	 Yassin Musharbash reports in <u>Die Zeit</u> that another German jihadist has been killed in Syria, raising the number of German jihadists who have been killed in Syria to 15. More than 270 German jihadists have now reportedly travelled to Syria. Alfred Hackensberger reports in <u>Die Welt</u> how ISIS has been ousted from Idlib province and Aleppo but continues to control Raqqa, surrounding villages and the road to the Iraqi border. He argues that ISIS is concentrating its efforts on expanding its control of eastern Syria and western Iraq (from where it gets most supplies), and that ISIS is the first Islamic terrorist organisation to control such a vast territory on both sides of the border. 	
29/01/2014		[background on perceptions of decision-makers: <u>statement</u> by foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier: 'as correct as the policy of military restraint may be, it must not be misunderstood as meaning standing aloof as a matter of principle. We are, also in Europe, a bit too big and a bit too important for that. We are not a small state on the edges of Europe, but

	the largest, most populated state in the
	European Union, with the strongest
	economy. If a country like that refuses
	to become involved in efforts to resolve
	international conflicts, then they will
	not be resolved, and no viable
	proposals will be made. That is why
	one of the first decisions Mrs von der
	Leyen and I suggested in the Cabinet
	was to change our approach to the
	removal and destruction of chemical
	weapons in Syria. This case is a
	plausible illustration of the role we
	play. I think we were right when we
	said that dropping bombs on Damascus
	in such a situation would be the wrong
	course, and probably more of a
	stumbling-block if we want to arrive at
	a political settlement at some point.
	But one cannot speak out against
	military options and then also keep out
	of things when it comes to the
	remaining alternatives.'
	[background on perceptions of the
	opposition: during a Bundestag <u>debate</u> ,
	a member of parliament (Bündnis
	90/Die Grünen) reports about the
	humanitarian situation in Iraq,
	including Kurdistan, based on a recent

	trip and calls for a strong German response. Members of Die Linke call for a protection of Kurdish groups in northern Syria.]
	[background on broader Syria policy: the Bundestag <u>extends</u> the mandate for Germany's participation in NATO's Operation Active Fence to protect Turkey's territory along its southern border from potential missile attacks from Syria.]
30/01/2014	[background on perceptions of decision-makers: foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier arques: 'Germany is too large to merely comment on global issues. It is all about taking foreign policy action: We are rightly expected to become involved and to do what we can to address conflicts as early as possible. () The big conflicts have moved closer to Europe, with direct effects also being felt in Germany. () If we don't manage to calm the situation, all state order in Syria, Iraq and even Lebanon could disintegrate. Three failing states and an ensuing endless series of ethnic and religious civil wars would be a

		be limited to the Near and Middle East.'] [background on broader Syria policy: In a meeting with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Chancellor Angela Merkel <u>calls for</u> a humanitarian corridor in Syria without elaborating how this could be implemented.]
Jan 2014	The <u>ICG</u> reports that more than 100.000 Iraqi civilians were displaced during the month due to the fighting in Anbar province. According to UNHCR reports, 65.000 fled fighting in Fallujah and Ramadi during the week of 18-24 January alone. ICG claims that after local groups reportedly regained control of Fallujah, the government no longer distinguished between residents and militias, announced Fallujah to be in the hands of ISIS and called for national and international support to fight ISIS. It claims elsewhere that Iraqi government forces 'regained control of areas west of Baghdad' on 29 January. According to Iraqi government estimates, 1013 people were killed in January which amounts to the highest death toll since April 2008. The Iraqi government also reportedly executed 26 on terrorism charges on 21 January. On Syria, ICG reports that clashes between ISIS and other rebel groups intensified after 1 January, when the Islamic Front accused ISIS of killing a rebel commander and 'being worse than the Assad regime'. While ISIS lost	

	control of its bases in Idlib and west of Aleppo, it consolidated its presence east of Aleppo and in Raqqa province. On 27 January, ISIS rejected a reconciliation initiative by other Syrian rebel groups. According to the SOHR, ISIS and other rebel groups suffered a high number of casualties (estimated 1400) in rebel infighting between 1 and 23 January. ICG also reports that ISIS claimed responsibility for a deadly car bombing in Beirut on 2 January.	
01/02/2104		[background on perceptions of decision-makers: In a <u>speech</u> at the Munich Security Conference, foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier refers to the situation in Iraq and Syria and anticipates that these and other conflict hot spots will keep German foreign and security policy busy in 2014.]
03/02/2014	 FAZ and Der Spiegel report that al-Qaeda formally cut all ties with ISIS and reiterated that Jabhat al-Nusra is the only legitimate al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria. Der Spiegel reports that, according to ISIS propaganda, a 26-year old German convert to Islam and ISIS member carried out a suicide attack in Syria. Der Spiegel highlights that, if the report can be confirmed, this would be the first time a German citizen conducted a suicide attack in Syria. 	

