The Ideological Shadow of Authoritarianism

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Abstract

How are left-right schemas formed in new democracies? Most of the literature either assumes that a common understanding of ideology is readily available to new democracies or points to variation in the dominance of different social cleavages. We propose an alternative theory, which focuses on the legacy of the authoritarian past. Dictatorships are not ideologically neutral. They are linked either to left or to the right. Neither are they positively evaluated by most citizens and political elites after the democratic transition. Combining these two observations, we derive a model of ideological learning. In its purest form, the model suggests that when the authoritarian regime is linked to the left (right), the consequent democratic regime will be characterised by an anti-left (anti-right) bias. We test our hypothesis with a new individual-level repeated cross-sectional dataset that covers all Latin American and European new democracies. We find significant ideological bias, which tends to evaporate over time and as the political system consolidates. We also show that the strength and durability of ideological bias is mediated by the indoctrination capacities of the previous regime.

Keywords: left-right; ideological bias; indoctrination; Post-Communism; Latin America
Successful democratization is typically followed by party system consolidation. During this process, elites and masses are confronted with a difficult task: how to develop a common understanding of overarching ideological terms. Doing so is vital in reducing the inherently multi-dimensional nature of politics. As it is well-known, ideological classifications help political parties to brand (Lupu 2013) and package (Zechmeister 2006) policy proposals and allow voters to cope with political issues in contexts of imperfect information (Downs 1957). The question, then, is how such encompassing ideological schemas are formulated in new democracies.

Given the high volume of research on party system consolidation, it is surprising that this question has not been systematically addressed. The reason, we suspect, lies in the underlying assumption that a common understanding of ideology is readily available to new democracies by the near-to-universal application of spatial analogies through the semantic terms of left and right. The almost automatic inclusion of post-communist democracies in comparative projects aiming to map parties’ policy positions (e.g. the Comparative Manifesto Project) and voters’ attitudinal predispositions (e.g. the Eurobarometer) along the left-right dimension is indicative of the common belief in its inherently exportable nature. This is not to deny the role of more in-depth studies that look closely into specific post-communist countries. However, even these studies tend to attribute differences in the meaning of ideological terms on the variation in the dominance of different social cleavages (Evans and Whitefield 1995; Kitschelt 1995, 1999; Tucker 2002; Whitefield 2002). Studies on the usage of left-right semantics in Latin America have examined more closely the dynamic development of ideological identifications but have focused primarily on factors that emerge after the democratic transition: elite coordination (Zechmeister 2006); party system structuration (Harbers, de Vries and Steenbergen 2013); and trust in political institutions (Doyle 2011).

Although this literature has enhanced our understating of left-right orientations in new political regimes, it has largely ignored an important distinguishing feature of these countries, namely the ideological nature of their authoritarian past. Ideology is not a monopoly of
democracies. Quite the contrary, it has been important to the non-democratic regimes of the 20th century. And if one of the leading ideologies of the inter-war period—fascism—lost importance after its defeat in World War II, the Cold War provided an unambiguous ideological context leaving non-democratic regimes of the post-World War II period to orient themselves into pro- or anti-communist camps. These dynamics are not captured by the existing democratization literature, which has mainly focused on the institutional features of these regimes as determinants of their path to democracy (e.g. Boix and Stokes 2003; Brownlee 2007; Gandhi 2008; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Geddes 1999; Hadenius and Teorell 2007; Przeworski 2000; Remmer 1985). Few studies have looked at the ideological connotations of non-democratic regimes (Gentile 2013; Levitsky and Way 2013; Linz 2000) and even fewer look at their legacies after the transition to democracy (but see Torcal and Mainwaring 2003).¹ In this paper we directly address this lacuna by examining the implications of the prior non-democratic regimes on the meaning of ideology in third-wave new democracies in Latin America, Eastern and Southern Europe; in doing so, we propose a new way of integrating the macro-level understanding of regime types and the micro-level understanding of formation of ideological perceptions.

Our argument emphasizes the role of history in providing a value component in the content of ideology. In new democracies, the ideological spectrum is coloured by the ideological label of the previous illiberal regime. Peoples’ attitudes towards the ideology of the previous regime is formed by two countervailing forces: resistance based on a revulsion against the brutality of the previous regime and indoctrination by the previous regime. We treat resistance as constant and consider nuances based on indoctrination. Thus, in the absence of successful indoctrination, the stylized post-autocratic regime will be characterized by an outright rejection of the prior regime’s ideology. If the authoritarian regime was linked to

¹ Historical case studies also exalt the role of previous regimes on the formation of political culture after the democratic restoration. An example of this literature is Aguilar’s (1996) in-depth examination of the legacy of the civil war and Franco’s regime in post-transitional Spanish political culture.
the left, as was the case in post-communist countries, the transition to democracy should be coupled by what we refer to as “anti-left bias”. If the authoritarian regime was linked to the right, as was the case in the countries of the third wave of democratization in Southern Europe and Latin America, the new political system should be characterized by an “anti-right bias.” We understand ‘anti-left’ and ‘anti-right’ bias to be the tendency of people to place themselves further away from either end of the spectrum than they would if they did not have negative associations with that end of the spectrum due to the ideology of the prior regime. The role of indoctrination is then to mediate the negative connotations attached to the previous regime and thus qualify the link between the authoritarian past and the current meaning of ideology. Consequently, we expect that successful indoctrination tempers people’s bias against the ideological camp of the dictator.

Building on the legacy of past regimes invites a developmental line of thinking about the formation of ideological perceptions in new democracies. The next question, thus, is: what are the implications of democratic consolidation and party system maturation for the persistence of ideological biases? One the one hand we expect some learning. As democracy consolidates, experience of the new political regime and its actors accumulates. This experience is likely to challenge, qualify, or contradict the ideological biases related to the previous regime. In other words, the weight of the past is likely to diminish as new political experience is incorporated. On the other hand, if indoctrination has been more efficient for those who experienced the previous regime, generational replacement might lead to the increase of aggregate ideological bias.

We test our expectations with a dataset which covers 50 countries, 950 country-years, and 2 million individuals. We show the ‘imprint’ of the past regime ideology on the left-right self-placements of people in new democracies. We contrast both types of left- and right-wing autocratic regimes against an ideological benchmark constructed by using old democracies. The results emphasize the importance of past legacies on ideological perceptions and account

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2 We use interchangeably the terms autocracy and illiberal regime.
for long-standing between-country differences in ideological self-placement. They also highlight the importance of prior regime indoctrination in our understanding of how these biases develop in the long-run.

