Spaces of performative politics and terror in Pakistan.

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Abstract: With a focus on Pakistan, we address the human geography of politics and violence, especially terrorism as a special case of violence. We argue that terrorism is centrally about controlling the public sphere, and that the reorganization of space, or territory, is absolutely essential to this. The spectacular violence that is characteristic of terrorism is not simply a communicative message, but recasts access and performance in the public sphere, such that distinctions between the public and private sphere collapse. To make this argument we develop Hannah Arendt’s thesis on totalitarianism and the human condition, extending it to consider non-State organizations and the geographical implications of totalitarianism. Based on open-source empirical evidence we demonstrate that the Pakistani-Taliban (Tehrik-e-Taliban, TTP) is a totalitarian movement, which prioritizes the violent targeting of public places where politics is performed. We review the geography of TTP’s violence in the Swat valley and in the Pakistani society in general to make our point. To put it another way, using Hannah Arendt’s terminology, the TTP seeks to suppress expressions of “worldliness” through their use of spectacular violence. The practical and policy implication of our argument is that counter-terrorism measures must seek to protect the performance of politics in an expanded public sphere.

INTRODUCTION

“They don’t slaughter animals on Eid (ul-Azha) as they are slaughtering humans here” (An Islamabad police sub-inspector after the suicide attack on a police contingent July 6th, 2008).

September 11th 2001 brought with it a new concern for terrorism and counter-terrorism among human geographers (Flint and Radil, 2009). In the immediate period following the attacks, human geographers were policy-minded in their approach. In the introduction to the edited volume “Geographical Dimensions of Terrorism” this policy approach is clear, stating that “strengthening our national, homeland, and economic security requires the creation and use of critical social and behavioral resources” (Ruben 2003, p. xxi). To facilitate the creation of “helpful” data for policy makers (Ruben 2003, p.xxi), a significant strand of human geography came to treat terrorism as a “hazard” (Cutter et al., 2003). But, as the American and European responses unfolded, many human geographers became more concerned with offering a discursive critique of the “Global War on Terror” (GWOT) (Flint and Radil 2009; Mustafa 2009). Flint and Radil (2009) argue that this reorientation has led to a failure to analyze, in geographical terms; terrorism, terrorist acts or the terrorist. Consequently four key themes in the post-2001 geographical literature on terrorism have emerged: offering problem-solving knowledge (Cox, 1981); the dilemma of definition; unpacking dominant discourses on terrorism; and the geopolitics of terrorism that tie it to wider critiques of GWOT, violence, and state oppression (Mustafa, 2009). In this body of work there is little concern with the local and the geographical consequences for everyday human living. Responding to Flint and Radil’s (2009) critique, and to the highlighted gap in existing literature, we reflect on the geography, specifically the geographical distribution, of Taliban violence in Pakistan, and we focus on the terrorists and their terrorism rather than American, European or British responses to it. Accordingly, we are not offering a critique of or geographical analysis of GWOT (for critical analyses of GWOT see Gregory, 2010; Gregory and Pred, 2007; and Dalby, 2003). However, from our analysis, we do indicate where State counter-terrorism policy responses might be improved should they consider the human geography and local geographic distribution of terrorism (Flint, 2003).
Our argument is twofold. First we argue that terrorist groups, such as the Pakistani Taliban (Terhik-e-Taliban Pakistan, henceforth TTP), aim at place destruction, and strategically consider the location and spaces of their violence: their targeting is not irrational or random. Rather, this targeting is aimed at controlling and redefining public spaces, and through that, restricting activities in, access to, and spaces of the public sphere of everyday (or informal) politics. Second, from this realization, we demonstrate that terrorist groups rely on logics similar to totalitarian movements and aim to destroy everyday politics, or “worldliness”. We present our argument through a careful consideration of TTP violence. The implications of our argument are that counter-terrorism measures are incomplete if they do not address the importance of place in terrorism. Therefore we suggest that responses to terrorism should not only be preoccupied with grand considerations of economics, war or religion, but should reflect upon the geography of everyday politics carried out in the public sphere. Ultimately, counter terrorism should seek to defend ordinary human “worldliness” because as we will demonstrate the antithesis of terrorism is politics as performance. Our arguments are grounded in Arendt’s ideas about politics and the human condition. She had two intellectual projects; one was a constructive project, concerned with mapping out her ideals of a free political realm, and the second a cautionary project, which entailed her warnings against deadly totalitarianism (Berger 2005). Because we draw on both of these projects to make our argument, we therefore follow Berger (2005) and include elements of both a figurative and literal reading of her work to avoid the limitations of either.

PLACE DESTRUCTION AND TARGETING IN TERRORISM

There is no consensus in policy or academic circles on a definition of terrorism. Schmid and Yongman (2005) summarized that in 109 definitions they found of terrorism, disagreements could be found about terrorism’s symbolic and communicative functions, its targeting, the perpetrators, and about the inevitability and desirability of normative judgments. For example, within the political realm, the definitions proposed by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation, US Department of State and the ones proposed by some religious and political authorities in the global South, carry the obvious imprint of contemporary and historical power relations (Mustafa, 2005a). More academic attempts at reaching a consensus on a definition, such as Hoffman (2006) and the United Nations (1994), suffer from conceptual over-stretch or are too dependent upon experiences of terrorism in the previous century, so that they lose their relevance and utility. In order to move beyond these limitations, this paper follows Mustafa (2005a, p.79) definition which engages with the human geography of terrorism. Therefore, terrorism is understood here to be:

