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Christopher Dandeker¹, Claire Eversden-French¹, Neil Greenberg¹, Stephani Hatch¹, Paul Riley¹, Lauren van Staden¹, and Simon Wessely¹

Abstract

U.K. Reserve Forces, principally the Territorial Army (TA), have been increasingly used since the end of the cold war, but there have been some concerns about their mental health problems and also possible unwillingness to remain in service. This article reports on the retention issues of 191 TA personnel who deployed to Iraq from 2003 to 2006. Qualitative data were thematically analyzed from three complementary studies. The authors found that, in 2003, negative aspects of Army organizational culture were reported as the prime reasons for TA personnel wishing to leave the military. In particular, Reservists reported their being unaccepted and underutilized. In contrast, by 2006, TA personnel were generally reporting being satisfied with their work as a Reservist and felt integrated with Regular colleagues. Those who stated they wanted to leave the military now reported it was primarily because of poor military family welfare support. These results suggest that although the British Army appears to have successfully managed the changing role and integration of the TA on operations, family welfare needs further consideration as an important influence on retention. Since the end of data collection for this study, new measures focusing on welfare have been introduced. Future work will assess the impact of these changes.

Keywords

military organizational culture, retention, part-time soldiers

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1. Introduction: The Changing Role of the Reserve Forces since 1989

Since the end of the cold war, the military in Western states has been reconfigured to meet the challenges of the altered security environment and to respond to the changing requirements of government. The result has been a geographical spread of the all-volunteer force (AVF) and a change in the organizational format of existing AVFs, including the two leading ones—those of the United States and the United Kingdom. Their armed forces have experienced a shift toward a smaller establishment, with, inter alia, greater use of civilian government employees, civilian contractors to support the military effort, and reserves or part-time soldiers to provide extra personnel to supplement the work of the Regulars. Indeed, during the 1990s it became apparent that the contemporary significance of reservists, as part of a reconfigured AVF, needed to be taken into account by scholars seeking to theorize post–cold war military trends as, for example, with the concept of the postmodern military. In this context, Moskos pointed out that, in the case of the United States,

with a diminishing active duty force, reserve components began to play an increasingly important role in the AVF. From being rather moribund during the cold war period and virtually excluded from the Vietnam War, reserve forces became integral components of force deployment.¹

In terms of operational tempo, the reconfigured military has also become much busier than its cold war counterpart, and this change has affected Reserve as well as Regular Forces. Not surprisingly, as a result of these changes, the study of Reservists—their organization, culture, deployment experiences, recruitment, and retention dynamics—has acquired a higher profile.² This article contributes to that literature, focusing on the case of the U.K. Reserve Forces with particular reference to issues of retention.³

2. The U.K. Reserve Forces and the Territorial Army (TA)

The one hundredth anniversary of the foundation of the U.K. TA, the largest of the U.K. current Reserve components in its AVF, was marked in 2008. In 1908, Haldane’s reforms of the British Army were designed to provide the basis of an expeditionary force ready to engage in a continental war, one in which the regular professional and auxiliary elements would fight together. The origins of the TA lay in two kinds of auxiliary components, the militia and volunteer forces, with the former—the modern form of which was established in 1757—comprising a compulsory system of part-time service (for three years) composed of men drawn by ballot and liable for full-time service in war. In contrast, as has been pointed out recently,

True volunteer forces, as opposed to militia, first appeared in the 1650s. They continued to be raised at times of great emergency, being composed mainly of
volunteer infantry and mounted volunteer units known as the yeomanry. Those forces attracted men with a stake in society, prepared to do their bit in a national emergency but less eager to imperil careers unless they were sure that such an emergency existed. It is perhaps those volunteers who have the strongest direct link to the ethos of the modern TA, not only in spirit, but in practice.4

The Reserves became part of a compulsory mass mobilization system when the United Kingdom had conscription during the years 1916 to 1918, 1939 to 1945, and 1948 to 1962. In addition, during the cold war era, Reserve Forces—once again as part of an AVF—played a key role in defending U.K. territory and in providing a basis for military expansion, should deterrence fail, as part of the U.K. commitment to the defense of NATO. However (echoing Moskos’s comment on the United States mentioned above), their role in operations was very marginal compared to what was to follow after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

During the 1990s, the U.K. government decided that, having paid for the Reserve Forces, it was important make them relevant and useable in circumstances short of all-out war and that the legal and normative basis for that provision needed to be put in place. The Reserve Forces Act 1996 (RFA 96) was passed (implemented in 1997), which provided a legal framework for the active mobilization of U.K. Reserve Forces in war fighting and peace support roles whereas previously Reservists were intended for use only in a war of national emergency.5 The intention was that, in the future, the U.K. Reserve Forces should work side by side with the Regular Forces, undertaking many of the same tasks—including frontline roles—and facing similar risks.

For the past decade, the British Armed Forces have provided the U.K. government’s expeditionary military capability of being able to go to crises before they come to the United Kingdom. While Reserve Forces continue to provide a strategic reserve and the basis of the territorial defense of the United Kingdom, they have come to play an increasingly significant role in operations abroad: since 1998, “approximately 10% of all forces deployed on operations have been Reservists,” and their role has become especially important over the past five years.6 As the Ministry of Defence (MOD) has pointed out,

Since the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, more than 17,000 reservists have served on operations around the world. They make up around nine percent of British Forces in Afghanistan, and four percent of British Forces in Iraq.7

While becoming an increasingly significant component of operational U.K. forces, and with a legal obligation to serve alongside Regular Forces when asked to do so, the MOD tries to ensure, wherever possible, that only those members of the Reserve Forces who have expressed a willingness to serve are called on to do so. The basis behind what is known as intelligent mobilization is that it is difficult to extensively rely on compulsion, even though Reservists have entered into their contract of liability voluntarily, when the operations on which they will be deployed are wars of choice.
Indeed, the United Kingdom has witnessed a public very divided over the legitimacy and legality of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and therefore these wars are “wars of contested choice.” Many would argue that it is difficult to perceive that there is a threat to the existence of the United Kingdom—the fundamental legitimizing principle of Reserve Services during the cold war era. In addition, the government seeks, where possible, to use Reservists on operations for only one year out of five.

Today, there are two general ways of classifying Reserve Forces in the United Kingdom: ex-members of the Regular Forces who have a Reserve liability, which is a commitment to be recalled to active service for a period after they leave, known as Regular Reserves, and those in civilian society who volunteer to serve in the military on a part-time basis and continue with a civilian career. In addition, the legislation designed to make Reserve Forces more useable for the contemporary context provides for other kinds of contractual arrangements for Reserve personnel: RFA 96 introduced two new categories of service (High Readiness and Sponsored Reserves) and three new forms of service, namely Voluntary Duties under section 27, Full Time Reserve Service under section 24, and Additional Duties Commitment under section 25.