**Illiberal regimes and their ideology: a question of love and hatred**

We expect that coming out of an illiberal regime, there is a ‘shadow’ of the past regime on the ideological perceptions of people in the new democratic regimes. Our expectation is based on a two-stage logic. The first stage assumes that autocracies are not ideologically neutral. Rather, they have either a left- or a right-wing inclination of which their own citizens, political party leaders in the transition period, as well as the world at large were aware of. Not all citizens need to recognize this link but at least some of them have to for the argument to work. The second stage requires negative evaluations of the authoritarian regime after the transition to democracy. Once again, not everyone needs to hate the previous regime, but many people need to hold negative feelings against it. Combined, the two-stages generate an ideological bias towards the ideological camp represented by the prior illiberal regime. Let us elaborate on each of the two steps separately, starting from the link between autocracies and ideology.

While the idea of political left-right spectrum is a simple dyadic distinction, its power as a meaningful set of categories lies in its relativity –in other words its ability to acquire new meanings based on changing historical and intellectual contexts (see Bobbio 1996). In the 20th century, the conflicts between liberal democracy and anti-liberalism (fascism, communism) and then the dominant Cold War conflict between communism and capitalism helped provide a grand context through which meaning could be attached to dyadic categories.

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3 We are not concerning ourselves with temporary democratic interludes and democratic reversals, but rather with successful democratizations after which democracy is able to consolidate.
of left and right. The inevitable potential for associations between Communist regimes of Eastern Europe and the ‘left’ end of the political spectrum can be taken as a given; Lenin (1920) himself used the term ‘left-wing’ in association with the communist parties of Europe. Despite variation in the intensity of indoctrination over time and across countries of the Communist bloc, these parties—almost all members of the International—had full control of the state and used part of their resources to infiltrate a Leninist/Marxist worldview within their societies (?). Even from a policy perspective, communist regimes have almost invariably prioritized economic equality over other macroeconomic goals—a key feature of left-wing ideology (Freeden, Sargent and Stears 2013).

The authoritarian regimes of Southern Europe and Latin America reflected a greater variety of motivating ideas making their classification of the left-right ideological spectrum a bit more complex than that of communist regimes given their blend of nationalist, corporatist, fascist, populist and later neo-liberal ideas (Freeden, Sargent and Stears 2013; Linz 2000). However, the overall historical context of the perceived threat of communism, which reached fever pitch with the Russian Revolution in 1917 and persisted in the ensuing Cold War, provided the unifying paradigm of ‘anticommunism’ which helped provide a collective “right-wing” identity for various political groupings and movements in Southern Europe and in Latin America. Let us examine these two groups of countries in turn.

In Spain, anti-communism provided one of the key unifying themes for the disparate movements that provided the basis of Franco’s regime namely, the anti-monarchist and fascist Falange Española and the monarchist Carlists (see Martín 2011; Payne 2011); the enduring strength of the anti-communist theme throughout the Francoist regime was apparent in the controversy surrounding the legalization of the Communist Party of Spain in 1977 (Linz and Stepan 1996: 96-97). In Portugal the corporatist ideology underpinning the Estado Nuovo rejected communism along with liberalism as both were seen as internationalist and secular thus opposed to the aims of supporting “God, nation, authority, and family” (Pinto and Rezola 2007). Finally, the supposed threat of communism and the opportunities for
garnering legitimacy by joining the anti-Soviet cause provided a useful source of justification for the Greek Junta (Kornetis 2013).

The importance of anti-communism as a justification and key aspect of regime mentality is particularly apparent in Cold War Latin America (Brands 2010, 241-42). The majority of the military regimes that arose in Latin America did so to counter the possibility of a government friendly to the Soviet Union and thus were viewed as ‘right-wing’ by virtue of playing an anti-communist role (see A.1 in the Appendix with ideological orientations of Latin American regimes); Pinochet’s regime in Chile whose principal aim was to defeat the socialist/’Marxist’ Left led by Allende is a case in point (Kurtz 1999). Similar fears of leftist takeover were employed to justify the Brazilian coup of 1964 (Markoff N.d.; Skidmore 1967).

In general, anti-Communism provided one of the key guiding principles around which the regimes built their ideological profile. Such a strategy was not without cost, however, as it often imposed limitations on the types of policies these regimes could pursue without losing the anti-communist reputation (+). A significant ally in this effort has been the Catholic church, which willingly collaborated with the authoritarian rulers in emphasizing the Communist threat(?).

Exceptions to the anti-communist trend in Latin America are not absent of course; the Sandinistas regime in Nicaragua provides one of the main examples of strong left-wing pro-communist authoritarian regimes that aligned itself with the Soviet Union.4 A few Latin American regimes show some ambiguity in their policy orientation,5 but in general Latin American illiberal regimes were predominantly coloured by clear ideological associations

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4 We do not include the Cuban regime in the analysis as it has not yet democratized.
5 The notable exceptions include the Peruvian military regime led by General Juan Vasco Alvarado (1968-1980), which although officially declared to be non-aligned, was very friendly with the Soviet Union (Berrios and Blasier 1991). The distinct nature of ‘Peruanismo’ with its strong nationalist and Catholic tendencies preclude its categorization as clear left-wing regime. Several Latin American regimes primarily pursued populist and ‘national reform’ policies thus making their right-wing association less clear, however in so far as they pursued a vigorous anti-communist policy these regimes are far more likely to be associated with the right (for more details see table in Appendix).
with the right. The link between military coups and the right is also reflected in how various classification schemes of political regimes have combined the two aspects, creating a category of right-wing authoritarianism (e.g. Alvarez et al. 1996;+).

We assume that people have no difficulty in categorizing illiberal regimes into the two basic categories of left and right and in forming preferences over these categories (as well as the objects (parties) falling into them). Accentuation theories of human inference highlight the prevalence of coarse thinking (Eiser and Stroebe 1972; Mullainathan, Schwartzstein and Shleifer 2008). Various experiments have shown that after asked to place objects into categories, individuals are found to evaluate objects falling in their preferred category more positively than before placing them into categories (Krueger and Rothbart 1990; Stangor et al. 1992). This logic applies also to social identification theories (Huddy 2001). Individuals form identities on the basis of their self-categorizations (Campbell et al. 1960; Tajfel 1982), leading them to in-group favoritism (Brewer 1979). Theories of spatial voting seem to be also susceptible to such categorization effects (Boelstad and Dinas 2015). The bipolar nature of the Cold War greatly helped in clearly designating two ‘camps.’

We now turn to the second assumption upon which our reasoning is based. Given that citizens of new democracies are aware of the ideological orientation of the preceding regime, how will they evaluate the previous regime’s ideology? Motivated by the revulsion to the repressiveness of the illiberal regimes, people will have a bias against the ideology associated with the regime. The idea that people feel revulsion to violent and brutal regimes can be said to be fundamentally based on the self-interested aspect of human nature: individuals prefer liberal regimes, where the individual’s own well-being is prioritized over long-term societal goals. Moreover, given that dictators have less incentives to redistribute and more incentives for rent-seeking than elected officials, democracy typically comes with important gains in both equality (?) and efficiency (?).  