An act of violence, different from other acts of violence, e.g., genocide, war, war crimes, political assassinations etc¹, in that it is (1) a spectacle directed towards a wider audience than the immediate victims, (2) directed towards place destruction and/or (3) place alienation. (2005a, p.79)

¹ Even though these other types of violence may also have a spectacular aspect to them, the difference between these types of violence and terrorism is two fold. First, in say an assassination, the prime motivation is to kill the target, with accompanying possible publicity as a secondary objective. The person in an assassination is killed not because of the message it sends but because of the attributes of the person, and what they were doing or had done. Second, the definition links terrorism to place annihilation/alienation. Without the later, it is argued that the act will not qualify as terrorism. Besides there is no hierarchy implied in the label terrorism. Genocide, or war crimes or other acts of violence are at times just as morally reprehensible as terrorism, if not more.
Mustafa’s definition draws upon Hewitt’s (1987, 1997) work on place destruction and its traumatic effects caused by the fire bombing of German cities during the second world war, and also Hewitt’s (2001) work on creation of “geographies of fear” and place alienation by Pinochet’s regime in Chile. According to Mustafa’s definition, the deciding factor is not the identity of the perpetrator - both state and non-state actors can carry out such acts. Rather, the focus is on place and the spectacle: you are victim of terrorism if you are subjected to violence not because of who you are or what you have done, but by virtue of where you are.

Terrorism has both direct and indirect victims whose experience of violence is mediated by places that are targeted by terrorists. Those initially injured or killed are, by the above definition, of secondary importance. Rather, the indirect victims, as audiences to that spectacular violence, are the primary concern. As Hewitt (2001) ably illustrates in the case of Pinochet’s Chile where people came to associate vast swaths of the country’s territory with penal colonies and torture chambers where disappeared people underwent violence and murder at the hands of the regime. The psychological impact of terrorism upon the audience occurs via their immediate experience of the target’s location/place, or through their identification with analogous cultural landscapes. For example, the destruction of tall buildings and airplanes crashing may have greater resonance with audiences in urbanized industrialized societies, while suicide bombing of tribal meetings (as in Pakistan) with more rural agrarian audiences have more importance. In either case, the above definition helps us to analyze the targeting and motivations of terrorists.

Different terrorist actors have different geographical priorities in terms of targets. For example, the IRA and Palestinian suicide bombers target the everyday secular spaces of pubs, dance halls, shopping malls, bus stops and cafes. In these cases, the terrorist targeting closely mimics patterns of social exclusion in the everyday lives of the Irish and Palestinians (Mitchell, 1979; Kliot and Charney, 2006). In Israel, ordinary public spaces of bus stops, cafes and restaurants constitute the majority of Palestinian targets, to the almost complete exclusion of iconic buildings and spaces (such as the Knesset or synagogues) of Israeli society (likewise in Ireland). This mirrors the geographies of Israeli occupation which results in the exclusion of Palestinians from everyday spaces of markets, cafes, and roads, through fear of being searched, detained or shot upon by Israeli military forces (Falal, 2004, Gregory 2004). However, Al-Qaeda (and those inspired by it), have different geographical concerns and ambitions to these two examples of Palestine and Ireland, which leads to different targeting priorities. Al-Qaeda’s geographical concerns are hierarchical, and rely on ideas about sacred spaces, in particular the holy places of Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem (Hobbs, 2005). Initially its targeting strategy focuses on perceived icons of Western modernity. The targeting of the World Trade Center, New York, the Pentagon, US naval vessels, embassies, rail and air transportation networks demonstrate an excellent understanding of the symbolic, cultural and practical value of these spaces (Mitchell, 2003). However, since the GWOT has brought the “fight” to the non-Western territories of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq, the geographical targeting of Al-Qaeda, and others inspired by it, has also included these non-Western societies’ public spaces. Here we see the targeting of Muslim religious shrines, mosques, Eid prayer congregations, market places, girls’ schools, political rallies, intellectuals, and security apparatus, and as a result the overwhelming majority of victims are Muslim non-combatants (Wright, 2008). This shift is not however merely reactive to a more overt Western presence, but it also reflects changes in the “moral geography” of the TTP and Al-Qaeda. Wiktorowicz (2005) argues that the previous divisions between the “near” and “far” enemy are eroding, and Mandaville (2008) notes that the previously upheld dichotomy in the Islamic militants’ minds of the “zones of peace” (dar al-Islam) and “zones of war” (dar
al-Harb) is increasingly porous. Recognizing these shifts in moral geography and in the
global physical location of terrorism, it is clear that the selection of targets by terrorist groups
is not random or irrational. Instead it is clear that terrorists’ violence prioritizes the public
spaces of their target audiences: in the West, secular iconic spaces of urban living, in
Pakistan, secular and religious spaces of rural and urban living are targets.

Our argument is not simply however that the geographic logic is defined by its
method and targeting practices, but also that the objective of terrorism is geographically
determined. In this we offer a departure with the “new terrorism” thesis which asserts that
terrorism is no longer about territory. Recently, Jacqui Smith, then British Home Secretary
(2008), remarked that we are confronted by a “new form of terrorism – so different in
motivation, complexity and reach, in fact, that it might as well have a different name”. The
“new terrorism” thesis, reviewed by Field (2009) and Brown (2010), argues that terrorism is
fundamentally different to “traditional terrorism” in terms of scale, scope and aims. In the
“new terrorism” thesis, place and space are absent, with spectacular violence communicating
a de-territorialized amorphous global jihad (Hoffman, 1989, 1995, 2006; Juergensmeyer,
1997, 2000; Laqueur, 1996; Simon and Benjamin, 2001; Wiklinson, 2003). In contrast, our
analysis demonstrates that geography and geographic reasoning is central, because it is the
control of the public sphere, and the destruction of “civilian life” as well as lives, through the
spectacle of violence, which characterizes terrorism.

