

Dual Mandates, Patronage, and Partisanship: Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design in France

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How does simultaneously holding two elected offices affect legislator behavior in a new democracy? Multiple office holding, or a dual mandate, speaks to an important debate regarding politician accountability: proponents argue this institution improves local representation, while opponents argue it reduces legislator productivity and national partisan attachments. In this paper, I use a regression discontinuity to provide causal evidence on the effects of multiple office holding in the French Third Republic (1870-1940). I find that dual mandate deputies were equally productive but were less likely to invest in early party institutions. Using the infamous separation of Church and State legislation in 1905, I also show they were more accountable to their local level. Finally, I demonstrate partisan investment is strengthened with reforms that give selective incentives to parties. While strong parties and dual mandates are institutional substitutes in achieving accountability, multiple office holding comes at the cost of undermining early political parties.

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1 Introduction

This paper studies the behavioral consequences of a specific channel of independent resources for a politician provided by multiple office-holding, more commonly called a ‘dual mandate.’ This institution allows an individual to *simultaneously* hold a local elected position and a national legislative post (for example, if a person is both a mayor and a legislator). A dual mandate ensures, among other things, a steady supply of resources essential for reelection, including control over local government funding and jobs, access to manpower and voter networks, and a regional reputation. Accumulating multiple elected offices is a democratic institution with a number of advantages and disadvantages, and understanding how vertical linkages affect politician incentives is relevant to many types of decentralization and local governance reforms. But are dual mandates beneficial, in allowing for better local representation and accountability, or do they reduce legislative effort and unfairly entrench elites?

While France, the focus of this study, is most typically remembered for its frequency of dual mandates, the practice is common elsewhere – Germany, Belgium, Finland, Ireland, UK, Denmark, Italy, Luxembourg, Hungary, Slovakia, and Israel all allow for multiple office-holding, and even more countries permit the practice at subnational levels. Historically, dual mandates have also played a role in the political development of the European Union, Ukraine, Canada, Hong Kong, and a large number of the states in the US. Further, this study is motivated by the fact that this institution is being increasingly advocated for new democracies or those with weak party systems.¹ Institutions that promote vertical linkages could be a solution for countries wishing to promote integration or accountability, and dual mandates have been defended as a “pro-democratic” institution (Navarro 2009, Borchert 2003). Recently, dual mandates were advocated as policy tool in order to improve turnout and confer legitimacy to the parliament of the European Union (Lelieveldt 2014).

¹Meanwhile, qualitative studies from Hungary and Slovenia also suggest that dual mandates may be particularly influential in countries with weak party systems (Zagorc 2008, Varnagy 2012).

The use of dual mandates speaks to an important debate in political science regarding politician accountability, yet there is a vastly understudied tradeoff in this specific institutional design. Policy advocates argue that dual mandates increase a national politician's accountability to the voter. Holding a local office fosters a closer link between a national politician and his constituency, ensuring that local interests are represented nationally. In turn, this linkage encourages voter participation and turnout, improving the ability of voters to hold their politician accountable. Opponents of this institution, however, argue that dual mandates can have negative effects on a politician's legislative effort, by increasing absenteeism and decreasing legislative productivity. Further, such independent bases of support could potentially advantage an individual politician at the expense of a party, insulating politicians from party discipline. This could unfairly advantage elites and reduce their accountability to political parties and platforms at the national level. Thus there is an inherent tension in multiple office holding – this institution could increase local representation for a district, but at the expense of either national legislator effort or partisan attachments.

This paper focuses on the effect of electing a national politician who already holds a local office on legislative outcomes relating to partisanship, representation, and legislator effort. To do so, I examine the case of the French Third Republic, during its formative years of party institutionalization between 1881 and 1919. In this France provides an ideal test for the effect of multiple office holding in a new democracy. The era was characterized by both weak party organizations and a strong legislature, and featured a pivotal subset of independently resourced elites – between 30-60% of deputies in the National Assembly held dual mandates (in French, *cumul des mandats*), and this practice was distributed across party groups and social classes. Universal suffrage had already been achieved and voter turnout was exceptionally high, over 70%, suggesting voters were engaged and could potentially monitor or hold their politicians accountable. In addition, during this time the Chamber of Deputies featured a period of voting on legislative reforms that empowered party institutions, allowing for a precise and novel measure of party investment, in addition to standard measures of voting cohesion.

