





The future of UK-Germany defence industrial cooperation

Introduction

Germany and the United Kingdom strive for closer military partnership, including defence industrial cooperation. Both countries mention the goal of more armament partnerships with European and transatlantic partners in their respective defence industrial strategies.¹ However, historical records of armament cooperation involving Germany and the UK show a mixed picture, with successes like the Eurofighter and the A400M, but also less fruitful projects like the original Boxer program, which the UK left. Traditionally, the aerospace sector was most open for cooperative armament projects, while the land and maritime sector remained more national.

Germany and the United Kingdom also have to think about how collaboration can address structural factors shaping their defence industrial bases, from industrial capability retention, to technological advancement to supply chain dependencies."

Research suggests that political, operational, economic, industrial and technological motivations can lead to closer defence and especially armament cooperation.² Often, these cooperative endeavours entail a mutual interdependence between cooperating actors for the long in-service life of modern weapon systems, underlining the high political symbolic value of such cooperation. Yet, beyond armament cooperation, Germany and the United Kingdom also have to think about how collaboration can address structural factors shaping their defence industrial bases, from industrial capability retention, to technological advancement to supply chain dependencies. As both countries and their industrial bases face new geopolitical and geo-economic realities, cooperation might be one way to rise to the multitude of challenges.


Industrial capabilities and structural factors

The interplay of structural forces such as transnational dependencies and international competition puts pressure on existing industrial capabilities and the respective national ambition to retain the industrial and technological base. While the latter ambition can trigger national responses, it can also be utilised for closer European industrial cooperation. German, continental European, and UK industrial bases are entangled and will remain mutually dependent for the foreseeable future.³ Factors like IPRs, company subsidiaries,⁴ and production and research facilities are likely to only unravel slowly, as

Sophia Becker Christian Mölling Torben Schütz the defence business is quite long-term in its nature. This will remain true even in light of the growing threat of an disorderly Brexit. These intra-European factors are among those that will shape the defence industrial base in the coming years.

However, today, the European Defence and Technological Industrial Base (EDTIB) also shows significant extra-European dependencies across the supply chain it relies upon to deliver equipment to Europe's armed forces – from imported raw materials⁵ all the way up to dependencies on weapon system exports to generate revenue.⁶ Germany and the UK's approach to defence industrial cooperation should therefore also ask how it can contribute to alleviate these dependencies. At the very least, closer coordination could inform the respective partners on the degrees of dependence they deem acceptable in which area. This becomes even more important given that the UK and the EU will have to figure out how their respective industrial capabilities factor into the larger EDTIB picture and in a comparatively fast-changing international defence industrial landscape where supply chains globalise and new industrial competitors emerge.⁷

Structural factors and dependencies can be understood and aligned by looking vertically at the development and production process of defence goods, as Figure 1 depicts.



R&D/R&T: Beyond state funding and its importance for R&D in the defence sector, political support for industrial restructuring can increase the resilience of the sector to a downturn in state R&D funding. While larger defence companies are able to spend more of their own resources on R&D, smaller companies are more reliant on state funding. Most European defence companies, including national champions, are relatively small compared to their international rivals.⁸ This reality limits their capacity to utilise cross-sectoral innovation and integrate commercial technologies, as well as their ability to invest their own money into R&D, and their access to capital.

FIGURE 1: EUROPEAN DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL DEPENDENCIES AND STRUCTURAL FACTORS (ALIGNED VERTICALLY) As retention of the technological edge – or at least coming second behind the US – remains an important goal for European armed forces, European governments should be interested in measures to increase the R&D/R&T capabilities of the EDTIB, even if this might cut into purely national structures. Politically, this means that allowing, accompanying, or even promoting, European industrial consolidation could offer a path for governments to increase the R&D/R&T capabilities of the EDTIB without investing significantly more – which nevertheless remains central.