In agreement with Flint and Radil (2009), we will demonstrate below that while the
terrorist network transcends state borders, it is “grounded on the specificities of places”
(2009, p.166). The specificity of places is not simply physical, but includes the social
construction of space (Rose, 1999). In this we are reminded that the public sphere is not only
a descriptor of “civilian life”, but includes the places in which this life takes place –they are
“life spaces”. The complex and diverse activities which occur in these “life spaces” are
multiple performed social interactions and exchanges of “sheer human togetherness”, they are
more than formal politics or culture, and have been defined as “civilian life”. For Arendt as
“civilian life” is carried out, individuals develop perspectives, identities, and connections to
others and to their environment. She also emphasized that these are constantly changing and
diverse as new people enter into “civilian life”. To summarize these two elements (plurality
and togetherness) she developed the term “worldliness” (1973). The terms “life spaces”,
“civilian life”, and “worldliness” have surfaced to capture the fact that human life is not only
about biology, but includes complex social interactions, to the extent that becoming fully
human requires such activities. As a result, the importance of life spaces to our humanity
cannot be underestimated, as it is in these locations that we see biological life (re)constituted
as political, through civilian life and thus as human. The quote which begins this article,
reminds us, that the geographical targeting of life spaces by terrorism destroys not only lives
but also civilian life: that is, it seeks to destroy our humanity. Thus terrorism, like sovereign
bio-power, seeks to determine which “civilian lives” are to be included or excluded from
politics, or put differently it is about the creation of politically qualified life (Masters, 2009,
p.31).

TOTALITARIANISM AND TERRORISM

The boundaries between whom and what are included (or excluded) within the scope
of politics are set up through a gendered public-private hierarchical divide (Pateman and
Gross, 1987; Okin, 1992). Low and Smith (2006, p.4) remind us that while the notion of the
“public” has different meanings in different societies, it is nevertheless “impossible to
conceive of a public space without the social generalization of private space”. The public-private divide is therefore more than a marker for gender relations, it also “serves as an enabling metaphor in conjunction with other state-elaborated notions of boundary such as the individualized citizen... the social and sexual contract... citizen rights... civil society... and democracy” (Joseph, 1997, p.74). The geographical distinctions of the public-private divide is linked to the creation of civilian life, because in these public spaces of social interaction, behaviors are coded as morally correct or incorrect, and people are regulated through them (Secor, 2002; Moghissi, 1999). Consequently particular expressions and performances of worldliness and civilian life are legitimized through the public-private divide. This divide is therefore normatively powerful but empirically complex, and requires constant reinforcement in light of societal changes.

Arendt argues that violence necessarily recasts this divide, and in the case of totalitarianism through the elimination of the divide violence reaches the point at which civilian life is destroyed. She argues that civilian life is destroyed when:

> Men (sic) have become entirely private, that is they have been deprived of seeing and hearing others, of being seen and being heard by them. They are all imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience, which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times (Arendt 1973, p.58).

For Arendt, being seen and heard by others, and vice-versa, is the foundation of performative politics, of worldliness. This is implied by Mitchell (2003, p.18) who argues that public spaces are places of social exchange among people who are necessarily different, and that through participation, appropriation and cohabitation of public spaces, worldliness, or civilian life, is realized. Spectacular violence, therefore works to impose a new conception of the public space and moral order that legitimizes some practices, places and persons, but not others. This process, distinguishes between politically constituted life and “bare life” – that is life without politics and life not worth saving or sacrificing (Masters, 2009) – in totalitarianism all life becomes “bare life”.

Typically, it is the state which creates, and sometimes suspends, civilian life through violence. Sometimes such violence at its extreme (when it is subservient to the organizational power of the State), is formalized in the shape of “state terror”. Such “state terror” was apparent in Pol Pot’s Cambodia, Stalinist Soviet Union, and Nazi Germany (Arendt 1970). These regimes were deeply modern. The objective of these, and any, totalitarian regime is total domination through systemic elimination of the boundaries between public and private spaces for expression of individuality or action (Arendt 1967). This renders human life superfluous, where individuals become specimens of a species, where one is substitutable for any other (Arendt 1967). What makes such regimes possible, and continues to inform the violation of non-state actors such as TTP and Al-Qaeda, is the unprecedented and deeply modernist belief in “perfected” humanity. This “perfected humanity” is realized through violence, which functions to remake “reality in accordance with the logic of its ruling ideology” in order to eliminate “the incalculable” (Villa 1999, p.182). In remaking reality through violence, totalitarian regimes’ characterization of the “perfected humanity” may differ, it may be based on racial superiority, the dictatorship of the proletariat, or religiously

2 We recognize that it is not only spectacular violence which can recast this divide and eradicate the ‘publicity’ of the public sphere. Mitchell (2003) provides examples of how US state policy and law have achieved this, so that eccentric behaviors are now criminalized.
pure community of believers, but the objective and method remains the same: the destruction of “worldliness”.

As we will demonstrate, nothing threatens the Pakistani Taliban and Al-Qaeda’s conservative politics, more than the plurality and civilian public life. Their narrow conception of civil life, and limits on who can access this life, means that they seek to destroy the diverse array of public spaces of worldliness found in Pakistan, particularly where it is inhabited by those not constituted as “political” by them, such as women. Women, in particular, are constituted as outside of politics and the public sphere by the TTP because they are seen as “naturally” located in the private sphere and therefore incapable of being “perfected”. Normative and social judgments built up from this public-private divide exclude women’s identities and ways of knowing the world from political reasoning and processes (Harding 1983; Bartlett 1990; Goldstein 2003). With the TTP this normative public-private divide is maintained via religious narratives and links to the local human geographies of Pakistani society, articulated in ideas of seclusion and gender segregation (Cook 2007; Rashid 2009; Marsden 2008).