	FAZ reports that the German domestic intelligence	
	agency is particularly concerned about those	
	German jihadists who return from Syria and about	
	their ability to carry out terrorist attacks in	
	Germany.	
05/02/2014	According to HRW, ISIS claimed responsibility for	
	the execution of four Iragi SWAT members near	
	Ramadi. It also reports how SWAT forces reportedly	
	ousted ISIS from one of Ramadi's neighbourhoods	
	on 30 January but how fighting was continuing in	
	other parts of Ramadi and how 'accounts of fighting	
	in and around Fallujah have been inconsistent'.	
10/02/2014	FAZ reports how the speaker of the Iraqi parliament	
	narrowly escaped an assassination while visiting	
	Mosul, how five people were killed in attacks in	
	Baghdad, Musayib and Balad, and how 21 ISIS	
	members accidentally killed themselves while	
	preparing propaganda with a suicide bomb north of	
	Baghdad.	
12/02/2014	Der Spiegel reports that ISIS still controls Fallujah	
	and parts of Ramadi and that 300.000 people have	
	been displaced by the fighting in Anbar.	
14/02/2014	Die Welt reports that ISIS took over parts of the	
	northern Iraqi town of Sulayman Beg and is about to	
	take full control, after laying siege to the town hall	
	and prompting residents to leave their houses.	
15/02/2014	Die Welt confirms that ISIS assumed full control of	
	Sulayman Beg. It also reports that at least 16 Iraqi	
	security forces have been killed in a series of attacks	
	across Iraq.	

18/02/2014		Head of domestic intelligence, Hans- Georg Maaßen, <u>reports</u> that 240 German jihadists have left for Syria and that the terrorism threat level in Germany remains high. He explains that German authorities have successfully prevented the departure of more than 12 German jihadists. Further, domestic intelligence agencies at the federal and state level are closely cooperating with the foreign intelligence service, military counterintelligence, Federal Criminal Police and Federal Prosecutor General to monitor, assess and act upon online activities by jihadists.
19/02/2014	Die Welt reports that a German jihadist, who was reportedly commanding an ISIS brigade in Manbij, has been killed in Aleppo province.Tomas Avenarius reports in Süddeutsche Zeitung that ISIS is considering introducing its own currency in the areas it controls. He claims that Iraqi security forces have so far failed to oust ISIS from the 'vast areas' it has seized. Avenarius reports that the Iraqi government has won the support of Anbar's Sunni tribes in the fight against ISIS.	
24/02/2014	According to the FAZ, the German government anticipates a continuing influx of German jihadists to Syria and inofficial estimates are much higher	

	than official numbers. 50 German jihadists have	
	reportedly returned to Germany from Syria.	
26/02/2014	Majid Sattar reports in FAZ that the official estimate	One of Germany's most prominent
20/02/2014	for German jihadists in Syria is 300 of whom more	Salafist preachers, Sven Lau, was
		•
	than 20 are estimated dead. 10 percent of German	detained on the suspicion of
	jihadists in Syria are reportedly converts to Islam	supporting ISIS in Syria under a
	and 40 percent are younger than 25. The growing	humanitarian aid cover, inciting
	number of female jihadists travelling solo to Syria is	German jihadists to travel to Syria, and
	a new phenomenon when compared to earlier	preparing a terrorist attack.
	Jihadi tourism to Afghanistan or Pakistan. Sattar	
	highlights the central role of online social networks	
	for the radicalisation of German citizens. The	
	federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia has	
	announced criminal investigations for those	
	returnees who are suspected of having committed	
	crimes in Syria.	
27/02/2014	Der Spiegel refers to 'a new dimension of brutality	
	by German jihadists' who have joined ISIS in Syria.	
	The authors trace the radicalisation of a German	
	citizen who had travelled to Azaz in Syria in the	
	summer of 2013 and posed on social media with	
	severed heads in mid-February 2014.	
28/02/2014	Alfred Hackensberger reports in <u>Die Welt</u> about a	
	German jihadist who encouraged German nationals	
	per video from Syria to join ISIS. Hackensberger	
	further reports that ISIS left its former stronghold	
	near the Turkish border, Azaz, on the morning of 28	
	February. Azaz was a significant base as it was close	
	to the Bab al-Salam border crossing.	

