

# **The UK–France defence and security relationship:**

## *How to improve cooperation*



**The Policy Institute  
at King's**

**NOVEMBER 2018**

**Report of the UK–France Taskforce**

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The Policy Institute at King's  
King's College London  
Virginia Woolf Building  
22 Kingsway  
London, WC2B 6LE

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Institut Montaigne  
59, rue la Boétie  
75008 PARIS

For more information about this report, please contact Dr Benedict Wilkinson,  
Senior Research Fellow: [benedict.wilkinson@kcl.ac.uk](mailto:benedict.wilkinson@kcl.ac.uk)

Research Team, in alphabetical order: Julie Burguburu, Quentin Devalmy,  
Morgan Guérin, Armida van Rij, Benedict Wilkinson

# ABOUT THIS TASKFORCE

The Taskforce has been jointly chaired by Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, former NATO Secretary General and Visiting Professor at King's College London, and Bernard Cazeneuve, former Prime Minister. The Taskforce has consisted of 20 security and defence leaders from government, industry, the armed forces and academia. Some members of the Taskforce preferred to remain anonymous, while others were happy to be identified. These are as follows:

**Lord Robertson**  
former NATO Secretary  
General (chair UK delegation)

**Bernard Cazeneuve**  
former Prime Minister  
(chair French delegation)

**Patricia Adam**  
former President of the  
French National Assembly's  
Committee on National  
Defence and Armed Forces

**Nicolas Baverez**  
Partner, Gibson,  
Dunn & Crutcher LLP

**General Sir Adrian Bradshaw**  
former NATO Deputy  
Supreme Allied Commander  
Europe

**Nick Butler**  
Visiting Professor,  
King's College London

**Patrick Calvar**  
former Chief of the General  
Directorate for Internal  
Security, Special Advisor  
at Montaigne Institute

**Matthias Fekl**  
former Minister of  
the Interior

**Professor Sir  
Lawrence Freedman**  
Emeritus Professor of War  
Studies, King's College  
London

**Ian King**  
former CEO, BAE Systems

**Alain Le Roy**  
Diplomat and former  
Secretary General  
of the European External  
Action Service

**Marwan Lahoud**  
Partner, Tikehau Capital,  
former CEO, MBDA

**Dominique Moïsi**  
Special Advisor,  
Institut Montaigne

**Benoît Puga**  
Grand Chancellor of the  
Légion d'Honneur and former  
Chief of the Special Military  
Staff of the President of the  
French Republic

**Lord Ricketts**  
former Ambassador  
to Paris, former National  
Security Advisor

The research team is most grateful to those interviewed for sharing their expertise and insights. They would also like to thank the peer-reviewers on both the British and the French side for their helpful comments and suggestions. Any errors remain, of course, the authors' responsibility alone.

# FOREWORD

On 2 November 2010, France and the UK signed two important military treaties enshrining long-standing defence cooperation. Today, the Lancaster House Treaties form the basis of our armed forces' cooperation. The diversity of the subjects dealt with – operations, industrial and capability challenges, but also nuclear cooperation – was an essential element in enabling our two countries to strengthen their collective security.

These treaties are the best of Franco-British friendship. They embody the depth of our friendship; our values, our shared threats and our shared ambitions. On this occasion our two countries reaffirmed – after the Chequers Declaration of 1995 made by John Major and Jacques Chirac – that they did not envisage 'situations arising in which the vital interests of either Party could be threatened without the vital interests of the other also being threatened'.

Since the Lancaster House Treaties were signed, the Arab Spring has happened, the Brexit referendum will see the UK leaving the EU, migration waves are taking place around the world, Russia has adopted a more aggressive foreign policy and populism is on the rise. In other words, the world has changed. Throughout this period of change, this UK-France relationship which underpins NATO in Europe and the defence of the European continent has remained crucial for both countries.

This is why, eight years after the signing of these treaties and in the context of Brexit, we felt it necessary to take stock of their implementation and to formulate proposals to deepen and further strengthen cooperation.

With the support of the Policy Institute at King's College London and Institut Montaigne, we decided to bring together one Taskforce, comprising the most recognised French and British experts in this field: former political leaders, diplomats, generals from our Armed Forces, intellectuals and business leaders. Since September 2017, we have met in Paris and London to together try and tackle the major questions that the current political situation, be it European or international, poses to us.

In the current geopolitical context, how can our two countries improve their cooperation to ensure the security of their citizens and strengthen their international influence? How can we provide our armies with the military capabilities to win the wars of the future? How can we ensure that Brexit will not jeopardise our collective security?

These questions – and many others – we believed, required collective reflection over the long term.

Based on our discussions and findings, we are presenting a way forward, a way for our two countries to deepen and strengthen their bilateral defence and security relationship. Looking to the future, there are crucial areas where we can, and should, improve cooperation: cyber security needs to become a central pillar of our collaboration; police and intelligence cooperation should be formalised and made more structured; and joint defence engagement activities should be developed to both deepen the relationship and demonstrate the value of cooperation abroad.

The report we are presenting is the fruit of this work and we would like to thank – as warmly as possible – all our Taskforce members and the rapporteurs for their important work over the past year.

**Bernard Cazeneuve**, former Prime Minister  
**Lord Robertson**, former NATO Secretary-General

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

France and the United Kingdom play a very special role in the defence and security of Europe. These two countries are the main military powers of the European continent: together they account for just under half of the European defence budget and capabilities, they are the only nuclear powers, and have demonstrated the will and ability to undertake expeditionary military operations. They are also the only ones with close ties with Africa and the Middle East because of their colonial past and, finally, the only ones aiming to lead on the global stage, in accordance with their seats as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

The military alliance between these two countries is long-standing: it dates back to the Entente Cordiale of 1904 and to the two World Wars during which they fought side by side for the freedom of the European continent. A new impetus was given to this deep defence and security relationship with the Lancaster House Treaties, signed in 2010 as a follow-up to the 1998 St-Malo Declaration. At this occasion, they reaffirmed their interdependence to the point that they do not see 'a situation in which the vital interests of one of the parties could be threatened without those of the other'. France and the UK have also committed themselves to an ambitious programme of operational, industrial and nuclear cooperation aimed, in a context of budgetary austerity, at drawing all the synergies from this strategic convergence recertified by France's return to the integrated NATO command structure. This partnership, which complements UK-France defence in multilateral structures, such as, but not limited to, NATO and the European Union, is crucial for both countries.

The UK and France collaborate on defence and security in a variety of ways. In the operational field, the two countries have created a non-permanent Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF), which has been successfully tested in multiple training exercises and continues to be refined. Officer exchanges and joint training have reached an unprecedented level. In industrial matters, numerous projects have been initiated, notably in the field of missiles, a sector now fully integrated around the MBDA group. In the nuclear field, our two countries have set up decisive joint simulation and research infrastructures to maintain, at a lower cost, the viability of our nuclear deterrence. The success of this cooperation, in an area as sensitive and as much linked to national sovereignty, shows the closeness and depth of the UK-France partnership.


The defence cooperation formalised by the Lancaster House agreements is supplemented by high-level security cooperation, whether it operates informally on a bilateral basis or through dedicated European instruments, such as the Passenger Name Record (PNR), the Schengen Information System, the Europol Agency or the European arrest warrant.

This partnership is all the more central for the security of the European continent as the threats we face have never been greater: Islamist-inspired extremism; Russian pressure on Europe's eastern border and its destabilising actions striking at the heart of our democracies; the emergence of new powers threatening the current international order; the weakening of North African and Middle Eastern states and increased migration flows within the region and to Europe, which is bolstering nationalist parties; the emergence of new threats in cyberspace; and the rise of populism. These all threaten the democratic freedoms and multilateralism to which the UK and France are committed.

It is in this context too that developments in American foreign policy, namely a strategic shift towards the Pacific, reinforced by President Trump's unilateral and isolationist policy, are shaping a world in which Europe will have to defend itself, and pay the price for its security and freedom.

UK-France cooperation has therefore never been so valuable, yet it also has never been so fragile. Even before Brexit, some aspects of this partnership were unsatisfactory. This





is particularly true in the industrial field, where several structuring projects, notably aimed at promoting the interoperability of our aircraft carriers, developing the next generation of nuclear submarines and producing a medium- and long-endurance surveillance drones, have failed. The Future Combat Air System (FCAS) project also seems compromised.

With regard to military operations, the model for joint operations envisioned by the Lancaster House Treaties has not been repeated since the military intervention in Libya, largely because of different political priorities (France alone assumed most of the burden of its interventions in Mali and Central African Republic). This remains the case today, even though the UK and France have since cooperated in the Levant, targeting both ISIS and the chemical weapons capabilities of the Syrian regime.

These limitations are in part due to budgetary restrictions and differences in the approach of both countries' defence industries, but also to the divergent views held by France and the UK on the respective roles of the European Union and NATO in defence and security, and diverging national political priorities in this regard. Brexit aggravates these difficulties. While it does not call into question the framework for bilateral UK-France cooperation, it does affect multilateral cooperation, which is particularly central in security matters, and could also complicate industrial cooperation.

Beyond its practical consequences, Brexit amplifies tensions inherent in the UK-France relationship. It will now be more difficult for France to reconcile its ambitions for European defence (recently reinforced by the establishment of EU initiatives such as permanent structured cooperation [PESCO] and the European Defence Fund) with its alliance with the UK, especially as France remains keen to involve the UK in this European architecture (which was a strategic objective as much as a pragmatic one). On the other hand, the two pillars of the UK's foreign policy – the transatlantic relationship and its European anchorage – are being questioned, leaving the country without a clearly defined and designed foreign policy: the 'Global Britain' doctrine designed to fill this gap still lacks substance.

Despite these headwinds, it is crucial to give new impetus to the UK-France relationship, in order to ensure the security of the European continent. To do this, we make three core recommendations.

First, everything must be done to ensure that Brexit does not jeopardise European security. Security issues must be separated and protected from the rest of the Brexit negotiations. A privileged partnership must be established to maintain police and judicial cooperation and exchanges of data, which are crucial in the fight against terrorism and organised crime. To this end, it seems possible to revise the status of third countries. It will also be necessary, especially for the UK, to find compromises on the most difficult issues, such as the jurisdiction of the ECJ and the degree of involvement in decision-making processes. The cross-border cooperation between France and the UK that was established by the Touquet and Sangatte agreements must also be preserved.

It is then necessary to fully implement the Lancaster House Treaties. In this respect, the full operationalisation of the Joint Expeditionary Force, which could usefully be articulated with the new European Intervention Initiative (EII), is of particular importance. As political impetus has always played a major role in the success of UK-France cooperation – but also in its failures – it seems desirable to strengthen strategic dialogue by creating an annual UK-France Defence and Security Council, supplemented by a more regular '2+2' dialogue comprised of foreign and defence ministers, and a 'Quint' dialogue between the heads of the main intelligence services.

Finally, we must adapt our partnership to prepare ourselves, together, for the uncertainties the future will bring. Collaboration between our intelligence services would benefit from being more formally structured, in particular to make progress in the field of cybersecurity, which must become a new pillar of our partnership. A common doctrine, joint development of key technologies in data encryption, the detection and identification of cyber attacks, and cooperation on artificial intelligence are needed. This new pillar should contain confidentiality and exclusivity clauses making it possible to overcome the difficulties posed by the Five Eyes alliance, in which the UK, but not France, participates. A common strategic vision must be developed in R&D, identifying key technologies and opportunities for collaboration and leading to joint capacity development. In this respect, the continuation of the FCAS project, for which our two countries have unique competencies and common operational requirements, appears particularly decisive for the strategic autonomy of the European continent, even if this project will undoubtedly have to be brought closer, in the long term, to the Franco-German combat aircraft project.

The UK-France defence and security relationship is strong. That does not make it immune to internal and external forces which can erode ties between the two countries. There is no more pressing moment in time to reinvigorate and revitalise the relationship, to the benefit of the UK, France, and Europe as a whole.

## Recommendations

In summary, our policy recommendations are as follows:

### 1. Tackle the security challenges raised by Brexit

- 1.1. Ensure that Brexit does not endanger security cooperation between the UK and the EU27
- 1.2. Maintain border cooperation agreements

### 2. Ensure the full implementation of the Lancaster House Treaties

- 2.1. Reinforce strategic dialogue and mutual knowledge through the creation of an annual UK-France Defence and Security Council and a more regular '2+2' dialogue
- 2.2. Prepare the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force for operations
- 2.3. Increase cooperation through shared training facilities and cooperation on maintenance of equipment

### 3. Prepare for the future

- 3.1. Build Future Combat Air System capacity
- 3.2. Increase cyber security cooperation by developing formalised and structured modes of cooperation, complementing the Lancaster House Treaties with a cyber security pillar and establishing a joint government taskforce to explore options for further cooperation
- 3.3. Formulate a joint strategic vision to inform R&D planning
- 3.4. Implement a formal intelligence framework between France and the UK
- 3.5. Deepen joint defence engagement activities
- 3.6. Use and strengthen officer exchange programmes



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
# **PART 1**

## *The value of cooperation*





# PART 1: THE VALUE OF COOPERATION



France and the United Kingdom are neighbours and, since at least the ‘Entente Cordiale’ of 1904, strong allies that have fought alongside one another in both world wars and in numerous missions since. They are significant economic partners and have important cultural and social links. Together, they are Europe’s only nuclear powers and Europe’s only members of the United Nations Security Council. They account for a little less than half of Europe’s defence spending, and more still of its actual capability.<sup>1</sup> Both nations have shown leadership and a willingness to engage militarily. Both are also former colonial powers that retain strong links and influence in Africa and the Middle East. Both have long experience in diplomatic affairs, as well as in intelligence. Both have buoyant, pioneering and thriving defence industries. Both have shared ambitions and values – notably, a global vision that singles them out in Europe.

