Thank you for your generous introduction and the opportunity to speak in an institution with such a distinguished reputation for history and war studies. When Charles Guthrie and I settled on this title neither of us had the conclusion of the Strategic Defence Review in mind. Yet my choice of title may prove prescient, for by this time tomorrow it may be that God is all our armed forces have on their side.

I would like to begin with a passage from a letter, written one Sunday in July 1940, by Christopher Seton-Watson, a subaltern in the Royal Horse Artillery.

Fresh from a church sermon, Seton-Watson commented: 'I wish there were less talk of the righteousness of our cause, and less crude simplification of the issue into a struggle of good versus evil. Believing as I do in the existence of a God, I cannot believe that Hitler could have achieved so much without the assent of God. The righteousness is not all on one side…..Don't let us assume that God is automatically on our side. We have got to make ourselves worthy of his help, to show our worth'.

And indeed Seton-Watson did, both in service which won him a Military Cross with Bar, and as a bachelor don who wrote fine studies of modern Italy and encouraged Oriel undergraduates to embark on careers I probably should merely allude to.

The Old Testament presumption that God was on one's side was still surprisingly universal during the Second World War. It was not the militant Christianity of the Great War, in which to be sure, historians had also appointed themselves keepers of sacred national flames. During the 1930s the churches had assimilated the appeasement and pacifism which was so modish among thinking people. But God was certainly a force to conjure with in the highest circles as the democracies went to war.
Consider Churchill's account of divine service aboard HMS Prince of Wales on 10 August 1941, where he and Roosevelt agreed the Atlantic Charter. It is fashionable among biographers of the Prime Minister to dismiss his religious views, which were admittedly idiosyncratic. But here is what he wrote about the service: 'I chose the hymns myself –"For those in Peril on the Sea" and "Onward Christian Soldiers". We ended with "O God, Our Help in Ages Past", which Macaulay reminds us the Ironsides chanted as they bore John Hampden's body to the grave. Every word seemed to stir the heart. It was a great hour to live'.

Then there was the D-Day Prayer which the Episcopalian President Roosevelt broadcast as the D-Day landings got underway: 'Almighty God: Our sons, pride of our nation, this day have set upon a mighty endeavour, a struggle to preserve our Republic, our religion, and our civilisation, and to set free a suffering humanity ... With thy blessing we shall prevail over the unholy forces of our enemy. Help us to conquer the apostles of greed and racial arrogances'.

According to Antony Beevor, troops attended church services in huge numbers on the ships of the Allied armada. Sheltering in landing craft ploughing through the pewter Channel, they retreated into private reflection, in which the 23rd Psalm jostled with the minutiae of life insurance policies.

'For atheism and Stalin' does not have much of a ring to it, though I suppose Darwin Dawkins might arm himself for the first part if push came to shove.

The third element of the Grand Alliance, the Soviet Union, was forced by necessity, to tone down militant atheism and to allow a deeply nationalist Orthodox Church some slack as part of the drive to gird Russia's resources. This was partly because the Germans had reopened churches and mosques in order to win local collaborators. One of the licensed functions of the Orthodox Church was to raise money – some 150 million rubles by 1944. The Dimitri Donskoi monastery raised funds for a tank brigade.

In a further irony, the last issue of Bezbozhnik, the paper of the League of the Militant Godless, was devoted to denouncing Nazi persecution of the Protestant and Catholic Churches in Germany, with the paper diverted to a plush book called The Truth About Religion In Russia Today. This was mainly designed to induce American Catholics to support Lend Lease for the Soviets.

On the Axis side, one belligerent nation could most sincerely claim to have God on its side, for Japan was ruled by a living deity – a lineal descendant of the Sun Goddess. The Japanese believed that the reason why they had never been defeated in the 2,600 years existence of the Yamoto race was that 'We are guarded by the god above'.

In a sophisticated modern society, like Japan, the precise mix of Buddhism, Shinto, and Confucius, was highly individual, but one thing was not a matter for agnostic doubts. He may have been a humble marine biologist, but Hirohito was the focus for the kokutai, the cardinal principles that bound Japanese society, and which elevated the Japanese above all other races.

