King's College London

No one could pretend that UK-China relations over the last few years have been easy. The protests in Hong Kong in 2019, and the implementation of a National Security Law there, are largely seen as driven by the central Beijing leadership; the arguments over the origin of the global COVID pandemic in 2020; the impact of the US trade wars under Trump’s first and now his second presidency; all of these have caused argument, dispute and contention.

The UK cannot see its relations with China as purely about problems it sees in China. It is also a link that is conditioned by historical and broader geopolitical issues. Where once economic, military, and technological advantages largely lay with the UK, now the power dynamics have shifted the other way. Take one simple metric, that of GDP. After parity in 2005, the Chinese economy is now five times the size of Britain’s. That sort of datapoint supports the argument that engagement with China, whatever the challenges, is a necessity, not an optional choice. For all the louder hawkish voices in the UK, it is in Britain’s national interests to work with China strategically, and have clarity about where it sees the parameters of this work. For that, a high level visit like this is crucial. It is one of the very few occasions when British policy makers get access to the key people currently in charge of China, and in particular, the President and Party leader Xi Jinping.

Starmer will not have a lack of things to speak about in the meetings he holds in Beijing and wherever else he goes in the country. Looming over everything will be the question of what both sides make of the current behaviour and posture of the US, Trump’s stance on Greenland, and his arguments with the key security alliance of NATO, all of which mean that Britain is now in the unusual position of having to think more deeply about a world where the longstanding links with America are changing.

China has different strategic objectives. It is not a political ally, and its values generally are not those of the UK. But on global issues like the environment, AI and public health, one of the great anomalies of the current situation is that London is probably closer to Beijing than Washington. How deep that alignment is is one of the key questions Starmer will need to address.

The other is the opportunities for economic cooperation. China is still a very small investor in Britain, even as it has become one of the largest trading partners – China was the UK’s 4th largest trading partner in 2025 with total trade between the two at £103 billion.

As China enters its 15th Five Year plan, the onus is on ramping up its already immense research and development spending. In many areas, it is either at parity with Britain, or ahead. It is Britain’s second largest research partner after the US. The question is how much more economic and intellectual collaboration can be increased that remain manageable and in Britain’s interests, and what tangible benefits they give as the country continues to experience productivity and growth issues.

If Starmer can return from his visit with clarity on the practical issues – some form of trade deal, a better understanding of how Britain can get access to China’s new technology, and more balanced, sustainable political links, then that will count as a success. Of course, human rights and values issues will factor. There will be an expectation that with the approval for the new Chinese embassy in London now granted, Britain can deal with a relationship which, for almost four centuries, has never been easy, but has always continued, through thick and thin.