In the United Kingdom, the largest component of the Reserve Forces is the TA, which, at its current establishment including all categories is 42,042, represents approximately one-third of the total strength of the British Army. Notwithstanding recent efforts to make Reserve Forces more relevant and useable, these components of the U.K. Armed Forces are significantly understrength and suffer from similar recruitment and retention difficulties as the Regular Forces. For the year 2006–7, the trained strength as a percentage of the requirement for volunteer reserves was 77 percent (Royal Navy), 70 percent (British Army), and 66 percent (Royal Air Force). Recruiting shortages are compounded by high labor turnover. It is also argued that members of the Reserves experience rather different challenges in their service when compared to the Regular Forces. For example, Reservists need to balance their military commitment with obligations to their civilian employers, who may not always be sympathetic to their employees’ circumstances as part-time soldiers. In addition, Reservists’ partners and families may also be less supportive of their military commitment before, during, and after deployments in comparison to Regular personnel. Furthermore, there may be tensions between Regular and Reserve components, with the former questioning the professional competence and commitment of the latter, who, for many decades, were often referred to by Regulars as “weekend warriors”; being rated as a second-class military professional is likely to lead to tensions and misunderstandings. Interestingly, recent epidemiological work has shown that members of Reserve Forces who have deployed to operational theatres since 2003 appear to have worse mental health than their Regular counterparts, which may be a reflection of the difficulties that Reservists face in relation to deployment. The MOD recognizes that support services for this population have to be calibrated to their needs and has commissioned further work on this theme, including how Reserve Forces are organized, geographically located, equipped, and supported insofar as family and other matters are concerned. It has also established health care programs specifically designed to address the
particular needs of Reservists. In November 2006, the MOD launched the Reserves Mental Health Programme, which provides support to all who feel that their mental health has suffered as a result of operational deployment. In particular, MOD now makes regular military mental health services available to Reservists who have become psychologically unwell as a result of their operational service since 2003. Reservists who seek help while mobilized are directly referred to one of the MOD’s Department of Community Mental Health units. Current and former Reservists may also be referred by their general practitioner to one of the six community veterans’ mental health therapist pilot schemes across the United Kingdom. These schemes aim to ensure that all veterans can access a new model of community-based mental health care and to make it easier for veterans with concerns about their mental health to seek and access help. The Medical Assessment Programme, based at St Thomas’ Hospital, is also available to all veterans including former Reservists with operational service since 1982 who have mental health concerns.

In this context, where the role of the TA is expanding and being rebalanced so that it integrates more closely with Regular Army structure, the adaptation and retention of volunteer Reserve personnel in the British Armed Forces offers an important subject for study for those interested in the well-being and sustainability of military populations. This article reports on the retention problems of TA personnel in the British Army following the unprecedented deployment of U.K. Reservists in Iraq from 2003 to 2006.

3. Organizational Culture and Military Retention

Recent changes in the role of Reserve Forces bring into focus the question of how successful the process of integration of Reservists into the organizational culture of the Regular Army has been and the connection, if any, between that process and the dynamics of retention among Reserve personnel. Changes in the role of the volunteer Reserve Forces, designed to increase their operational utility, could have three possible effects on retention: (1) to make membership in the Reserves more attractive, as Reservists, like their Regular counterparts, now have the opportunity to carry out what they sometimes call “real soldiering; (2) conversely, for some individuals, deployment may be unwelcome, leading to increased attrition along with lower levels of recruitment within the Reserves; or (3) it could be possible that these changes have little or no effect.

Let us turn first to the question of organizational culture. There are numerous definitions of organizational culture in the literature—some have suggested as many as 150. At its core, the term refers to an organization’s beliefs and values that underpin its practices and behavior: that is, the culture of an organization is “the way it does business.” An influential definition has been provided by Schein: “A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and therefore to be taught to new members as the correct way you perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.” As the literature on business organizations evolved...
during the 1980s, an important distinction came to be drawn between organizational climate, which refers to the temporary—or more ephemeral—perceptions, feelings, and attitudes of people, and culture, which comprises deeper, more entrenched (and therefore slower and more resistant to change) ideas.

The study of organizational culture has to take into account different levels of analysis, for example, the micro level of the individual and small groups, the meso level of wider groups, such as regiments and corps, and the overall organization as a whole—for example, the armed services (including their links to the wider environment). The notion of surface and deeper aspects of culture was developed by Schein with his concepts of “artefacts”—the visible features of the organization’s structures ways of doing business, such as the appearance of the workplace and everyday practices; “espoused values”—the organization’s official statements of its goals and purposes, as found, for example, in documents such as strategic plans, vision statements, and handbooks; and “underlying assumptions”—the core values and beliefs, some of the unstated, indeed taken-for-granted and unconscious drivers of the two other levels of beliefs and conduct. It is also important not to assume that the organization has a consensual, unitary understanding of its culture: it can be quite differentiated from this point of view with uneven commitment to cultural principles across an organization as well as the presence of rival belief systems, or subcultures, held by different groups.

The culture within the U.K. Armed Forces is deep-seated and, in light of the above discussion, would be expected to be resistant to change. In Kirke’s summary of British Army organizational culture, he describes an all-pervading idea of “superiority and inferiority” and of “being the best,” a term that recruiters have used to encapsulate membership of the Army. These feelings of superiority are also expressed in beliefs of belonging to more prestigious regiments or sections of the Army and in the contrasts that some Regular personnel draw between their own professionalism and that of TA “weekend warriors.” With this in mind, we hypothesized that greater use of Reserve Forces alongside Regulars would create cultural tensions, and, as we shall see, this was, initially at least, supported by our findings. We were also interested in whether such tensions affect retention.