Raw material dependencies: Europe is highly dependent on raw material imports; for 19 out of 39 materials important for the defence industrial production, European countries are totally dependent on suppliers from outside Europe.⁹ Nearly three-quarters of the raw material imports are sourced from just six countries.¹⁰ Creating economic incentives for the exploration and exploitation of European depots and build-up of domestic refining capacities by Western companies, regulatory reforms or resource partnerships with non-European partners are all areas which profit enormously from transnational action and collaboration. While the German position is likely covered by EU initiatives in this area, the UK could benefit from coordination with the EU and by facilitating further cooperation with international partners such as Australia.

Component production: Dependencies in component production and system integration are most likely difficult to mitigate as they touch the core of the defence industrial business and thus domestic political interest in Germany and the UK. Moreover, both countries likely have diverging views of the acceptable level of dependency in these areas, especially regarding components. Initiatives in Europe to use only ITAR-free components for example will not be shared by the UK and its close relation to the US and the entanglement of their defence industrial bases. Consequently, an effective handling of non-European dependencies in these life cycle steps would likely require a clearer picture as to what an EDTIB should be able to do and what not, together with the aforementioned industrial consolidation. The key here would be to answer the question what roles British and German industrial bases should play in retaining key industrial capabilities in the European portfolio.

Export: Lastly, export pressure on the industry due to overcapacities in Europe and thus dependencies on non-European demand can be reduced by consolidating supply and demand within Europe. As described above, this will require tailored and specific cooperation between the UK and Germany, but also with other European partners across the life cycle of defence products.

Cooperation across the life cycle

The different stages of the armament life cycle provide a helpful starting point to identify both challenges and opportunities. The sooner cooperation begins and the more consistent it is pursued through the course of a life cycle, the larger the potential benefits across the political, military-operational, and economic dimensions.

Phase I: R&D/R&T

Early collaboration can generate industrial and technological benefits even if it ultimately does not lead to jointly produced and fielded weapon systems. Historically,

"

Early collaboration can generate industrial and technological benefits even if it ultimately does not lead to jointly produced and fielded weapon systems." joint research and development (R&D) programmes fed into different national successor programmes, increasing their respective technological sophistication.¹¹

Consequently, Germany and the United Kingdom – in cooperation with additional European and transatlantic partners – should explore joint R&D and R&T opportunities in technological areas where all actors pursue future capabilities and armament programmes, even if these are not collaborative in nature. For potential joint efforts, these include technologies for medium-to-long-range strike and air defence purposes. New developments, e.g. in passive detection to new effectors like lasers or hypersonic missiles, all require further R&D and R&T before becoming useful for military applications. Examples where R&D and R&T collaboration could yield benefits – even if they lead to national programmes – include technologies for next generation combat aircraft like FCAS and Tempest (and uninhabited wingman) or armour and effectors for armoured vehicles.

Moreover, operationalising and realising European adaptation to the future of warfare will require significant investment, including in new technologies. As R&D/R&T in the defence sector is still very much dependent on state investment,¹² such activities would profit from European or at least bilateral collaboration. Most NATO members and EU allies share similar visions of how technology will influence the battlefield: characterised by information, its generation distribution and processing as the centre of future warfare.¹³ While the development of concrete systems might prove too sensitive given persistent problems of information sharing even among allies, earlier technological development activities might be a good cooperation opportunity.

Phase II: procurement and operation & maintenance

System level

Looking at later stages of the life cycles of military equipment, such as procurement, operation and maintenance, UK-Germany industrial cooperation opportunities show a mixed picture. Unfortunately, the current UK-Germany armament cooperation on the system-level is limited and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future given the diverging procurement preferences of both countries.¹⁴ In simplified terms, the political and industrial preferences of the German and British government remain roughly constant, which means national or European procurement for Germany, national production or US imports for the UK. Hence, the focus on the system-level should lie on exploiting existing equipment commonalities in operation, maintenance and upgrading. Joint operations for Eurofighter at the Baltic Air Policing and the introduction of Boxer APCs into the British army seem promising to lay the foundations for such cooperation. In earlier stages, that is for development and joint procurement, however, newer, and smaller programs, without overwhelming political visibility, might offer good cooperation opportunities, like uninhabited systems.