But in very different ways, both the UK and France are facing moments of fundamental political change. France is increasingly positioning itself as Europe’s centre of gravity; it is showing great leadership at a time of uncertainty and doubt about the European project. Its decision to increase defence spending has been welcomed by European and American allies.<sup>2</sup> There are necessarily challenges: specifically, France needs to reconcile its deeply pro-European identity with finding strategic autonomy, as highlighted by its Strategic Defence and National Security Review of 2017.<sup>3</sup> But all in all, France is politically and militarily rejuvenating.

The UK, on the other hand, has full spectrum capability, yet its resources are diminishing, particularly in terms of troop numbers. With less capability, there are questions about the extent to which it can project power in pursuit of its national interests. Wider choices over defence procurement mean that the UK has underinvested in key areas, such as cyber, which are likely to affect (if not become) the battlefields of the future.<sup>4</sup> Equally, the UK needs to find a way to reconcile its focus on the transatlantic relationship, which is challenged by President Trump, with its European heritage, which is challenged by Brexit.

The UK’s decision to leave the EU in 2016 has coloured all its foreign relations, but perhaps none so much as its relationship with France, which is now particularly precarious. The trust between both states has been seriously dented at a time when France focuses with ever greater intensity on its European mission. As one commentator put it, ‘not only does France see its future in Europe, but it truly sees Europe as its future’.<sup>5</sup> As President Emmanuel Macron said in a speech in Athens in 2018:

‘Sovereignty is what allows us to decide for ourselves, to decide our own rules, our own future, it is what makes our world. [...] True sovereignty is constructed, it must be constructed in and by Europe! This is what we believe in! The sovereignty that we want, is sovereignty which is there precisely to bring our forces together to build together a European power to decide not to be subjected to what the superpowers will do better than we will. I believe in sovereignty, our national sovereignties, but I believe in this European sovereignty. Why? Because our challenges are no longer on a nation-scale. [...] Our European sovereignty is what will enable us to be digital champions, build a strong economy, and make us an economic power in this changing world.’<sup>6</sup>

1 Eurostat, ‘General government expenditure on defence’. N.d.

2 ‘Mattis welcomes NATO defence spending efforts’, *France24*. 8 June 2018.

3 République française, *Strategic Review: Defence and National Security*. 2017

4 Menon, A. and Salter, J. P. ‘Brexit: initial reflections’, *International Affairs*, 92:6. 2016. Pp.1297-1318.

5 Toucas, B. ‘Understanding the implications of France’s Strategic Review on Defense and National Security’, *CSIS Commentary*. 19 October 2017.

6 Speech of President Emmanuel Macron at Athens, 7 September 2017.

Despite its claims to the contrary, the UK government is by contrast looking inwards, reflecting on a new identity and what it means to try to be ‘Global Britain’ in a post-Brexit world. As Prime Minister Theresa May put it in 2016:

‘Brexit should not just prompt us to think about our new relationship with the European Union. It should make us think about our role in the wider world. It should make us think of Global Britain, a country with the self-confidence and the freedom to look beyond the continent of Europe and to the economic and diplomatic opportunities of the wider world. Because we know that the referendum was not a vote to turn in [on] ourselves, to cut ourselves off from the world. It was a vote for Britain to stand tall, to believe in ourselves, to forge an ambitious and optimistic new role in the world.’<sup>7</sup>

But while the UK-France relationship is currently precarious because of Brexit, it is nonetheless still precious. Indeed, it has not been so precious to either country since at least the Suez Crisis in 1956. In part, this is because the world has changed.

The election of President Trump, with his ‘America first’ stance, signals a very different United States, one which is more isolationist and unilateralist, and while more unpredictable, has undeniably shifted focus towards the Pacific region and away from Europe. More fundamentally, it is also a United States with a weaker commitment to the tenets of the existing liberal world order.<sup>8</sup>

This trend – of rising populism and greater isolationism – partly spurred by issues of migration, is visible across Europe. For many, it signifies that something has gone wrong with Western politics – that states are becoming more selfish, more protectionist and more detached from the wider world. But for many, it shows the importance of the strength and depth of the links between the UK and France, two of the oldest and greatest powers in Europe.

As President Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister John Major put it after a meeting at Chequers in 1995: ‘the vital interests of one could not be threatened without the vital interests of the other equally being at risk’. This commitment has no equivalent anywhere in the world, and in a time of old resurgent threats and new emergent ones, these words have more meaning than ever.

Violent, Islamist-inspired extremism poses an immediate and significant danger to both countries. Certainly, this challenge is not new. But the scale of the threat is clear from the dramatic increase in the number of terrorist attacks carried out on European soil over the last five years. Both states face this bitter reality. In France, 5 terrorist attacks took place, 6 were attempted and a further 20 attacks were foiled in 2017.<sup>9</sup> The UK, in turn, was subject to five terrorist attacks in 2017, with 10 attacks foiled that year.<sup>10</sup> The UK and France, with around 3 million and 4.5 million respectively, have the largest Muslim populations in Europe, and, perhaps as a consequence, saw larger numbers of nationals joining the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) as foreign fighters than other EU member states (roughly 850 from the UK and 1,100 from France).<sup>11</sup>

Despite substantial territorial losses and the liberation of Mosul and Raqqa, ISIS will likely pose a threat for many years to come. The continuing spread of violent jihadist ideology

7 Speech of Prime Minister Theresa May at the Conservative Party Conference, 2 October 2017.

8 Dombrowski, P. and Reich, S. ‘Does Donald Trump have a grand strategy?’, *International Affairs*, 93:5. 2017, pp. 1013-1038; ‘The one-year-old Trump presidency’, *The Economist*. 11 January 2018.


9 ‘Terrorisme dans l’Union Européenne: Bilan 2017’. Centre d’Analyse du Terrorisme. January 2018. P. 1.

10 Sandford, D. ‘Far-right terror threat ‘growing’ in UK as four plots foiled’, *BBC News*. 26 February 2018.

11 ‘Who are Britain’s jihadists ?’, *BBC News*. 12 October 2017.



# PART 1: THE VALUE OF COOPERATION



continues apace in the digital world. Returning foreign fighters will likely continue to spread their message, both during and following custodial sentences – prisons are, after all, noted hotbeds of radicalisation.<sup>12</sup> Apart from ISIS, al-Qaeda is once again expanding its territorial influence, alongside various radical groups and ‘self-starters’ inspired to mount more and more sophisticated attacks.

In the geopolitical realm, some states – emerging powers using force, or countries attempting to acquire weapons of mass destruction – add to this list of threats. The rising power of China is certainly a strategic security challenge for both countries and requires long-term investment, especially in foreign policy and counterintelligence. The current instability in North Africa and the Middle East and the regional expansion of Iranian influence are also main security challenges. Moreover, this instability in the region led to the arrival of more than 1 million refugees in Europe,<sup>13</sup> creating political instability within the EU, emboldening populist parties and fuelling their often-incendiary rhetoric.

Russia in particular has stoked these political trends in order to challenge the unity of the West, and in Donald Trump has found a US president who is often either indifferent to, or openly supportive of, its actions. Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea brought long-dormant concerns more readily associated with the Cold War to the fore, particularly fears over military ‘readiness’ and the expansionist intent of a revisionist adversary. The country’s willingness to engage in extra-territorial military activities in eastern Ukraine, the continued process of ‘borderisation’ in the Russian-occupied territories of Georgia, and repeated border incidents in Baltic states are compounded by large military exercises on NATO’s eastern border, which, some might argue, provoke Western powers.

Russian actions are typically carried out under a cloak of deceit: complex disinformation campaigns are mobilised to avoid attribution and accountability, most vividly observed in the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH-17 in eastern Ukraine. Aggressive Russian covert operations are also a serious cause for concern, as demonstrated by the poisoning of Sergei Skripal, and alleged meddling in the US and French presidential elections, as well as the 2016 Brexit referendum.

Cyber attacks are also a growing threat, and have revealed vulnerabilities in national infrastructure. Future attempts to disrupt critical systems look all but inevitable. Countries, including the UK and France, are therefore looking to develop their offensive cyber capabilities, as well as ramp up existing defences.

In short, we are living in a new era, one that offers a clear rationale for deep and wide UK-France security cooperation: both countries have unique intelligence and police capabilities in Europe and face similar threats. This is precisely why it is a world which needs a strong relationship between the two nations.

And yet, despite the palpable importance of this relationship, it is currently under pressure for all the reasons above: changed politics, new threats, new technology. It is a relationship that is being tested and challenged, but it is still unique and rightly envied by many other nations.

## About this project

It is against this backdrop that the Policy Institute at King’s College London and Institut Montaigne established a taskforce comprised of 20 top-level French and British defence and security experts. Among us include those who contributed to the Lancaster House Treaties of 2010, which currently organise defence cooperation between our two countries, and those who shaped the treaty before that.

For the last year, the Taskforce has worked to examine the ‘health’ of the defence and security relationship between the UK and France. We wanted to understand how that relationship was working, and whether it could be deepened. We felt that we faced a moment in time: a changing, volatile and risky world – one that ultimately needed the UK and France to cooperate more closely than ever before.

We conducted a series of interviews with current and former British and French officials from the Ministry of Defence, the Home Office, the Foreign Office, diplomatic missions, Parliament, intelligence services and business leaders. The Policy Institute at King’s College London and Institut Montaigne provided the research base for this project. This report represents the Taskforce’s conclusions.

In the early stages of the project, it became apparent that there was a real need to understand, first, what drives cooperation on defence and security between the two countries and, second, whether there were barriers to enhanced cooperation. We wanted to understand where cooperation had, perhaps, been less successful, and why this would have been the case. Equally, we wanted to explore those areas where cooperation had been effective and explore how these could be championed into other fruitful areas of cooperation.

The remainder of this report is divided into three sections. Section 2 focuses on the extent of defence and security cooperation between France and the UK. This is our attempt to review the state of relationship as it stands, as well as to explore successes and shortcomings since the signing of the Lancaster House Treaties. We systematically assess the programmes resulting from the Treaties and those developed since across operations, industry and equipment, and nuclear. In this section, we also look at security cooperation, in both structured contexts, as well as those less formal ones. We explore the role of such cooperation beyond the Treaties, examining joint police work and cyber security, and the ways in which formal collaboration is complemented by informal networks.

In Section 3, we identify the series of challenges, barriers and difficulties faced by both parties. We explore the difficulties inherent to the relationship, as well as those beyond the control of both parties. Finally, in Section 4, we outline what we consider to be necessary steps for cooperation to flourish both in the short and long term. This section looks ahead to a series of policy recommendations that we see as a way of strengthening defence and security cooperation between the UK and France.

While the focus of this project has been bilateral cooperation, we cannot omit the many ways in which the UK and France cooperate on these issues multilaterally and through various institutions, such as the EU and NATO. We will touch on these dimensions too, particularly in the context of Brexit, where we sought to understand how the UK’s withdrawal from the EU might influence its bilateral relationship with France.



We are living in a new era, one that offers a clear rationale for deep and wide UK-France security cooperation.”

<sup>12</sup> Basra, R., Neumann, P. and Brunner, C. ‘Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures: European Jihadists and the New Crime-Terror Nexus’, ICSR Report. King’s College London. 2016.

<sup>13</sup> ‘Rapport d’information de l’Assemblée nationale sur la situation migratoire en Europe’, no. 4551. 22 February 2017.




## PART 2

# *The extent of cooperation*





## PART 2: THE EXTENT OF COOPERATION



### A historic collaboration

Cooperation on matters of defence and war has been a key characteristic of UK-France relations since the First World War. In 1947, the two countries signed the Treaty of Dunkirk, in order to protect themselves and cooperate in the event of a German attack.<sup>14</sup> One year later, the two countries, alongside Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, signed the Treaty of Brussels, establishing the Western European Union (WEU) as a military alliance. The WEU was only dissolved in 2011.

However, it was not until the war in Bosnia that a formal defence relationship between the UK and France began to be established. A Joint Nuclear Commission was established in 1992,<sup>15</sup> followed by the creation of the UK-France European Air Group at the 1994 UK-France summit. The purpose of this group was specific and limited: it was designed to improve the capabilities of both countries' air forces, and to plan for combined operations in scenarios where there might be value for both states.<sup>16</sup> Formalised cooperation through the Air Group was soon expanded in the decisive Saint Malo agreement, driven by the mutual desire of two political leaders – President Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister Tony Blair – to develop a unified response to the 1998 Kosovo crisis.