To understand retention issues and how these are connected to tensions among different populations that work together, it is useful to first consider the ways in which their organizational cultures are similar and different. For full-time Regular military personnel, their organizational culture has an overriding effect on their daily working lives. Regiments have their own traditional rituals, taboos, and prejudices to outsiders, and entry into a regiment is marked by both formal and informal rites of passage. As Kirke points out for a Regular soldier, organizational culture amounts to near total immersion, which is especially heightened on operations. However, volunteer Reservists do not have the same level of cultural immersion because of the nature of their part-time military status—which for most is secondary to their primary civilian careers. Nevertheless, the recent organizational change in the contemporary military, with its greater dependence on the volunteer forces, has demanded increased integration of Regular and Reservist personnel.
Within the U.S. military, research has been undertaken looking at the effects of organizational change on the recruitment and retention of the volunteer Reserve Force. U.S. Reservists have reported that one of the positive aspects of the changing role of the Reserve Forces is the opportunity for them to “soldier” full-time and put their skills and military training into practice. However, in a 2003 study of U.S. Army Reservists deployed to Iraq, Reserve personnel expressed dissatisfaction with the disparity they perceived between themselves and Active (Regular) personnel. They perceived that they were given less training opportunities and poorer quality of military equipment, which then led them to believe they were being treated as second-class members of the Armed Forces.

As mentioned in the introduction, within the United Kingdom, recruitment across the Volunteer Reserves has been in steady decline since the late 1990s. Within the TA, with falling personnel levels too (20 percent over the past five years) and notwithstanding cuts in the establishment, it remains understrength. Although it appears to have stabilized during the 2006 to 2007 period, turnover of personnel continued to be high. This loss of trained TA personnel has had a negative effect on the overall capability of the U.K. Armed Forces on operational deployments. In 2006, the National Audit Office (NAO) was commissioned by the U.K. MOD to undertake a review of the U.K. Reserve Forces. The NAO concluded that MOD “faces real challenges in recruiting and retaining the required number of Reservists.” It noted that turnover in the Volunteer Reserves has been especially high during Operation TELIC (the U.K. military’s codename for operations in Iraq). If that is true, then overseas deployments appear to have a negative impact on TA retention, which is the opposite of what has been found for U.K. Regular Army personnel.

The NAO report suggested that this loss of personnel might be because of Reservists having different career motivations and being subject to different external civilian pressures from those of Regular personnel. This point was also raised in the subsequent report on recruitment and retention of both Regular and Reserve personnel mentioned earlier. To date, there have been few scientific studies on the retention of U.K. military Reservists despite the ongoing reorganization of the Armed Forces and the high attrition rates of Reserve personnel. This article reports on the retention issues of 191 TA personnel who deployed to Iraq during the period 2003 to 2006, and despite the small-scale nature of certain elements of this study, it helps to fill a gap in the literature on Reserve Forces, especially the TA.

Research Design and Method

Study Design

Qualitative and quantitative data from three complementary studies were analyzed for this article.

Study 1 was a large-scale cohort study assessing the mental and physical health of 7,695 U.K. Regular and Reserve personnel who served in the 2003 Iraq war, referred
to as Operation TELIC 1. Of the 7,695, 1,080 were TA soldiers. A questionnaire was devised and handed or mailed out to study participants between June 2004 and March 2006. For the current analysis, we selected from the questionnaire a single question: “Do you intend on remaining in the Armed Forces? Please explain.” This article develops an analysis of both quantitative and free-text responses to this question.

Study 2 was a smaller-scale, mixed-methods study investigating the general health, well-being, and deployment experiences of forty soldiers from the British Army Reserves deployed to Iraq between October 2004 and May 2005. These personnel were not a subsample of the larger study above. Of the forty Army Reservists, thirty-five were Volunteer Reservists, that is, TA personnel. This study was designed to complement the larger cohort study above and covered similar topics. Study 2 participants undertook two semistructured interviews, one predeployment face-to-face interview and one postdeployment over-the-telephone interview in the month following their return home. Interviews took on average sixty minutes. Within the postdeployment interview, we asked the same question as study 1: “Do you intend on remaining in the Armed Forces? Please explain.” Interviews were audi-taped and transcribed.

Study 3 was a subsample of the study 1 cohort, consisting of a representative sample of 1,107 participants who were interviewed during 2006–7 as part of a follow-up project focusing on mental health and stigma in the Armed Forces. Of the 1,107 participants, 378 (34 percent) were members of the TA, of which 292 (77 percent) completed an in-depth telephone interview. Interviews took on average forty minutes and covered experiences of deployment, family and personal stress, health, and stigma of help seeking. The study also collected data on attrition and reasons why individuals left the military. There are significant points about study 3 that need to be borne in mind. The majority of these personnel were selected because they had reported symptoms indicative of mental health problems during the first survey. As such, they might well be more likely to have negative experiences and perceptions of their military service than a random sample of all those who served in Iraq. The nature of the sample frame must therefore be borne in mind throughout.

Sample

Study 1 \( (n = 136) \). Of the 1,080 TA personnel in study 1, 627 (58 percent) completed a questionnaire, of which 136 (22 percent) provided a free-text response to the retention question identified above. No responder bias in terms of the principal health outcomes of the study was found between those who provided free-text responses and those who did not.

Study 2 \( (n = 32) \). Of the thirty-five TA personnel participating in study 2, thirty-two (91 percent) completed a full postdeployment interview including the retention question.

Study 3 \( (n = 23) \). Of the 292 TA personnel identified in study 3, 44 (15 percent) participants had served with the TA on subsequent operations to Iraq between 2004 and 2006. Of these, 23 (52 percent) provided in-depth information about issues affecting retention.
Data Analysis

The selected qualitative data were analyzed using the constant comparative method. We identified the key themes relating to the retention of TA personnel. Raw data were grouped (coded) into categories each containing data with a common theme. Further analysis was undertaken to define the categories in relation to each other, and salient issues and themes were identified. Quotations showing a nonidentifying respondent ID have been used to illustrate these themes in the results.

Quantitative data were analyzed using SPSS version 11.5. The quantitative analysis presented in this article takes the form of simple descriptive statistics alongside the more in-depth qualitative results.

5. Results

Sociodemographics for all three studies are shown in Table 1.

**Study 1.** The mean length of TA service was eleven years, and the mean sample age was thirty-eight years. Of those in the sample, 82 percent \( (n = 112) \) were male and 64 percent \( (n = 87) \) were married or cohabiting and 41 percent \( (n = 52) \) had children younger than eighteen living at home. At the time of being mobilized for deployment to Iraq, 79 percent \( (n = 107) \) were in paid civilian employment and 9 percent \( (n = 12) \) were self-employed.

**Study 2.** The mean length of TA service was ten years, and the mean sample age was thirty-six years. Nearly all of the sample was male (94 percent, \( n = 30 \)). Over half the sample (59 percent, \( n = 19 \)) was married or cohabiting, and 38 percent \( (n = 12) \) had children younger than eighteen living at home. At the time of being mobilized, 81 percent \( (n = 26) \) of Reservists were in paid civilian employment and 6 percent \( (n = 2) \) were self-employed.