The limited vision of civilian life, and the narrow franchise offered by the TTP and Al-Qaeda have lead some commentators to assume that these groups are therefore necessarily “traditional”, “medieval” or “backward” (Lewis 2004; Sivan 1985). As Kurzman notes, in one sense these writers are correct as Al-Qaeda looks backwards to the early years of Islam as a ‘golden era’ (2002, p.13). However, the idea that the world can be created anew through violence, an idea al-Qaeda put into practice on Sept. 11, 2001, is a modern construct (Gray 2003). As a result, it is not a return to tradition but a return to a “place newly created” (Al-Azmeh 2003). Besides, celebration of cultural, religious and doctrinal diversity was a defining characteristic of the so called medieval (Islamic) West Asian and North African civilizations that enabled their astonishing contributions to art, literature and science. Equating the contemporary totalitarian movements like the TTP, or Al-Qaeda, to that period in Islamic civilization would therefore be contradictory (Barsamian 2000). As we demonstrate their limited vision of life is premised upon a modern ideal of a “perfected humanity”. The idea of a global community of believers, and the (re)institution of the caliphate, rely on modern ideals of progress, law and property (Evans, 2007, Ahmad 1998). Ultimately, these movements are a product of modernity and do not stand apart from it; their leaders, their methods and as we demonstrate, their objectives, are deeply modern (Pasha 2003, 2010). In order to demonstrate our argument, we now turn to the case to the Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP).

GEOGRAPHIES OF TERROR AND CONTROL IN PAKISTAN

Pakistan has been one of the key staging grounds of the Al-Qaeda and Taliban movements’ violent campaign against foreign military intervention in neighboring Afghanistan, as well as perceived western ‘un-Islamic’ influences on the Pakistani society and government. Since 2005 the Taliban in Afghanistan and their sympathizers and allies within Pakistan, who had been protégés of the Pakistani state, turned upon their previous benefactors (Abbas 2005, Rashid 2001). The result was and continues to be a series of

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3 We acknowledge that these characteristics are not unique to Islam or Muslim societies, and can be found throughout the world, including the West (Peterson, 1992; Pateman and Gross, 1987). We also acknowledge that women do contribute to politics and society, “if we chose to see them” (Enloe 1992), thus the invisibility of women reflect social values rather than social reality.
bombings across urban and rural Pakistan, targeting state infrastructure, civilians, and the de-facto, if seemingly temporary, control over parts of Pakistani territory by the militia movement in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the settled districts of Swat, Malakand and to a lesser extent Dir. In this section we will briefly outline the geographies of terrorist violence in Pakistan in the aftermath of the then US administration’s declared ‘war on terror’. But before we delve into the geographies of violence in Pakistan we set up the socio-geographical context of Pakistan for understanding those geographies in the following few paragraphs.

**Socio-Geographical Context of State Formation and Civil Society in Pakistan**

Pakistan like most post-colonial states incorporates multiple ethnicities within its artificial boundaries (Figure 1). Consequently it harbors multiple conceptions of its statehood, citizenship, governance and identity. Conventional explanations of Pakistan’s genesis ascribe a central role to religion as a driver of Indian Muslims’ nationalist aspirations (e.g., see Cohen 2004, Talbot 1998, Verma 2001). More recent historical scholarship, however, points to deeper disagreements over post-colonial state structures and scales of governance, between the Indian Muslim political leadership in the All India Muslim League and the more secularist nationalist leadership of the Indian National Congress, as the main driver of secessionist politics in colonial India (e.g., see Jalal 1994, Singh 2009). Regardless of one’s sympathy for the religious versus secular explanation for Pakistani state formation, post-colonial Pakistani state, much like India, has grappled with issues of religion, ethnic identity and centralized versus decentralized governance structures in its polity (Jalal 1995). Much of Pakistan’s current violent geographies can be best understood through the lens of these internal social and political cleavages derived from its colonial borders, in addition to the geopolitics of Pakistan’s alignment with the West.

A detailed history of Pakistani state and civil society can be found elsewhere (see Malik (1997), and Abbas (2005) among others). The key point is that Islam continues to be one of the many contested themes in the Pakistani national narrative, besides, ethno-linguistic conflict and decentralized governance. For most of Pakistan’s history the ethno-nationalist forces have been in favor of decentralized governance structures, while the Islamist forces have been more in favor of a stronger center. The ethno-nationalist centrifugal forces were to culminate in the division of the country, with its eastern wing forming the new state of Bangladesh in 1971. In the aftermath of that national trauma, the populist government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto gave a federalist constitution to the country, but in practice pursued a highly authoritarian centralized governance style. Mr. Bhutto perceived the right wing religious parties as the main threat to his government and was deeply insecure about the depth of his own support among the electorate (Hasan 1988). That insecurity not only led him to orchestrate unnecessary rigging of the 1976 national elections but also to periodically concede many of the religious right’s demands such as declaring certain sects as heretics, alcohol prohibition, and changing the weekly holiday from Sunday to Friday among others (Hasan 1988). This concession of political and public space to the religious right by the Bhutto government was to be carried forward by the dictatorship of General Zia-ul-Haq, which replaced Mr. Bhutto in a coup in 1977.