The joint UK-France Declaration signed in St Malo in 1998 was the foundation for still deeper and more intense cooperation developed through the Lancaster House Treaties 12 years later. Again, two political leaders – Prime Minister David Cameron and President Nicolas Sarkozy – championed the agreement, not least in recognition of a vastly different political context. The global financial crisis had ushered in a period of acute austerity for both countries; wars in the Middle East and North Africa had stretched resources on both sides of the Channel, to the point where this period is now known as the 'Entente frugale'<sup>17</sup>; and there was a growing consensus in both the UK and France on the requirements for European security, the role of NATO, and the need for closer bilateral cooperation.

The Treaties are organised around three pillars. The first is operations, which covers joint training and exercises; joint work on military doctrine; exchange of personnel; and sharing and pooling of material, equipment and services, with the ultimate aim of joint deployments. The second is capabilities, through which there is cooperation in research and technology; weapons acquisition, deployment and maintenance; and development of interdependent technological and industrial bases. The third pillar is nuclear cooperation: to ensure the viability and safety of their national deterrents, France and the UK committed to build a joint nuclear simulation centre in France, as well as a joint nuclear research centre in the UK.

The Lancaster House Treaties are predominantly defence-focused. Security cooperation, by contrast, has been less formal, though arguably deeper and wider. Much of existing security cooperation between the UK and France takes place outside of the framework of Lancaster House, either on a more informal basis, through relationships between people and organisations, or in a multilateral (mostly European) context. That said, while the Lancaster House Treaties are first and foremost defence cooperation agreements, security-related issues such as cyber threats and terrorism are mentioned in most of the closing declarations of every bilateral summit since 2010.



Defence and security cooperation between the UK and France is essential, not purely for their own security, but for that of the European continent and beyond.”

### Cooperation for the defence of the European continent

Defence and security cooperation between the UK and France is essential, not purely for their own security, but for that of the European continent and beyond. Together, the two countries have produced what is arguably the most important and strong defence and security relationship in Europe. They account for a little less than 50 per cent of European defence expenditure,<sup>18</sup> they are Europe's leading defence powers in terms of capability and defence industrial capacity, they are both nuclear-weapons states and members of the United Nations Security Council, and they are both willing and able to intervene in external and high-intensity operations. They have numerous policing, borders and intelligence agreements, not to mention countless joint projects and programmes between the two nations.

In short, defence and security cooperation between the UK and France is deep and long-standing. It takes place through numerous modes, bilateral and multilateral, especially within NATO and EU structures; some are highly formalised, others are deeply informal. At the formal end of what one might call the 'spectrum of cooperation' are agreements such as the Lancaster House Treaties, and the multilateral security agreements developed through the EU. In addition to these legal agreements are more informal modes for collaboration and cooperation, meaning the myriad of relationships between companies, and individuals. These are critical for cooperation: they underpin shared ventures and facilitate at the operational level. In addition, there is the wider alignment of France and UK's strategic cultures and values. The two nations share views on their roles in the world, the need to preserve the international status quo in the face of rising powers and illiberal regimes, and in their capabilities and willingness to project military power to achieve these ends.

In this section, we begin by reviewing both the extent of defence cooperation between France and the UK, before covering cooperation on security issues. In the defence section, we explore the degree of cooperation in the nuclear and operational realms, as well as the full range of industrial projects in defence section. In the security section, we focus on intelligence sharing, police cooperation and cyber security.

### 2.1 Defence cooperation

The trajectory of UK-France defence cooperation in the post-Second World War period – from the Suez Crisis in 1956, through Saint Malo in 1998 during the crises of the Balkans, to the 2010 Lancaster House treaties – is one of growth and intensification. However, in terms of industrial cooperation and the development of joint programmes, it could be argued that both countries achieved greater successes before Lancaster House than after. The production of the Gazelle, Lynx and Puma helicopters, or the Jaguar jet attack aircraft, all in the 1960s and the 1970s, are examples of such industrial achievements.

Cooperation became steadily deeper and broader as it cut across defence industrial, operational, nuclear and security arenas. In the post-Lancaster House era, the relationship embraces a wide range of activities: joint military operations, extensive intelligence sharing on counter terrorism, cooperation in the defence industrial sector through joint R&D and collaborative equipment programmes, and nuclear cooperation through the sharing of facilities in both the UK and France.

<sup>14</sup> 'Traité d'alliance et d'assistance mutuelle entre la France et le Royaume-Uni'. Dunkirk, 4 March 1947.


<sup>15</sup> Tertrais, B. 'Entente Nucléaire: Options for UK-French nuclear cooperation', *BASIC Trident Commission*. June 2012.

<sup>16</sup> Taylor, C. 'Franco-British Defence Co-Operation', House of Commons Library. SN/IA/5750. 8 November 2010.

<sup>17</sup> Leymarie, P. 'Entente Frugale' entre Paris et Londres', *Le Monde Diplomatique*. 4 November 2010.

<sup>18</sup> Eurostat, n.d.

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While it has generally been successful, there are areas where cooperation has been more limited, and less effective. In part, that is because the world today is different from 2010, when the Lancaster House Treaties were signed, and because France and the UK had slightly divergent objectives which they sought to meet through the signing of the Treaties. The UK sought to strengthen its political links with France, as a means of establishing synergies and economies of scale for its military; by contrast, the French were concerned with creating a starting point for European defence cooperation which would ultimately bind the UK. But above and beyond this, challenges to cooperation have been driven by fundamentally different approaches to, and views of, NATO's role in Europe.

Regardless of Brexit, this relationship seems to need both new energy, as well as different priorities and strengths, if it is to deal with new threats and an uncertain international system.

### 2.1.1 Operations and training

#### Operations and exercises

Despite broad cooperation between the UK and France, the most obvious symbol of cooperation – actually going to war together – has been infrequent and irregular. The UK and France have deployed together with reasonable frequency, but almost always as part of a larger alliance or force. While this demonstrates the capacity for joint deployment, on the rare occasions where they have cooperated outside of an alliance structure, there have been difficulties. To some extent, such frictions are the product of differences in national priorities as to where, when and how to intervene. But the main challenge for joint military inventions lies in the countries' different stances on NATO, with the British favouring the alliance and the French more reluctant to engage with it.

Despite the relative infrequency of joint operations, the UK and France have conducted multiple exercises together, particularly since the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) was established by the Lancaster House Treaties. One of the CJEF's purposes is as an early entry force, allowing for the rapid joint deployment of troops in a range of theatres. Unlike other joint forces, such as the Franco-German brigade or Eurocorps, it is not permanent, but rather an *ad hoc* expeditionary force encompassing the three services, with an integrated command and 'available at notice for bilateral, NATO, European Union, United Nations or other operations'.<sup>19</sup> It has not been without controversy, particularly over its size, with the UK arguing for developing a small force that could be rapidly expanded, and the French government eager to build a multi-divisional force from the outset.<sup>20</sup>

The CJEF has been refined iteratively through a process of extensive testing. Significant effort has been directed towards command-level exercises (without troops) to develop joint-force procedures together, coupled with a series of practical exercises to test processes operationally. Given the joint nature of CJEF operations, exercises to date have encompassed a mixture of air, land and sea operations: the 2011 Flanders exercise focused on land forces, Corsican Lion in 2012 dealt with naval forces, and air forces were deployed during 2013's Capable Eagle. Staff-level exercises have included Rochambeau in 2014, Griffin Rise in 2015, and, notably, the Griffin Strike exercise in 2016, which saw the deployment of 5,500 military personnel, 20 aircraft, and around a dozen ships aimed at the full-scale testing of the binational chain

of command. Covering strategic, operational and tactical aspects of conflict, the exercise sought to assess UK-France interoperability and responsiveness across all aspects of the joint force.

Although this seems to have validated the CJEF concept, the force has still not been used as a mechanism for operations. Being signed only four months before the war in Libya in 2011, the CJEF was unready, but its development benefited a lot from this operation<sup>21</sup>. Today, the force is prepared purely for crisis management or peacekeeping operations, rather than high-intensity kinetic operations. To date, the level of interoperability that the CJEF has acquired only allows for an efficient deployment in a homogeneous environment (air, sea) but would be more complicated in discontinuous terrain (land). The CJEF is scheduled to be fully operational in 2020, but as things stand, that looks rather optimistic as challenging final hurdles remain.<sup>22</sup>

Setting the CJEF to one side, both countries have sought to increase their understanding of each other's rapid deployment forces through joint exercises of their airborne and marine units. In the latest of a series of steps, the defence secretaries of both countries announced a vastly expanded training programme involving 2,500 British Armed Forces personnel in August 2017. This latest deployment involved 1,500 personnel from 16 Air Assault Brigade, who, alongside France's 11th Brigade Parachutistes, took part in the NATO Swift Response exercise in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. Similarly, French soldiers joined personnel from the UK's 3rd Battalion, the Parachute Regiment, to carry out Exercise Askari Storm in Kenya in November 2017.<sup>23</sup>

The 2011 Libya operation demonstrates the strengths and weaknesses of UK-France joint military operations,<sup>24</sup> as the two countries were the key political drivers for deciding to intervene. Although support from the US was required to provide intelligence and refuelling functions, France and the UK were at the frontline of the operation and performed more than 80 per cent of air strikes.<sup>25</sup>

Given both nations' limited defence budgets, there are other significant areas where deeper cooperation could be of mutual benefit. In particular, two issues stand out. First, greater efforts to pool training centres and facilities: by adopting an approach based around shared access to training resources, the UK and France could maximise the use of facilities while minimising maintenance and operation costs. The French urban warfare facility at Sissone and the British anti-submarine warfare ranges off the Scottish coast both represent significant assets that could be exploited more fully through a joint approach. The British Army's training unit in Suffield, Canada, is another option: as a combined armoured training area which can accommodate exercises up to battle group level, it was used extensively in training for Afghanistan. Despite certain difficulties – such as its geographical location, which requires French troops to travel from Europe to Canada – there may be scope for joint use of this facility.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>22</sup> HMG, Ministry of Defence, No. 10, and the Rt Hon Gavin Williamson CBE MP, 'UK and France commit to new defence cooperation'. News Story. 18 January 2018.

<sup>23</sup> HMG, Ministry of Defence, 'UK agrees new military training programme with France'. News story. 31 August 2017.

<sup>24</sup> Cameron, A. 'The Channel axis: France, the UK and NATO', in Johnson, A. and Mueen, S. (eds.) *Short war, long shadow: The political and military legacies of the 2011 Libya campaign*. Whitehall Report 1-12. London: RUSI. 2012. P. 15; Goessens, G. 'Ou en sont les accords de coopération franco-britanniques de novembre 2010?', *Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la sécurité*. 20 March 2012.


<sup>25</sup> Goessens, G. 'Ou en sont les accords de coopération franco-britanniques de novembre 2010?', *Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la sécurité*. 20 March 2012; House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, *Libya: Examination of intervention and collapse and the UK's future policy options inquiry* (Third Report of Session 2016–17, HC 119). House of Commons. 14 September 2016.

<sup>19</sup> HMG, Prime Minister's Office, 'UK-France Summit 2010 Declaration on Defence and Security Co-operation'. 2 November 2010.

<sup>20</sup> Pannier, A. 'Franco-British defence cooperation under the Lancaster House Treaties (2010): Institutionalisation meets the challenges of bilateral cooperation', PhD Thesis. Sciences Po Paris. 4 July 2016.



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Second, there is room for greater collaboration regarding transport facilities. As one example, both nations maintain a fleet of Lockheed Hercules C-130s and are in the process of acquiring the Airbus A400M as a replacement. Moves towards cooperation on servicing, maintenance and training could offer opportunities for significant financial savings which, in turn, will release funding for investment in other areas of defence.

Regarding the political will to go to war together, there is a perception among French elites that the UK is currently experiencing ‘war fatigue’ and a lack of willingness to engage militarily abroad as a result of its involvement in the Iraq war, as illustrated by the 2013 vote on intervention in Syria. This is despite evidence showing that the 2013 vote happened not because of unwillingness, but rather poor handling of the parliamentary vote and Prime Minister Cameron’s failure to communicate a clear strategy for the UK’s involvement in Syria.<sup>26</sup> Ever since, the UK and France have fought alongside each other against so-called ISIS in the Middle East.

### Personnel and training

The Lancaster House Treaties have led to significant development in personnel exchange programmes between the UK and France. On the civilian side, reflecting stronger dialogue between the two governments, both ministries of defence have swapped officials. Similarly, French and British diplomats have participated in joint training seminars.<sup>27</sup> On the military side, a series of important exchanges have taken place, with a view to developing a deeper mutual understanding of both nations’ armed forces: in 2016 both armies agreed to the permanent exchange of deputy divisional commanders, whereby a French officer became second-in-command of the UK’s 1st Division and a British officer took up an equivalent role in the French 1st division based in Besançon.<sup>28</sup> Similar exchanges have taken place with the other armed services. As of August 2017, there were 40 personnel working in reciprocal roles.<sup>29</sup> For both countries this signifies unparalleled integration of their respective armed forces.

