The Royal Society’s Space: 2075 report put numbers to the problem: the UK spends less than 0.05% of GDP on space, ranking 16th globally, while the sector underpins nearly a fifth of the economy. That mismatch constitutes a strategic vulnerability.
Why does this matter? Because space is no longer a benign environment (if it ever was). It is a contested battlespace. Allies are moving quickly, fielding sensors, hardening resilience, and rehearsing space control. If the UK does not pivot from policy to capability, it risks becoming a spectator in a domain that underpins every aspect of modern defence and national security.
This viewpoint reflects on what was observed in 2025, the strategic gaps that remain, and what must happen in 2026 if the UK is serious about spacepower. Written from a defence-space practitioner’s perspective, it also speaks to a wider UK governance pattern identified by Sam Freedman: growing executive ambition without matching delivery capacity—a gap that space now exposes starkly.
The analysis and recommendations that follow are directed at government defence decision-makers and focus on accelerating delivery and capability, rather than shaping any particular industrial outcome.
What we saw in 2025
From where I sit in the defence-space ecosystem, last year was another heavy on intent but light on delivery. The UK’s Strategic Defence Review (SDR) formally raised space to parity with the other domains and promised a faster move towards warfighting readiness and industrial partnering. That mattered, both politically and symbolically, but it did not, in itself, put new space capability into the field. In parallel, the Ministry of Defence began managing Space as a Portfolio within the new National Armaments Directorate (NAD). This consolidating move is intended to speed acquisition by bringing DE&S, Defence Digital, DIO, Dstl and Support under one umbrella. Sensible governance, yes; a step-change in operational output, not yet.
Operationally, Major General Paul Tedman cut through the noise in his RUSI and DSEI speeches. He characterised space as the ‘central nervous system’ of modern war and described a battlespace collapsing to machine speed, with ‘finders and strikers’ locked in a new reconnaissance-strike contest. His core point was blunt: without assured Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT), satellite communications (SATCOM), and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), the integrated force can neither understand the battlespace nor fight effectively. This benchmark should be used to judge success in 2026.
Alongside these policy statements and rhetoric, there was some tangible progress at the civil–military seam. The joint National Space Operations Centre (NSpOC), operated by the UK Space Agency, UK Space Command’s No 1 Space Operations Squadron, and the Met Office, passed its one-year milestone and now publishes monthly operational summaries. These track thousands of conjunction alerts, monitor re-entries, and issue protective warnings to UK-licensed operators. This capability forms the backbone of national space safety and is quietly becoming more robust and operationally relevant. It is a non-negotiable requirement for any space-faring nation and, for the UK—with hundreds of licensed satellites—fundamental to sustaining secure and resilient operations in orbit.
At the ESA Ministerial in Bremen, the UK had the opportunity to lay out its stall. London committed around £2.8 billion across ESA programmes for the next decade—a significant headline figure—but, after adjustments, some observers regard this as a net reduction in certain lines. For Defence, the key issue is the dual-use payoff: civil investments that strengthen Space Domain Awareness (SDA), Earth Observation, defence ISR, and overall resilience. ESA’s own ministerial framing now emphasises autonomy and security, with programmes increasingly optimised for dual-use outcomes. However, as the ADS Group cautions, the UK must translate these subscriptions into clear buying signals for industry and strategic autonomy. More needs to be done to leverage ESA investment to strengthen the UK’s space backbone.
For all the frameworks and pledges, delivery remains thin. 2026 must be the year the UK moves decisively from policy to capability.
What it means for defence and industry - Strategic gaps & emerging risks
The UK remains heavily reliant on US systems for PNT and strategic warning, despite space capabilities underpinning modern defence. That reliance creates a clear strategic fragility. GPS disruption during the Ukraine conflict has demonstrated that PNT denial is now routine rather than exceptional, with similar interference increasingly reported across the Nordics, bringing the challenge closer to home. The National PNT Office, established in 2023 within DSIT, has begun to define the problem, develop best-practice guidance, explore options such as eLORAN and a National Timing Centre, and support resilient GNSS alternatives. These are important first steps, but it remains early days. The MOD must now accelerate work on sovereign alternatives and jam-resistant PNT layers if the UK is to stand on its own in future conflict.
The UK’s ability to generate strategic missile warning and space-based ISR also remains heavily dependent on allied systems, principally those of the US, or on commercial assets. RAF Fylingdales provides a critical radar node for ballistic missile warning and space surveillance, and the planned Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability (DARC) site in Pembrokeshire will add further depth. Beyond these ground-based sensors and the development of the NSpOC, however, the UK has no sovereign space-based early-warning constellation and only limited ISR capacity in orbit. This dependency may be tolerable in peacetime, but in a crisis, it becomes a vulnerability. Recent missile activity in the Middle East has underlined how crucial space-based missile warning is for timely defence. The question for 2026 is whether the UK continues to double down on reliance on the US or begins to build a European or national layer to close the gap.
Funding remains a structural weakness. DSIT’s R&D allocations and the UK Space Agency’s corporate plan demonstrate some ambition, yet the MOD has still not published the Defence Investment Plan (DIP), delaying clarity on how and when space resilience will be financed. Investment through ESA helps and provides access to dual-use technologies, but unless Defence steps forward as a clear and credible customer, the UK will not field a meaningful warfighting capability.