6 Confronting incompliance with the regime  

6 This is not the case in post-Communist regimes, which experienced significant increase in inequality after their transition. Even in this case, however, overall comparison between regimes led to predominantly pro-democratic sentiments (Hofferbert and Klinge-
might also generate dynamics of violence, which spark negative sentiments, especially against regimes that were arbitrary and unpredictable in selecting targets for repression (\(+)\).\(^7\) In accordance with the ‘Churchill hypothesis’ people prefer even imperfect democracy to the alternatives: the experience of democracy leads both public opinion (Rose and Mishler 1996) and elites (Bermeo 1992) to see it as the least bad option and to prefer democracy to the prior non-democratic regime even if the new democratic regime is unsatisfactory.\(^8\) In their evaluations of the past, citizens in new democracies will also be inevitably affected by the current ‘democratic consensus’ giving particularly negative evaluations to regimes opposed to the democratic ideal. As Norris (1999) argued, “by the end of the twentieth century, overwhelming support is given to the principle of democracy as an ideal of government, even among citizens living under flawed regimes characterized by widespread abuse of human rights and civil liberties, such as Nigeria, Peru and Turkey” (also see Klingemann 1999 for a broad cross-national analysis of support for democracy). Inglehart (2003) takes this conclusion even further by characterizing survey responses as “lip service to democracy” which is “almost universal today.”

Even in Latin America, where various accounts stress a latent cultural predisposition towards authoritarianism (\(?)\), public opinion seems to be largely in favour of democracy both before the start (Geddes and Zaller 2004) and after the end of the authoritarian regime (\(?)\).\(^9\) At the very best, the authoritarian legacy operates as a new, cross-cutting cleavage that shapes the newly forming party system (Torcal and Mainwaring 2003). Despite the high levels of polarization produced by this cleavage, the winning coalitions were typically those that stood more critically against the previous regime (e.g. Chile etc.). Indicatively,\(^\text{mann} 1999)\).

\(^7\) For the counterproductive implications of indiscriminate violence see Kalyvas 2006.

\(^8\) Mishler, and Haerpfer (1998) highlight the latter highlight the importance of people’s comparisons between old and new regimes when interpreting their experiences under the new democratic regime – again emphasizing the importance of history in people’s understanding of the new present.

\(^9\) Linz
extensive survey evidence from Argentina, Chile and Mexico has challenged the perception of an authoritarian culture, portraying a citizenry with pro-democratic values (7). Measuring the normative regime preferences of political actors in Latin America, Mainwaring and Pérez-Lináz (2013, 82) also find consistent evidence in favour of democracy, especially since the 1960s. Drawing on this evidence, we infer that most people will attribute negative connotations to the past illiberal regime.

The tendency to negatively evaluate the ideology of the prior illiberal regime is particularly apparent in the behaviour of party elites in new democracies. Research on party elite identification in new democracies indicates a strong self-reference to the ideology of the past regime particularly in attempts at dissociating themselves from the past regime. Many such examples can be considered. In the post-Communist context, former Communist parties were discredited and shunned by other parties (Ishiyama 1995; Mahr and Nagle 1995); the electoral success of communist successor parties in Eastern Europe has been linked to their ability to re-brand themselves as social democratic parties (Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Grzymala-Busse 2002; Tavits and Letki 2009). To prove their credibility, several ex-Communist parties implemented economic liberalization despite their promises to the contrary in party manifests (Tavits and Letki 2009). In Latin America, political elites have shown a reluctance to be labelled ‘right-wing;’ studies of Brazilian political elites have shown that politicians place themselves to the left of their ‘actual’ positions and they refuse to label themselves as ‘right’ (Souza 1989, Leoncio Martins 1987, Pierucci 1987). This phenomenon of direita envergohada (‘ashamed right’) seems a remarkably durable feature of Brazilian political culture (Power and Zucco 2009). Possibly the reluctance of political elites to openly label themselves as right-wing may explain the high level of confusion about left-right self-placement among ‘latent’ rightists among Brazilian voters (Ames and Smith 2010). By the same token, PSR, the major right-wing party of Portugal since the democratic transition, avoided a name that would link it to any of the common party families of this ideological camp. Rather it opted for a “social-democratic” equivalent. The campaign strat-
egy of the Greek socialist party also drew upon the political exploitation of the turbulent political period that led to the 1967 coup (Moschonas 1995). Perhaps the most accurate representation of this essentially multi-faceted strategy is the party’s campaign chant, used at least until the late 1990s as a way to remind the electorate of the link between the right and the past authoritarian regime: “the people does not forget what the right means.”

Combining the two parts of our argumentation leads us to the first hypothesis, which encompasses all types of illiberal regimes:

\[ H_1: \text{In post-authoritarian regimes, individuals will have an ideological bias against the ideology of the prior illiberal regime.} \]

This hypothesis can be decomposed into two separate hypotheses, according to the ideological label of the illiberal regime:

\[ H_{1A}: \text{If a country had a left-wing illiberal regime, we expect anti-left bias under democracy.} \]
\[ H_{1B}: \text{If a country had a right-wing illiberal regime, we expect anti-right bias under democracy.} \]

Life in Democracy: Political learning and the role of Indoctrination

We cannot expect the biases formed as a legacy of past regimes to survive indefinitely in a frozen state. The task of examining the presence of such biases is thus inevitably followed by a next task, namely to shed light on the way this bias develops over time. How long does the anti-left or anti-right bias endure once the democratic regime consolidates? To address this question we need to first consider the two main forces of change in individual political attitudes: learning and persistence. Learning can be seen as the result of the standard Bayesian updating paradigm (Grynависки 2006; Fiorina 1981; see also Achen
As experience with democratic politics accumulates, people update their perceptions of what left and right means, thus weakening the link between ideology and the prior regime. This process gradually dissipates the ideological bias and leads to convergence in the understanding of ideological terms between new and old (“neutral”) democracies. Persistence, on the other hand, posits that “residues of early socialization are relatively immune from attitude change in later years” (Sears 1981:184). The idea of persistence complements the concept of “impressionable years” according to which people up until young adulthood are more sensitive to external shocks such as regime changes (Valentino and Sears 2011; Dinas 2013, Stoker and Jennings 2008). Mannheim referred to the phenomenon as the “stratification of experience” (Mannheim 1929[1952]), also known in psychology as a primacy effect (Birnbaum 1974; ??): events that take place when one is old constitute another layer in individuals’ stock of political information. For the young, however, lack of prior experience makes it more difficult to superimpose this event upon other early impressions (Schuman and Corning 2012:3).

