King's College London

The study by Dr Olga Vlasova, of King’s College London, examined how the Kremlin sought to dampen public anxiety and head-off domestic unrest during one of the most febrile periods of the first year of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Rather than using patriotic appeals for sacrifice or national unity, Dr Vlasova found that official messaging focused heavily on preserving an appearance of normality.

Dr Vlasova analysed 2,300 articles from major Russian news organisations, including RIA Novosti, TASS and Interfax, alongside official documents and speeches covering August to November 2022.

More than half of the analysed news coverage emphasised that everyday life was continuing as normal and that the mobilisation was proceeding according to plan. Official narratives stressed that the mobilisation was “partial”, that many groups were exempt and that military service could be voluntary.

The messaging was also tailored to different parts of the country. While major cities were presented with narratives of stability, mobilisation was often much more extensive in national republics and smaller towns and villages, the study found.

Economic measures formed a second part of the strategy. Financial payments, debt relief, employment protections and other benefits for servicemen and their families were used not only as material support but as reassurance that the state would protect households from the consequences of war.

The third pillar was information control. The study found very limited reporting on Russian casualties and other potentially damaging aspects of the mobilisation, while legislation threatening severe penalties for spreading “false information” about the military helped suppress alternative accounts.

However, Dr Vlasova notes that the Kremlin’s approach is “inherently unstable” over time.

She said: “There are clear contradictions in [Russia’s] approach. Mobilisation necessarily disrupts routines and introduces new forms of uncertainty and fear. The attempt to both mobilise and demobilise public emotion is inherently unstable.

“Over time, the tensions between visibility and denial, participation and passivity, may become harder to manage. It is possible that the Kremlin will turn to other forms of emotional governance in the future.”