Both nations have also sought to increase bilateral training. In the case of the Royal and French Air Forces, this has extended to training with the United States, which has occurred since 2013 under the Trilateral Strategic Initiative.<sup>30</sup> This is a positive development given the high likelihood that future conflicts will require significant interoperability of these (and other) forces, as multi-state air operations in the 2011 Libyan intervention demonstrate. Furthermore, past experiences in the Balkans and elsewhere have served to highlight the benefits accrued through leveraging the forces of other nations – the trilateral framework is one mechanism the UK and France can use to best exploit the rich mix of forces deployed by the United States in future operations. Finally, with the deployment of new technologies, including the so-called ‘5th generation’ jet fighters, trilateral training offers a unique opportunity for the UK and France to engage with the most advanced aircraft fielded by the United States. Signalling the strength of their bilateral relationship, in 2013 Royal Air Force pilots flew the French Rafale aircraft solo for the first time, with French Air Force correspondingly flying the UK’s Typhoon aircraft.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>26</sup> Watson, A. ‘Pacifism or pragmatism? The 2013 parliamentary vote on military action in Syria’, Remote Warfare Programme. Oxford Research Group. 28 May 2018.

<sup>27</sup> HMG, Ministry of Defence, ‘Joint training for French and British diplomats’. News Story. 19 June 2014.

<sup>28</sup> Odell, M. ‘French general given top UK army job’, FT. 8 February 2016.

<sup>29</sup> HMG, Ministry of Defence, ‘UK agrees new military training programme with France’. News story. 31 August 2017.

<sup>30</sup> Goldfein, P. and Adamson, A. ‘The trilateral strategic initiative: A primer for developing future airpower cooperation’, *Air and Space Power Journal*, 7:1. Pp. 5-13.

<sup>31</sup> HMG, Ministry of Defence, ‘Double first for French and British fast jet pilots’. News story. 11 February 2013.

### 2.1.2 Defence industrial cooperation

The abiding similarities between the UK and France’s political and economic landscapes, as well as their industrial bases, means that defence industrial cooperation has occurred between the two countries since the 1960s, even if there have been peaks and troughs that reflect changing circumstances in both countries.

The Lancaster House Treaties sought to coordinate the development of defence capability and acquisition. Under Article 7, France and the UK commit to comparing ‘capability objectives and prospective programmes and, to the greatest extent practicable, to harmonise timelines and requirements.’<sup>32</sup> At a time of austerity, and with shared security challenges, both governments were eager for economies of scale and wanted to maximise capacities and reinforce their respective defence industries.<sup>33</sup>

In terms of capabilities, the Lancaster House Treaties resulted in three major joint projects to develop ‘high-spectrum’ capabilities: the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) programme, the stealth supersonic cruise missile (FCASW/FMAN-FMC) programme, and the Maritime Mine Counter Measure (MMCM) programme. These projects are at different stages of development, and there is no guarantee that they will eventually go into production. Nevertheless, given their symbolism – as tangible assets of UK-France defence cooperation – it would be highly preferable if these programmes were to succeed, unless significant financial, technical or political issues arise.

#### Drones, unmanned aerial vehicles, unmanned combat aerial vehicles and the Future Combat Air System programme

The UK-France summit of 2012 set the goal of jointly developing the next generation of two types of drones: mid-altitude and long-endurance surveillance drones (MALE) and combat drones.<sup>34</sup> Despite the best of intentions, cooperation in drone development and production has not been successful. The MALE drones were to be developed through the Telemos programme, jointly launched by BAE Systems and Dassault in March 2011; a model was presented at the Paris Air show in June 2011 and contracts were expected to be signed at the Farnborough Air show in 2012, with the two companies expecting €500 million in funding from each country. However, the project was abandoned after 2012, as it risked leading to unwanted inter-European competition – similar to that between the Rafale and the Eurofighter – because the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS) had already launched its Talarion drone. The French government chose instead to focus its efforts on a new EADS project based on Talarion’s basic structure, MALE 2020, which now involves France (Dassault, EADS/Airbus), Germany (EADS/Airbus) and Italy (Finmeccanica/Leonardo).

Cooperation over combat unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) was even less successful, and the joint development of the FCAS has now stalled. The contract was originally awarded to Dassault and BAE Systems after a £120 million feasibility study in 2014. However, the UK Ministry of Defence’s budgetary issues, combined with the uncertainty produced by Brexit, has meant that the continuation of the FCAS programme is far from guaranteed,<sup>35</sup> even though there was a commitment made at the 2018 Sandhurst summit to pursue the demonstrator



At a time of austerity, and with shared security challenges, both governments were eager for economies of scale and wanted to maximise capacities and reinforce their respective defence industries.”

<sup>32</sup> HMG, *Treaty between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic for defence and security co-operation*. Cm. 8174. London, 2 November 2010.

<sup>33</sup> Kluth, M. ‘European defence industry consolidation and domestic procurement bias’, *Defense and Security Analysis*, 33:2. 2017. Pp.158-173.

<sup>34</sup> HMG, Prime Minister’s Office, ‘UK-France declaration on security and defence’. News story. 17 February 2012.

<sup>35</sup> Tran, P. ‘UK was the one to put the brakes on drone demo project, industry says’, *DefenseNews*. 12 April 2018.

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For all OneMBDA's successes, it may be at risk because of Brexit. ... This has the potential to affect missile production across the board.”

project. Since then, France and Germany have launched a separate FCAS programme, led by Dassault and Airbus, in which it is not yet clear how the British defence industry could play a role.

### **MBDA and the stealth supersonic cruise missile (FCASW/FMAN-FMC) programme**

Weapons manufacturer MBDA – which is similar in organisational set-up to Airbus, but for missiles and missile technology – was created in 2001 by Airbus, BAE Systems and Leonardo. The Lancaster House Treaties enshrined a commitment to coordinate and integrate the French and UK missile development and production sectors,<sup>36</sup> and through this commitment, MBDA became a key site of deeper cooperation between the two countries. The company's 'OneMBDA' strategy outlined a 10-year plan culminating in the establishment of 'a single European prime contractor and the achievement of efficiency savings of up to 30%'<sup>37</sup> through centres of excellence shared between MBDA's two French and British subsidiaries.

The operational value of MBDA is in providing a secure and agile supply chain. For instance, during the Libyan intervention in 2011, both the French and Royal Air Forces consumed their missile stockpiles rapidly. The Royal Air Force, in particular, was concerned that its stockpiles of Brimstone missiles were running dangerously low. MBDA was able to respond to this demand, quickly putting Brimstone missiles into production.<sup>38</sup> But there are wider political and economic reasons for the French and UK governments' support for MBDA: they were eager to reap the rewards of economies of scale, as well as the economic and employment benefits of a thriving missile sector, and, more broadly, to increase the defence interdependence of the two countries. This ambition of the Lancaster House Treaties was taken further through an intergovernmental agreement in September 2015: four Centres of Excellence combining research and production were created to bring together key technological competencies, out of a total of 12 envisaged in the OneMBDA initiative.

For all OneMBDA's successes, it may be at risk because of Brexit. We do not yet know the structure of the trade agreement between the UK and the EU, but there is a chance that some of the advantages of an integrated missile sector, particularly the economic and employment benefits, will be diluted through tariffs, restrictions on property rights and free movement, and regulations on arms exports.

This has the potential to affect missile production across the board. The MBDA agreement has underpinned industrial cooperation on numerous projects: the Sea Venom programme, for which a €500 million contract was signed in March 2014<sup>39</sup>; the Storm Shadow/Scalp cruise missile capability enhancement programme, for which a design phase was launched in July 2014<sup>40</sup>; and the stealth supersonic cruise missile (FCASW/FMAN-FMC) programme (replacing the French Exocet and British Harpoon missiles), which entered design phase through a €100 million contract signed in March 2017.<sup>41</sup>

This last project is particularly important, as long-range strike missiles are a sector of high strategic value, as well as considerable economic benefit. The FCASW/FMAN-FMC encompasses about a third of MBDA's portfolio of activities. As a joint enterprise, it is likely

<sup>36</sup> 'Fifty years of European technological and operational excellence', MBDA. <https://www.mbda-systems.com/about-us/history>


<sup>37</sup> HMG, Prime Minister's Office, 'UK-France Summit 2010 Declaration on Defence and Security Co-operation'. 2 November 2010.

<sup>38</sup> This was in stark contrast to their experience with the Paveway IV, where the US manufacturer simply put the request for additional supplies to the back of an 18-month queue. Interview with MBDA official, 8 January 2018.

<sup>39</sup> 'MBDA to develop FASGW(H)/ANL, next generation Anglo-French anti-ship missile', MBDA. Press release. 27 March 2014.

<sup>40</sup> HMG, UK-France Summit, *Annex on security and defence*. 3 March 2016.

<sup>41</sup> 'France and the UK launch next-generation strike missile project with MBDA', MBDA. Press release. 28 March 2017.



to bind both nations' missile sectors together for years, if not decades, as well as reducing reliance on the US sector.

### **Maritime mine counter measures programme**

The Lancaster House Treaties also announced a project to prototype a new anti-mine system. In March 2015, a £17 million demonstrator contract was signed by the Organisation for Joint Armament Co-operation (OCCAR) on behalf of the UK and French governments.<sup>42</sup> The Maritime Mine Counter Measures (MMCM) programme will develop an autonomous system for the next generation of mine countermeasures ships,<sup>43</sup> remotely operated from a command centre. The objective of the programme is to develop, manufacture and test two systems. Together, these will give strategic, operational and tactical freedom of manoeuvre and thereby assure the delivery of maritime force projection and maritime security. The arrival of the prototype in Brest in May 2018 suggests that this programme is, after cooperation on missiles, one of the more positive and rewarding examples of industrial success since the Lancaster House Treaties were signed.<sup>44</sup>

### **Aircraft carriers**

Aircraft carriers, perhaps more than any capability other than the nuclear deterrent, are a symbol of military prowess and national pride. Aircraft carriers enable the projection of force and power at long range; they provide a range of military options for the widest range of missions and theatres of operation. Both the UK and France recognise the strategic utility, as well as symbolic value, of aircraft carriers; they also recognise the price tag – the UK's two carriers have been approved at a cost of £6.2 billion.

For France, there have been continuing hopes of acquiring a second aircraft carrier in order to increase the availability of their carrier capability. Rather than acquire a second nuclear powered aircraft carrier there were preliminary discussions concerning the acquisition of a conventionally powered aircraft carrier instead, and the French looked at the British Queen Elizabeth class as a potential basis for the new carrier. However, as a result of changes to technical specificities, budgetary issues and changes in both nations' requirements, plans for a second carrier have been quietly dropped.

### **Land, air and maritime systems**

Beyond these major weapons development and production projects, the UK and France have collaborated on a variety of land, air and maritime systems. For instance, the 40mm Cased Telescoped Armament systems, a joint BAE/Nexter project, has been purchased by the British Army for its Ajax family of reconnaissance vehicles, and it is envisaged that this turret will replace the existing turrets on the Warrior infantry fighting vehicles. The French Army have also recently signed a contract to have the system fitted to its Jaguar armoured fighting vehicle.

In terms of air systems (beyond the development of drones), both the UK and France are part of the A400M programme and currently receiving new aircraft. Although France will have a larger inventory, the UK is currently in possession of more aircraft because the two governments agreed to swap delivery slots. The 2010 joint declaration planned the development of a common support plan and a bilateral Joint User Group for the A400M. These two elements seem to have been established; there is less clarity on whether joint training programmes have been set up.


<sup>42</sup> HMG, Ministry of Defence, 'UK works with France to defeat threat of underwater mines'. News story. 27 March 2015.

<sup>43</sup> 'New European maritime mine counter measures project launched', *European Defence Agency*. 28 October 2014.

<sup>44</sup> Groizeleau, V. 'Guerre des mines: Le prototype du drone de surface est arrivé à Brest', *Mer et Marine*. 22 May 2018.



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In the maritime domain, the Lancaster House Treaties promised, somewhat vaguely, to cooperate in the joint development of ‘some of the equipment and technologies for the next generation of nuclear submarines’.<sup>45</sup> A bilateral Memorandum of Understanding was signed in June 2011 to develop this further, but these agreements and projects have not materialised. Cooperation on ships has not been mentioned in recent UK-France summits. The UK had considered acquiring the Naval Group and Finchantieri FREMM multipurpose frigates but in the end withdrew from the programme, instead preferring the Type 45 destroyers (although it did retain the PAAMS air defence system which had been developed in support of the FREMM project). Similarly, the UK has looked for partners in the development of both its Type 26 and Type 31e frigate programmes without success.