This creed, and the samurai values which went with it, was central to the mentality of men who suffered the greatest proportionate casualties of the war, requiring 1600 bullets to kill each one of 10,000 Japanese defending Peleliu in September 1944. Many Japanese believed that as they died they became martyrs for their divine emperor. 'I shall fall smiling and singing songs. Please visit and worship at Yasukuni Shrine this spring. There I shall be a cherry blossom, smiling with many other colleagues. I died smiling so please smile. Please do
not cry. Make my death meaningful' wrote one 20 year old Kamikazi pilot before his premeditated suicide.

In a rare excursion from military history, Basil Liddell Hart once wrote that 'the Nazis might [more truly] be defined as a party where bad manners were carried to the extreme'. You may feel, as I do, that there may have been more to it than using a knife as a fork, or failing to open doors for women.

Every German soldier (except for the SS) had 'Gott mit Uns' inscribed on his belt buckle. Himmler preferred his men to be "God-believing", for belief in higher powers was the gateway to fanaticism. Moreover, atheism would elide Nazism with Communism in ways that were politically unhelpful. Hence it is dishonest to claim that the Nazis were atheists, or for that matter to claim that they were Christians, except in so far as a general mulch is good for a variety of plants in any garden.

Nazism was a political movement which significantly mobilised north German Protestants, despite its leader being an Austrian lapsed Catholic who only became a German citizen in 1932. That is not to say there were not Catholic Nazis, but merely that the latter were more heavily invested in Weimar through the Centre Party, which was vital to the Republic's successive coalitions. Popes Pius XI and XII deplored all forms of totalitarianism, as you can see from the remarkably astute 1937 encyclical Mit brennender Sorge, practicing neutrality in wartime, with a pronounced tilt to the Allied side. Roosevelt had a special envoy to the Vatican, the steel magnate Myron Taylor; Hitler did not. Indeed, he plotted to kidnap the Pope, who in turn knew about German resistance plots to kill Hitler.

Much of the Nazi movement's domestic political pitch derived from its claim to be re-moralising German society, although that went together with darkly transgressive temptations. These were the tribal tom tom beats which George Orwell wrote about so well, and which Freud had intimated.

Hitler repeatedly claimed to be 'doing the Lord's work' and saw Providence guiding his own actions. Like Communists, the Nazis deified an historical mechanism, although this consisted of pitiless racial, rather than dialectical, materialism. This was camouflaged in a redemptive national myth, with Hitler, rather than a saviour social class, at the centre of an idolatrous Führer cult.

Although the Nazis gave full vent to anticlericalism, they were also certain that science would triumph, and, unlike their treatment of synagogues, abstained from physically wiping the churches out. None of which should excuse clergy from both major German denominations for blessing, from afar or in the field, the invasion of the Soviet Union as a crusade against Godless Bolshevism.

God is only one aspect of the wider subject of moral combat, which means not only what people fought for, but how they fought. There are many ways in which one could write about morality and warfare, the most traditional, in Christian (or Islamic) culture at any rate, being concerned with just war or issues of proportionality, about which Lord Guthrie and Michael Quinlan have written so well.

The idea that war deranges human morals is also venerable. In the Georgics, Virgil wrote in 29 BC: 'Here right and wrong are reversed; so many wars in the world, so many faces of evil'.
We moderns know that too, albeit in the language of newspapers or psychology rather than epic poetry.

In 1946 around 12 million GIs came home, causing a Stateside moral panic. Newspapers ran such headlines as 'Veteran Beheads Wife with Jungle Machete' or even 'Veteran Kicks Aunt' while stories about a civilian triple axe murderer were buried inside on page 17.

A sociological study highlighted several paradoxes: 'Veterans had lost their moral sense in battle, yet they returned home highly critical of the nation's peccadilloes'. 'Veterans were physical and mental wrecks, yet they threatened to set up a reign of terror through cunning and brawn'. 'Veterans were returning 'vicious and godless', even though there had been "no atheists in foxholes"'.

Were one so minded, it would be possible to write a moral history of the Second World War in terms of increased divorce rates, for in the US and Britain they doubled, illegitimate births ditto, a rising incidence of crime and delinquency attributable to absent authority, or, in the German case, two million illegal abortions resulting from women and children being raped by Red Army soldiers.

Alternatively, one might also explore the wisdom of demanding unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan, a subject Liddell Hart had pungent views about, which allegedly inhibited resisting good Germans, and certainly resulted in further immense loss of life. One might also write a history of a kind of bravery, perhaps beyond that envisaged by our previous prime minister in his tales of wartime courage. I mean commanders who decided to break off battle (like Admiral Raymond Spruance at Midway) having secured their objective, or who at real risk to their careers declined battle at all.