Choosing between these two processes is important because they lead to different predictions of aggregate change. This is because of the intervening role of generational replacement. For learning generational replacement either makes no difference or exacerbates the process. This is because new cohorts, which have less or no experience of the previous regime, are assumed to adjust either more quickly or at the same pace as old cohorts. Thus, the two processes are mutually self-reinforcing. For persistence, the role of generational replacement is more ambiguous. This is because old cohorts will retain some influence from the regime, which new cohorts will lack. This makes the old different than the young. Generational replacement, in turn, will lead to the gradual imposition of new cohorts’ attitudes upon the old cohorts. This makes it vital to consider whether this shadow from the past regime introduces stronger ideological bias to old or to young cohorts.

Until now we have provided no answer to this question, because we have only looked at one feature of these regimes, namely repression. Repression under illiberal regimes, however,
was not the only form of experience that shaped peoples’ attitudes towards the regimes’ ideologies; the effect of repression in fostering a bias against the regimes’ ideologies was tempered by the regimes’ ability to indoctrinate. Indoctrination can be generally understood as an acceptance of a regime’s guiding idea.\(^\text{10}\) Attaining full compliance of the population by illiberal regimes entailed the use of indoctrination. Unlike the threat of violence and brutality on its own, some sort of belief in the mission of the regime and the need for suffering for the common good had the advantage of creating a ‘dual reality’ allowing an escape from harsh reality (Czeslaw Milosz Captive Minds; Adler 2012 Keeping the Faith with the Party: Communist Believers Return from the Gulag). To many, especially those people who were victims of the harshest repression, a continued commitment to party was the only way to mentally cope. An important element in the success of fascist and communist regimes was their ability to turn their political ideology into a type of religion. This sacralization of politics was necessary to mobilize the hearts and minds of the populace (Gentile and Mallet 2000). Adler (2012) points the religious-like faith in communist ideology, which emphasizes faith over empirical proof, as an important element of the GULAG survivors’ justification for their continued commitment to communism. New developments in historiography have suggested that political sacralization is also frequent in democratic regimes (?). The very process of building new societies along ideological grounds served to create new social identities as well as the basis for new social bonds, which were particularly attractive in times of social upheaval (Browning and Siegelbaim 2009; Fitzpatrick and Ludtke 2009; Adler 2012; Milosz; documentary film Hitler’s Children by Guido Knopp; Knopp 2002). The ability to co-opt citizens and legitimize the regime through ideology has been integral to long term stability of authoritarian regimes (Levitsky and Way 2014; Gershewski 2014). In short, successful indoctrination helped counteract the negative impressions created by the regimes’

\(^{10}\)This acceptance can be a full belief in the regime’s ideology or an external acceptance manifested through role playing and duplicity (a process described by Czeslaw Milosz as “Ketman” in allusion to the Shiite practice of duplicity when faced with intolerant mullahs). These two forms are reflected by the dual conceptions of socialization (Checkel 2005).
violence.

Indoctrination is more likely to be successful when experienced directly than when transmitted by socialization agents (e.g. family). Therefore, we expect higher levels of indoctrination among older cohorts. This means higher levels of ideological bias among the young. This line of reasoning leads us to two diverging predictions, as shown in 1, which presents the level of ideological bias at any given point in time. In the absence of indoctrination we expect no significant variation in the level of ideological bias according to age.\textsuperscript{11} When indoctrination is present, however, we expect the old to be more affected and thus to denote lower levels of bias, as shown in the second panel of 1. The next question, then, is how these expectations translate into the overall pattern of change in authoritarian regimes. This is shown in Figures 2 and 3. In both graphs, we present three idealized patterns only as a way to highlight that we hold no strong theory about the functional form of over-time change, insofar as it retains some relatively monotone trajectory. Figure 2 shows the expected pattern of aggregate change in the absence of indoctrination. Since both learning and generational replacement lead to the same predictions, we only present one line for both processes. Figure 3 shows the expected pattern of aggregate change in the presence of indoctrination. Here learning and generational replacement lead to opposite expectations: the solid line represents the learning mechanism whereas the dotted line shows the pattern according to generational replacement. We see that whereas the former aids convergence, the latter increases divergence.\textsuperscript{12}

The last question then is when are we more likely to witness indoctrination. Illiberal regimes vary in their abilities to indoctrinate. Although there are probably significant nu-

\textsuperscript{11} This assumption is non-consequential for our argument and we only make it to ease the graphical representation of our hypotheses. One could augment the first panel of 1, by replacing the flat lines with a negative red and a positive blue slope, denoting the expected tendency among young to learn and adjust more quickly than older cohorts. Such a pattern would only exacerbate the process of convergence.

\textsuperscript{12} Although we have retained symmetry in these trajectories, we do not assume it. We remain agnostic as to whether learning or generational replacement exert a greater impact in the aggregate pattern of change.
ances that require a more fine-grained classification with respect to how well a regime transmits its ideology to its citizenry, in the absence of such a comparative measure we draw on Linz’s (2000) classic distinction between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. The primary difference between the two types is the degree to which the regime is guided by a highly developed ideology. This is the case only for totalitarian regimes. A highly developed ideology has a comprehensive worldview that provides a defined goal for the future development of the society and man. Ideologies are characterized by a firmly developed belief system with fixed elements, a closed cognitive structure, and considerable constraining power. The ideology provides a goal towards which the society develops and strong justification for sacrificing individual welfare for the pursuit of the “common good.” This ideology provides a justification for the violence and repression carried out by the illiberal regime. Considerable resources are used to mobilize adherence with the regime’s worldview. Even if indoctrination was not always successful, it is expected that ideology provides some ‘immunity’ against the expected revulsion with an illiberal regime.

Authoritarian regimes, on the other hand, are characterized by ‘mentalities’ which Linz defines as ‘ways of thinking and ‘reacting to different situations’ (Linz 2000:162-165). Mentalities are formless and fluctuating compared to ideologies. The contrast between the Marxist-Leninist ideology and the vague combination of ‘anti-communism’, nationalist and populist aims of Latin American regimes provides an illustration of the difference between ideology and mentality. The first provided the communist elites with a fixed and highly developed body of ideas that could provide legitimacy and meaning to the regimes; it would also provide guidance for the development of policies. The Marxist-Leninist ideology was particularly strong as it was underpinned by body of written literature by Marx, Lenin, and Engels; the

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13 We do not aim at fully embracing Linz’s distinction between the two types of regimes. We only employ one aspect that Linz uses to differentiate between the two types, namely the presence and explicit attempt to disseminate a regime ideology. We are even sceptical as to whether this essentially coarse distinction is accurate but in the absence of an objective measure we stick to it, because doing so is more likely to generate a conservative comparison for our hypotheses.
presence of such a corpus of literature strongly restrained the communist elites to a certain menu of plausible policies but was also a source of strength. A developed ideology was particularly useful for the purposes of socializing the population; an articulate ideology is easier to teach in mass education systems (Kenez The Birth of The Propaganda State; Zajda 1988),\textsuperscript{14} it enables psychological and emotional identification of the masses with the regime, and is more appealing to intellectuals, students, and the youth (Fitzpatrick, Arendt+++).