Yet identification is a significant challenge in studying political behavior as a result of a dual mandate. Multiple office-holding is not randomly allocated across French deputies, and even more importantly, districts that elect a candidate with a preexisting local office are also likely to differ markedly from those that elect less resourced candidates. Therefore I evaluate the effect of dual mandates on legislative outcomes in a quasi-experimental framework. Following a growing literature in American politics² as well as Bach (2011) in France, I use a regression discontinuity design in the context of national legislative elections that take place in single member majoritarian districts. I estimate the effect of a district electing a candidate *with a local office* to the legislature, instead of a counterfactual candidate without a local office, on legislative outcomes for that district.

This research design is similar to studies that have used regression discontinuity designs to estimate the effect of narrowly electing a female candidate in close elections between women and men (Balhotra et al. 2017), or electing a Hispanic candidate in narrow races between Hispanic and non-Hispanic candidates (Fang 2016). It departs from traditional incumbency advantage studies in that the treatment is the *election* of a certain type of politician (a local office holder). This allows me to focus on a fundamentally different research question, which is not how the local office affected the individual, but how the choice of a district to elect a certain type of politician (instead of a counterfactual different type) affects legislative outcomes for that district. Crucially, this allows me to hold district and electoral contexts constant, to study how in competitive environments national behavior might be conditioned by a local office.

I find strong support for the hypothesis that politicians holding two offices are less likely to invest in partisan endeavors. Holding two offices decreases the frequency with which the deputy votes with their chosen party, as measured using yearly roll call votes of redistributive bills. Dual mandate deputies are much less likely to support institutional reforms that strengthened fledgling party institutions. I also consider how the election of a dual mandate holder impacts legislative effort. I demonstrate that there is no effect on rates of absenteeism or bill sponsorship, suggesting that dual mandate deputies exert as much effort as their non

²Lee 2008, Caughey and Sekhon 2011, Eggers et al. 2014, Fang 2016 among others.

local office holding counterparts. In addition, I provide non-causal but suggestive evidence that strong parties can negate this effect with selective incentives, by examining how newly introduced partisan control of committee assignments affected cohesion.

Further, to examine the effect on representation, I use a historically significant and contentious bill on the separation of church and state in 1905 to show that dual mandate deputies were more likely to break party ranks in favor of district preferences, demonstrating the salience of constituency ties for deputies with dual mandates. Finally, existing empirical evidence has shown a link between multiple office holding and both depressed electoral competition and incumbency; as a robustness check, I verify that my partisan results are not being driven by an incumbency effect. In sum, these findings suggest that strong parties and dual mandates may be potential substitutes in terms of achieving accountability, but the adoption of such an institution in a new democracy may come at the cost of undermining early political parties.

The next section reviews the theoretical expectations behind multiple office-holding, while Section 3 discusses the context of dual mandates in the French Third Republic. Section 4 outlines the regression discontinuity design and the data; Section 5 presents results and robustness checks, and Section 6 concludes.

2 Theoretical Expectations

The goal of this paper is to analyze how multiple office holding affects channels of accountability, in the context of a new democracy. There is no doubt that the addition of a local office advantages national politicians. To a national candidate, an additional local office provides access to government resources and staff that could be used in campaigning; it conveys local prestige and influence; it provides a source for information; it attracts financial support; and it effectively deters electoral competition (Knapp 1991, Navarro 2009). Subnational office holders often control numerous sources of patronage, including municipal jobs or contracts, and can determine the direction of area funding. Importantly, access to these local government resources is not de facto controlled by party organizations. As a result,

we would expect individuals with access to local and institutionalized patronage – as opposed to personal wealth or reputation – to behave differently than less resourced candidates. Here, I first explore the theoretical predictions for the relationship between dual mandates and elite partisanship, and then discuss expectations for legislator effort, in terms of both representation and productivity.

Elite Partisanship

One goal of this paper is to understand how individual access to state patronage affects elite partisanship, in a weak party system. Strong parties are critical for the proper functioning of a newly established democracy.³ Yet the strength of a party depends on its ability to incentivize legislators – parties can distribute financial resources, legislative office, and a party label in exchange for loyal and cohesive behavior (Aldrich 1995, Schelsinger 1966). Individuals with access to local patronage, however, are much harder to discipline. Dual mandates have been argued to effectively create an “elite within an elite” (Navarro, 2009), because this institution could potentially advantage an individual politician at the expense of a party. In fact, local office can often be secured for long periods of time, and it provides a consistent base from which to enter and exit national politics (even further insulating a candidate from partisan control). Particularly in a new democracy, where parties are less established and have fewer incentives, personal resources could easily undermine investment in early political parties.