Feb 2014	The ICC reports that ICIC executed conject figures in	
reb 2014	The <u>ICG</u> reports that ISIS executed senior figures in	
	Syrian rebel groups (Liwa al-Tawhid, Suqour as-	
	Sham) affiliated with the Islamic Front in two	
	separate suicide bombings on 1 February. On 23	
	February, ISIS killed a senior Ahrar al-Sham	
	commander who had been appointed by al-Qaeda	
	to mediate between Jihadi groups in Syria. This	
	came after Jabhat al-Nusra had given ISIS a deadline	
	(1 March) to accept mediation or face expulsion	
	from Syria. ICG refers to the SOHR's estimate (27	
	February) that 3300 had been killed in rebel	
	infighting since January. On Iraq, ICG reports that	
	the army continued to besiege Anbar, continued the	
	shelling of Fallujah and Ramadi, that ISIS brought	
	down an army helicopter on 22 February and that	
	government forces regained control of Sulayman	
	Beg and surrounding areas on 22 February after	
	more than a week of fighting. Car bombings across	
	Iraq continued. In and around Baghdad, at least 114	
	were killed in three attacks on 5, 18 and 27	
	February.	
08/03/2014	Markus Wehner reports in FAZ about a growing	
	number of female German jihadists, including a 15-	
	year old girl, who travel to Syria alone to become	
	ISIS fighters. He also reports how on two occasions	
	police officers at the Cologne-Bonn airport did not	
	prevent the mother of two German jihadists from	
	transporting Kalashnikov magazines and other	
	suspicious equipment to Turkey.	

09/03/2014	Der Spiegel and Die Welt report that at least 34	
	people were killed in a suicide attack in the	
	predominantly Shia city of Hillah in southern Iraq.	
10/03/2014	HRW reports about human rights abuses by Iraqi	
	security forces, especially against prisoners and in	
	retaliation for ISIS' "Breaking the Walls" campaign.	
	HRW claims that 'as many as 1000 prisoners	
	escaped' during the Abu Ghraib and Taji prison	
	breaks in July 2013. HRW further reports that	
	severe fighting is ongoing in Anbar which has	
	caused a humanitarian crisis and prevented the	
	delivery of humanitarian aid to residents of Fallujah	
	and Ramadi and to internally displaced persons.	
20/03/2014	Süddeutsche Zeitung claims that Fallujah is entirely	
	controlled by ISIS and that heavy fighting broke out	
	after the Iraqi army launched a fresh offensive.	
22/03/2014	SWP's Guido Steinberg reports that he and others	
	who have monitored the influx of foreign fighters	
	into Syria have known for two years how easily new	
	Jihadi recruits enter Turkey and are brought across	
	the border and how recruitment works.	
23/03/2014	SWP's Guido Steinberg argues that German jihadists	
	may well intend to launch attacks in Germany upon	
	their return, but that it is generally not easy for	
	them to leave their units in Syria. He claims that	
	German authorities lack personnel to monitor all	
	those who could return.	
26/03/2014	Die Welt reports that a Swiss foreign fighter with	
	ISIS launched an attack at a security control point in	
	southern Turkey, killing three.	

27/03/2014	Boris Kálnoky reports in <u>Die Welt</u> how ISIS is now seeing Turkey as a legitimate target for deadly attacks after tensions have grown (see also <u>Die</u> <u>Zeit</u>).	The government <u>briefs</u> the Bundestag about the capacity of the Iraqi security forces (p. 76). It highlights capability shortfalls, corruption, limited loyalty to the Iraqi government, infiltration by militant opposition forces and broader structural weaknesses as key challenges. It states that the Iraqi security forces have to date failed to deal a decisive blow to terrorist groups in Iraq.
31/03/2014	Der Spiegel reports about the radicalisation of young German jihadists in Bremen prior to leaving for Syria.	German authorities <u>arrest</u> two suspected ISIS members upon their return from Syria and one suspected ISIS supporter. The Federal Prosecutor General <u>emphasises</u> that the Syrian civil war has 'an immediate effect on Germany', that Jihadi returnees pose a danger to Germany and that German authorities need to counter the threat resolutely.
Mar 2014	On Syria, the <u>ICG</u> reports that ISIS rejected al- Nusra's ultimatum to accept mediation and that it withdrew from Idlib and Latakia provinces, concentrating its fighters in eastern Aleppo and Raqqa. ISIS seized a town in Al-Hasakah province in northeastern Syria on 30 March where it reportedly killed 50 rebels. On Iraq, ICG reports about the ongoing fighting in Anbar, with ISIS still controlling Fallujah. It also reports about criticism that the Iraqi	