In short, a strong ideology facilitated the socialization of the masses into being attached to the regime ideology. Authoritarian regimes on the other hand had very underdeveloped statements of the guiding aims as manifested by the short declarations of regimes principles’ after the coups (examples include Papadopoulos’ ‘New Creed’ in Greece or Pinochet’s ‘Declaration of Principles’ in Chile); these very short statements mainly justified the need for a military coup on the basis of some external threat. The vagueness of authoritarian ‘mentalities’ had the advantage of blunting any cleavages in the coalition of disparate groups supporting an authoritarian regime, but at the same time it severely limited the ability of authoritarian regimes to socialize the masses in loyalty to the regime. Instead authoritarian regimes depended on the de-mobilization of political movements and the creation of apathy, both of which were crucial mechanisms of political control; lacking an ideology to co-opt the opposition, these authoritarian regimes relied on discouraging the presence of any social movements and citizen activity (Linz 2000: 70-71). However, without a powerful ideology, authoritarian regimes were not able to as easily provide a compelling justification for their violence and repression.

The difference between regime types in terms of the dominance of ideologies versus mentalities was reinforced by the different institutional structures of the two overarching regime types: the dominance of single political parties in the totalitarian regime as opposed to reliance on the military in authoritarian types (Linz 2000). The presence of a single political

\textsuperscript{14} Marxist-Leninist theory featured heavily in the school curriculum starting for children aged 10;.
party not only contributed to the duration of regimes (Levitsky and Way 2014; Smith 2005; Geddes 1999), but also proved instrumental in maximizing the penetration and control of society. In the early regime phases, single-party strengthened partisan feelings of “us-versus-them” and provided a structural basis for the centre of power both organizationally and ideologically (Levistky and Way 2014). In later phases, the single regime parties increased the regime’s penetration of society and indoctrination capacities by providing cross-cutting membership across all state, social and economic institutions (such as schools, universities, youth groups, and workplaces). Authoritarian regimes that relied on the military as their basis of power, on the other hand, were limited by the civilian and military divide; even if officer training could serve as means of some form of indoctrination (as in the case of military academies in Brazil teaching the ideas of “New Professionalism”), any military-based indoctrination was by nature limited by the military-civilian divide.

This line of argument does not imply that learning in left-wing autocracies is purely dominated by indoctrination. Assuming this would imply that people in these countries differ in the way they perceive information from those in countries without indoctrination. Thus, even if in left-wing regimes indoctrination is likely to impact the process of ideological bias adjustment, it interplays with an inherent process of learning. Moreover, this coarse distinction does not preclude variation both within and between countries of the same ideological regime. There is no doubt that the experience of illiberal regimes was not uniform or monolithic; the longer-lived communist regimes experienced several different phases throughout their duration with fluctuations in the levels of repression and indoctrination to the extent that one regime could even go through phases in which it switches regime ‘types’ (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2013). It is likely for example that indoctrination in Poland in the 1980s was much lower than in Russia in the 1950s (see for example Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2014). However, given that there is no objective indicator of indoctrination, engaging into more fine-grained distinctions is likely to complicate the picture without adding much theoretical insight. Thus, we choose to remain agnostic and allow such differences, should they exist, to
be revealed by the empirical analysis. This reasoning leads us to expect a pattern analogous to the blue line of 2 for right-wing regimes and a pattern that stands somewhere between the two red lines of Figure 3 for left-wing dictatorships. Such a pattern would encompass the counter-veiling forces of generational replacement and learning under indoctrination. We present these expectations in a form of hypotheses below:

\[ H_{2A}: \text{Anti-right bias will dissipate gradually as the democratic regime consolidates.} \]
\[ H_{2B}: \text{Anti-left bias will persist more than anti-right bias as the democratic regime consolidates.} \]

**Data and Research Design**

We understand ‘anti-left’ and ‘anti-right’ bias to be the tendency of people to place themselves further away from either end of the spectrum than they would if they did not have negative associations with that end of the spectrum due to the ideology of the prior regime. In other words we can understand the ideology of the prior illiberal regime to be the treatment (Left for left-wing prior regimes and Right for right-wing prior regimes), which predicts individual self-placement in the left-right axis: where the prior regime was left-wing, for example in post-Communist Eastern Europe, people will place themselves further to the right end of the spectrum, whereas in Latin American or Southern European right-wing military dictatorships, people will place themselves to the left.

In order to determine the presence of anti-right and anti-left bias we need to cover as much time as possible since the collapse of right-wing and left-wing regimes in as many countries as possible. To this end we have created a ‘mega-dataset’ which pools several cross-national surveys that include a left-right self-placement item, including the World Values Survey, European Social Survey, European Elections Study, the Latinobarometer, the Eurobarometer and the Central and Eastern European Barometer surveys. In total, our surveys cover 50
countries in the period from 1970 to 2012. This results into 950 country-years and about 2 million individuals (for more details see Table A.2 in the Appendix).

In the first instance we are interested in the overall degree of bias and its dissipation over time. To estimate this bias we need a comparison group. We use established democracies, which we define as countries with uninterrupted democratic rule since the end of the WWII. In long-standing democracies, we assume that the effect of past is neutral: either the country democratized slowly over a long period of time as was the case for the first wave democracies (Huntington 1993) or in the case of some established countries which had an authoritarian interlude (i.e. Nazi occupation) the effect was sufficiently short and far enough in the past to have a relatively neutral effect on left-right self-placement. Therefore we assume that in established democracies no bias based on past regime experiences exists, in other words these countries are ideologically ‘neutral.’ Thus, using them as a benchmark, we can estimate the effect of coming from a left- or a right-wing dictatorship on left-right self-placement. Apart from providing a benchmark for comparison, the use of these neutral democracies helps in two important respects. First, these countries serve as control groups both against the left and against the right. This facilitates comparisons between the two types of regimes. Second, it accounts for the potentially confounding role of period effects. Public mood might occasionally fluctuate either to the left or to the right. Since such tides are likely to affect both treated regimes and neutral democracies, comparing the two groups allows us to obtain estimates net from such mood effects.