Prior research has mixed expectations regarding how access to independent resources affects partisanship. On the one hand, a number of previous studies have shown that individual control of patronage or personal wealth leads to dissent in legislative voting (Moser 1999, Reuter 2010, Nalepa and Carroll 2013) or weakly institutionalized parties (Kirchheimer 1966, Shefter 1977, Samuels 1999, Tavits 2009). On the other hand, political assets aren’t necessarily anathema to partisan behavior. Instead, local notables could be the building blocks of party organizations (Ostrogorski 1902, Hale 1999, Randall and Svasand 2002,

³Strong and cohesive parties lead to greater accountability and further party institutionalization (Mainwaring and Scully 2005), and even regime stability (Linz 2000, Carey 2009).

Trounstine 2008), and a maverick politician who can consistently deliver votes could expect a fruitful career in a political party.

Much of the existing research on dual mandates focuses primarily on the contemporary French National Assembly.⁴ In terms of studying effects on partisanship, modern day France is perhaps a less compelling case; not only are party organizations established, but over 90% of deputies hold a local office, making it difficult to isolate the effect of electing such deputies. Still, observational studies have shown that national candidates with a local office face less competitive races, suggesting such resources depress local competition and provide a significant electoral advantage (Francois 2006, Foucault 2006). Dewoghelaere et al. (2006) and Costa and Kerrouche (2009) also argue dual mandates are a result of the weakness of modern French parties, in that since parties can't provide resources, national candidates compensate by picking up a local office. In Hungary, Chiru (2015) finds that dual mandate holders in 2010 campaigned on personalistic platforms and suggests this might undermine partisan cohesion, but doesn't explicitly test party line rebellion.

Here I examine how dual mandates affect two salient dimensions of early political development: party voting cohesion, and the support of institutional reforms that strengthen parties. I focus on two simple, testable hypotheses. First, that national politicians with a local office are less likely to consistently vote with their chosen party, and second, these same politicians are more likely to vote against party-strengthening institutional reforms.

The intuition behind these predictions is straightforward. Independent bases of support, such as dual mandates, insulate politicians. They provide political entrepreneurs with the means to build up careers at the expense of the party, and access to such resources lowers the cost of dissidence to an individual deputy (Carey and Shugart 1995, Mainwaring and Scully 1995, Warner 1997). Particularly in the context of a weak party system, where parties have fewer resources with which to incentivize cohesion, legislators with a local office are less willing to endure party discipline. Similarly, this is why these same politicians are more likely to vote against party-strengthening institutional reforms. Since they have an independent

⁴Chiru (2015) and Várnagy (2012) in Hungary, Zagorc (2008) in Slovenia, and a nice comparative study of France, Germany, and others by Navarro (2009) are the exceptions.

source of electoral support, national legislators with a local office have a lesser need to invest in party institutional control, and are less willing to accept permanent or formal partisan constraints on legislative behavior.

Legislator Effort

The second goal of this paper is to understand how dual mandates affect legislator effort. One benefit attributed to multiple office holding is its ability to improve representation. A dual mandate incentivizes an electoral connection in which legislators are not only responsible to but also reliant on the specific patronage network of their local office. Local expectations and accountability may then be higher – for example, voters who elected their mayor as their national politician will expect to receive more benefits (or first priority) compared to other towns in their district. This is similar to the personal vote seeking logic (Mayhew 1974 and Shugart and Carey 1992). It also echoes studies that find legislators will prioritize local financiers at the expense of the party (Besley et al 2006, Gagliarducci et al. 2011), and that actors are bound by local ties in multi-level interactions (Putnam 1988). Further, because of the local office, national dual mandate holders may also be better informed about the preferences of their district. As a result, we can hypothesize that dual mandate holders are more likely to pursue policies that are representative of their local supporters.

However, multiple office holding may come at a cost for voters. A deputy who is allocating his time across two levels of government in two different geographical locations could easily have higher rates of absenteeism, and lower rates of participation in legislative bill production, committee service, or other parliamentary activities. In this, the national and local mandates could be at odds. Navarro’s (2009) surveys of multiple office holding in the European Parliament (1999-2004) and the German Bundestag in 2005 provided empirical evidence that dual mandate holders write fewer legislative reports, give fewer speeches, and are less likely to take on leadership positions.

In contemporary France, in terms of legislative effort, prior research has returned contradicting results. There is evidence to suggest a local office negatively impacts national

activity. Bach (2011) shows that winning a mayoral office reduces committee attendance, but doesn't impact constituency-related activities such as casework. Sauger (2009) found no effect on roll call voting, and Francois and Weil (2014) find dual mandates actually increase a deputy's parliamentary activity. Brouard (2013) uses survey data to show that multiple office holding has no effect on attitudes towards constituency service, and in fact, deputies without a local office are more likely to express the need to bring home additional resources in the form of pork for their districts, in order to compensate for their lack of local involvement. As a result, the theoretical predictions are less clear, and so I test whether or not multiple office holding has a negative impact on legislator effort.