**Study 3.** At the time of being interviewed, eighteen participants were still serving in the military and five had since left. The mean length of TA service was sixteen years, and the mean sample age was thirty-seven years. Again, nearly all of the sample was male and was married or cohabiting (83 percent; \( n = 19 \) for both). In all, 30 percent \( (n = 7) \) had children younger than eighteen living at home, and at the time of being mobilized 83 percent \( (n = 19) \) were in paid civilian employment.

6. Military Career Intentions—Quantitative and Qualitative Data

Quantitative Data

From the quantitative data, just over one-half of the participants in study 1 (58 percent) and study 2 (55 percent) and over three-fourths of those in study 3 (78 percent) stated they intended to remain in the Armed Forces following their deployment to Iraq. In all three studies, notwithstanding the intentions of those who wished to remain
Table 1. Demographics of the Reservist Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Study One N=136</th>
<th>Study Two N=32</th>
<th>Study Three N=23</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N(%)</td>
<td>N(%)</td>
<td>N(%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>112 (82)</td>
<td>30 (94)</td>
<td>19 (83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>24 (18)</td>
<td>2 (6)</td>
<td>4 (17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>111 (82)</td>
<td>30 (94)</td>
<td>18 (78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non White</td>
<td>3 (2)</td>
<td>2 (6)</td>
<td>5 (22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>22 (16)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of Participantsa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-29</td>
<td>13 (10)</td>
<td>6 (19)</td>
<td>7 (30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>52 (38)</td>
<td>15 (47)</td>
<td>7 (30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>59 (43)</td>
<td>10 (31)</td>
<td>8 (35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 plus</td>
<td>12 (9)</td>
<td>1 (3)</td>
<td>1 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital Status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married/Long term relationship (&gt;12 months &amp; living together)</td>
<td>96 (71)</td>
<td>18 (56)</td>
<td>19 (83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single/Other*</td>
<td>40 (29)</td>
<td>14 (44)</td>
<td>4 (17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘O’ Level/G.C.S.E’s or equivalent and below</td>
<td>63 (46)</td>
<td>19 (59)</td>
<td>9 (43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘A’ levels or equivalent and above</td>
<td>51 (38)</td>
<td>13 (41)</td>
<td>12 (57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>22 (16)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In paid civilian employment (inc. self-employed)</td>
<td>123 (90)</td>
<td>28 (88)</td>
<td>19 (83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>10 (7)</td>
<td>3 (9)</td>
<td>2 (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (3)</td>
<td>2 (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>3 (2)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ranks</td>
<td>97 (72)</td>
<td>23 (72)</td>
<td>21 (91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissioned Officers</td>
<td>39 (28)</td>
<td>9 (28)</td>
<td>2 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reservist role</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat (Infantry)</td>
<td>15 (11)</td>
<td>9 (28)</td>
<td>7 (30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Support (e.g. Artillery)</td>
<td>9 (7)</td>
<td>10 (31)</td>
<td>1 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Service Support (e.g. Logisticians/ Mechanics)</td>
<td>109 (80)</td>
<td>13 (41)</td>
<td>15 (65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>3 (2)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Divorced, separated, widowed, or in short term relationship at time of pre-deployment interview

aThis sample of reserves has a typical age profile for a TA group (and is also not predominantly comprised of NCOs). Reserves are substantially older than regulars, in fact the largest age group is 40 to 49. See Tess Browne, Lisa Hull, Oded Horn, Margaret Jones, Dominic Murphy, Nicola Fear, Neil Greenberg, Claire French, Roberto Ron, Simon, Wessely, and Mathew, Hotopf. Explanations for the increase in mental health problems in UK Reserve Forces who have served in Iraq. British Journal of Psychiatry 190: (2007); 484-489 Table 2.
in the TA, over half of their comments referred to negative aspects of TA life, and participants thought that these features had an overall effect on retention. Indeed, their comments were similar to those expressed by the participants who expressed their intention to leave the military. In study 1, nineteen (14 percent) endorsed neither yes nor no for the retention question but did provide a free-text response. The majority (89 percent) of these comments related to negative aspects of life in the TA that affected retention and shared the same themes as those made by participants who intended to leave the military.

**Qualitative Data**

The qualitative data provided insights into (1) the ways in which TA personnel perceived how they fit into the wider organizational culture of the Army, (2) perceptions of how family welfare issues were being addressed by the Army, (3) views on how military service affected their civilian careers, and (4) the ways in which the Army provided postdeployment support and care. We consider each of these in turn.

1. **The organizational culture of the U.K. military during deployment.** The qualitative data shed light on the career intentions of Reservists and their perceptions of how they fit into the wider organizational culture of the British Army. In study 1, the factor most frequently perceived as having a negative effect on the retention of TA personnel was the Army’s organizational culture during deployment. This accounted for over one-third of all comments (36 percent). Of those soldiers who did not intend to remain in the TA, fourteen soldiers (37 percent) commented that there were negative aspects of military life during their deployment that led to their decision to leave the Armed Forces. Eleven soldiers (29 percent) specifically commented on poor organizational systems and procedures within the Regular British Army with which they served in Iraq. Five TA soldiers (13 percent) described being given unsuitable or unrewarding roles while deployed and not feeling accepted by Regular soldiers because of their Reservist status. Negative feelings toward the military leadership of the Regular British Army and comments on how people were poorly managed were also echoed by 33 percent (n = 26) of those who (for the time being at least) were intending to remain in the Armed Forces and 43 percent (n = 9) of those whose retention intentions were unclear.

   The unit I was with was poorly led with lazy senior officers who seemed not to care about anything other than their own well-being. (4794; leaving the Armed Forces)

   Persons sent as individuals to join regular units were not accepted and used to fill unrewarding roles/parts. (4151; leaving the Armed Forces)

   Although I had been in the TA for 20 plus years I decided to retire. [While deployed there was] a lack of respect for TA, lack of respect among individuals, terrible abuses of people who were weak. The treatment of the TA in the Gulf was a disgrace. (5444; leaving the Armed Forces)
The potential to undertake work seemed to be unorganised and ad-hoc. At one point our main focus was the local population yet every day we burned spare rations. Before the dressing station [medical facility] left theatre despite there being shortages of medical kit in local hospitals we burned thousands of pounds worth of medical kit/drugs. This seemed to be down to lack of direction from senior commanders and individuals having a “too much hassle,” “can’t be bothered” attitude. (4819; intending to remain in the Armed Forces) 

My experiences of dealing with regular soldiers leaves me not wanting to repeat my operational experiences. The TA felt like second-class soldiers by the regulars despite doing the job better than them. (4329; intending to remain in the Armed Forces)

In addition to comments about the general lack of cohesion between TA and Regular British Army personnel, four (11 percent) of the TA soldiers in study 1 who were leaving the military perceived that the Regular Army soldiers they served alongside were poorly behaved, this being perceived as a further example of poor leadership and discipline.