We are not interested in capturing the effect of prior regimes on ideological perceptions in a specific year. Rather the aim is to provide a generic model of ideological perceptions after the transition to democracy and along the process of party system consolidation. To build such a model we need to include information about the time elapsed since the regime ended. We do this by adding various polynomials of time, centered at the year of the previous regime end. These polynomials are of course interacted with the treatment indicator. For example in the case of left-wing dictatorships, we fit the following model into the data (Equation 3):
\[ LR_{i,j,T-c} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Left \\
+ \beta_2 (T - c) + \beta_3 (T - c)^2 + \beta_4 (T - c)^3 + \beta_5 (T - c)^4 \\
+ \beta_6 (T - c) Left + \beta_7 (T - c)^2 Left + \beta_8 (T - c)^3 Left + \beta_9 (T - c)^4 Left \\
+ \beta_{10} 70's + \beta_{11} 80's + \beta_{12} 90's + u_{i,j,t} \]

where \( c \) denotes the year of regime-end and errors are clustered at the country-level. A key feature of this model is that \( c \) does not exist for neutral democracies. We thus choose the \( c \) that corresponds to most of the countries in the left-wing group: 1989. Doing so helps to compare individuals who are interviewed in the same period and are of the same age, but come from different authoritarian background. We also include a set of group-invariant decade dummies.

In right-wing authoritarianism, the choice about \( c \) is more complicated by the different years of regime endings (i.e. Colombia 1958, El Salvador 1985; Chile 1990). We therefore test a series of models with shifting years for the regime end in neutral democracies starting from 1975 and up to 1990; we choose 1975 as the start for the sensitivity test as most right-wing regimes collapsed after that year. By the same token, all countries but one (Panama, 1991) had restored their democratic regime by 1990. \(^{15}\) The model for right-wing autocracies is shown below (Equation 2):

\(^{15}\)We are only interested in the latest authoritarian episode after which there were no democratic reversals.
Next, to examine the underlying mechanism driving the trajectory of bias over time, we augment this model by decomposing our estimates across year-of-birth cohorts. Instead of grouping years of birth according to some arbitrary rule, we decide to be agnostic, estimating a treatment effect for each one of them separately. This means we obtain an estimate of the effect of the ideology of the previous regime for each cohort. We identify this effect by comparing same cohorts between treated and control units, i.e. between Left/Right and neutral regimes. Thus, our identification is based on the assumption of parallel ageing and period effects (each of these assumptions can be relaxed but in turn, not simultaneously, see Dinas and Stoker 2013). We apply the same model both when we expect high levels of indoctrination and when we expect low levels of indoctrination. This strategy allows the data to reveal differences between cohorts if they exist. The two models, then, take the following form:

For the left-wing dictatorships (Equation 3):
\[ LR_{i,j,T-c} = \lambda_{\gamma} + \beta_1(T-c) + \beta_2(T-c)^2 + \beta_3(T-c)^3 + \beta_4(T-c)^4 + \beta_5 Left + \beta_1(T-c)Left + \beta_2(T-c)^2 Left + \beta_3(T-c)^3 Left + \beta_4(T-c)^4 Left + \beta_5 Left \]
\[ + \lambda_{\gamma}(T-c) + \lambda_{\gamma}(T-c)^2 + \lambda_{\gamma}(T-c)^3 + \lambda_{\gamma}(T-c)^4 + \lambda_{\gamma} Left \]
\[ + \lambda_{\gamma}(T-c)Left + \lambda_{\gamma}(T-c)^2 Left + \lambda_{\gamma}(T-c)^3 Left + \lambda_{\gamma}(T-c)^4 Left \]
\[ + \beta_{1070}'s + \beta_{1180}'s + \beta_{1290}'s + u_{i,j} + u_{i,j,t} \]

and the right-wing dictatorships (Equation 4):

\[ LR_{i,j,T-c} = \lambda_{\gamma} + \beta_1(T-c) + \beta_2(T-c)^2 + \beta_3(T-c)^3 + \beta_4(T-c)^4 + \beta_5 Right + \beta_1(T-c)Right + \beta_2(T-c)^2 Right + \beta_3(T-c)^3 Right + \beta_4(T-c)^4 Right \]
\[ + \lambda_{\gamma}(T-c) + \lambda_{\gamma}(T-c)^2 + \lambda_{\gamma}(T-c)^3 + \lambda_{\gamma}(T-c)^4 + \lambda_{\gamma} Right \]
\[ + \lambda_{\gamma}(T-c)Right + \lambda_{\gamma}(T-c)^2 Right + \lambda_{\gamma}(T-c)^3 Right + \lambda_{\gamma}(T-c)^4 Right \]
\[ + \beta_{1070}'s + \beta_{1180}'s + \beta_{1290}'s + u_{i,j} + u_{i,j,t} \]

where \( \lambda \) denotes the difference for cohort \( \gamma \) between Left/Right and neutral democracies and \( \gamma = \{1930, \ldots, 1975, 1976, post1976\} \).\(^{16}\) Left/Right is a dummy that switches on for citizens of left- and right-wing dictatorships respectively. Finally, \( c \) is 1989 in the first equation and varies between 1975 and 1990 in the second equation.

\(^{16}\)Although the results remain intact when using cohorts born before 1930, we opt for including only those born until then to avoid possibly confounding pre-WWII differences in the type of regimes individuals have experienced in these countries.
Results

We start with the results for left-wing regimes and then move to right-wing regimes. We estimate Equation (1) and use these estimates to derive the expected difference in individual left-right self-placement between left-wing regimes and neutral democracies for each year from $T - c = 1$ until $T - c = 20$ after the end of the authoritarian regime. Figure 4 summarizes these estimates. The vertical axis denotes the difference in LR placement between left-wing dictatorships and neutral democracies. The black dotted line denotes no difference between the two groups. Negative values indicate that left-wing dictatorships are on average more left-wing than neutral democracies and vice versa for positive values. The solid curve smooths out the year-by-year predictions based on Equation (1). The dashed curves trace the point-wise 95% Confidence Intervals (CIs). A relatively persistent gap is observed, with left-wing electorates being located somewhat more to the right than those from neutral democracies. The overall pattern is relatively flat, showing no tendency towards convergence. Taken as a whole, the graph suggests the presence of anti-left bias, but provides no evidence in favor of convergence.