UKspace’s 2026 outlook warns of a turbulent strategic context: US elections, populist pressures within the EU, Russia’s continuing campaign in Ukraine, and China’s growing space assertiveness. Alliances matter, but partnerships cannot substitute for capability. The spaceDIME framework, developed by Gabriel Elefteriu at the Council on Geostrategy, highlights the need for diplomatic burden-sharing, informational fusion with allies, military fielding of systems, and economic funding to converge. Without that convergence, the allied posture risks remaining pre-emptive rather than practical.
The bottom line is clear. The UK has national policy, strategies, problem definitions, governance structures, and some international investment—but not yet the pace, sovereignty, or systems required to match its ambition. Military satellite communications, Space Domain Awareness (SDA), PNT resilience, ISR, and space control must accelerate from strategy into delivery in 2026. The strategic risk of continued delay is not only near-term exposure, but the creation of a long-term constraint on national power.
International benchmarks & why the UK must accelerate
After years of frameworks and vision statements, the reality is stark. While the UK debates governance and strategy, others are moving at speed. France is fielding space-control capabilities and running AsterX, an annual multi-threat, multi-domain space operations exercise with allied partners explicitly designed to protect and defend space infrastructure. Germany has adopted a new Federal Space Strategy that prioritises security and strategic autonomy. Sweden is pushing hard on launch and surveillance infrastructure: Esrange is being developed for orbital launches under a US–Sweden Technology Safeguards Agreement, and the tri-static EISCAT 3D radar, including a site in Sweden, is coming online to support space-weather monitoring and debris detection.
The tone from US think tanks and allied defence circles is equally clear: space is no longer a benign environment—it is a battlespace, and the tempo is accelerating. Reports from CSIS warn of daily GPS jamming, cyber intrusions, and close-proximity operations by Russian and Chinese satellites. The US Space Force’s posture for 2026 is unambiguous: full-spectrum warfighting. It is fielding next-generation OPIR satellites, jam-resistant communications, and on-orbit servicing demonstrations to harden resilience. China’s satellite fleet passed 1,000 operational units in 2025, many of which are ISR-focused, and continues to grow. These developments are not theoretical; both states are shaping the operating environment now.
Looking ahead to 2026
2026 is less about what might happen and more about what must happen—and fast. UKspace has called for delivery at pace, not more frameworks. The UK needs to publish the Defence Investment Plan, formally stand up the National Armaments Directorate’s Space Portfolio Group, and move flagship programmes from PowerPoint into procurement. Industry needs clarity and credible buying signals; government needs to harden SDA, PNT, and ISR flows now, not in 2030. Allies are acting with urgency. If the UK does not pivot from strategy to execution, it risks becoming a passenger in the space domain.
Ambition without acceleration is a liability. Defence must pivot from policy to practice; SDA and space control cannot remain aspirational. If Major General Tedman’s ambition for the UK to ‘gain control of the Space Domain’ is to be realised, it will require sensors, attribution tools, and doctrine—not in 2030, but now. Resilience is non-negotiable. PNT hardening, protection of ground segments, and rapid recovery concepts have begun, but the journey is only just starting. Evidence shows that the transition from framework to capability is inherently multi-year, often taking a decade or more. The NSpOC has only recently reached its first-year milestone and began publishing regular monthly operational bulletins in 2024–25. Meanwhile, DSIT’s National PNT Office is following a staged path from a ten-point resilience framework through consultations, standards, and R&D roadmaps.
The UK has talent, technology, and allies. What it lacks is tempo. 2026 must be the year ambition is translated into capability, or the UK risks becoming a spectator in the space domain. It must be the year of delivery.
From policy to practice
Space is no longer a supporting domain; it is the backbone of modern defence. The UK has strategies, governance, and international commitments, but these do not win wars. Delivery does. 2026 must mark the pivot from policy to practice: deploying sensors, hardening PNT, and building credible space-control options before the gap becomes irreversible.
Author Bio
Allen Antrobus is a strategic adviser and recognised expert in the space domain, with over 20 years’ experience across UK defence, government, and the commercial sector. He has held senior roles at the UK Space Agency, the Ministry of Defence, and Airbus Defence and Space, and is currently a Managing Consultant at PA Consulting.
He has shaped national space policy, led multi-sector innovation programmes, and advised senior decision-makers on space strategy, security, and operations. As Chair of UKspace’s Security and Defence Committee and a member of the MOD Secretary of State’s Net Assessment Challenge Space Group, he helps align industry perspectives with national defence priorities.
His career includes initiating UK participation in Combined Space Operations and the EU Space Surveillance and Tracking programme, and delivering work for clients including the European Union, the Netherlands Government, the Royal Air Force, UK Space Agency, and UK Space Command.
His current work focuses on space-enabled capability development, resilient PNT alternatives, and integrating AI with space-derived data to address global challenges. A former Visiting Fellow at Plymouth University and an active RAF Reservist, he is known for distilling complex geopolitical, technical, and commercial issues into actionable insight.