It was under Zia-ul-Haq’s regime (1977-1988) that Pakistan became a frontline state in the Cold War as a consequence of the Soviet invasion of neighboring Afghanistan in 1979. The Soviet’s ill fated war to dominate Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989 perversely worked to the advantage of the Zia regime. While Zia’s regime had already instituted some judicial measures, such as public hangings and floggings and mass arrests of political opposition, his
alignment with the West against the Soviets provided him the much needed international acceptability and financial support to sustain his regime. His new allies were unwilling to challenge him on his human rights record, and instead made available considerable amount of resources to the Pakistani intelligence agencies, primarily the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), for funneling to the Afghan resistance (Abbas 2005, Malik 1997, Mustafa 2005b). Saudi support matched the Americans, funding the Pakistani intelligence services in their covert war against the Soviets (Nasr 2000; Johnson 2008). While the Americans were central to the financing, equipping and training of resistance groups in Afghanistan it was typically the Zia regime, with Saudi advice, which was ultimately in charge of priming the resistance groups for receipt of western aid (Nawaz 2008). The groups that Pakistan chose were typically the Islamist elements, such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Ahmed Shah Massoud who had been against the pro-Soviet Afghan regimes through the 1970s, in addition to some of the most conservative and pro-Wahhabi elements such as Abdul Rasul Sayyaf (Rashid 2001, 2008). The negative consequences of the Pakistani support of Islamist elements in the Afghan resistance for Afghan, public politics and ‘civilian life’ were well known following the end of the Cold War (Hilali 2002, Abbas 2005, Nawaz 2008). What was less known until September 11th 2001, was the “blow back” of the violent religious agenda in Afghanistan and subsequently in Indian-administered Kashmir on Pakistan’s own society (Hussain 2007).

Starting with Zia’s unpopular attempts at Islamizing the Pakistani society, public spaces were systematically subjected to gendered constriction as well as to any alternate interpretation of religion, culture, history and politics beyond the narrowly sanctioned line authorized by the state (Mustafa 2006). Islamization, and particularly a specific type of strict Islamization represented by the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) party (for details see Mustafa 2006), frowned upon public displays of joy, public gatherings, street theatre or carnival, in the same vein as Pinochet’s regime in Chile, where public plazas and streets became associated with random arrests and disappearances (Hewitt 2001). With any permitted public gatherings women were systematically excluded or segregated and granted only a bystanders role (Marsden 2008). Civil society and political life was suppressed and sports stadiums and traffic intersections were stigmatized with terror by holding of public floggings, hangings and random harassment of couples in the name of checking for immoral behavior (Husain 2010, Mustafa 2006, Saigol 2009).

Through the 1990s, while the Pakistani politics oscillated between centre-left and centre-right governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, one constant in the foreign policy of Pakistan was its obsession with Kashmir and its continued attempt at dominating the post-Soviet political landscape in Afghanistan (Rashid 2001, Yasmeen 2003). In both cases Pakistan used its Islamist protégés to both dominate Afghanistan while also providing soldiers to augment Kashmiri insurgency (previously indigenous) against Indian rule (Nasr 2000; Johnson 2008). While the Americans were central to the financing, equipping and training of resistance groups in Afghanistan it was typically the Zia regime, with Saudi advice, which was ultimately in charge of priming the resistance groups for receipt of western aid (Nawaz 2008). The groups that Pakistan chose were typically the Islamist elements, such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Ahmed Shah Massoud who had been against the pro-Soviet Afghan regimes through the 1970s, in addition to some of the most conservative and pro-Wahhabi elements such as Abdul Rasul Sayyaf (Rashid 2001, 2008). The negative consequences of the Pakistani support of Islamist elements in the Afghan resistance for Afghan, public politics and ‘civilian life’ were well known following the end of the Cold War (Hilali 2002, Abbas 2005, Nawaz 2008). What was less known until September 11th 2001, was the “blow back” of the violent religious agenda in Afghanistan and subsequently in Indian-administered Kashmir on Pakistan’s own society (Hussain 2007).

4 “Wahhabi”, “Wahhabism” and “Wahhabist” refer to a particular interpretation of Islam which emerged with the foundations of the modern Saudi Arabian state. An important concern of Wahhabism is the inviolability of Arabia and especially its two holy mosques. The tradition also prizes militancy in service of religious values, and is seen as a strict return or purification of the faith (Simon and Benjamin 2001). Please refer to: Al-Rasheed (2002) and Niblock (2006). In line with Wiktorowicz (2006) we use the term to link it precisely to Saudi Arabia and not as a general prefix to Islamic extremism. However, it is linked to Salafi movement ideals, although Salafi’s never use the term Wahhabi, and consider it an insult (Wiktorowicz 2006). The terms “Salafi” “salfism” and “Salafist” refer to a general trend in Islam that is characterised by a “strict adherence to the concept of tawhid (the oneness of God) and ardent rejection of a role for human reason, logic, and desire. Salafis believe that by strictly following the rules and guidance in the Qur’an and Sunna (path or example of the Prophet Muhammad) they eliminate the biases of human subjectivity and self-interest, thereby allowing them to identify the singular truth of God’s commands” (Wiktorowicz 2006, p. 207; Esposito 2003).
The recruitment of these movements came from the ranks of the impoverished landless tenants and small farmers in feudal-dominated Southern Punjab province and rural lower class from the ethnic Pashtun belt in the west of the country (Rana 2004, Behuria 2007). (For locations, see Figure 1). The key consequence of this involvement with these movements was a rising incidence of Sunni-Shi’a sectarian violence, particularly in Southern Punjab. However, with the end of the Cold War, international politics and diplomacy were focused elsewhere, and the extensive sectarian violence in Pakistan drew little international attention (Jones 2002). Not until the violence of the region globalised, or rather, not until the violence threatened the civilian life of Europe and America, did Pakistan’s internal violence and regional relationships become an issue of international concern.