3 *Cumul-des-Mandats* in France, 1881-1919

The ability to hold multiple offices predated the Third Republic, and was born out of both the post-Revolution attempt to dismantle regional identities and the Napoleonic desire to centralize the French state. Crucially, at the time *cumul des mandats* was actually regarded as a democracy-enhancing institution, important for local representation and essential to preserve regime stability (Marrel 2003, Caille 2000 in Navarro 2009).

This was in part because from 1881-1919, the French Third Republic saw a lengthy transition from purposefully weak parliamentary groups to relatively coherent and organized parties. For much of this period, party groups in the National Assembly had no role in vetting candidates who stood for election, and candidates came forward on their own initiative or under the sponsorship of short-lived local committees (Cole and Campbell 1989). Within the legislature, parliamentary groups had no formal rights or responsibilities, though they were surprisingly cohesive and were managed by leadership committees that helped coordinate legislative activity.

Further, the electoral law incorporated over 600 single member districts and a second ballot, and legislative elections took place in districts as small as 2,000, which encouraged local and personalistic politics (Brouard et al. 2003, Kreuzer 2001). By 1884, departmental and municipal councils were elected by universal manhood suffrage, and multiple office hold-

ing took on a new and democratic dimension. This ability to accumulate national and local office via popular vote resulted in a culture of local politics based on clientelism, personal relations, and social prestige – as Gambetta wrote, “*C’est introduire la politique au village*” (Weber 1976, Cole and John 2001).

The key advantage of the dual mandate system was the ability of the local politician to build a patronage network. Departmental and mayoral councils were responsible for local infrastructure and public goods, education, and subsidies for school fees and poverty-based welfare (McPhee 2004, Weber 1976). Once elected nationally, deputies could uniquely intervene at various levels of government – municipal, departmental, and in Paris – to direct state funding, contracts, and jobs to supporters. National candidates would frequently co-opt local officials and resources to campaign on their behalf (La Groye and Wright 1979), and such elites also had both reputation and name recognition not easily matched by a challenger new to local politics. Importantly, due to the centralization of the French state, the powers and responsibilities of a mayor or councilor were consistent across regions, particularly when it came to allocating government funding and jobs. As a result, the system of dual mandates in the French case provides a unique and consistent measure of independent political resources across deputies.

Local office was a common stepping stone to a national career. Figure 1 shows the percentage of deputies with a dual mandate per term; averaging 47% across all terms, but ranging from a low of 36% in 1885 to almost 70% in 1906.⁵ Each column is also divided by type of local office also held by the national politician. Administratively, France was divided into over 80 departments, further divided into municipal subunits (such as communes, arrondissements, and voting districts). The majority of local offices held were that of departmental councilor, though a small percentage were mayors. Local elections were non-concurrent with national elections, and thus an ambitious politician could obtain a local office before the legislative election (and then keep this post while serving his national

⁵Note the 1889 term is absent; the 1889 election results are physically missing from the French National Library.

term).⁶ This also provided a career safety net; while national careers were typically short (1-2 terms, or five to ten years), local careers could span for decades.




Figure 1: % of Dual Mandates, By Term

Who were the deputies holding dual mandates? Summary statistics can be found in Table 1. On the surface, there are similar patterns of political experience and age, as well as district size, between dual mandate deputies and non dual mandate deputies. Differences do arise in wealth, as measured by land ownership, and urban districts – multiple office holders were slightly more likely to be wealthy, and live in rural districts (which were also overrepresented in the legislature, at this time). Unsurprisingly, the biggest differences relate to an electoral advantage. On average, local office holders faced larger margins of victory, fewer candidates, and were less likely to face a second ballot in the national election.

⁶It was also possible to hold more than two positions; about 4% of the dataset held three or more posts, but there are no significant differences in behavior and these are treated the same as those who held two.

Table 1: Full Dataset Means, Elected Deputies: 1881-1919

		FULL	DUAL	NO DUAL
DEPUTY	Incumbent (0/1)	0.62	0.61	0.63
	Age	48.7	49.4	47.9
	Landowner (0/1)	0.13	0.16	0.10
DISTRICT	Size	19,301	19,501	19,081
	Urban (pp/km)	110.70	103.19	119.17
NAT'L ELECTION	% Margin	27.04	28.92	24.97
	# Candidates	3.02	2.89	3.17
	Second Ballot (0/1)	0.31	0.29	0.33
<i>Observations</i>		3,518	1,844	1,674

Columns represent the full sample, only dual mandate holders, and only non dual mandate holders. District size is measured by number of registered voters, and Urban is measured using population density (person per sq. km.).