	government is not seriously trying to solve the crisis – with MPs claiming that Maliki is not waging war on terrorism but against Anbar and its people. According to UN reports, 400.000 have been displaced in Anbar since the beginning of ISIS' campaign. ICG further reports that bombing attacks across Iraq continued: among other deadly incidents, at least 80 were killed on 25 March including 41 soldiers.	
08/04/2014		Foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier <u>expresses</u> deep concern about 'the increasing degree to which religious minorities, including Christians, are being targeted by Islamist terrorists' in Syria and calls 'for the immediate release of representatives of Christian churches who have been abducted'.
11/04/2014	FAZ reports how ISIS has seized control of a dam five kilometres south of Fallujah to use water as a strategic weapon against the Iraqi army: ISIS closed most of the locks and flooded parts around Fallujah to hinder the Iraqi army's offensive on Fallujah. Maliki announced a fresh offensive against ISIS to regain control of the dam.	
12/04/2014	Der Spiegel reports how prominent German jihadist Denis Cuspert disseminates an ISIS propaganda video from Raqqa in which he encourages German jihadists to join ISIS in Syria.	

17/04/2014	Süddeutsche Zeitung reports that, according to the	
	SOHR, ISIS killed al-Nusra's Idlib commander	
	together with three family members on 15 April.	
18/04/2014	FAZ reports that ISIS formally cut ties with al-Qaeda	
	and is concentrating its efforts on 'proper jihad' and	
	establishing a caliphate. It also reports that at least	
	14 people were killed in a bombing attack on a	
	mosque in Homs, Syria.	
	SWP's Guido Steinberg discusses ISIS' rise to power	
	as an independent actor in Syria, rather than an al-	
	Qaeda affiliate, and its likely intention to engage in	
	jihad beyond its core conflict zone. He reports that	
	most Jihadi foreign fighters joined ISIS, rather than	
	al-Nusra, after April 2013. Steinberg highlights how	
	hard it is to estimate the strength of ISIS which may	
	have between 5000 and 15.000 fighters. According	
	to him, the rise of Jihadi groups in Syria has	
	strengthened Assad's position and reality on the	
	ground has come to match Syrian regime	
	propaganda. He argues that Germany needs to	
	prepare itself for ISIS' reach into Europe and that	
	counter-terrorism cooperation with Turkey remains	
	the biggest challenge for Berlin.	
28/04/2014	FAZ interviews Saleh al-Mutlaq, a prominent Iraqi	
	Sunni politician and one of the three deputy prime	
	ministers, who warns about the weakness of the 1.5	
	million-strong Iraqi army – evidenced by its failure	
	to recapture ISIS-held territory in Anbar including	
	the dam south of Fallujah. al-Mutlaq claims that the	

	Iragi state has de facto collapsed and will become 'a	
	second Syria' unless it defeats ISIS.	
	second syna unless it deleats isis.	
	ICG reports in detail about the situation in Fallujah	
	since December 2013 and argues that 'the potential	
	for miscalculation, or calculated escalation, is	
	enormous'. It argues that ISIS' rise is a symptom,	
	not the cause, of poor governance in Iraq which is	
	driving instability. According to ICG, ISIS' initial claim	
	in early January 2014 that it had seized control of	
	Fallujah 'was greatly exaggerated: while it raised its	
	black flag above some administration buildings in	
	the city centre, locals blocked most of their forays	
	and forced them to retreat to the outskirts.' ICG	
	claims that by mismanaging the crisis, the Iraqi	
	government gave Fallujah residents little choice but	
	to form an alliance of convenience with ISIS. The	
	army's siege of Fallujah allowed ISIS to renew its	
	support base in Iraq: 'with a high profile from the	
	fighting in Syria and superior weaponry, they once	
	again have become a magnet for the country's	
	disaffected'. ICG also suggests that by initially	
	exaggerating the threat to Fallujah, exacerbating	
	tensions and allowing the crisis to escalate, Maliki	
	rescued his chances in the 30 April parliamentary	
	elections.	
29/04/2014	Die Welt's Alfred Hackensberger reports from Erbil	
	how Mosul has long been an ISIS stronghold and	
	that Kurdistan remains the only safe region for	
	Europeans in Iraq due to strong security measures.	
I		