Component cooperation

Components of weapon systems also constitute an important portion of the defence market. Short term opportunities here lie predominantly in munitions, as Germany, the UK and Europe as a whole retain a significant dependency on US products in certain domains. Moreover, closer integration of munitions into various systems enhances

"

While the development of concrete systems might prove too sensitive given persistent problems of information sharing even among allies, earlier technological development activities might be a good cooperation opportunity." European interoperability and might, in the end, be cheaper if ordered together. Since the European stocks for certain munitions are still way too small for high-end and even longer low-intensity conflicts, there is a clear need to take advantage of economies of scale. Moreover, German participation in the UK's complex weapon programme, which addresses some munition shortfalls, could also be an option.¹⁵ Cooperation on procuring components, as well as their development, also makes sense for modular commonly used systems, e.g. new mission modules for the Boxer APC or electronic warfare equipment for the Eurofighter. Moreover, mid-lifetime upgrades for the big-ticket programmes of the last two decades like the Eurofighter or the A400M might offer cooperation opportunities.

Political Issues

Lastly, the political nature of defence industrial cooperation also entails contentious issues. These came to the forefront over the past five years with Brexit, a growing European Union defence industrial ambition and intensified debates about arms exports, especially into regions with active conflicts. All the above have some potential to disrupt or complicate defence industrial cooperation between Germany and continental Europe on the one side and the UK on the other.

While it is still too early to tell what the economic consequences of the Brexit will be in light of uncertainty about a deal, the current political climate between the UK and the EU certainly is not conducive to closer cooperation. For this very reason, defence cooperation, in which the interests of the UK and continental Europe still align, becomes even more important as a showcase for constructive relations across the English Channel.

Another factor that will likely complicate UK-Germany defence industrial cooperation above the component level is the question of dependency on US parts. As some actors in Europe are floating the idea of future "ITAR-free" armament projects,¹⁶ this would likely be a step too far for the UK to follow – politically and industrially. Hence, future collaborative projects should either be in a sector where the EDTIB is already independent or where no fundamental European industrial interests are standing in the way of incorporating transatlantic components. This includes projects for equipment which the Europeans might plan to export to other international customers, which could be problematic if they incorporate ITAR-regulated components.

Yet not only the US interest in the final destination of their exported components plays a role. The same is true for intra-European arms component trade, as the controversies around German components in products exported from the UK to Saudi Arabia during 2019 demonstrates.¹⁷ Diverging export behaviour between European partners might grow into a factor structurally inhibiting cooperation or determining certain cooperative blocks within Europe. In turn, such a development would likely entail duplication in armament efforts, lead to non-strategic planning and reduce the chances to make the most of cooperation opportunities – that is decreasing costs and profiting from the broadest defence industrial know-how to get the best product.

"

... defence cooperation, in which the interests of the UK and continental Europe still align, becomes even more important as a showcase for constructive relations across the English Channel."

Recommendations: exploit short term options – explore future opportunities

Right now, political motivation to bind the UK to European security beyond Brexit dominates the exploration of German-British defence industrial cooperation. At the same time, the UK and Germany have pursued different armament strategies. Bringing these two paths to converge is not an easy task in the short-term – especially not on defence, where procurement and lifecycles span over decades. However, the current situation offers some options.

For potential industrial cooperation, Germany and the UK have to systematically explore opportunities in operational, technological, industrial and economic dimensions. This would provide solid reasoning for selecting respective cooperation projects. Doing so requires broadening the scope of cooperation beyond the "traditional" armament cooperation to include topics like mitigating industrial dependencies and developing a clearer transnational industrial ambition. Four steps could mark the start of such defence industrial cooperation:

1. Focus on equipment commonality and future technologies in armament cooperation:

Germany and the UK could both benefit economically and operationally from further deepening defence industrial cooperation based on equipment commonalities by exploring future joint updates. Moreover, joint investment into R&D and R&T, especially in technology and product areas like robotics for uninhabited systems, smart munitions and digitisation, would offer future opportunities for joint procurements. At the very least, even if these collaborations fail to lead to joint armament projects, they could enhance the sophistication of future projects of both actors. As with the Franco-German armament projects, deciding on clear leads for each project would help mitigate requirement overloads. For example, in the case of uninhabited systems, both armed forces envision important roles for these types of systems, yet the UK appears to be further ahead in their integration. In turn, this would make a UK lead in such endeavours useful.