### C4ISR

On three occasions – 2010, 2012 and 2014 – pooling of future military satellite communications was mentioned in joint statements, but they failed to go beyond exploratory study. The UK has instead pressed ahead with the development of their next generation of satellites. The first element of a new British military satellite communications capability to replace the current Skynet 5 network has been awarded to Airbus Defence and Space without a competition.<sup>46</sup> Negotiations to complete the deal to supply the Skynet 6A satellite are ongoing, but the UK Ministry of Defence said it opted for the non-competitive route with Airbus in part to maintain domestic space capabilities. Timing was an important factor, and according to officials, the decision was influenced by the ability of Airbus to meet the required delivery timeline for the satellite. New spacecraft are being acquired to fill a potential capacity gap as early satellites in the UK military’s Skynet 5 constellation approach the end of their useful lives ahead of a new generation of communications capabilities becoming available around the end of the next decade.

Finally, the UK’s post-Brexit involvement in Galileo, the EU’s global satellite navigation system, has emerged as a fault line in the negotiations for the country’s withdrawal from the bloc. The rapidly escalating disagreement hinges on the UK’s contribution to and overall investment in the Galileo project to date. The UK has been a key partner since 2003, providing 12 per cent of the project’s annual budget, with UK-based companies receiving 15 per cent of commercial contracts, since 2003.<sup>47</sup> The UK has therefore argued that, given its deep involvement in the development of this highly specialised technology, it should be granted access to Galileo’s Public Regulated Service, an encrypted capability available only to EU member states’ governments and armed forces. The EU, however, has stated that the UK will be a third country post-Brexit and, consequently, cannot be granted concessions on highly sensitive security issues that are not available to other third-party states. This episode in the divorce negotiations highlights the challenges associated with disentangling national economic and security interests.

### 2.1.3 Nuclear cooperation

If defence industrial cooperation can be characterised as patchy, then UK-France nuclear cooperation can be seen as consistent and deepening. Nuclear cooperation between the two countries has existed since the Cold War, and with the 2000s marked by shrinking defence budgets, both nations have placed renewed emphasis on such cooperation. The Anglo-French Joint Nuclear Commission, established in 1992, set the stage for the removal of barriers to deeper cooperation, which in light of the austerity and fiscal restraint that characterised 2010, led to

agreements for cooperation on the long-term viability, safety and security of nuclear weapons, stockpile certification, and increased efforts to counter nuclear and radiological terrorism.

Nuclear deterrence is at the heart of the Lancaster House Defence and Security Cooperation Treaty, which seeks to ‘ensure the viability and safety of [France and the UK’s] national deterrents’ through the ‘building and joint operating of such facilities as may be agreed’ by the two countries. Supplementing the main Lancaster House Treaty, a second agreement saw France and the UK reaffirm ‘their mutual interest in keeping their independent nuclear forces at the highest level of safety and reliability, at least cost’ and declared themselves ‘determined to co-operate to this end in the industrial, technological and scientific fields.’

Under the Treaties, the two countries committed to constructing joint radiographic-hydrodynamic facilities under the TEUTATES programme, such as Epure, a joint installation in Valduc to model the performance of nuclear warheads and associated equipment, supported by a Joint Technology Development Centre in Aldermaston. The main purpose of facility sharing was to conduct independent trials to assess the behaviour of critical nuclear weapons components and materials during ‘cold’ tests, but it also paved the way for future joint work.<sup>48</sup>

According to the agreement, there is ‘no greater evidence of the value [the UK and France] attach to the bilateral relationship than [their] willingness to work together in this most sensitive area.’<sup>49</sup> The establishment of the radiographic-hydrodynamic facilities in particular are a sign of deep trust between the two states.<sup>50</sup> In turn, this has laid the foundations for current and future coordination on sensitive technical matters and, beyond that, issues of policy.<sup>51</sup> On top of its scientific and technical value, this cooperation has saved significant amounts of money – French sources estimate the savings to be around €400–450 million for France (€200 million for 2015–2020 and €200–250 million after 2020).<sup>52</sup>

Other areas of cooperation span both civil and defence nuclear sectors. On the former, in 2014 both parties recognised the importance of the UK-France relationship for the delivery of the UK’s long-term energy policy, which is increasingly dependent upon France’s EDF through the development of the Hinkley Point C nuclear power station.<sup>53</sup> On the latter, again in 2014, a deepening of defence nuclear cooperation can be observed in the commitment to engage in joint research at the UK’s Orion and France’s Laser Mégajoule facilities. A joint working group was finally created in 2016 to identify potential new areas of cooperation.



There is ‘no greater evidence of the value [the UK and France] attach to the bilateral relationship than [their] willingness to work together in this most sensitive area.’”

This success is perhaps due to the fact that it is the only part of the Lancaster House Treaties that contained mandatory provisions. However, while this is one of the more successful areas of cooperation between the UK and France, questions can be raised concerning the parties’ ultimate objectives. The public discourse concerning the UK’s continued support for its nuclear weapons programme caused disquiet in Paris. The protracted nature of the debate, the public consideration of alternatives under the 2010 Coalition government, and the tendency of successive UK governments to delay key decisions, all fed into these concerns. As a result, for France, nuclear defence cooperation can be seen as one means of ensuring the UK retains its nuclear deterrent, thus avoiding a situation in which France is the sole remaining nuclear power in Europe, while balancing UK-US cooperation in the nuclear domain. In stark terms, the 2010 agreement is

<sup>45</sup> HMG, Prime Minister’s Office, ‘UK-France Summit 2010 Declaration on Defence and Security Co-operation’. 2 November 2010.

<sup>46</sup> ‘Airbus scored British military satellite deal without competition’, *DefenseNews*. 31 July 2017.

<sup>47</sup> Besch, S. ‘A hitchhiker’s guide to Galileo and Brexit’, *CER Insight*. 3 May 2018.

<sup>48</sup> Tertrais, 2012.

<sup>49</sup> HMG, Prime Minister’s Office, ‘UK-France Summit 2010 Declaration on Defence and Security Co-operation’. 2 November 2010.


<sup>50</sup> Interview with French expert commentator by Armida van Rij, Paris, 19 December 2017.

<sup>51</sup> Harries, M. ‘Britain and France as nuclear partners’, *Survival*. 54:1. 2012. P. 8.

<sup>52</sup> Tertrais, 2012.

<sup>53</sup> HMG, Prime Minister’s Office, ‘UK-France Summit 2010 Declaration on Defence and Security Co-operation’. 2 November 2010.

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a legal instrument that commits the UK to half a century of nuclear defence cooperation with France. For the UK, the aim was to demonstrate the viability of its nuclear deterrent.

Despite some delays and this possible difference of perspective, nuclear cooperation has been successful so far. However, this does not mean that all possibilities for further cooperation have been exhausted – far from it. While both countries may wish to maintain their nuclear autonomy and save money, there is still space to deepen collaboration in areas such as stockpile certification.<sup>54</sup>

### 2.1.4 Military intelligence

The UK and France have long-standing previous experience of cooperating on military intelligence during various military missions. Current close relations between the military intelligence communities are based on wartime cooperation and a common heritage, which has been sustained ever since. This started in the Second World War, continued with Suez in 1956 and started again in 1991 in Bosnia, Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. This close and long-standing relationship has naturally led to the military intelligence communities working together, as was the case during the Libya campaign. During the 2011 NATO operation in Libya, while the US supplied intelligence and surveillance in part through its satellite capabilities, the UK and France supplied much of the remaining intelligence and surveillance capabilities<sup>55</sup> required for air strikes and other military operations. From early on in the operation, the UK and France undertook and provided the much of the support needed, such as intelligence gathering.<sup>56</sup> This operation was further valuable experience of cooperation.

In the field of military intelligence in particular, the UK has been a leader in the collection, analysis and use of intelligence for the development of conventional and unconventional countermeasures<sup>57</sup>: the UK holds over 50 per cent of all combat intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance heavy drones of all EU member states.<sup>58</sup> France has at its disposal two Helios satellites and various signal intelligence centres across the globe. Because of their proximity, France and the UK have every interest in maintaining this cooperation.

A current hurdle faced by the intelligence communities is valued and unchangeable relations with other countries. For instance, the UK's membership of the Five Eyes Community has an impact on the amount of intelligence the UK can share with France – although intelligence sharing between France, the UK and the US has increased in the past decade. In the past few years, a 'bridge' has been created between the two military services' computer systems to enhance and facilitate intelligence sharing. The difference between the different levels of classifications between the two countries has yet to be tackled, adding a layer of complexity – albeit surmountable – to cooperation.

For cooperation to work well and make the most efficient use of resources on either side, there is a need for all major players to be engaged in the process. The UK has a well-developed interagency process, in part due to the Irish experience and operations in Iraq.<sup>59</sup> Equally, the

progressive implementation of the CJEF is a possible driver of military intelligence sharing, and France is looking at this project to foster cooperation in the field of intelligence. More recently, military intelligence cooperation between the two countries was strengthened further following the 2018 UK-France summit in January 2018. Here, it was announced that the UK and France 'have agreed a package of practical measures to improve co-operation between our military intelligence services in support of shared strategic interests and CJEF operations'.

## 2.2 Security cooperation

Security cooperation was not the focus of Lancaster House, but it is a key element of the wider relationship between the UK and France. While the Treaties are first and foremost defence cooperation agreements, security-related issues such as cyber threats and terrorism are mentioned in most of the closing declarations of every bilateral summit since 2010. Thus, although security cooperation may not have been formalised under Lancaster House, it does form a key pillar of wider bilateral UK-France cooperation, and will continue to play an important role in future relations between the two countries.

While the UK and France cooperate on security bilaterally, they also cooperate in a host of other ways, through EU organisations and initiatives. While Article 4 of the Lisbon Treaty stipulates that 'national security remains the sole responsibility of each member state', in practice EU member states cooperate more and more with each other on security issues. Whereas most intelligence cooperation remains outside the EU framework, since it has significant implications for sovereignty, it operates mainly through bilateral mechanisms, even though some anti-terrorism cooperation depends on data obtained from EU tools. However, most of the police and judicial cooperation operates through EU mechanisms.

While UK-France defence cooperation is close and should therefore be relatively undisturbed by Brexit, the same cannot be said for security cooperation. Their bilateral security cooperation is enabled by tools provided through the EU, and dependent upon EU-level cooperation. It is also underpinned by the EU's Charter of Fundamental Rights.

### 2.2.1 Police and judicial cooperation

The UK and France have a long history of cooperating on police and judicial matters even though the two countries have different systems in place to govern these domains: they have different data analysis processes, different legal structures – especially when it comes to prosecution – as well as structural and institutional differences in their police forces.<sup>60</sup> For that reason, cooperation on fields such as counter-terrorism, drug trafficking, organised crime, illegal immigration and other areas depends heavily on EU mechanisms, as detailed in the table below:

<sup>54</sup> Harries, M. 'Britain and France as nuclear partners', *Survival*. 54:1. 2012. P. 8.

<sup>55</sup> Barry, B. 'Libya's Lessons', *Survival*. 53:5. 2011. Pp. 5-14.

<sup>56</sup> Barry, 2011, p. 6.

<sup>57</sup> Molling, C. and Giegerich, B. 'The United Kingdom's Contribution to European Security and Defence', Research Paper. Institute for International Strategic Studies. 2018, p. 6.

<sup>58</sup> Giegerich and Molling, 2018, p. 6.

<sup>59</sup> Interview with former senior-level GCHQ official by Armida van Rij, London, 17 April 2018.

<sup>60</sup> Foley, F. *Countering terrorism in the UK and France: Institutions, norms and the shadow of the past*. Cambridge University Press. 2013.



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


TABLE 1: OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN EU SECURITY COOPERATION MECHANISMS

Mechanism	Type of cooperation	Object
Passenger Name Record (PNR) Directive	Police, intelligence	Forcing air carriers to give the personal information of passengers from member states when entering or leaving the EU, in order to prevent and detect terrorist infractions as well as serious forms of criminality.
Prüm decision	Police	Implementing the automatic exchange of DNA profiles and fingerprints, as well as exchanges between member states of all data related to cars and their owners.
Schengen II information system (SIS II)	Police, intelligence	Pooling alerts among the participating states about objects or persons wanted for arrest, under surveillance, undesirable in the Schengen area, currently missing, etc. The UK, although out of the Schengen area, participates in the program in the name of the Schengen acquis.
European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS)	Police	Exchanging and linking criminal records databases between member states.
European Arrest Warrant (EAW)	Justice	Facilitating the extradition of individuals between member states.
Europol	Police	Facilitating data exchange (notably via two information systems, the Europol Information System [EIS] and the Secure Information Exchange Network Application –[SIENA]), operational cooperation (in particular through joint investigation teams and a task force dedicated to cyber criminality [J-CAT]) and strategic multiannual plans (SOCTA/EMPACT).

The precise extent of the British contribution to these mechanisms has been debated, but it is nonetheless significant and neither the EU, nor the UK would gain from halting cooperation. For example, at the moment, the UK is the second largest contributor to Europol information systems and is copied into 40 per cent of the organisation’s data messages.<sup>61</sup> The British police consulted the SIS II database 539 million times in 2017 alone.<sup>62</sup>

On top of this EU cooperation, there is also bilateral cooperation, especially on border issues.