Post 9/11 Geographies of Terror in Pakistan

The left leaning parties that had aligned themselves with the ethno-nationalist identity politics of Sindhi, Baloch, Pashtun, and to a much lesser extent, Punjabi ethnic groups, had been deliberately sidelined and even oppressed by the Pakistani state throughout its existence. But, starting from the 1980s one of the accomplishments of twenty years of state patronage of the conservative Islam, in the Pashtun areas of North Western Frontier Province (NWFP now renamed Khyber-Pakhtunkwa in 2010) and Balochistan was to realign Pashtun identity politics away from their secular/leftist leanings and more towards the Islamist parties (Mustafa 2006). With a resurgent TTP, it seemed that the realignment was complete but the victory of leftist Pashtun parties in recent elections in 2008 and the swing in Pashtun public mood against the TTP seem to indicate that the realignment is by no means complete or irreversible. Nevertheless one has to be mindful that the influence of the Wahabbist inspired Islamic conservatives in Pakistani society, particularly amongst the Pashtuns, remains significant (Hussain 2007 and Husain 2010).

On September 11th 2001 the military ruler of Pakistan General Pervaiz Musharraf reversed 20 years of pro-Taliban and pro-Islamist policies in Afghanistan and Kashmir in the face of American outrage at the events of that day. Musharraf’s policy reversal was perceived as a deep betrayal by Pakistan’s former clients such as the Taliban and their allied groups fighting in Kashmir, and they were to make their anger well known in the form of multiple assassination attempts at Musharraf and series of bombings all over Pakistan (Abbas 2005, Hussain 2007). Some of Pakistan’s client militant groups, such as Harkat-ul-Ansar, active in Kashmir may have had dealings with Al-Qa’eda; there is, however, little evidence to suggest that Pakistan’s government had any direct contact with Al-Qa’eda (Nawaz 2008). Also, while there was a phase of missionary Islamism in the Pakistani intelligence agencies such as the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), by all accounts those influences were cleansed earlier in the 1990s, leaving only a diminished ideological fondness for the TTP and similar groups (Nawaz 2008, Abbas 2005). For the Pakistani state these groups were convenient strategic assets against vastly superior Indian conventional forces, in Kashmir and way of keeping the Indians out of Afghanistan. However, these assets were to go on to become thir worst liability, as the relationship between the state and these groups grew increasingly distant (Rashid 2008, Hussain 2007).

The violent outcome of the diverging interests between militant groups and the State soon became apparent. Between 2003 and July 2008, 8,330 people were killed in Pakistan from suicide attacks and bomb blasts. Of this number 4,300 were killed in 66 suicide attacks between July 2007 and 2008 alone (The News 2008). Although, bombings and suicide attacks have at times targeted security personnel in the country, of the 4,300 killed in
2007/2008 only 17% of the casualties were security personnel. The year 2009 was the worst in terms of loss of human life where according to Pakistani Institute of Peace studies just in that year 12,632 men and women were killed. Of the dead, 3,021 were killed by insurgents, 6,329 in Pakistan army operations, 1,163 in army-TTP battles, 700 in border violence, and 1,419 in other violence, including drone strikes (Fisk 2010 and PIPS 2010). Figures 2 and 3 indicate the locations of violent attacks against civilians and security forces respectively, in Pakistan in 2008 and 2009. The geographical concentration of violence over the two years is certainly in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province, which was the main staging ground for the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan in the 1980s. The Al-Qa’eda and Taliban-inspired suicide bombings in Pakistan have targeted security installations and apparatus, as would be expected in revenge for the Pakistani military’s ongoing counter insurgency operations in the borderlands. But, suicide bombings and other types of violence on part of the Pakistani TTP and Al-Qa’eda have also been directed at such seemingly irrelevant targets as lawyers’ rallies for the restoration of the country’s deposed Chief Justice, political rallies by the center left Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party, Eid prayer congregations, mosques, girls’ schools, barber shops, occasional churches, restaurants, and music stores. Figure 4 outlines the types of places targeted by the TTP and its allies’ violence focus on public places and spaces of everyday interaction and Pakistan’s security establishment’s offices to the complete exclusion of monumental spaces or architecture.

It is a common refrain in Pakistan that cricket is a religion and politics is a sport. There are few places in the world where street politics have a more pronounced appearance of a spectacular carnival as in Pakistan. If television images of the triumphant return of Benazir Bhutto to Karachi on October 19 2007 are taken as an indicator, there were hundreds of thousands of people, dancing to the music, singing and generally rejoicing, before two suicide blasts killed more than 170 of the revelers and injured hundreds more. In a country where public spaces have been severely constricted under the rule of General Zia-ul-Haq in the 1980s and the subsequent sectarian violence and other Islamist elements’ moral policing (Hasan 1988, Abbas 2005), Bhutto’s political rallies—more so than those of other political parties—served as a space for the celebration of the ordinary peoples’ political appearance of togetherness. As many of the injured in the blast later recounted to a Pakistani journalist, it did not matter what the People’s Party could or could not do for them, their appearance by her side was reward enough and their sacrifice in life and limb a small price to pay (Dawn 2008). This interpretation of the rally may sound romantic or partisan to some, but while a number of the participants in the rallies were actually bussed in by party activists, many more had come long distances of their own volition.