In the Regular Army you will get on fine if your face fits. His face [fellow TA member] and mine didn’t fit. We didn’t swear and throw things at Iraqi civilians. We took pride in our work and doing a job well. We enjoyed having a conversation that didn’t revolve around cars, football and sex. It would appear that these are the skills required of a Regular soldier. It is for this reason I no longer wish to be a part of the British Armed Forces. I am proud of the role I played on Op TELIC 1. I am not proud of the unit I served with. (4530; leaving the Armed Forces)

Linked to Reservists’ perceptions of poor organization and mistreatment within the British Army were comments regarding lack of protective clothing and military equipment for TA personnel. Fifteen Reservists (11 percent) from study 1 commented that the lack of an adequate kit and adequate equipment during their deployment had a detrimental effect on TA morale and retention. 

I think that the lack of equipment issued to our unit on Op TELIC 1 had a very big impact on how people coped with the stressful situation of a first mobilisation and first combat experience. (4876; intending to remain in the Armed Forces)

Lot of [TA] colleagues in the Gulf have left. Felt disillusioned with lack of equipment and organization. (4762; has not indicated whether leaving or remaining in the Armed Forces)

The results of study 2 were in marked contrast to those of study 1. Three-quarters ($n = 24$) of the TA sample from study 2 who served in Iraq in 2004–5 reported good military management and leadership. All of the participants in the study sample were
deployed to Iraq as individual reinforcements providing additional manpower for a range of combat and noncombat roles within U.K. Regular Army units. The majority of the sample (78 percent) felt they were not treated any differently or resented by their Regular work colleagues and reported integrating well into the unit. The majority of those who had previously deployed commented on a perceived change in behavior regarding how Reservists were generally accepted.

At one time, Reservists who went on operations would try and blend in with Regulars. . . . They certainly wouldn’t publicise that they were Reservists. They hoped that people thought that they were good . . . that they were Regulars. Well, that doesn’t happen any more. People went out of their way, if they were mistaken for Regulars, to correct people and I think that’s an important distinction to make between now and say five or six years ago. It’s a huge cultural difference, you notice it in operations that Reservists put their head up and say “Right, before you say anything. . . . I am a Reservist and I’m proud of it.” That’s a huge difference from the past! (R09)

A minority of Reservists \((n = 6, 19\text{ percent})\) in study 2 reported bad treatment by some of their Regular colleagues because of their Reservist status. Bad treatment involved a combination of being repeatedly allocated menial or unpopular tasks and being ignored, isolated, or treated with disrespect. However, despite these negative experiences, overall the majority of the sample reported an increase in respect from the Regulars as the six-month deployment progressed. At the start of the deployment, two-thirds of the sample \((n = 21)\) reported they felt they had the respect of their Regular counterparts. This figure increased to 94 percent \((n = 30)\) by the end of the deployment. Reservists felt that they had “proved their worth” and subsequently gained respect.

Had respect from Regulars once proved I could do the job. I needed to prove myself. . . . I was put in post because of civilian employment [similar role] so I integrated into slot. Initially I was on an unspoken trial basis, they [Regular Unit] were waiting for me to become overloaded, but it never happened. (R22)

First Commanding Officer treated TA soldiers with disdain and displeasure—didn’t want or trust us, but we gained 200 percent respect because [of] what we did during tour. (R40)

However, over half the study 2 sample \((n = 18)\) said they had never expected to be part of a major deployment or be deployed overseas, and they felt that the changing role and culture of the TA was maybe not so attractive to some of the longer serving Reservists.

Different when I joined before it was a drinking club. Now you’re aware that in the next year you could get deployed to Iraq. You need to be willing to go on operations [overseas deployments]. Now that the TA deploys, [it is a] big shift culturally. . . . The retention rate is suffering. (R18)
TA before, it was fun weekends and Tuesday was sports night. Now we work all the time, not as much fun, so thinking of leaving. . . . Didn’t expect ever to deploy, not when I joined in 1990. (R23)

In study 3, only three respondents (13 percent) stated they received poor treatment from Regular British Army personnel as a result of their Reserve status and that subsequently their mental health had suffered both in the theatre and on their return home.

2. Family welfare and military service. In study 1, comments about the negative impact of military deployments on marital and personal relationships and general family well-being were expressed by 15 percent ($n = 21$) of the sample. This represents eight (21 percent) TA personnel who reported they were leaving the military, nine (11 percent) who reported they would continue with the TA, and four (21 percent) whose intentions to remain in the TA were unclear.

If I had been single I would have remained with [name of TA Unit]. I think family/relationships are the main reasons why people struggle to stay in the Forces. (4847; leaving the Armed Forces)

Whether I stay in the Armed Forces depends on the effect it will have on my wife as she is still on antidepressant tablets [following soldier’s deployment on Op TELIC]. (4403; has not indicated whether leaving or remaining in the Armed Forces)

In addition, two of the Reservists commented that a lack of adequate military welfare support for their families during the deployment period played a role in their decision to leave the Armed Forces.

I believe that if I and my family had been better prepared and supported before and during my deployment I would still be a serving member of the TA today. (4936; leaving the Armed Forces)

In studies 2 and 3, the main reason given for participants either intending to quit or having already quit the TA was “having to put my family first.” In study 2, irrespective of their marital status, 88 percent ($n = 28$) of the TA sample thought it a necessity for the military to provide welfare support to their spouse, partner, or immediate family members during deployment. There was a considerable disparity between the type and amount of support that the TA sample reported their families received. Just under half the sample (47 percent, $n = 15$) reported that support had been provided and that it was sufficient. Examples of support were family newsletters, social events, and regular phone calls offering practical and emotional support.

TA unit appointed new boss, dead keen to get family down, nice bloke. [He] sent a letter out every two weeks to [name of wife]. TA unit brought people in; full-time welfare staff [who] did stuff with the kids and all sorts. (R11)
TA unit was very good when partner’s father was very ill. The Officer Commanding and the Admin Officer were good. The Officer Commanding ran my partner to hospital in his own car. (R19)

Conversely, twelve Reservists (38 percent) in study 2 reported either insufficient support ($n = 5$) or no support at all ($n = 7$).