While the UK and France do not share a land border, there is an intense traffic via ferries and the Eurotunnel rail link. This is regulated by the 1991 Sangatte Protocol<sup>63</sup> and the 2003 Treaty of Le Touquet,<sup>64</sup> which provides the legal basis for the juxtaposed controls in Calais, Cocquelles and Dunkirk for ferry and Channel Tunnel passengers and vehicles, and Paris, Brussels, Lille and Calais-Fréthun for Eurostar rail passengers.

61 Boffey, D. “Brexit: UK may have to recognise ECJ court rulings to keep security cooperation”, *The Independent*. 30 April 2017.  
62 Dearden, L. “EU-wide information system threatened by Brexit used by UK 539 million times every year, police say”, *The Independent*. May 2018.  
63 *Protocol FRANCE between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the French Republic Concerning Frontier Controls and Policing, Co-operation in Criminal Justice, Public Safety and Mutual Assistance Relating to the Channel Fixed Link*. Cm 2366. Sangette, 25 November 1993.  
64 *Treaty between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the French Republic concerning the Implementation of Frontier Controls at the Sea Ports of both Countries on the Channel and North Sea*. Cm 6172. Le Touquet, 4 February 2003.

In Calais especially, these have come at a high monetary cost to the French state.<sup>65</sup> Britain has made significant payments since 2013 towards the cost of security measures around the Eurotunnel and Calais port terminals. During the UK-France summit in January of this year, Theresa May agreed to contribute a further £62 million to France for further enhancements.<sup>66</sup>

Much of this investment has been in response to the rise in migrants trying to cross the border into the UK. The UK has supported Eurotunnel to increase the number of security guards, and France has deployed more police to the area. Perhaps most significantly, however, the countries established a joint command-and-control centre in Calais, from which law enforcement staff from both countries coordinate operations.<sup>67</sup>

Maintaining this cooperation is especially crucial for the security of both Britain and France because of the high level of movement of people and goods between the two countries.

The question of Calais in particular is a highly sensitive one for both countries. It should be a high priority to work together constructively to ease burden sharing on both sides as much as possible, and develop ways to best support and receive vulnerable migrants. Abandoning these agreements would be disastrous for both countries, as well as for Belgium, which is also a signatory of Le Touquet.

On maritime cooperation, the UK and France also increased cooperation between the Royal Navy and the *Marine Nationale* in November 2017, building on existing cooperation such as joint exercises and intelligence sharing. The aim is for both countries to use the most advanced technologies, share knowledge and conduct maritime security operations.<sup>68</sup>


## 2.2.2 Intelligence cooperation

Intelligence has been a key element of cooperation between the two countries. Given its importance in terms of sovereignty, it is mostly outside any EU framework. Several formal structures exist, such as the Counter-Terrorism Group (CTG) established following 9/11, the Counter-Terrorism Working Group implemented by Europol, and the EU counter-terrorism coordinator. But there are also informal networks, such as the Police Working Group on Terrorism (PWGT), which allows for the exchange of information classed as ‘secret’. This is not possible yet within the existing EU framework due to legal obstacles, even though intelligence services often use data from EU databases, such as PNR or SIS.<sup>69</sup> While cooperation between intelligence services at the European level does not form part of the EU mandate, these working groups facilitate mutual understanding, exchanges of analysis and allow for convergence of views. Moreover, intelligence cooperation against terrorism and organised crime is only useful if it leads to police action to disrupt plots, and detain and prosecute suspects. For this, the EU instruments remain vital.

Still, most counter-terrorism cooperation and all cooperation related to counter-espionage takes place at the bilateral level, between the security services (MI5, DGSI) and the intelligence services (MI6 and GCHQ, DGSE). These five services form the ‘Quint’ that was reunited for

65 Avis n°275 présenté le 12 octobre 2017 par Pierre-Henri Dumont, Assemblée Nationale.  
66 Piper, E. “‘Be my guest’ – France’s Macron spells out reasons for Britain to stay in EU”, *Reuters*. 17 January 2018.  
67 House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee, *Migration Crisis*. (Seventh report of session 2016-17, HC 24). 2016. P. 9.  
68 HMG, Ministry of Defence, ‘UK and France increase security cooperation in the Channel’. News story. 20 November 2017.  
69 DG for Internal Policies, *The European Union’s Policies on Counter-Terrorism*, Brussels: European Parliament. 2017. P. 55.

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the first time at the Sandhurst summit, signalling stronger intelligence cooperation between the two countries while the process for the UK's exit from the EU continues. Part of this was the agreement to collaborate and share knowledge beyond previously existing areas, including artificial intelligence and cyber security.<sup>70</sup>

Today, this cooperation is mostly informal. However, with new, tighter EU regulations on data protection and privacy, the lack on any legal basis for data exchanges is likely to become an issue. Intelligence sharing between two sovereign countries is generally based on informal and personal relationships, yet structuring this cooperation by public or private agreement – as France did with the US – could strengthen it further.

### 2.2.3 Cyber security

As starkly evidenced during 2016 and 2017, cyber security is increasingly a crucial area for national security and the safeguarding of citizens, national infrastructure and even democratic processes. Recent cyber attacks have targeted data held by institutions such as banks, as well as being a tool for corporate and state espionage, in the UK and France, but also beyond.

With the advent of the 'internet of things', which will mean society becomes even more interconnected, the opportunities to exploit the openness of Western societies will only increase. Cyber cuts across many other policy areas: radicalisation and terrorism, information warfare, intelligence and organised crime. As a result, it is becoming a central pillar of security and defence policy.

With its high level of anonymity and difficult legal considerations, cyber is a complex domain.<sup>71</sup> An additional layer of difficulty is that criminal cyber groups are increasingly assisting states in cyber warfare as proxies, leading to difficult questions of attribution for states attacked in such 'hybrid warfare' scenarios.<sup>72</sup>

While cyber security is clearly an area of growing importance, it is not supported by a specific commitment in the Lancaster House Treaties. It is not mentioned in the document itself, although it is present in the 2010 co-signed declaration, which states that cyber attacks are 'an increasing challenge for the security of government and critical national infrastructure',<sup>73</sup> and certifies 'a framework which will govern our enhanced cooperation in this crucial area, leading to strengthened individual and common resilience<sup>74</sup>'. While the 2012 declaration following the summit that year notes progress in terms of cyber security and the necessity to deepen cooperation,<sup>75</sup> cyber security has not been mentioned in either the 2014 or 2016 summits.

Although it has not formed a key element of recent summits, there has been some progress on cyber security, but it remains a grey area with little legislation. A UK-France action plan was launched in June 2017 to fight the dissemination of terrorist propaganda online, by forcing internet service providers to remove extremist content, ensuring access to personal data during

investigations, improving access to digital evidence abroad and promoting counter-radicalisation narratives online.<sup>76</sup> However, this is not currently covered by legislation in the UK, nor is it in France, and companies are therefore not bound to comply.<sup>77</sup>

Additionally, during the 2018 Sandhurst summit, France and the UK made a commitment to implement an annual strategic dialogue on cyber threats, in order to 'impede, mitigate and raise the cost of malicious cyber-attacks by criminals, state actors, and their proxies, including those that seek to interfere in the internal democratic processes of states'.<sup>78</sup> An agreement might also be drafted in order to develop joint research in artificial intelligence and cyber security.

To defend systems against cyber threats, there is a need for better real-time intelligence sharing, among a greater number of allied countries. As such, there is a clear case to be made for stronger cyber security cooperation between the UK and France, which could be achieved by adding a new pillar to the Lancaster House Treaties. This cooperation might at first be focused on the capability plan and the key technologies identified by the French cyber-defence strategic review<sup>79</sup>: data encryption, detecting and identifying cyber-attacks, and AI on a cyber level. Equally, the relationship would benefit from a forum for regular discussions on cyber security at the highest level.

<sup>70</sup> Bellow Perez, Y. 'UK and France to join forces on artificial intelligence', *UK Tech*. 19 January 2018.

<sup>71</sup> Applegate, S. 'Cybermilitias and political hackers: Use of irregular forces in cyberwarfare', *IEEE Security & Privacy*. 9:5. 2011. P. 16, 18.

<sup>72</sup> Bussolati, N. 'The rise of non-state actors in cyberwarfare', in Ohlin, J. D., Govern, K. and Finkelstein, C. (eds.) *Cyberwar: Law and ethics for virtual conflicts*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). Pp. 102-126.

<sup>73</sup> HMG, Prime Minister's Office, UK-France Summit, 2010.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>75</sup> HMG, Prime Minister's Office, 'UK-France declaration on security and defence', 2012.

<sup>76</sup> HMG, *French-British action plan*. Paris, 13 June 2017.

<sup>77</sup> The EU is considering legislation in this domain as well.

<sup>78</sup> HMG, Prime Ministers Office, UK-France Summit 2018 Declaration on Defence and Security Co-operation. 18 January 2018.

<sup>79</sup> République française, Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale, Strategic review of cyber defence. February 2018.




# **PART 3**

## *The challenge of cooperation*



## PART 3: THE CHALLENGE OF COOPERATION



It is in areas such as defence industrial collaboration or operational cooperation where the greatest benefit lies.”

Our review of the health of the relationship between France and the UK shows that cooperation has occurred in numerous areas but has had varied success at best. In nuclear matters, the cooperation has been deep and productive. In others, it has been unsuccessful and, we suspect, unsatisfying for both parties.

We recognise that cooperation involves tricky choices and trade-offs, often requiring compromise on national priorities. Sometimes, as in both countries’ experience of drone development, this circle simply cannot be squared. Sometimes, particularly when the stakes are very high, a middle road can be found, as in the case of nuclear cooperation. Sometimes, as with security cooperation and personnel exchanges, cooperation that involves personal or organisational relationships is simply easier.

As is often the way, it is precisely when cooperation is hard – when there are dilemmas to be solved and hurdles to be overcome – that the rewards are the greatest. It is in areas such as defence industrial collaboration or operational cooperation where the greatest benefit lies. Here there is a virtuous circle: economies of scale mean equipment is cheaper, that more jobs are created, that equipment is interoperable, that operations can be conducted jointly and efficiently.

This is the basis of the deepest cooperation. And it is clear that this type of cooperation is what both countries need. But if this is to be achieved, there are a number of unresolved issues and pressing questions that need to be answered if we wish to make progress between the UK and France. In this section, we explore the barriers to deeper cooperation.

### 3.1 France and the UK’s views of their role in the world

France and the UK share common values, a common global outlook and face similar threats. This does not, however, result in shared views of each country’s respective global role *per se*.

The main and most important discrepancy, the one that has the biggest impact on UK-France cooperation, is each states’ relationship with the US on the one hand, and the rest of Europe on the other, and the different visions that we have of these two alliances. While the US remains the UK’s closest ally, it has had a more turbulent history of relations with France. These views and preferences have been demonstrated in national decisions regarding international interventions: while the UK has long favoured multilateral NATO cooperation and strong transatlantic relations, France only rejoined NATO’s Integrated Military Command Structure in 2009, after 43 years outside of the organisation.<sup>80</sup> Conversely, while France longs for a strategically autonomous EU, Britain has always been less federalist and more sceptical of European strategic ambition, as highlighted by the key disagreement between both countries about a possible EU operations headquarters. The UK and France have therefore had different outlooks since the very beginning: for the UK, the cooperation established by Lancaster House complements its role in NATO; for France, it is seen as an element of European autonomous defence.

Nevertheless, these different preferences and strategic cultures aside, there remain shared values and shared visions. Despite the countries’ individual preferences for multilateral joint operations, they have demonstrated commitment to the EU and NATO respectively. France remained active in NATO operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan, and was the third largest contributor to NATO’s common budgets even when it was outside of the command structure.<sup>81</sup>

<sup>80</sup> Cameron, A. ‘Assessing France’s Current and Future Role within NATO’, RUSI Occasional Paper. February 2009. P. 1.

<sup>81</sup> Cameron, 2009. P. 1.

Bearing in mind their joint commitments and responsibilities, it is clear that the UK and the EU27 will need to find mechanisms to involve the UK in the planning process of EU-led operations in the future. Brexit may make it more difficult for France to present its strong bilateral defence alliance with the UK as convergent with its ambitions for EU defence. That France increasingly talks of European defence integration at a time when the UK is leaving the EU is not insignificant.

However, Brexit also means that the UK’s role in the world will change. It is not clear whether the UK will continue to turn inwards, or whether it will look for a wider global role, as it has so often claimed. It is also not clear if the EU will manage to overcome its internal politicking and firmly establish itself as a defence actor, in addition to being a diplomatic one. There is no certainty on whether the Brexit vote will contaminate the way the UK is perceived by other nations, or whether it will drive it to forge closer relations beyond Europe. For instance, a possible UK-EU security treaty will depend in part on the fact that EU member states will not want to be seen to be too soft on the UK, not least because a favorable agreement between the UK and the EU may well see other states such as Turkey demanding similar arrangements. But more broadly, the UK’s relative economic size may mean that it has to re-evaluate its role on the international stage. And while there has been a lot of talk of ‘Global Britain’, this concept so far seems to be lacking substance.