As a way to unpack the roots of this pattern, we try to decompose this trend by looking at cohort dynamics. To do this we estimate Equation (3) and use these estimates to track differences between same cohorts from left-wing and neutral democracies. The results are shown in Figure 5, which traces all cohorts over time. Each line represents a year-of-birth cohort, moving along a period of twenty years. The vertical axis denotes the average cohort-specific difference in LR placement between left-wing and neutral democracies. Scores below zero denote a more left-wing profile in new democracies and scores above zero indicate that on average respondents from post-communist regimes are located more to the right than those from neutral democracies. Learning would predict a gradually descending pattern with differences in the first years evaporating as we move away from the transition period. Given that we assume indoctrination in left-wing democracies, generational replacement should
manifest itself by a gradual increase in the differences between left-wing and neutral cohorts as we move to younger year-of-birth groups. The figure reveals no evidence for learning. With only few exceptions, all curves seem to resemble the overall trend, staying remarkably flat over time. There is no inclination towards convergence. When it comes to generational replacement, however, the figure provides evidence in favor of the pattern advocated by indoctrination. Although the cohorts in each graph seem to be very similar to each other and tend to look like one curve parallel with the horizontal axis, their relative position changes from earlier to more recent cohorts. For every group of new cohorts the mean positioning is higher in the vertical axis. Whereas post-communist cohorts born between 1930 and 1940 seem similar or if anything more leftist than those from neutral democracies, for those born after the 1970s, post-communist respondents seem to be located almost one point more to the right than those from neutral democracies.

The same pattern is observed if we change the presentation of these results by looking at time trends across cohorts. This is done in Figure 6, which presents the difference in left-right placement between left-wing and neutral regimes for every year after the end of the transition across all cohorts. Each dot represents a cohort and the overall pattern is summarized by a local linear smoother. We find a clear ascending trend, which means that as we move to more recent cohorts the anti-left bias increases. This trend appears to be steeper in the first years after the transition, without however disappearing as the democratic regime consolidates. The last two figures say, of course, the same story: generational replacement revives the anti-right bias in post-communist regimes, without learning compensating much for this effect. The reason this pattern does not translate into a net increase in the degree of bias probably relates to dynamics that have emerged after the transition to democracy. Such dynamics might also explain why in Figure 6 the level difference between left-wing and neutral democracies goes actually down. However, the cohort-specific trend remains robust and points to the important role of indoctrination in mediating the pattern of anti-left bias in these countries.
We now turn to right-wing regimes. From Equation (2) we derive estimates for the ideological difference between these regimes and the neutral regimes over time. The overall pattern is shown in Figure 7. Four different panels are shown, each one using a different $c$, i.e. starting point for neutral democracies. All graphs point to the same pattern: although these regimes start more left-wing than neutral democracies, they gradually converge to the same equilibrium. The pattern bears resemblance to the blue curve of Figure 2, which depicts the expected pattern of change in the absence of indoctrination. In Figure 2, both generational replacement and learning lead to the same expectations, thus driving ideological convergence.

We now try to decompose this pattern looking at cohort-specific dynamics. Figure 8 depicts the estimates from Equation (4) and provides more evidence in favour of the learning hypothesis. Similar to Figure 5, it depicts cohorts over time. We see again a replication of the overall pattern: all cohorts start from a more left-wing departure point and gradually convergence to the same ideological position as neutral democracies. This is the case for both old and young year-of-birth groups. Thus, instead of being driven by generational replacement, the overall trend seems to come closer to the pattern anticipated by the learning hypothesis. The same conclusion is drawn when one looks at all cohorts together, in a year-to-year basis, as shown in Figure 9. With the exception of a slightly curvilinear pattern in the very first years after the transition, the general pattern reveals no variation between cohorts along all years examined in the graph. The only change is that this flat line is located lower in the graph in early years than in later years after the transition, when it converges to the levels of neutral regimes. Again, this evidence implies no indoctrination and thus no effect for generational replacement. Instead, convergence seems to stem from learning. Learning, in turn, seems to take place in a relatively homogeneous fashion across all cohorts.
Robustness Checks

We address three potential criticisms to these findings. First, rather than being the result of the prior regime, these difference might be due to different economic conditions between new and old democracies. The intensity of liberalization reforms that took place in East and Central Europe after the fall of Communism might have shaped people’s ideological perceptions in a way that might also account for these results. Similar concerns may be raised for countries in Southern Europe and Latin America. To address this concern we add a series of economic indicators in the estimation: inflation, unemployment, GDP per capita and inequality. The results remain robust to the inclusion of these covariates. These results are available in the Appendix (Figures A.1 and A.2). As a second check, we replaced the time polynomials with actual $T - c$ fixed-effects. The results are substantively identical with those presented in the main text, both for the left and for the right (will be added in the Appendix).

Thirdly, we examined whether the findings are driven by a particular country, we engage into jack-knifing. We sequentially exclude one country from both treated groups. All these results are also available in the Appendix (Figure A.3 for the left and Figure A.4 for the right). We find only negligible change in the overall pattern shown above. The results do not seem to be driven by a specific country.

As a fourth check, we recoded our dependent variable in order to capture more explicitly the presence of anti-left and anti-right bias. We simply used a binary distinction between left (any position $x_{i,j,t}$, where $0 \leq x_{i,j,t} < 5$ in the original LR scale) and non-left positions and vice versa for the right $5 < x_{i,j,t} \leq 10$. The results for the right-wing dictatorships are substantively identical to those found in the main text, as shown in A.6. The results for left-wing dictatorships, however, differ substantially. They challenge the idea of a starting

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17 We refrain from using these covariates in the main analysis, as they are evidently post-treatment.
point of anti-left bias. The whole trajectory seems to support the indoctrination hypothesis. Generational replacement, then converts a relatively pro-left electorate into a more pro-right electorate, as shown in Figure A.5.

A last point that needs to be made relates to the association between indoctrination and repression. Although we cannot have a systematic estimate of the magnitude of this relationship, we do hold some intuition about its direction, which we believe is non-negative. This is important for us because it makes it easier to attribute the observed effects to indoctrination. If the relationship between the two is negative, it might be that what is attributed to indoctrination might stem from lower levels of resistance. However, such a cohort-specific pattern is difficult to reconcile with this alternative hypothesis.

Discussion

The survival of authoritarianism depends on many factors—e.g. international alliances, external pressures, elite coordination, economic shocks—but seldom its ideology. Yet, it is this exact characteristic that is most likely to leave its shadow in the coming democratic regime. It do so either by its negation or by its approval. To what extent one prevails over the other depends on the level of indoctrination of the regime and the degree of personal experience with it. In regimes where ideology has been primarily defined by its negation to communism, its imprint appears eroded after the transition, leaving room to the counterveiling impact of repression. This is the case in Latin America and Southern Europe, where right-wing regimes left a gradually diminishing right-wing legacy on citizens’ ideological perceptions. In Eastern and Central Europe, however, the ideological imprint of the regimes imposed after the end of the WWII seems to have coloured early ideological perceptions. Its success, however, is reduced as time goes by the the process of generational replacement is initiated. New cohorts react more to the legacy of repression than to its indoctrination practices, associate the two and and thus become more likely to hold negative views against
the ideology of the previous regime. Apart from shedding some light on the origin and evolution of ideology in newly democratic regimes, when taking as a whole these regimes seem to have at least three implications that is worth discussing in more detail.