[My] father died whilst [I was] away. [I] couldn’t come home, it was stressful. No support from TA. Would have liked TA to let girlfriend know what was happening, especially as she used to be in the same TA unit. So they knew her but didn’t contact her. I was very disappointed. (R17)

Local TA only contacted partner once regarding [the] Christmas party for kids. That was it! No invites, no newsletters! The TA should have made sure that there were regular meetings for partners and they should have kept in contact. . . . They [the TA] should set it up that partners can come in, get together and have a chat. (R25)

Only five Reservists in study 2 stated that they had not wanted nor needed support for their families while deployed, but one of these respondents further stated his TA unit suffered from poor communication and lacked understanding.

In study 3, the majority of respondents reported that family issues were a key concern and cause of stress to them while deployed ($n = 15$, 65 percent) and on their return home ($n = 3$, 13 percent). Of these respondents, seven (39 percent) talked about the difficulty of separation from their families while deployed, especially if there were problems at home, and not being there to help their spouse or family. They commented that these problems were further exacerbated by the lack of military welfare support to families of TA personnel both during deployment and postdeployment. In addition, one-third of these Reservists ($n = 6$) stated that difficulties caused by separation and lack of welfare support had the potential to lead to the breakdown of their relationships at home, leading to permanent separation and/or divorce. Two TA personnel from this study felt that Reservists and their families were not as ready to deal with long periods of separation caused by deployment compared to full-time Regular service personnel and their families.

My wife had no contact whatsoever when I was deployed from the Unit. There were no [family] welfare facilities when I was deployed. . . . It was such a shock. (346c)

I lost my wife due to the time I spent away. You can’t get back if you think they are having affairs or if there is illness in the family (413c).

It [deployment] is a stress, especially for the Reserves because of being away from your spouse when you wouldn’t normally be used to it. (833c)
To sum up this part of the discussion, within studies 2 and 3, the most common source of dissatisfaction with military service was concerns over family welfare and poor military welfare support during the deployment. In study 2, there was a disparity between TA units that had provided frequent and welcome support and those that appeared to have provided very little or no assistance. Concern over family welfare in studies 2 and 3 was the principal reason for Reservists expressing a desire to leave the military postdeployment, as reported elsewhere.\textsuperscript{34} Our results also confirm findings from research on Regular British Army personnel and their spouses and other military populations that soldiers’ long-term commitment is largely dependent on their family’s support of their military career.\textsuperscript{35}

Unlike the majority of families of Regular Army personnel, families of TA personnel typically do not live in close proximity to one another and thus find it harder to benefit from any support network of the other military families within the unit. However, this problem is now being increasingly recognized. For example, TA units now receive funding for the appointment of permanent welfare staff with the explicit mission of reducing the gaps in welfare support between TA and Regular families.\textsuperscript{36} Projected follow-up studies will provide data to assess if this has been successful.

3. Military service and civilian careers of TA personnel. In study 1, 8 percent ($n = 11$) of the sample of Reservists commented on the disruption that military deployments caused to their civilian careers and how this was a negative factor in retention. All of the comments highlighted that most Reserve personnel have the responsibility of managing dual careers and that the sustainability of a military career, in which future deployments are inevitable, is largely dependent on the level of disruption this causes to their civilian employment.

I cannot afford career-wise to be deployed a third time. (3930; leaving the Armed Forces)

Military did not seem to see the need to give us definite information regarding our deployment—this does not sit well with civilian life or employers. They would need to give more guarantees in future in order for me to have a parallel military–civilian career. (4869; intending to remain in the Armed Forces)

Currently between jobs—largely because of TELIC [deployment to Iraq]. It’s a career killer. (3948; intending to remain in the Armed Forces)

In study 2, of the twenty-six Reservists in full-time paid civilian employment at the start of the deployment (excluding two self-employed), eighteen (69 percent) had returned to their civilian jobs postdeployment. Of the eight who no longer worked for their previous employers, one Reservist reported losing his job as a direct result of his deployment commitments to the TA, and a further two stated they felt they were forced to leave because of the poor treatment they received from their employer on their return to work. Of the eighteen Reservists who had returned to their civilian employment,
one-third were now thinking about the possible negative effects of further deployment on their civilian careers. However, none of the Reservists in study 3 talked about civilian employment as a factor in retention.

4. Support for Reserve personnel postdeployment. In study 1, 10 percent \((n = 13)\) of Reservists commented on their concerns regarding the lack of welfare support for TA personnel postdeployment. These concerns, which came from both those intending to leave \((n = 6)\) and those intending to remain in \((n = 7)\) the Armed Forces, focused on poor military aftercare for Reservists who suffered health and/or readjustment problems postdeployment.

Since last July [2003] I’ve had depression. Most of my problems started two months after returning. My unit hasn’t helped me at all. My partner has done all the work to get me on the right road. I feel quite alone now and I have contemplated topping myself jumping in front of a bus. \((4105;\) leaving the Armed Forces\)

We have not been asked much if our health deteriorated since return from TELIC. Mine has significantly! I have received no help, support or advice from my unit and will be leaving due to this. \((4922;\) leaving the Armed Forces\)

One week after returning to work I had a nervous breakdown and was diagnosed with PTSD, anxiety and depression. My GP initially referred me to the [name of National Health Service Mental Health Trust] who wrote back saying it was a matter for the Army and they had no expertise in PTSD. . . . I informed my TA unit and they contacted the Army Welfare Service who monitored my progress and offered counselling but it would have involved a 120 mile round trip! How can less fortunate former servicemen cope with this system? \((4129;\) intending to remain in the Armed Forces\)

In studies 2 and 3, poor military support postdeployment emerged more as a general family readjustment issue, as discussed above.

7. Implications of Data on TA Retention for U.K. Army Organizational Culture

It is widely accepted that if the U.K. Armed Forces are to make a success of their approach to a greater use of Reserve Forces to work with their Regular counterparts in contemporary operations, some organizational changes may be necessary.\(^{37}\) In this article, we hypothesized that greater use of Reserve Forces alongside Regulars would create cultural tensions, and this was, during the initial stages of operations in Iraq at least, supported by our findings.

Analysis of the 2003 data (study 1) showed that the perceived poor and often hostile organizational culture of the Regular Army during deployment was the most frequently reported factor influencing TA soldiers’ decisions to leave the military. Many Reservists felt exposed to regiments to which they did not belong or by which they
were not accepted that had unfamiliar, long-held beliefs, traditions, and practices. Reservists commented on the negative culture of Army units, which portrayed a general lack of acceptance of TA members, in addition to poor leadership, people management, and discipline. Consequently, some Reservists experienced feelings of isolation and demoralization, and, for some, these feelings negatively affected their desire to continue serving in the military. Even among those TA individuals who indicated they intended to remain in the Armed Forces, one-third reported they experienced negative interactions with the Regular Army and acknowledged this could affect retention within the TA.