Conversely, while France is close to leading Europe at the moment, the country faces difficult socio-economic issues and challenges around its identity. In the case of the latter, clarity on both nations’ ambitions is essential, in particular on whether they will continue to overlap significantly, or whether Brexit marks a ‘parting of the ways’.

Then there is the role of the US. Recent isolationist and unilateral foreign policy decisions, some of them signalling a real split with the French and British-led European consensus, should not be taken only as a temporary populist episode. The shifting of US interests towards the Pacific means that its disengagement and divergence from Europe is likely to last. Yet the US has in the past played a key role in shaping the bilateral relationship between the UK and France, and it will likely continue to do so. The UK is keen on maintaining its ‘special relationship’ with the US – especially in light of Brexit – while France’s relationship with the US is more recent, but seemingly strengthening at pace. It remains to be seen whether trilateral dynamics will be a positive influence on UK-France cooperation, or whether, at least in the short term, both countries vie for American attention, at the expense of their own relationship. It is clear, then, that events in the US call for a closer relationship between the UK and France – provided the challenges posed by Brexit can be overcome.

### 3.2 Affordability


Defence budgets in both the UK and France have declined in real terms since the end of the Cold War. In part, this is a consequence of squeezed public finances on the one hand and rising domestic demand for public services on the other. Defence budgets have lost out, all the more so in a climate of acute austerity since the 2008 global financial crisis.

While both countries are facing these pressures, the UK in particular is feeling the squeeze. The failure to hedge against the US dollar in the wake of the 2016 EU referendum, combined with the devaluation of sterling has left a cavernous hole in the UK’s equipment budget. Estimates from the UK’s National Audit Office place this hole at £21 billion, more than 10 per cent of the entire equipment budget in the next 10 years.<sup>82</sup>

<sup>82</sup> National Audit Office, *The equipment plan 2017 to 2027*. Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, HC 717, session 2017-2018. January 2018.



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The financial squeeze has already impacted the UK-France relationship. The budgetary uncertainty, together with the political uncertainty caused by Brexit, has left the UK commitment to the launch of the FCAS programme in doubt. Indecisiveness on the part of the UK has led France to propose a project with Germany that would see Dassault and Airbus design a new combat system for the 2040s, as a successor to the countries' respective Rafale and Eurofighter programmes.

A related challenge which will need to be resolved is the establishment of the European Defence Fund (EDF). With President Macron's pro-Europe stance, and calls for Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and EDF,<sup>83</sup> it is likely to be economically and strategically attractive for France and its defence industries to take part in EDF projects with other EU member states. While Macron has advocated that the UK should continue to be engaged in the EU's defence initiatives, and designed the European Intervention Initiative with one of the objectives being to better integrate the UK into European defence, it is not clear if the UK will be able to access the EDF after Brexit.

### 3.3 Defence industries

Defence industrial cooperation is consistently described as the sticking point for cooperation between the UK and France. Whereas nuclear cooperation might be more sensitive and political, it is has been far more successful. Cooperation that impacts conventional arms and equipment has been anything but straightforward, and more often a site of real contention and frustration.<sup>84</sup> Indeed, the issue of industrial cooperation is seen as the weak link in the overarching structure of cooperation.

The largest issue at hand is the gap between procurement cycles, equipment plans, defence budgets and national security – as was the case when the Lancaster House Treaties were signed. Interviewees for this report have identified political will as the key catalyst for industrial cooperation, meaning that if the client wants a particular piece of equipment to get off the ground, the defence companies will make it work.

Equally, if the companies sense political uncertainty or lack of drive, it will not work, as we have seen with the failed merger of BAE and EADS. We need to create incentives for political leaders to share the same outlook on defence industrial cooperation. There is an equally crucial question of financial resources, and whether financial pressures can act as a stimulus for greater cooperation, or whether the opposite is the case and makes cooperation more challenging.

There are also several specific challenges that need to be overcome if the UK and France are to cooperate more deeply. First and foremost, the UK and France have different approaches to their domestic defence industries. Historically, the French government has viewed the safeguarding of its defence industries as part of its national security, and pursues a policy of strategic autonomy.<sup>85</sup> The UK, in contrast, has traditionally been more open to competitive bidding processes, with the ambition to secure cost-efficiency and value for money. At a time of austerity and squeezed defence budgets, the UK is gradually beginning to move towards a defence acquisition policy that reaps the economic and strategic rewards created through favouring domestic suppliers. But it is a slow process.<sup>86</sup>

<sup>83</sup> President Macron speech at the University of the Sorbonne, 26 September 2017.

<sup>84</sup> Interview French expert commentator by Armida van Rijn, Paris, 19 December 2017.

<sup>85</sup> Belin, J., Hartley, K., Lefeez, S., Linnenkamp, H., Lundmark, M., Masson, H., Maulny, J and Ungaro, A. R. 'Defence industrial links between EU and US', *ARES Report No. 20*. September 2017. P. 6.

<sup>86</sup> De France, O., Giegerich, B., Marrone, A., Maulny, J. and Taylor, T. 'The impact of Brexit on the European armament industry', *ARES Report No. 19*. August 2017. P. 16; HMG Government, Ministry of Defence, *National Security Through Technology: Technology, Equipment, and Support for UK Defence and Security*. Cm 8278. 2012. P. 13.

In the meantime, other factors are looming which are likely to cause real challenges for cooperation. Brexit means that, as yet, we do not know the shape and structure of a future trade agreement between the UK and the EU. Uncertainty for the defence industry may well begin to hollow out the UK's defence industrial base, but even if not, there are likely to be significant institutional and regulatory impacts.

Unrelated to Brexit – though no less serious for the relationship – is the fact that the UK and France are also competitors for the same global export market, especially in the Middle East. The Eurofighter and Rafale, for instance, are direct peer competitors for overseas sales. In our view, competition for exports – particularly when defence budgets are tight – is likely to reduce incentives to cooperate on developing major weapons systems.

Diverging perspectives on the role of domestic defence industries in providing national security has meant that France and the UK have found it challenging to create a joint industrial base large enough to support the full spectrum of both governments' equipment requirements. The bigger issue here again is the dichotomy between the imperative for national sovereignty and capabilities for territorial defence, and countervailing imperatives for international cooperation. The non-binding element of most of the Lancaster House provisions has meant that progress has been heavily dependent on the willingness of both countries to cooperate.<sup>87</sup> MBDA provides a potentially more positive template if it is followed through into other sectors, because it allows some variation in prioritisation between the two nations. Some other programmes that initially had significant support have either been slowed or abandoned, such as the surveillance drone developed by BAE and Dassault. Other areas of cooperation – on submarines, satellites, IED, NRBC and ships, for instance – have failed to translate into concrete projects.

### 3.4 Security cooperation


As we have seen, security cooperation between the UK and France is deep, largely informal and continuously evolving. Nevertheless, despite its shifts, bilateral cooperation looks set to continue post-Brexit. Beyond agencies and agreements, personal relationships and trust between countries remain essential for effective cooperation. The importance attached to trust and personal contacts limits the extent to which information sharing can be digitalised through databases.<sup>88</sup> Geopolitical closeness is also a factor which drives trust, personal relationships and rapprochement of structures and mandates. The best example is the Five Eyes agreement, which intimately connects British and American intelligence communities. These two dimensions explain the contrast between UK-France relations and the intelligence sharing relationship between GCHQ and the NSA, which is unparalleled in its depth and division of labour: both parties rely wholly on the other for assessments on some parts of the world.

While the British and French intelligence agencies have a close working relationship, it is not as well established as that between the US and the UK. Providing more structure to cooperation in this area would help change this. Cooperation between the UK and France also faces numerous challenges when it is articulated through the EU on a treaty basis. Here, there are numerous legal issues relating in particular to the UK's continued access to and/or participation in EU databases and other security-related organisations and directives.

<sup>87</sup> De France, O., Giegerich, B., Marrone, A., Maulny, J., Taylor, T. 'The impact of Brexit on the European armament industry', *Armament Industry European Research Group*. Research paper No. 19. August 2017. P. 19.

<sup>88</sup> DG for Internal Policies, 2017. P. 55.

## PART 3: THE CHALLENGE OF COOPERATION



### 3.4.1 Challenges for the UK

We acknowledge that there are precedents for allowing continued multilateral cooperation between the UK and the EU27 post-Brexit. For instance, there are agreements on the exchange of Passenger Name Record data with the US, Australia and Canada by the EU, while negotiations are ongoing with Mexico. Similarly, Norway and Iceland have signed agreements to be part of the Prüm directive, and Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Lichtenstein all participate in the SIS II for which they pay into the EU budget and accept the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) over their national courts in matters related to Schengen.<sup>89</sup> Furthermore, *ad hoc* agreements with 16 non-member states, including the US, have been signed by Europol, leading to information pooling (including access to the SIENA system, and indirect access to the EIS system), exchanges of liaison officers and expertise, and strengthened operational cooperation.

But we caution against over-optimism. Europol, SIS II and the EAW are all part of the EU's justice and home affairs (JHA) policies. While the UK's expertise in intelligence gives it some leverage for negotiations to maintain access to Europol, it will have to pay to do so, and it will have to submit to the oversight of the ECJ. Maintaining permanent staff at Europol, and possibly a seat on the Management Board, like Denmark does, may well be in accordance with the UK's status – but it remains to be seen whether the UK will make concessions.<sup>90</sup> SIS II, exclusively a Schengen database, also presents problems. The UK had to battle to gain access to it as a non-Schengen country in the first place, and it only went live in 2015 after the UK invested £39 million to plug into the SIS database.<sup>91</sup> It is unlikely that since then certain member states' views will have softened on having a non-Schengen member make use of a system aimed at protecting those in Schengen. There is also no legal basis in the EU treaties for a non-EU, non-Schengen country to participate in Schengen, and by extension SIS II. Countries such as Australia can only obtain SIS information by asking Europol to run a search.<sup>92</sup> Non-EU countries must also follow EU data protection laws. Once the UK has formally left the EU, it will fall under Section V of Directive 2016/680, which allows for the European Commission to decide whether third countries have adequate levels of data protection to allow for a data transfer to take place without special authorisation.<sup>93</sup> To gain this special access, the EU may demand for the European Commission to scrutinise UK data protection laws on a regular basis to ensure compliance – a decision that is likely to be politically unpalatable.<sup>94</sup>

The European Arrest Warrant (EAW), the EU's extradition system, is likely to be the greatest stumbling block. As a net exporter of criminals, the UK has benefited hugely from the EAW: since 2010, it has extradited 6,514 suspects and gained only 800 from other European countries.<sup>95</sup> The complication is predominantly due to the constitutional changes that would be required with regard to extradition of countries' own nationals. Some EU countries have extradition arrangements in line with the EAW that allow for their own nationals to be extradited to other EU countries *only*.<sup>96</sup> To allow for the extradition of nationals to the UK post-Brexit, constitutional changes in countries like Germany and Italy would be required.

<sup>89</sup> Mortera-Martinez, C. 'Hard Brexit, soft data: How to keep Britain plugged into EU databases', CER Insight. 23 June 2017. P.2.

<sup>90</sup> Mortera-Martinez, C. 'Good cop, bad cop: How to keep Britain inside Europol', CER Insight. 16 May 2017. P. 3.

<sup>91</sup> Mortera-Martinez, C. 'Hard Brexit, soft data: How to keep Britain plugged into EU databases', CER Insight. 23 June 2017. P.2.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>93</sup> 'Post-Brexit law enforcement cooperation: Negotiations and future options', UK in a Changing Europe. 2017. P. 18.

<sup>94</sup> Mortera-Martinez, C. 'Hard Brexit, soft data: How to keep Britain plugged into EU databases', CER Insight. 23 June 2017. P.2.

<sup>95</sup> Mortera-Martinez, C. 'Arrested development: Why Brexit Britain cannot keep the European Arrest Warrant', *CER Insight*.

10 July 2017. P. 1

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*

### 3.4.2 Challenges for France

For France, the challenges are of a different nature. While wanting to maintain its strategic autonomy – an approach that underpins the 2017 Strategic Review of Defence and National Security – France equally wants to deepen cooperation with European allies. The threat environment is simply too complex, too multi-faceted and too dynamic, and France needs access to intelligence assessments from the broadest range of countries.

France will have to balance its pro-EU conviction and commitment with the pragmatic fact that it needs the UK, and indeed the rest of Europe, to help safeguard its citizens. This has resulted in hard stances during the Brexit negotiations, especially on the ECJ,<sup>97</sup> while at the same time suggesting ways to keep the UK close outside of an EU context, such as the European Intervention Initiative, which is still at an early stage of development. Thus, a crucial question remains the jurisdiction of the ECJ. While initially a red line for the UK in Brexit negotiations, Theresa May has since indicated a softer stance on the extent of the court's authority. The UK has suggested it would be willing to accept ECJ jurisdiction, provided that it can add an independent dispute resolution mechanism. Here, the artificial delineation between internal and external security is problematic and will likely create issues on jurisdiction.