20/04/2014	In a detailed you art ICC analysiss proving tensions	
30/04/2014	In a detailed <u>report</u> , ICG analyses growing tensions	
	between ISIS and Turkey. Regarding the situation	
	along the Syrian-Turkish border, ICG claims that ISIS	
	'gained control of two thirds of the (Syrian) border	
	towns and gates' in early 2014. It reports that ISIS	
	'has attacked Turkish NGO workers inside Syria and	
	killed their Syrian employees'. Many of its	
	kidnappings of foreign journalists have not been	
	made public for security reasons, and Turkish	
	intelligence negotiated the release of a Turkish	
	journalist in early January. Further, ISIS 'has gained	
	ground to the east, including through attacks on the	
	Syrian Turkmen town of Çobanbeyli'. The report	
	also discusses how Turkish authorities have become	
	much more sensitive to the transnational threat ISIS	
	poses after tensions between ISIS and Turkey	
	heated up in March 2013. ISIS fighters and Turkish	
	soldiers engaged in border clashes in October 2013	
	and January 2014, and Turkish security forces were	
	wounded in a raid on a suspected ISIS safehouse in	
	Istanbul in late March 2014.	
Apr 2014	ICG reports that rebel infighting continued in	
	eastern Syria where ISIS launched an unsuccessful	
	attack on the town of Abu Kamal near the Iragi	
	border on 14 April. On Iraq, ICG reports that ISIS	
	tightened its grip on Fallujah and started providing	
	basic services. In early April, ISIS pushed eastwards	
	towards Baghdad and established a presence in Abu	
	Ghraib city. ICG accuses the government of	
	continuously using the Anbar crisis to marginalise	

	Sunni opposition and gather domestic and	
	international support. ISIS' suicide bombings	
	continued, among others at a Shia political rally in	
	Baghdad on 25 April, killing 33.	
03/05/2014	HRW reports that ISIS has claimed responsibility for	
	deadly attacks on a Shia election campaign rally and	
	on polling centres in Iraq. On election day, suicide	
	bombs were also launched in Tikrit and Kirkuk. HRW	
	argues that the Iraqi government is exacerbating a	
	humanitarian crisis in Anbar and indiscriminately	
	targeting civilians. It reports that ISIS remains in and	
	around Fallujah and on the outskirts of Ramadi.	
04/05/2014	FAZ reports that al-Nusra ousted ISIS from Abriha in	
	Deir ez-Zor province.	
07/05/2014	HRW reports that the Iraqi army has not yet entered	[background on perceptions of the
	Fallujah but on 6 May, 3500 Iraqi soldiers and 750	opposition: in two separate motions,
	pro-government militia began an offensive on	the <u>CDU/CSU + SPD</u> and <u>Bündnis 90/Die</u>
	surrounding towns. HRW reports that journalists are	<u>Grünen</u> parliamentary groups call on
	blocked from entering Anbar and that it is relying on	the government to step up its
	Facebook messages by residents and hospital	humanitarian assistance to Syrian
	employees.	refugees and pay special attention to
		the situation in Kurdistan and ISIS'
		activities in Anbar as a deterioration
		would further destabilise the region.]
08/05/2014		[background on perceptions of the
		opposition: Members of parliament
		(CDU/CSU + Bündnis 90/Die Grünen)
		<u>call</u> on the government to step up its
		support of Kurdistan given the Iraqi

			conflict and growing influx of Syrian refugees.]
12/05/2014		Süddeutsche Zeitung reports that ISIS has seized	
		control of strategic areas in Deir ez-Zor province	
		after heavy fighting with al-Nusra.	
21/05/2014			[background on perceptions of the
			opposition: an inquiry by Die Linke
			<u>focuses</u> on atrocities committed by ISIS
			against Yazidi groups in Mosul province and northern Syria.]
24/05/2014	A French-born jihadist who		
	spent over a year fighting for		
	ISIS in Syria opens fire at the		
	Jewish museum in Brussels,		
	killing four people. This is the		
	first ISIS-inspired terrorist		
	attack carried out in Europe		
	by a returning foreign		
	fighter. The attack highlights		
	that ISIS is stepping up its		
	external operations and that		
	foreign fighters who return		
	from Syria to Europe pose a		
	concrete, rather than		
	abstract, threat.		
27/05/2014		Drawing on reports by Fallujah residents, <u>HRW</u>	
		claims that 'ISIS has planted improvised explosive	
		devices along the main highway and other parts of	
		city, and is operating prisons in Fallujah and	
		elsewhere'. Further, ISIS has reportedly taken over	