2. Manage resource dependencies: define and where necessary reduce, where possible cooperate. Reducing defence industrial dependencies or at least defining acceptable levels of dependence across the life cycle of products would enhance security of supply. Creating a raw material strategy for the UK and aligning¹⁸ it with the EU's strategy for critical raw materials would be a first step. Both could address standing weaknesses such as insufficient incentives for domestic production and refining capacities and insufficient supply chain diversification efforts.¹⁹ The UK could also play a role in facilitating closer exchange between the EU and international partners such as the USA, and Commonwealth members. Among those, Australia and South Africa already are important raw material suppliers, but others also show potential.

3. Define transnational defence industrial capability ambitions: Even Brexit will not change the fact that the British DTIB is an important part of the EDTIB. Yet, in a changing international market with emerging competitors and an ever more crowded export market, industrial consolidation will once again become an important topic in Europe. Since further national consolidation is hardly recommendable in most European countries, governments should explore which transnational consolidations would fit both their national ambitions as well as the international competitiveness of the EDTIB

"

For potential industrial cooperation, Germany and the UK have to systematically explore opportunities in operational, technological, industrial and economic dimensions." and its companies and nudge them towards that future. Developing such a transnational, European industrial agenda would likely alleviate extra-European dependencies on components and exports.

4. Clarify arms export positions: As the debates of 2019 have shown, European governments need to calibrate their arms export policies more jointly. This includes Germany and the United Kingdom. Both should explore options to emulate the Franco-German arms export control agreement from November 2019²⁰ for joint projects and especially component deliveries. This would increase mutual trust among companies, which in turn might contribute to positive attitudes towards further industrial consolidation.

References

- For Germany: Die Bundesregierung, Strategy Paper of the Federal Government on Strengthening the Security and Defence Industry, p.4, Available at: p.4. <u>https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/S-T/strategiepapier-staerkung-sicherits-und-verteidigungsindustrie-en.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=4 [Accessed 27 October 2020]. For the UK: HM Government, 2017. Industry for Defence and a Prosperous Britain: Refreshing Defence Industrial Policy, p.13. Available at: <u>https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/669958/DefenceIndustrialPolicy_Web.pdf</u> [Accessed 27 October 2020].
 </u>
- Mölling, C. & Schütz, T., 2018. European Armament Collaboration: What We Can Learn from History and Concepts in: N. Karampekios et al. (eds.), The Emergence of EU Defense Research Policy. From Innovation to Militarization. p.135f
- Giegerich, B. & Mölling, C., 2018. The United Kingdom's contribution to European security and defence, IISS / DGAP, Available at: <u>https://dgap.org/system/files/ article_pdfs/the_united_kingdoms_contribution_to_european_security_and_defence.pdf</u> [Accessed 23 October 2020].
- 4. The Military Balance, 2020. Chapter Four: Europe, IISS, Vol. 120(1), pp. 64–165, p. 84.
- Pavel, C. & Tzimas, E., 2016. Raw materials in the European defence industry, JRC Science for Policy Report, European Commission, Available at: <u>https://pub-lications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC98333/raw%20materials%20</u> <u>in%20the%20european%20defence%20industry_online%20report.pdf</u> [Accessed 27 October 2020].
- Beraud-Sudreau, L., 2015. The extra-EU defence exports' effect on armament cooperation, European Parliament, p.16f, Available at: <u>https://www.europarl.europa.</u> <u>eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/549043/EXPO_STU(2015)549043_EN.pdf</u> [Accessed: 26 October 2020]
- Schütz, T., 2018. Globale Rüstungsdynamiken Alte Zentren, neue Akteure, Working Paper Nummer 080, Hans Böckler Stiftung, Available at: <u>https://www. boeckler.de/pdf/p_fofoe_WP_080_2018.pdf</u> [Accessed 02 November 2020]
- 8. The average Defense News Top 100 European defence company turnover is 1/3 of Chinese conglomerates and ½ of that of US companies. Even national champions from the last consolidation round of the 1990s like BAE Systems, Leonardo or Thales are by now rather small compared to their international competition. Defense News, 2020. Top 100, Available at: https://people.defensenews.com/top-100/ [Accessed 1 November 2020].