Institutional differences between the UK and France have also hampered cooperation between the two countries.<sup>98</sup> First, in the UK, the police are organised on a regional level (and within three different legal frameworks – for England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland), with budgets and management a partially local responsibility, under the supervision of the National Crime Agency. The London Metropolitan Police has special competence in the realm of counter-terrorism. The police trigger public prosecution and operate independently from judges. Conversely, the French police organisation (though divided between police and gendarmerie) is highly centralised and operates under the supervision of the public prosecutor's department. Though it does not impede cooperation between the UK and France, it is obviously a source of difficulties.

Second, regarding intelligence, both countries have separate organisations for security and intelligence capabilities (MI5, MI6 and GCHQ in the UK, and DGSE, DGSI in France), creating a complex network for intelligence sharing and cooperation.<sup>99</sup> Furthermore, the UK has traditionally relied on an all-source assessment from its various agencies, only possible because these agencies cooperate with one another – in part due to past experience of dealing with IRA terrorism. The UK's intelligence gathering analysis and policymaking processes are further supported by organisations such as the Joint Intelligence Organisation, the National Crime Organisation, and within the police force, the regional Counter Terrorism Units (CTU) and Counter Terrorism Intelligence Units (CTIU). However, the multitude of policing, intelligence and counter-terrorism organisations in the UK has at times also led to interagency competition and territoriality, in particular when funding is at stake. France, on the other hand, has a more decentralised intelligence framework, which explains British perceptions that there is a lack of integration between agencies, though the appointment of the National Intelligence Coordinator, and subsequent National Centre for Counter-Terrorism (CNCT) attached to the President's Office has started bridging the gap between agencies and streamlined coordination.

<sup>97</sup> Barigazzi, J. and De La Baume, M. 'Germany and France push harder line on Brexit talks', *Politico*. 14 November 2017.

<sup>98</sup> Foley, F. 2013.

<sup>99</sup> DG for Internal Policies, 2017. P. 54-55.




# **PART 4**

## *The future of cooperation*



## PART 4: THE FUTURE OF COOPERATION



The future of cooperation between the UK and France has never been as precious, and never been as precarious. In a volatile world, with old threats resurging and new threats emerging, the relationship is vital not only for both countries' respective national security, but European and global security, too. In a world when the US is turning in on itself, and the paradigms of power with which the West has become all too comfortable are shifting, the relationship between these two countries is vital, and both governments should prepare to increase defence expenditure if they want to ensure the security of their citizens and borders.

It is a strong relationship – one based on shared values, shared histories and shared ambitions – but it is being seriously threatened. In part, this is a consequence of political change, in particular the UK's decision to leave the EU. But neither country has made the most of the relationship when times were easier. Too often, agreements have not been followed through as effectively as they could have been, or have fallen through as a consequence of transient challenges, particularly relating to stretched budgets

In our view, that is not a sufficient basis for a strategic, long-term relationship. We strongly advocate rejuvenating the relationship between our countries, injecting new energy and new commitment. We know that there are difficult choices and difficult trade-offs. We know that both countries will need to make concessions that may be unpalatable. But in our view, it is time to reset the relationship because a fragile or fractured bond between the UK and France, risks both our own security, as well as that of others.

Three areas seem especially decisive: first, both countries need to meet the challenges set by Brexit and ensure that it does not endanger the security of Europe through a step backwards in cooperation. Second, the full implementation and operationalisation of areas already covered by the Lancaster House Treaties is needed. Finally, France and the UK need not only to strengthen present areas of cooperation, but also better prepare for tomorrow's challenges.

### 4.1 Tackle the security challenges raised by Brexit

#### 4.1.1 Ensure that Brexit does not endanger security cooperation between the UK and the EU27

Defence and security cooperation between the UK and the EU27 is of tremendous importance for both countries: Brexit must not jeopardise it, and defence and security must not be used as leverage in the negotiations.

Security issues need to be isolated and insulated from the rest of the Brexit negotiations. Both the UK and the EU27 need to separate defence and security from the trade and customs parts of the Brexit negotiations, in recognition of the shared benefits of UK-EU cooperation in this area.

The UK has already proposed a specific treaty on security, in which it suggests going further than the current agreements in place with other foreign countries. The EU27 do not want to create a specific status for the UK that might disturb relationships with other third countries, yet it seems possible to find agreements that would make it a privileged partner.

Such an agreement might open up to third countries several defence and security mechanisms that are currently reserved to member states, such as SIS II; we also need to update the third-party status in the agreement to ensure closer association is possible. It would also require establishing consultation processes, finding the right balance between two legitimate objectives:

the UK's desire to participate in military operations only if it has been involved in planning them, and the EU's desire to maintain autonomy in decision-making.

#### 4.1.2 Maintain border cooperation agreements

After Brexit, the UK will no longer be part of the EU, which might endanger the border cooperation agreements set up by the Treaty of Le Touquet and the Sangatte Protocol.

**We believe it is imperative to maintain these agreements.** The UK and France cannot allow these agreements to be influenced by withdrawal negotiations and future security arrangements between the UK and the EU27. The UK government should consider how it might take on a greater proportion of burden-sharing from France.

### 4.2 Ensure the full implementation of the Lancaster House Treaties

#### 4.2.1 Reinforce strategic dialogue and mutual knowledge

Ultimately, defence and security cooperation depends less on the language of treaties and declarations than on the signatory country's leaders. Political will has enabled us to overcome difficulties on the implementation of some aspects of the Lancaster House Treaties, but when political will has been lacking, implementation of other aspects has failed.

The creation of a biannual bilateral head of governments' summit in the Lancaster House framework was, in this way, very useful. But it appears that we need to go further, even more so as an implication of Brexit is that British leaders will no longer attend European Council and other high-level meetings, thereby reducing opportunities for interactions with French leaders.

Thus, we advocate for the creation of an annual UK-France Defence and Security Council, larger than the council between the Defence Ministers that was set up by the 2018 Sandhurst summit. It should involve the President, Prime minister, Foreign Secretaries, Defence Ministers, Home Secretaries and Chiefs of Defence Staff and intelligence chiefs.

This council would be complemented by a **more regular '2+2' dialogue**, consisting of Foreign Secretaries and Defence Ministers, and an established 'quint' dialogue between the heads of the main intelligence services, as during the 2018 Sandhurst summit.

#### 4.2.2 Prepare the CJEF for operations

While the CJEF concept has been praised and tested successfully during training, it has not yet been deployed operationally.


The first objective should be to ensure its full operational capability, planned for 2020. The main task of the CJEF is to set a framework for joint UK-France operations to be possible at appropriate notice and with the right capabilities.

Joint engagement can already be achieved on air and sea issues, because existing systems are largely interoperable and allow for efficient deployment in these environments. More work remains to be done to build interoperability in land environments. The anti-submarine challenge seems an especially decisive area of joint intervention in cooperation with the US.

“  
We strongly  
advocate  
rejuvenating  
the relationship  
between our  
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new energy and  
new commitment.”



## PART 4: THE FUTURE OF COOPERATION



Last but not least, since it has always been clear that CJEF should in due time examine the conditions for a possible opening up to other allies, it would be useful to start working on its plugging in with NATO and the emerging European Intervention Initiative: it would be a good way for the UK to signal that it remains committed to European defence, a way for the European Intervention Initiative to rest on a strong and tested framework and to integrate the two main military powers of the European continent.

### 4.2.3 Increase cooperation through training facilities and maintenance

France and the UK should increasingly rely on each other for training facilities and equipment maintenance, thus maximising their use and minimising the cost to both countries. Moves towards cooperation on servicing, maintenance and training in areas where both countries hold the same equipment, such as the C-130 and the A400M aircrafts, should offer opportunities for financial savings, thereby releasing funding for investment in other areas of defence. There may also be scope to utilise the British Army's training facility in Suffield, Canada for joint UK-France exercises.

## 4.3 Preparing for the future

### 4.3.1 Pursue the objective of building FCAS capacity

Enhanced aerial combat capacities will be crucial for the wars of tomorrow. Yet no European country currently has the financial or industrial capability to build a next-generation aircraft alone, given the investment it requires and the stretching of military budgets. As a result, the risk is losing this competence with the end of the Rafale, Typhoon and Eurofighter programmes. On top of industrial issues, within the context of a loosening transatlantic relationship, it is key for national security to maintain European capability to design autonomous combat air systems.

The UK's commitment to purchase 138 F-35 jets (48 have already been ordered, four have been delivered), the absence of current operational need for an FCAS programme on the British side, and the UK's strong defence industrial relationship with the US, has raised doubts over the completion of the original UK-France FCAS programme, which is important to develop specific technologies that would be needed for the next generation of fighter aircraft.

However, it would be a pity to abandon a programme in which significant financial investments have been made, as a feasibility study and technological work have already begun. Furthermore, the UK has unique capabilities among European states in fighter jet design, whether it is military engines, electronic warfare, sensors or stealth technologies. Plus, the involvement of its air force in high-intensity combat operations and kinetic strikes would help design a combat air system with adapted operational capabilities. By contrast, there are significant differences between the French and the German (mostly defensive) use of air force, that could lead to divergences among programme's priorities.

It therefore seems desirable to proceed, in the medium-term at least, with the UK-France FCAS programme, in order to develop the key technologies needed for a future combat air system; and, in the long-term, to merge this programme with the France-Germany FCAS programme as a France-UK-Germany project. In time, this programme might serve as one of the first building blocks of a 'combat aircraft MBDA'.

### 4.3.2 Increase cyber security cooperation by developing formalised and structured modes of cooperation

The UK's involvement in the Five Eyes community remains a sticking point for France-UK cooperation in cyber security.

However, US-UK cooperation on nuclear issues did not prevent UK-France nuclear cooperation from becoming a pillar of the Lancaster House agreements. That cyber security is a sensitive subject should not prevent stronger French-British cooperation in this area, which is becoming as central as nuclear in strategic affairs.

We propose going further than the strategic dialogue on cyber threats set up by the Sandhurst summit – instead, **complementing the Lancaster House Treaties with a cyber security pillar**. This should include the joint development of a doctrine for responding to cyber threats, the development of joint capabilities (especially on the key technologies identified by the French cyber defence strategic review, namely data encryption, detecting and identifying cyber-attacks and AI), and **establishing a joint government taskforce to explore options for further cooperation**. One of the purposes of this taskforce would also be to formalise cyber cooperation and provide a platform for regular and structured discussions on these issues between the UK and France.

This cyber security pillar can only work under exclusivity and non-disclosure agreements, which would preserve secrecy on jointly developed capabilities.

### 4.3.3 Formulate a joint strategic vision to inform R&D planning

All of the joint R&D UK-France programmes designed to prepare for oncoming threats will rely on a common set of key technologies, drawing mainly on AI, cyber security, robotics, stealth and spatial observation. In addition to industrial cooperation, research will be needed to militarise technologies developed by the civil sector.

Although states prefer to develop several capacities alone, there is a clear case to be made for more joint research that is defence and security-oriented. It was an ambition established at the bilateral 2012 Paris summit, but both countries have as yet failed to deliver.

To orientate UK-France defence and security cooperation towards the future, it is necessary to **formulate a strategic vision, based on a joint identification of key technologies and potential opportunities**. This, in turn, needs to be implemented through a range of bilateral instruments, building on the Sandhurst agreement to develop joint research in AI and cyber security. If the final Brexit agreement allows for the UK to retain some level of access to Horizon 2020 and the European Defence Fund, they could provide sources of funding for joint projects.

### 4.3.4 Implement a formal intelligence framework between France and the UK

Nowadays, intelligence cooperation between France and the UK, while regular and deep, works mostly on an informal basis, founded on trust and personal contacts. Although these are imperative, they are not a substitute for more structured, formal relations that are enshrined in law and help to foster intimacy between the two countries. Such a framework is all the more important considering intelligence cooperation is increasingly based on the exchange of data.

## PART 4: THE FUTURE OF COOPERATION

The Lancaster House treaties should therefore be complemented by a discreet agreement on intelligence sharing which facilitates cooperation between the UK and France.

### **4.3.5 Deepen joint defence engagement activities**

**Design and implement joint defence engagement activities.** As a token of the close relationship between the two countries, joint defence engagement activities should be developed. Through the use and deployment of liaison officers in each countries' respective defence and foreign affairs ministries, the UK and France can collaborate on outward-facing activities. Such activities might involve, for example, giving joint information briefings to foreign service staff.

### **4.3.6 Use and strengthen officer exchange programmes**

Exchange programmes have played a key role in facilitating UK-France defence and security cooperation, helping each country to develop a better understanding of the other's activities and structures, as well as expanding their networks. **This mutual understanding should be cultivated further, in order to safeguard cooperation between France and the UK for future generations of military and civilian officers.**