Which commander could resist following in the footsteps of Alaric the Visigoth in taking Rome? Well, General Matthew Ridgway did in September 1943 when he subverted an operation called Giant II. The idea, which derived from Eisenhower, was for the 82nd Airborne to land at airfields around Rome, in order to link up with Italian troops whose commanders were changing sides. Ridgway despatched Maxwell Taylor behind enemy lines to interview Italian generals. They feared that the Italian capital would be destroyed. Even as paratroopers sat listening to idling engines, the mission was called off and Ridgway wept with relief.

But I want to turn from these specifics to the more sombre matter of why the Second World War was so uniquely destructive.

The insistent fact which requires explanation is why more civilians than armed combatants were killed in the Second World War than in any previous conflict. 34 million civilians to 21 million forces personnel, if you regard 55 million deaths as an approximate global total. By contrast, in the Great War there were ten and a half million military casualties, but only 100,000 civilian deaths attributable to military action, with a further 4.5 million victims of starvation and disease.

Firstly, the concept of total war erased a simple distinction between combatants and civilians as did the dependencies between modern warfare and modern industrial production. The
ways in which all countries advertised the total mobilisation of the civilian population was akin to pinning a target disk on them.

'The worker attached to a war industry must be considered to be like a soldier who, in the face of the enemy, has the requirement and obligation to remain at his proper combat post' announced the Italian war production commissariat in 1940. These were what British or US air war strategists called the 'vital centres', without which men in the field would have no uniforms, guns and ammunition.

Ironically, it was all too vivid memories of the mass slaughter in the trenches which heightened the attractions of delivering a knock-out blow, whether through mobile Blitzkrieg in the German case, or saturation bombing in the Allied. One of the abiding memories of the young Arthur Harris was of flying over scenes of carnage at Passchendaele as a young pilot. Liddell Hart's own experiences on the Somme led him to advocate bombing with poison gas as a way of avoiding attritional carnage – which makes his subsequent hostility to area bombing in the 1940s all the more remarkable.

Second, ideology and science contributed to the belief that modern wars involved fundamentally antagonistic systems, which would fight for their survival in ways which resembled the implacability of natural organisms. This was not just Hitler's view, but rather something shared by those who planned future conflicts. 'War' a German military planner wrote in the 1920s, was 'no longer a clash of armies, but a struggle for the existence of the peoples involved'.

War was not about nations elegantly manoeuvring armies for advantage on tightly circumscribed battlefields, but a bludgeoning fight to the death to preserve civilisation, democracy, the Bolshevik revolution, the 'master' race, or in the Japanese case, the ancient values which made Japanese society unique.

The scale of what was at stake was made clear by Churchill when in June 1940 he sombrely explained that: 'if we fail, then the whole world, including the United States, including all that we have known and cared for, will sink into the abyss of a new Dark Age made more sinister, and perhaps more protracted, by the lights of a perverted science'. That exactly captured the peculiar way in which the enemies of the liberal democracies fused barbaric warrior values with the technologies of advanced societies. Hitler made it clear too in 1945 when he decreed that a Germany which had failed its existential test should completely perish in an apocalypse of his own making. Anyone of any racial worth had been killed already. The idea of fleeing elsewhere was alien to his death cult.

Thirdly, wars which fuse civil with international conflicts in a mutually escalatory fashion are notoriously vicious. They would include the disasters experienced by the Spanish, and so shockingly depicted by Goya in the early 1800s, or the 1915 Turkish genocide of the Armenians, which was related to fears that they were a Russian fifth column.

Both the Russian Civil War, and the Spanish Civil War, were more recent harbingers of total systemic conflicts, for the atrocities often commenced after formal hostilities had ceased. The war in Spain was not only construed as a crusade against Godless heathens, but as George Orwell showed, as one against heretics on one's own side, the grim fate of Catholic Basques as well as Barcelona's Trotskyists. The nadir of barbarism of this kind was reflected in the German policy of deliberately starving three million or more Soviet prisoners of war to death,
and the cold-blooded decision to deny "x million" more civilians food which was "subtracted" for the benefit of the Wehrmacht, which connived in these policies.