- Pavel, C., Tzimas, E., 2016. Raw materials in the European defence industry. [online] European Commission – Joint Research Centre. Available at: <u>https://pub-lications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC98333/raw%20materials%20</u> <u>in%20the%20european%20defence%20industry_online%20report.pdf</u> [Accessed 2 November 2020], p.51.
- 10. The six countries being China, USA, South Africa, Australia, Chile, and Russia. Ibid., p.55.
- See e.g. how the German-US "Main Battle Tank 70" program fed into both the Leopard 2 and the M-1 Abrams main battle tank programmes. For the Leopard 2, see Europäische Sicherheit & Technik, 2019. 40 Jahre in der Nutzung – Kampfpanzer Leopard 2. [online] Europäische Sicherheit & Technik. Available at: <u>https:// esut.de/2019/10/fachbeitraege/ruestung/15489/40-jahre-in-der-nutzung-kampfpanzer-leopard-2/</u> [Accessed 2 November 2020].
- 12. Schütz, T., 2020. COVID-19 und der Rüstungssektor, Hans-Böckler-Stiftung. Forthcoming.
- Becker, S., Mölling, C., Schütz, T., 2020. Learning Together German-British Cooperation on Military Innovation and the Future of Warfare. Kings College London – The Policy Institute. Forthcoming.
- Becker, S., Mölling, C., Schütz, T., 2020. UK-Germany defence cooperation: bridging the political and military gaps. Kings College London – The Policy Institute. Forthcoming, p.20.
- 15. Idib. p.25f.
- Trevithick, J., 2018. Eurofighter Consortium 2.0 Takes Shape As Spain Set To Join Franco-German Stealth Jet Program. [online] The Drive – Warzone. Available at <u>https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/25279/eurofighter-consortium-2-0takes-shape-as-spain-set-to-join-franco-german-stealth-jet-program</u> [Accessed 30 October 2020].
- Mölling, C., Schütz, T., 2019. Rüstungsexportpolitik Optionen einer Europäisierung. [online] German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). Available at: <u>https:// dgap.org/sites/default/files/article_pdfs/dgap_policy_brief_7_rustungsexportpolitik - optionen_der_europaisierung.pdf</u> [Accessed 30 October 2020], p.5.
- So far, the UK does not have a dedicated strategy on how to address critical raw material supply. See e.g. UK Houses of Parliament – Parliamentary Office of Science & Technology, 2019. Access to Critical Materials. [online] Houses of Parliament. Available at: <u>https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/POST-PN-0609/POST-PN-0609.pdf</u> [Accessed 2 November 2020], p.3.
- Theodosopoulos, V., 2020. The Geopolitics of Supply: towards a new EU approach to the security of supply of critical raw materials?. [online] Vrije Universiteit Brussels - Institute for European Studie. Available at: <u>https://www.ies.be/files/IES-PB-The-Geopolitics-of-Supply.pdf</u> [Accessed 2 November 2020], p.5.
- 20. French Government Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, 2019. Press release Franco-German Agreement on Defence export controls (14 November 2019). [online] Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs. Available at: <u>https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/germany/events/article/franco-german-agreement-on-defence-export-controls-14-nov-19</u> [Accessed 3 November 2020].

This report is part of a Policy Institute project investigating defence cooperation between the UK and Germany, funded by the Hanns Seidel Foundation. Visit <u>our</u> <u>website</u> to find out more about the project.

About the authors

Sophia Becker is a Research Fellow for US Security & Defense Policy at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), Berlin.

Christian Mölling is Research Director at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), Berlin.

Torben Schütz is a Research Fellow for Armament Policy at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), Berlin.

The Policy Institute

The Policy Institute at King's College London works to solve society's challenges with evidence and expertise.

We combine the rigour of academia with the agility of a consultancy and the connectedness of a think tank.

Our research draws on many disciplines and methods, making use of the skills, expertise and resources of not only the institute, but the university and its wider network too.