These findings should not be viewed in isolation from comparable experiences of other armed forces serving in Iraq. For example, in 2003, following similar changes and reconstruction, U.S. Reservists in Iraq reported they were being treated as second-class members of the Army. Similar to U.K. Reservists, they felt that as they were now being tasked to undertake the same responsibilities and threats as Regular soldiers, they should be treated as equals. During this same period, the U.S. military was reported to be experiencing severe manpower shortfalls within the Army Reserves that were threatening to undermine the effectiveness of the Army as a whole.

It is widely acknowledged that to achieve changes in organizational culture, a top-down approach can be a key factor: an approach where policy makers and leaders within an organization send a clear, consistent message of the required changes while modeling the behavior they want to see in others. This is required to ensure that temporary or superficial changes in behavior and attitudes are accompanied by deeper and more long-lasting shifts in values and outlooks. It has been argued that, “organizational leaders are primary agents in creating, embedding and forming cultural assumptions.” Our data suggest that this had yet to happen in 2003. However, in contrast, the evidence from the latter two studies indicates considerable and rapid change, at least insofar as the perceptions of Reserve personnel are concerned. The majority of the study 2 sample reported good military management and leadership, and over three-fourths reported good unit cohesion between Regular and Reservists personnel. In addition, the majority of those Reservists who had previously deployed to Iraq in 2003 commented on a perceived change in military culture both within senior chains of command and at the grassroots level among their Regular coworkers: Reserve personnel generally now felt accepted as part of the team. This was confirmed in the 2008 Armed Forces anonymous Continuous Attitude Survey, in which 86 percent of officers and 67 percent of Regular soldiers now reported that Reservists made a valuable contribution to the Army, with similar proportions rating Reservists as “professional” or “very professional.” However, the low response rate (23 percent) limits the conclusions that can be drawn from this source.

Our data do not allow us address how or why this occurred. Nor can we be sure, at this point, that these developments reflect shifts in fundamental values or organizational culture rather than temporary changes in organizational climate. These findings therefore, raise the question of how to interpret the extent to which social and cultural relationships between Regular and Reserve components have changed in the British Army.
A number of possibilities need to be considered. For example, it is conceivable that the two types of soldier merely became used to each other within their existing cultural frameworks, which changed little. Alternatively, there has been some adjustment of cultures, but this could have been on the part of not just Regulars but also TA soldiers. We suspect that the most persuasive interpretation is that both components have changed; that once mutual accommodation occurred, it became possible for both kinds of soldiers to realize that there was much for both to benefit from effective cooperation, which is very unlikely to occur if there is an entrenched “us and them” oppositional culture.

However, we do note how the U.K. MOD did signal its commitment to better integration and cultural change with regard to the role of the Reserve Forces, so as to achieve its stated policy intention of the greater use of Reserves. In doing so, it also confirms the findings of other research in this area. Northover, for example, has suggested that more integrated training for Regulars and Reserve Forces is useful. For example, those Reserve personnel who had trained together with Regulars before mobilization performed better on operations. This finding helps to reinforce the arguments made in this article. However, it remains the case that both forces suffer from serious wastage rates, although it is far more difficult for Regular soldiers to leave the service as they must serve a minimum of four years (in most cases) before being allowed to do so.

This positive affirmation of the Reserve Forces appears, from study 2 data, to have filtered down through the Army’s chain of command, and briefings promoting the Reserves are now included on key training courses for all Regular Service personnel. In addition, wherever possible, Reservists are now mobilized a few months prior to the actual deployment to allow them to meet and train alongside the Regular units with which they will be serving. It is worth noting that a recent TA Continuous Attitude Survey concluded that 50 percent of officers and over half of soldiers suggested that the Regular Army and the TA need to work and train together more often. Furthermore, the U.K. MOD has addressed the imbalance in mental health support between Regular and Reserves by making military mental health services available to Reservists on return from deployment. This is a significant (and symbolic) move in equalizing the status of the two components of “one Army.”

Nonetheless, despite these improvements, turnover of TA personnel continues to be high. In study 2, data show that just under two-thirds of the sample never expected to take part in a major deployment, with nearly three-quarters of these having joined up prior to the organizational changes implemented by the RFA in 1997. This point highlights a cultural differentiation within the TA: there are some longer serving members whose expectations of service may not have shifted from the old TA culture when Reserve deployments were not contemplated.

8. Conclusion

This article shows that the unprecedented use and more integrated role of U.K. Reserve Forces in Iraq in 2003 revealed cultural and organizational tensions between Regular and TA personnel. Yet eighteen months afterward, the findings from the 2004 to 2006
data suggest that the U.K. MOD has had some success in addressing these problems. However, despite some success in implementing organizational change, attrition of U.K. Reservists has remained high. This article highlights that, until very recently, less attention has been paid to the continuing disparity in the provision of welfare support for Reservists’ families and that concern over family welfare is the most frequently reported factor as to why Reservists intend to leave the TA.

It is relevant to acknowledge that since the end of the data collection for this study, the Armed Forces have instituted a series of measures intended to address gaps in welfare provision. The recommendations of the Unit Welfare Officers report are intended to improve the situation, as is a new review of Welfare Provision for Mobilised Reservists, which will specifically address support for members of the Reserve Forces and their families prior to, during, and after mobilized service. We will be able to assess the impact of these changes as part of our ongoing main study in 2008 and 2009.

Finally, we should be careful with drawing conclusions from the data, some of which are drawn from small-scale studies. In addition, a further limitation of the three studies is that they incorporate only Reservists’ own accounts and perceptions of military welfare provided to their families. None of the Reservists’ reports have been independently validated, and it is possible that family support was provided by the military but that either it was poorly marketed or spouses chose not to approach or accept help from the military when needed. We also again draw attention to the sample frame for study 3, which contains an excess of those with mental health problems during service and hence a likely bias toward negative perceptions and experiences. Nor do we have sufficient, reliable data on how Regulars perceived Reservists instead of how Reservists perceived Regular culture, although there are some pointers, as, for example, in the recent pilot study by Kirke, which reviewed a period similar to that covered by this article.