70 or 80 per cent of German casualties were inflicted by the Soviets on the Eastern Front. This put liberal democracies in the position of being grateful to a society in which barbarity had become normative. A society which had undergone terror famines and purges – and whose leaders were inured to violence by revolutionary struggle – waged war with a callous indifference to human suffering. 158,000 Soviet soldiers were executed for cowardice or desertion by the NKVD, including 13,500 at Stalingrad alone. Part of the rationale for the RAF's area bombing campaign was to show Stalin a similar Allied blood sacrifice in the form of aerial photographs of smouldering German cities.

War did not halt the pervasive paranoia on which Stalinism was built. Millions of repatriated POWs – virtually all of them victims of the Soviet leadership's own military ineptitude in 1941 – were imprisoned or shot for having glimpsed the improbable sight of prosperous peasants in Rumania, or the real one of houses with electric light bulbs and flush lavatories in Germany. Not to speak of those who had been impressed as auxiliaries into German service, and who were shot after being repatriated by the Allies.

Finally, throughout occupied Europe, and indeed South East Asia, the Second World War also entailed non-uniformed combatants waging war on uniformed occupiers, sometimes with methods which might be called terrorism. It was certainly treated as such by Germans and Japanese. The British SOE, which instigated much of this activity, took the IRA of the 1920s as a positive exemplar. While much of this activity is rightly celebrated, we need to acknowledge that resistance groups sometimes used torture against collaborators and spies, and that their ranks included Kim Il Song in Manchuria as well as the heroic cosmopolitan ladies we hear so much about. In some parts of Europe, resistance also spiralled off into vicious civil wars between rival groups of partisans, in which the Poles or Ukrainians, the Croats or Serbs, were the real enemy rather than the Germans or Soviets. Because religion was such a marker of identity in these conflicts, it played a correspondingly large role, with clergy disgracing themselves on all sides.

I want to turn now to the moral contest which lay at the heart of a conflict often rightly described in terms of good and evil, even though the deaths of 55 million people are scarcely cause for celebration.

It is erroneous to believe that the Nazis abandoned morality as such. Law, which in liberal societies is supposed to protect our rights against the state, was redefined as the will of the racial collective, eschewing as one lawyer put it, 'its claim to be the sole source for deciding what is legal and illegal'. They abandoned what they reflexively called sentimental humanitarianism, in favour of a more limited, and often unremarked, ethno-sentimentality, themes already put into practice in pre-war campaigns to sterilise the disabled, mad or feckless. War enabled this to turn truly murderous, starting with the elimination of 'ballast existences' in asylums and concentration camps. A modern nation's ethics were supposed to revert to those of the Spartans, or at least to a bastardised Nietschzeanism.

This was extended into a frenzied assault on European Jews once US participation made the war global as well as total, bringing as it did the shadow of possible defeat and the triumph of
what he called the 'world arsonist'. Speaking to his inner circle a day after declaring war on America in December 1941, Hitler said: 'The world war is here, the destruction of the Jews must be the inevitable consequence'.

Perverse though it may seem, retention of a sense of right and wrong was as essential to the exterminatory process as the scrupulous legal documents and receipts which accompanied expropriation, ostracism and deportation.

This was not just a matter of prosecuting individual SS men who stole the watches, jewellery and gold teeth of their victims, even though the entire Holocaust involved systematic theft, from the big German banks to the street level equivalent of car boot sales.

The existence of what SS courts called 'excess perpetrators' were essential to the majority who killed in a more robotic fashion. What else is one to make of the ten months sentence received by a member of the Dortmund Gestapo who lurched drunkenly through Bialystok shouting that 'he was Lord of life and death….if he was ordered to shoot three hundred children, he'd shoot 150 of them himself'.

Essential too was the belief that this generation of Germans had been given an historic opportunity and mission to purify the world of a cosmic evil in human guise. As one perpetrator exclaimed after shooting two hundred people: 'Man alive, damn it, a generation has to go through this, so that things will be better for our children'.

Criminalising their innocent victims was also integral to these events; Jews were allegedly responsible for the scenes of torture and murder which German troops and army pathologists encountered in Latvian or Ukrainian jails the NKVD had vacated. They were also partisans. Indeed on the 18 December that is what Himmler wrote after a meeting with Hitler: 'Jewish Question / to be exterminated as partisans'.

In a further twist of logic, might not even an infant grow up to visit that sort of vengeance on the people who had killed its parents? And don't forget that the word 'Anständigkeit' (decency) is as easy to find in the annals of the major perpetrators as 'Ausrottung' (extermination).