First, the dynamics of party competition after the transition need to be considered in conjunction with the legacy of the authoritarian past. Elite decisions about party physiognomy and issue stances are better understood when looked under the light of what the general mood about the terms left and right is. To the extent this is the case, parties might significantly vary their policy priorities in order to match their ideological profile. To the extent that persuasion effects are importaant in newly democratic regimes (Lenz, 2012), this pattern might lead to changes in public opinion not only with regard to the terms left and right but with the policy principles they represent. The prolongation of this pattern might generate a vicious circle whereby the historical past informs the meaning of ideology in the democratic regime.

Second, the results point to the importance of indoctrination in authoritarian regimes. Without more evidence available it is impossible to further unpack this notion and look at variations within types of regimes. Obtaining a valid and comparative measure of indoctrination seems to be a useful research area for the future. Until then, however, it is still interesting to consider the socialization tools through which indoctrination takes place and how this breaks after the democratic restoration. Imagine, for example, a 10 year-old Romanian in 1995. How does parental socialization operate in this setting and endurable is it after the change of the reime? Such questions require more in-depth examination of the process through which political beliefs are instilled via formal and informal socialization agents. As Arendt (On Totalitarinaism) put is, “The aim of totalitarian education has never been to instill convictions but to destroy the capacity to form any.”

Finally, there are important implications from these findings with respect to party positioning, which in light of these results, is also affected by this history-driven pattern of bias. The main party representing the ideological side of the dictator is likely to receive support
by sympathizers or others who make no strong link between prior regime and political ideology. However, it is also likely to suffer from what one could call reverse contrast effects. Contrast is defined as the tendency to place an object you do not like more far away than what you would have done if one were only based on one’s perceptions. In the presence of ideological bias, the party related to the ideology of the previous regime is put more towards that side not because of its issue positions but because people who do not like the party and who hold negative views over the dictatorship are likely to move the party towards a disliked subspace of the political spectrum. This pattern might explain why for example the main right-wing parties of Greece, Portugal and Spain have been constantly treated by their respective national electorates as the most right-wing within the EU, despite them holding relatively moderate right-wing stances according to their manifestos.
References


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**URL:** [http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/123/2/577.abstract](http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/123/2/577.abstract)


Figures

Figure 1: Age-differences in ideological bias, with (right panel) and without (left panel) indoctrination.

Note: The blue lines denote right-wing authoritarian regimes while the red lines denote left-wing autocracies. The solid lines depict the age-differences at a given point in time in a democratic regime that stems from an dictatorship without indoctrination, whereas the dotted lines denote the same differences in the presence of indoctrination. We only present a linear approximation of age-differences for simplicity. We remain agnostic about the exact functional form of these differences assuming only a relatively monotone in the differences between young and old.
Figure 2: Three Idealized Patterns of ideological bias, along the process of democratic consolidation, without indoctrination.

Note: The blue lines denote right-wing authoritarian regimes while the red lines denote left-wing autocracies. Time = 0 denotes the year of the democratic transition and time Time = T denotes the last available year of observation. All graphs are based on artificial data and used only as benchmarks for the evaluation of the empirical results.

Figure 3: Three Idealized Patterns of ideological bias, along the process of democratic consolidation, with indoctrination.

Note: The red lines denote the LR self-placement of regimes with left-wing authoritarianism, whereas the blue lines denote the left-right preferences of right-wing authoritarianism. The solid lines depict the trajectory according to the learning mechanism, whereas the dotted lines depict the trajectory according to the generational replacement mechanism with indoctrination.
Figure 4: Left-Wing Regimes.

Note: The vertical axis denotes the average difference left-right positioning between respondents from left-wing autocracies and respondents from neutral regimes. The solid line tracks this difference over time and the dotted curves denote the 95% point-wise confidence intervals.
Figure 5: Left-wing Vs Neutral cohorts over time.

Note: Each line represents a year-of-birth cohort. The vertical axis denotes the average difference in left-right self-placement and the horizontal axis denotes the number of years since the regime end.
Figure 6: Time since regime ended and left-wing Vs neutral cohorts.

Note: Dots present the average left-right difference between left-wing and neutral regimes. The red line summarizes the overall pattern for each graph. Each graph represents a given year after the regime ended.
Figure 7: Right-Wing Regimes

Note: The vertical axis denotes the average difference left-right positioning between respondents from right-wing autocracies and respondents from neutral regimes. The solid line tracks this difference over time and the dotted curves denote the 95% point-wise confidence intervals. As shown in the heading of each graph, each panel uses a different year to denote regime end among neutral democracies.
Figure 8: Right-wing Vs Neutral cohorts over time.

Note: Each line represents a year-of-birth cohort. The vertical axis denotes the average difference in left-right self-placement and the horizontal axis denotes the number of years since the regime end. The estimations uses $c = 1975$ for neutral regimes.
Figure 9: Time since regime ended and right-wing Vs neutral cohorts.

Note: Dots present the average left-right difference between right-wing and neutral regimes. The red line summarizes the overall pattern for each graph. Each graph represents a given year after the regime ended. The estimations use $c = 1975$ for neutral regimes.
## Appendix

### Table A.1: Latin-American Authoritarian Regimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year of Redemocratization</th>
<th>Prior Regime</th>
<th>Ideology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Military Dictatorship</td>
<td>Peronism (Corporatist)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Pinchet</td>
<td>Right-Wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1958 (?)</td>
<td>Military Dictatorship</td>
<td>Right-Wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>1978 (?)</td>
<td>Military Dictatorship</td>
<td>Trujillo (Right-Wing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1985 (?)</td>
<td>Military Dictatorship</td>
<td>Right-Wing</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1981-1992: Civil War</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Military Dictatorship</td>
<td>Right-Wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Ignore Fujimori)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Civilian Military Regime</td>
<td>Right-Wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Military Junta</td>
<td>Right-Wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Military Junta</td>
<td>Right-Wing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1979</td>
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<td>Nicaragua</td>
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<td>(Ambivalent)</td>
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<td>1991</td>
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<td>1974</td>
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<td>Right-Wing</td>
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<td>1975</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1978</td>
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<td>Right-Wing</td>
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Figure A.1: Including Economic Indicators
Figure A.2: Including Economic Indicators
Figure A.3: Leaving one Country out: Left-Wing Dictatorships
Figure A.4: Leaving one Country out: Right-Wing Dictatorships ($c = 1975$)
Figure A.5: Left-Wing: Binary Outcome
Figure A.6: Right-Wing: Binary Outcome