However, the above caveats do not detract from the findings across all three studies: soldiers reported conflict between their Reserve service and their families that had a negative impact on their military career intentions. Similarly, in the United States, Reservists are less likely to continue in the Armed Forces if they report perceived military–family conflict. It is possible that with greater family welfare support, conflict could be reduced, thereby benefiting Reserve retention. It is also important to note that, at this stage, we are able to assess only retention intentions—our follow-up study will show if these intentions were reflected in actions.

Given the integral role that Reservists now have within the Western military, future studies should have equal if not more focus on Reservists than on the Regular Forces. In addition, this article has highlighted the importance of family adjustment to the TA’s changing role and the prospect of separation from their loved ones because of overseas TA deployment. Consequently, the authors of this article are currently undertaking further research: (1) a follow-up of the large cohort study (study 1) and (2) an in-depth study of volunteer Army Reservists and their spouses during a deployment to Afghanistan. Both will further investigate factors affecting the well-being and retention of TA personnel.
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Notes

and Retention in the Armed Forces, Session 2005-06, October 2006, HC 1633, 964, Executive Summary.


9. House of Commons Defence Committee, Recruiting and Retaining, par. 17, 10.

10. For a useful statement, see the official view at http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/WhatWeDo/ReserveForcesandCadets/ReserveForces/ (accessed August 26, 2008).


14. Recent concerns about Reservists’ mental health prompted the launch of the Reserves Mental Health Assessment Programme in November 2007. However, the number using this service has been small. See the speech by the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, Derek Twigg, http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/DefencePolicyAndBusiness/NewMentalHealthcareProgrammeAnnouncedForReservists.htm (accessed September 24, 2009). As at July 2008, of the 261 calls received, 63 cases were assessed and 48 received treatment following assessment. MOD October 2008. However, the take-up figure may mask the number who need help but do not or feel they cannot ask for it.


17. Schein, Organizational Culture. Also see the interesting discussion in Teemu Reiman and Pia Oedewald, “The Assessment of Organisational Culture: A Methodological Study,” VTT


19. There are rather more colorful terms in circulation, such as STAB (“stupid TA bastard”). Reservists are not passive recipients of such epithets. In return, they can offer the riposte of ARAB to Regulars, meaning “arrogant Regular Army bastard.”

20. There is more to cultural differentiation within the Army than the regimental system: Corps and Brigades or Divisions (as in the household division) have an important cultural aspect. For a good discussion, see A. Beevor, Inside the British Army, rev. ed. (London: Corgi Press, 1991).


27. For full details, see ibid.


29. The samples were representative of the British Army as a whole; consequently, they are split into mainly juniors and fewer seniors. The numbers were too small to begin to analyze intergroup differences, and to do so would lengthen this article without providing much additional valuable detail. The key break point of rank is clearly commissioning, and this is accounted for. So far as age is concerned, it is reasonable to assume that that older personnel will be associated with different life perspectives, but this may be less important in the Reserves, where rank may not link to age in the same way as in Regulars. So it is likely that for Reservists it is their circumstances as Reservists rather than their age that is the influential consideration.

30. The issue of deploying as an individual augmentee (IA) or as a formed unit is an important one but is not confined to Reserve Forces. Many Regulars now also deploy as IAs. In a recent study by Neil Greenberg and colleagues, only 55 percent of the approximately 1,200 participants deployed with their complete unit and about 20 percent deployed as IAs. See Neil Greenberg, Amy Iversen, Lisa Hull, Duncan Bland, and Simon Wessely, “Getting a Peace of the Action: Measures of Post Traumatic Stress in UK Military Peacekeepers,” Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine 101 (2008): 78-84. Indeed, for all forces (Reserve and Regulars), improvements have been made in the way IAs are prepared for and recovered from operations,
and this may in some way have explained some of the changes we observed over the study period: namely, both groups were dealt with in the same way.

31. Although we question whether this statement was based on reality or perception, the quote appears to represent frustration at the “system.” Reserve medical staff (including combat medical technicians and medical assistants) from all three services deploy in support of land operations, and the frustration apparent in this quote is likely to affect some military medics, whatever their status.

32. While Reservists may have complaints about the quality of equipment, it is important to note that they were not alone in this experience: Regular soldiers suffered from similar difficulties.

33. We do not know why this individual seems to have not been granted compassionate leave, as should have happened, how many other such cases have occurred, or if this is a relatively isolated example.

34. National Audit Office, Reserve Forces.


37. In 2005, the UK MOD announced a re-balancing of the Army, which included the TA. ‘The move to larger, multi-battalion regiments is the only sustainable way in which to structure the British Army for the long-term... The new battalions will continue to recruit in the areas of their original constituent elements. Regional recruiting will remain the bedrock of the British infantry. Nor will there be any diminution in the role of the Territorial Army (TA) and the Reserves. The TA will in future be more closely integrated with the Regular Army for both training and operations. Each of the 14 TA infantry battalions will be part of a regular parent regiment, one per regular regiment with the exception of the Royal Regiment of Scotland which will have two, and the Guards Division which will have one affiliated TA battalion.’ See G Hoon, Defence, Australian Government Department of Defence, February 2005, <http://www.defence.gov.au/defencemagazine/editions/20050201/sections/the_big_picture.htm (accessed September 25, 2009). A strategic review of reserve forces announced in March 2008, reported in April 2009, see Strategic Review of Reserves, http://www.mod
38. Moskos, “A New Concept.” Also see Lomsky-Feder, Gazit, and Ben-Ari, “Reserve Soldiers as Transmigrants.”
42. MOD, Reserve Forces: Territorial Army; MOD, TA Rebalancing.
44. Changes in support systems include the following. As part of the TA Rebalancing Implementation Plan, an officer post was established in all major units to fulfill the recruiting, retention, and welfare functions. Originally named the Regimental Recruiting Retention and Welfare Officer, these posts were renamed Regimental Operations Support Officer (ROSO). See Army Headquarters memorandum, LAND/RF/5501 27 Nov 05. Reservists, like their Regular counterparts, can also access the Army Families Federation—see http://www.army.mod.uk/welfare-support/welfare-support.aspx. Official information on welfare packages is available in Joint Service Publication 770 Tri Service Operational and Non Operational Welfare Policy, issue 1, July 31, 2007, MOD Directorate Service Personnel Policy.
45. Kirke, “Issues in Integrating.” It is based on a small number (fifteen) of majors, only one of whom was from a combat unit, and is therefore less representative of the cross-section of the Army compared to the work presented here. Kirke points out that Regular–Reserve integration is a key theme in the Future Army Structure being designed in the United Kingdom. Our findings give some indication that the proposed structure may already be having an effect before being fully implemented.

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