The other attacks on civilians, such as the lawyers’ rallies in favor of the deposed chief justice of Pakistan had also galvanized the civil society in Pakistan. There too, not just the lawyers from all political persuasion, but also members of the public actively participated. The spaces of appearance for the citizens of Pakistan whether in organized rallies as above or lubricants of worldliness like music stores, mosques or schools particularly girls’ schools have been the targets of TTP and Al-Qa’eda with their totalitarian ideologies of salafist Islam (Mir 2008). There is also a marked gender dimension to the TTP targeting. Just in the Swat district of Pakistan where there has been a TTP inspired insurgency going on since 2005, 276 schools 167 of them girls have been targeted by the Taliban, and many parents have been afraid to send their daughters to school, while many working women have been afraid to go to work or even to shop for such mundane pleasures as clothes besides the burqa (Shah 2008, Asian Development Bank (ADB) and World Bank 2009). Overall in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province and the FATA areas affected by the Taliban insurgency by the end of
2009 473 schools had been partially or completely damaged because of Taliban or their allies’ activities (ADB and World Bank 2009).

While the violence and associated loss of life has been appalling enough, one of the more insidious consequences of the violence has been constriction of the cultural and social spaces for expression of political and social life (Mumtaz 2010). People have been subjected to violence in less dramatic ways by TTP sympathizers for just playing music on college campuses and any type of cultural even in the urban areas of Pakistan has to be shrouded in multiple layers of security. This is to the extent that Pakistanis have even stopped patronizing restaurants and other public spaces for fear of becoming victims of terrorist violence. This was particularly so in case of the Swat valley where the TTP made popular street intersections and promenades in local towns and villages into human abattoirs where people were routinely beheaded and their headless bodies strung up from electricity polls for days on end. Local women of the area who had no tradition of wearing Afghan style all covering burqas if found outside of their homes without one were routinely beaten and harassed. Elsewhere in Pakistan similar occurrences were noted, for example, Marsden (2008 p.409) recounts that in Chitral (a region of the NWFP) “‘bearded ones’ … often accuse women who dare to shop in the bazaar of being ‘little prostitutes’”. Furthermore, it was the video of the flogging of one such girl by the TTP that proved central to changing public mood in Pakistan against them (Wilkinson 2009).

The control of Swat by TTP runs counter to existing models seeking to explain radicalisation and terrorism that stress underdevelopment, or marginalization as preconditions for civil conflict (Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner 2009; Piazza 2006). Until the early part of the previous decade, Swat had a reasonably developed tourist, mining, handicraft and agricultural economy, and a significant presence of internationally funded development projects (primarily Dutch and Swiss). Initially the TTP movement enjoyed some local support in Swat and their message of religiously derived quickly administered justice seemed to resonate with the rural populations of Swat (Rose 2009). This was particularly so because Swat has had no land settlement and being that vast majority of litigation in rural Swat, as in the rest of Pakistan is based on land disputes, the local courts based on common law had few formal land records to go on to adjudicate land disputes (The Dawn 2010). Consequently, an average litigant was likely to spend decades in civil court without any redress. TTP promised to do away with the modern court system which was a source of considerable public anger.

In reaction, the federal government appeared to make a series of concessions to TTP demands for the introduction of their version of Sharia law in Swat, in view of its initial relative popularity amongst the local populace. Such concessions were combined with a series of limited military offensives, between 2005 and 2007, which aimed to keep the TTP from completely taking over the state infrastructure in Swat. It was only when the Taliban’s objectives expanded to include regime change, and the ‘realities’ of TTP control and justice were televised across Pakistan, that national and local public opinion became increasingly critical of the movement (Rose 2009). The turn in public opinion resulted in another military operation in 2009 that resulted in one of the largest internal displacement of a civilian population in the post World War II era involving more than 2.5 million people (ADB and World Bank 2009). The offensive has been successful so far by all accounts and with 70% of the internally displaced peoples from Swat having returned to their homes as of December 2009 while the remaining also continue to stream back to their homes (Livingston and O’Hanlon 2010). But as the Swat offensive is drawing to a successful conclusion, the Pakistani military has initiated anti-militant offensives in the southern FATA agencies of
South Waziristan and possible even North Waziristan. But sustaining the gains made against the militants by the military will involve a lot more than check points and police actions. We conclude this essay with a discussion of what might be involved in ensuring a safe future for Pakistanis.

ANTIDOTE – POLITICS AS PERFORMANCE

The above discussion demonstrates how the spectacle of terrorist violence functions pedagogically to inculcate Taliban ideology and moral orders in Pakistan and how attempts to minimize TTP control depended in part on populations understanding of the limited vision of life the TTP offered (as well as the State’s own attempts at place destruction). As Goldstein (2004) argues, such spectacles are systems for the creation and transformation of society: they impose order on the [resistant] populations of Swat, and reinforce TTP reign over the community and rural spaces of the valley. It appears that the TTP were (if not consciously) aware that to change the social you need to change space (Lefebvre 1991; McKay 1996). The violent acts became tropes to produce public understandings of the totalitarian life envisioned by the TTP, and thus served to contain Pakistani politics. The containing of Pakistani politics to a restricted class of peoples (that fit TTP’s view of the virtuous males) and limited range of activities (excluding fine arts and public expressions of joy), in a redefined public sphere through violence is the final aim of the TTP. This critique of Taliban echoes the recent critique by Gregory (2010) of the ‘performance of space in late modern war’ where discursive geographies: techno-culturally produce bombing targets, politico-culturally define enemies as radically Other, and deploy polico-juridical instruments to exempt categories of people from protections of the law. While Gregory (2010: 179) draws attention to the role and potential of visual arts in producing counter-geographies to illuminate the “artfully concealed . . . spaces of constructed (in)visibility” through which Western military violence is enacted, we argue that performance of politics and human togetherness, including artistic expression, can prove to be an effective antidote to the totalitarian violent geographies that the Taliban seek to enact.