Over on the other side of the world, Hitler's Axis ally waged what was depicted as a war of liberation so as to free their fellow Asians from European and US colonialism in South East Asia and the Pacific. Churchill specifically excluded that sort of liberation from the workings of the Atlantic Charter. The Japanese message had considerable purchase among nationalists in these regions, many of whom indirectly benefited from Japanese mobilisation of populations with the slogan "Asia for the Asians". Sukarno in the Dutch East Indies would be a good example of an Asian collaborator, or by his lights a nationalist who exploited the Japanese, but it also applied to much of the Filipino elites and Wang Jinwei in Nationalist China.

While few of these people objected to the white man being slapped around, things went awry when the Japanese slapped around Asians too, or requested Malay Muslims to bow towards Tokyo once a day rather than to Mecca. From 1934 onwards, in Manchuria, the Japanese found themselves fighting counter-insurgency wars, with tactics to which the victorious imperialists after 1945 were much indebted.
Our much-used phrase, 'winning the people's hearts', derives from minshin haaku in Japanese. So does (shudan buraku) or strategic hamlets, which the Japanese used to separate insurgents from peasants in Manchuria from 1934 onwards and which were reinvented in Indochina, Indonesia, Malaya and South Korea in the following decades. Thoughtful Japanese commanders also worried about how to balance what they called 'the rule of branches and leaves' (day to day kinetic emergencies) with 'the rule of roots', by which they meant fundamental economic and political problems affecting the loyalties of the general population. We are still grappling with that one in Afghanistan.

In some cases the Allies used captured Japanese troops to re-impose the colonial power – Douglas Gracey in Indochina being an example - or, as in South Korea, found their Military Advisory Group advising men who had served in the Japanese armed forces who did not need Americans to tell them how to tackle insurgents.

In this attempt to reclaim the history of morality in warfare from the philosophers and theologians, or at least men in white coats who bloodlessly scrutinise impossible real time decisions, perhaps I should conclude by reverting to the world of the young Christopher Seton-Watson. He fought in three very different theatres – northern France, North Africa and Italy.

Physical context often determined how wars were fought, for in this respect the Second World War is an umbrella term for several types of conflict. In North Africa there were few civilians, no partisans, and the fluid nature of the fighting in featureless terrain militated against the more intimate violence troops went on to experience in Italy and France. It may have helped that neither Hitler nor the Americans regarded the desert war as much more than an unwelcome detour, forced on them by their Italian and British allies.

What one might call the circumstantial spiral of violence took off in the altogether trickier terrain of Italy and northern France with its opportunities for booby-traps and close-quarter combat. Seton-Watson recorded in April 1945 that after a Polish officer disappeared, only for his mutilated corpse to be found later, orders were published to accept no German paratroops as prisoners, and to shoot even those retained for interrogation. 'Cold blooded' Poles may have done the shooting, but British officers also tacitly sanctioned activities which lessened the possibility of enemy surrenders.

The pre-ordering of the legal framework, a high degree of ideological investment, and a relentless spiral of violence, explains why the German-Soviet war was fought with appalling brutality on both sides, or rather all sides, since Rumanians were responsible for some of the worst massacres. Even the Einsatzgruppen affected professional disdain for what they saw the Rumanians do in Odessa, the largest single massacre of Jews in Europe. In 1944 what was normative behaviour on the Eastern Front leached onto the western front, when SS divisions did things in France which they had done every day in the Soviet Union.

In the Pacific theatre, the Allies waged war with tremendous ferocity. Initially they believed that the Japanese were myopic weeds with big glasses and buck teeth, evidently unfamiliar with atrocities in the Sino-Japanese war which may have killed up to fifteen millions.

Allied troops rapidly revised their opinion as Yamashita's troops ran through them in Malaya, and forced a much larger Dominion force to surrender Singapore under humiliating circumstances. They discovered that the Japanese attitude to prisoners of war had evidently
undergone a sea change since the 1904-5 Russo-Japanese war, in which the enemy had been treated with conspicuous decency.

It may be that the intervening racial war the Japanese had fought in China lowered respect for Geneva Conventions the Japanese had signed 'with amendments' but without ratification. Their own surrender was not prohibited, but it was highly stigmatised, not least by the audience of august ancestors watching the soon-to-be-dead.