	parts of Fallujah's hospital. HRW also reports that	
	ISIS claimed responsibility for nine car bombings in	
	Shia areas of Baghdad which killed at least 34.	
29/05/2014	FAZ reports that at least 54 people were killed in a	
	series of attacks across Iraq the previous day. One	
	major attack, killing 12 security forces and 7	
	civilians, was carried out at a control point in Mosul.	
May 2014	ICG reports that ISIS gained ground in eastern Syria	
	(Deir ez-Zor province) throughout the month of	
	May. It also reports that deadly bombings across	
	Iraq continued which killed at least 172. According	
	to ICG, the Iraqi army escalated the fight against ISIS	
	and local militia in and around Fallujah by using	
	indiscriminate force (barrel bombs). ISIS reportedly	
	clashed not only with previously allied local militia	
	in Fallujah, after being accused of kidnapping,	
	beating and disarming local fighters, but also with	
	other local groups in eastern Anbar over the sale of	
	gas and other commodities.	
01/06/2014	FAZ reports that a 29-year old French citizen and	
	ISIS member has been arrested in connection with	
	the terrorist attack at the Jewish museum in	
	Brussels on 24 May. Police found an ISIS flag, a	
	video in which a masked man claimed responsibility	
	for the attack, weapons and 'an impressive amount	
	of ammunition'. The suspect had been imprisoned	
	five times, became radicalised during this time and	
	spent a year in Syria after being discharged from	
	prison. FAZ reports that roughly 700 French jihadists	
	have travelled to Syria.	

02/06/2014		Michaela Wiegel reports in FAZ that German officials had noted the Brussels terrorist suspect upon his return from Syria in March 2013 and had informed French authorities, but that French intelligence officials and police were overwhelmed with the monitoring of Jihadi returnees. The arrest of the Brussels suspect was pure coincidence during a routine control at a bus station in Marseille. Reporting about the Brussels attack and the failure to monitor the suspect upon his return from Syria, Javier Cáceres argues in <u>Süddeutsche Zeitung</u> that one of the worst nightmares for European security officials has become reality.	
04/06/2014	ISIS begins its <u>advance on</u> <u>Mosul</u> as part of its northern Iraq offensive, and also launches parallel attacks on <u>Samarra</u> (125 km north of Baghdad) and Tikrit over the next days. These developments highlight ISIS' military capability and the challenges for the Iraqi security forces.		[background on perceptions of the opposition: Die Linke <u>questions</u> the government about its assessment of ISIS' activities and pushes for stronger measures to protect the Syrian Kurds.]
05/06/2014		Amnesty International reports about a raid on a northern Syrian village on 29 May in which 15 civilians, including 7 children, were summarily executed. The executions, likely carried out by ISIS, happened after nearby clashes between ISIS and	A member of parliament (CDU/CSU) <u>claims</u> that 320 German jihadists have left for Syria.

	 YPG forces had escalated. Amnesty International fears that 'these civilians were killed as retribution for their perceived support of the YPG, either directly or indirectly through their Yezidi Kurdish landowners, or because they were mistaken for Yezidi Kurds'. It further reports: 'The fighting between ISIS and YPG is believed to have been sparked by a disagreement over the control of large amounts of grain stored in the village of Tell Halaf, which is under YPG control. On the same day as the summary killings took place, crops belonging to Yezidi Kurds in al-Tleiliye and its vicinity were set on fire.' Die Zeit reports that 320 German jihadists have left for Syria. 	At an EU Justice and Home Affairs meeting, German interior minister Thomas de Maizière <u>states</u> that the threat posed by ISIS foreign fighters returning to Europe is no longer abstract but concrete.
06/06/2014	Die Welt reports that federal criminal police, domestic intelligence and the ministry of the interior have long been warning about the risk of Jihadi returnees committing attacks in Germany. 20 German jihadists have so far returned from Syria and are being closely monitored.	
07/06/2014	FAZ reports that 25 ISIS members stormed a university in Ramadi and took dozens of students hostage, before Iraqi security forces freed them, killed the suspected leader of the ISIS unit and regained control of the campus. Further, at least 59 people were reportedly killed in armed clashes between ISIS and Iraqi security forces in Mosul, in addition to at least 36 killed in and around Mosul	

	the previous day. In Baghdad, at least 60 people were killed in a series of car bombings on	
	predominantly Shia areas.	
08/06/2014-	Note: no relevant knowledge claims were found on	
09/06/2014	these two days	