To counter TTP terrorism we turn to Arendt’s constructive project, and her understanding of civilian life and politics. For Arendt civilian life and politics is “a realm characterized by the presence of spontaneous, competitive, non-instrumentally orientated human action and by the absence of all matters relating to necessity” (Berger 2009, p.157). Arendt makes careful distinctions between politics and labor, with the latter forced upon us by bodily necessity (1973, p.177), and insists that politics should be non-instrumental. For Arendt politics is a performing art, whose value is not in the lasting result but in the performance itself (Torgerson 2000, p.2). Therefore Politics is best understood as “…the joy and gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed…” (Arendt 1993, 263). Invoking performance is not to suggest politics, and civilian life, are merely play, but recognition that politics, and civilian life, need to be constantly enacted.

Politics can thus be seen as “action centered”, and relies on “human togetherness” in the public realm. However, action and performance cannot stand alone, so “a definite space had to be secured and a structure built” she says in reference to ancient Greece “where all subsequent actions could take place” (1973, 194-5). Although for Arendt this definite space is less a physical location, but a “space of appearance”, we are nevertheless reminded of the human geography of the public sphere and terrorism. This is because in Arendt’s conception of civilian life and worldliness “any physical space can be transformed into a political one”
thus the politics is exemplified when “coffeehouses, street corners, living rooms and kitchens” become public (Zerilli 2005, p.20). In Pakistan for example, the predominant syncretic Sufi tradition entailed public carnivals, parades and processions around the anniversaries of local saints or other religiously important occasions. The Shia Muslim minority too annually engaged in public observances of mourning for the Prophet Muhammad’s grandson in the holy month of Muharram. One of the key victims of Taliban violence is and has been these religious observances, and as a consequence taking out customary processions in the face of the Taliban threat has become something of an act of political defiance of terrorism in Pakistan. The Pakistan state, however, unhelpfully has been keener in its security mindedness to prevent such processions from happening rather than viewing them as important bulwarks against TTP terror.

Thus the public sphere in the streets or concert halls of Pakistan, medieval souq of Baghdad, in the rialto of renaissance Venice, in the streets and hotel De Ville of revolutionary France, or in the ivory towers of academia, has a specific geography. The geography of public spaces is therefore the geography of “civilian life” and the antipode of terrorism.

Performative politics is not only public, but is where “man distinguishes himself” (Arendt 1973, p.176). The importance of distinguishing oneself, and acknowledging human plurality, cannot be underestimated given that its opposite is when humans become “absolutely superfluous” in the totalitarian project. Totalitarianism relies on tragic worldviews that are based on a “perfected humanity” according to a higher unifying logic of science, nature or religion. Indeed, Arendt identifies the biggest threat to public realm when “it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective” (1973, pp.57-58). In contrast performative politics has the capacity to subvert this logic by drawing attention to the plurality of civilian life and the ability to initiate something new and something unforeseen (Beltran 2009, p.601; Hansen 1993).

CONCLUSION

In Pakistan politics have a very distinct flavor of a carnival as do the syncretic religious observance of the predominant Sufi tradition. Beyond the obvious politico-religious significance of such manifestations of togetherness even such mundane events a music concerts and the kite festival of basant have come to take on a political valence, where they have come to be identified by many in Pakistan as very political acts of defiance against forces of obscurantism (Husain 2010, AFP 2010). Kite flying among other activities is something the TTP and some of its sympathizers in the Pakistani military and political establishment have thought fit to discourage or outright ban under the guise of public safety or protecting the Islamic character of the society. Not that we are Pollyannaish enough to think that letting the young and young at heart to fly kites on the spring festival of basant is the most effective bulwark against TTP and its fellow travelers’ totalitarianism. During the peculiarly South Asian style competitive kite flying, the intensely private roof tops, for a few brief weeks of the year, become intensely public spaces of action and performance. We believe that the togetherness entailed in such activity enacts a public sphere worth protecting and perpetuating, because of its subversive potential towards totalitarianism.

This paper draws attention to a new way in which geographical analysis can contribute to understanding terrorism that places analytical priority on terrorism, terrorist and the terrorist act rather than State responses to it (Flint 2009; Mustafa 2009). We offer a human geography approach which considers the ways in which space is used and thought about by terrorists and their target audiences. This human geography approach demonstrates
that the places where terrorists carry out spectacular displays of violence are linked to their project to seek a “perfected humanity” and to the performance of “civilian life”. Such insights rely on a broad understanding of politics and humanity, which cannot be reduced to biology and state institutions. Drawing on Arendt’s broad elements of politics (as plural, performed, non-instrumental and action-centered) we are able suggest that counter-terrorism measures must do more than place/space destruction, as the military interventions in the Swat seem to have achieved, or improve service delivery and administration of justice as civilian authorities are doing in the Swat. Instead we suggest that counter-terrorism measures draw upon and shore up the unfinished and imperfect nature of civilian life and the complex responses to TTP redefinitions of public space and civilian life. Thus, as the examples of kite flying and carnival indicate, space is clearly already implicated in these enactments of civilian life yet power dominates space, creates and produces it in own image, and supports it by producing disciplinary theatrical spaces. The disciplining power must be countered by performance of togetherness—even if it is to just fly kites.
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