A projection of how Japanese imagined surrender themselves, combined with a need to advertise humiliating white men while putting other Asians in their 'proper place', may explain the appalling treatment the Japanese inflicted on their captives. The fact that Yamashita tried to get a grip on the mass slaughter in Manila suggests that commanders did possess a sense of right and wrong, although ironically he was hanged for failing to exercise command responsibility.

Malevolent sadism, often by ethnic Koreans as well as Japanese, had its own grisly momentum. Allied troops waged their own war of extermination against the Japanese, with slogans like 'Rodent Exterminator' stencilled on their helmets. This was especially after they encountered, or heard about, cannibalism, torture, mutilation and faked surrenders, though sheer racism towards an incomprehensible enemy played its part.

Since both sides knew what was going to happen to anyone seeking to surrender, the most prudent calculation was to fight to avoid fates worse than death. This translated in the Japanese case to men blowing themselves apart with hand grenades or being mown down in massed banzai charges. The normative view among their opponents was succinctly put by the US Marine sergeant who said 'we'll have to kill every little yellow bastard'.

In a reversion to practices used against the Apache, or during the US conquest and occupation of the Philippines earlier in the century, trophy hunting became commonplace, with US troops collecting bags of enemy ears and wearing bracelets of Japanese teeth. Critically wounded Japanese prisoners were not safe either, as George MacDonald Fraser noted when Indian troops surreptitiously buried them alive under rocks in a field hospital in Burma.

So far I've offered what you may like to regard as a moral map, rather than a compass. The implicit lessons are banal. Don't elect governments which practice predation against other nations or advocate utopias, including the last utopia, as Samuel Moyn calls it, of human rights and the universal reign of pursed lipped lawyers, for as historians know, great evil can often result from doing good.

Invest financial, moral and intellectual capital in defusing conflicts, always regarding war as a last resort. Fight existential wars implacably, but avoid those which are not of necessity. How one balances the ethics of ridding the world of Saddam Hussein with inadvertently extending the regional power of Iran is one you may wish to ponder. If we have to resort to war, then do so in an intelligent, just and proportionate fashion, with as much attention paid to how to end them as to start them.

God presents a particular problem in our current struggles with violent Islamism. The job one would like least is probably that of an armed forces chaplain. Some of the task is perennial:
allaying anxieties among young men and women far from home, or dealing with grief over the loss of a comrade from within the closely knit units which the memoirs of veterans from George MacDonald Fraser to Patrick Hennessey have made so vivid. Of course the dead have families too, as I am sure our Veterans Minister, Andrew Robathan knows very well.

The status of religion within these campaigns is made difficult by the fact that our opponents fight shouting 'Allahu akbar', while our own forces ranks include soldiers who are Muslims as well as Christians, and people of other faiths or none. The medieval crusaders' battle cry of Deus le veult is no longer an option, and 'crusade' is frowned on even as a synonym. Claiming that 'we' are fighting for western civilisation is difficult too, since there are several other civilisations, from Communist China via Hindu Indians to Muslim Indonesia, which are similarly engaged in fighting Islamist insurgents and terrorists, sometimes more effectively than we seem to be doing. Western civilisation probably does not have much local purchase either among Protestant fundamentalists who regard much of our own civilisation, from Homer to homosexuals, as the handiwork of the Devil. A large number of US military chaplains are drawn from this evangelical background.

If one concludes that God is too contentious in our present expeditionary travails, except as solace for individuals, then it is all the more important that we are clear in our own minds about the moral contest we are engaged in. We are rightly asked to admire the bravery of our young soldiers and airmen. But this conflict is not just about them, but also the organised will of civilian and secularised societies to sustain a struggle, not for four, five or nine years, but perhaps fifty, often in the face of doubting or fashionable opinion.

That is part of the military covenant too, along with boots, housing, rifles and armoured vehicles. The enemy is protean and may well strike from Somalia, Yemen, Mali or Mauritania by way of people who live in Bradford, Luton or Walthamstow as our fellow citizens. The moral universe (such as it is) of our opponents – one is tempted to say their moralised hysteria - is not a subject we are handling very well. Indeed I am tempted to say that Liddell Hart's equation of Nazism with bad manners anticipates many of our current problems in explaining why we are at war, for manners often include a reluctance to give offence, which I have endeavoured to avoid tonight. I thank you.