Table 2 also shows the average distribution of dual mandates by party grouping, from 1902 (the first term at which single affiliations in parliamentary groups could be reliably identified) to 1914. Notably, multiple office-holding is consistently and similarly present in all parties, regardless of their organization or ideology. It doesn't seem to be case that party organizational weakness encouraged the accumulation of mandates (in contrast to Dewagolhere et al. 2006), otherwise we would expect to see much larger variation across groups. Socialists do have fewer dual mandates, mainly due to convention. Overall, holding two offices was distributed across many socio-demographic characteristics.

Table 2: Average % of Dual Mandate Deputies in Each Party Group, 1902-1919

RIGHT	PROGRESSIVES	RADICALS	RAD-SOC	SOCIALIST
48.5	52.1	54.9	52.9	34.4

Local office holders were area notables, and fledgling party organizations actively sought the membership of deputies holding local or regional office. For example, both the governments of Floquet in 1889 and Waldeck-Rousseau in 1900 convened lavish yearly banquets for hundreds of the most prominent mayors of France in order to solicit their support (Duby 1976). Yet historical evidence suggests deputies with dual mandates shunned party organizational innovations that would have limited their autonomy (Kreuzer 2001, Huard 2006). In a more concrete example, the evidence is stark when looking at the composition of partisan governing committees.⁷ From 1893-1914, of the approximately 200 leadership posts, only 3% of party official positions were held by deputies who were also mayors, and only 27% were held by deputies who were also departmental councilors.

Finally, one strength of the French case lies in a contentious period of reform in the first decade of the 20th century, in which legislators initiated bills giving significant legislative and electoral responsibilities to parties. The first was the Associations Law of 1901, or the *Loi du 1er juillet 1901 relative au contrat d'association*, which gave legal existence and rights to political associations outside the legislature, and was the beginning of partisan organization (Hanley, 2006).⁸ Then in 1902 and 1910, two bills were passed giving parliamentary groups control over committee assignments; and in 1906, an electoral reform to enact proportional representation with party lists narrowly failed. Table 3 summarizes the relevant legislation.

Dual mandate holders were often opponents of such reforms, precisely because they either gave parties selective incentives by which to enforce discipline or, as in the case of the Associations law, the ability of parties to start building competing electoral technology. These four key reforms, over four legislative terms, result in the novel ability to measure individual and systematic preferences for the strengthening of party institutions, over time. The next section details the data and empirical strategy.

⁷A partisan governing committee would consist of 3-6 members and, depending on the party, include some combination of a founder, president, vice president, secretary, representative, rapporteur, or questeur.

⁸Before this, political organizations were illegal, though it wasn't enforced; see Scarrow, 2006.

Table 3: Party Reforms, 1901-1910

TERM	YEAR	REFORM	OUTCOME
1898	1901	Legalized political associations	Passed, 305-224
1902	1902	Party control of select committee assignments	Passed, 270-244
1906	1909	Switch to proportional representation	Failed, 225-291
1910	1910	Refusing party control of all committee assignments	Failed, 196-300†

† Note: this bill was a blocking amendment that failed, hence the institutional change strengthening parties was then implemented. Vote is rescaled for the empirical analysis, such that all votes are in support of party reform.

4 Identifying the Effect of a Dual Mandate

How does electing a political candidate who holds a local office, instead of a candidate who does not, affect national legislative behavior? Identification is a significant issue in studying political outcomes as a result of electing a dual mandate deputy. Multiple office-holding is not randomly allocated across individuals, and even more importantly, districts that elect a candidate with a preexisting local office are likely to differ markedly from those that elect less resourced candidates. It is highly unlikely that typical OLS methods will adequately account for unobservables affecting local partisan or legislative preferences, and prior empirical work has largely been unable to control adequately for district and electoral characteristics, both which substantially drive elite behavior.

One solution to these empirical challenges is to employ a regression discontinuity (RD) design, a quasi-experimental identification strategy that can provide causal estimates in the absence of randomized data. This strategy hinges on identifying a treatment whose assignment is a function of a pretreatment forcing variable, and therefore ensuring the treatment and control groups are defined based on whether their values of the forcing variable are above or below a known threshold. The most common application of this research design in political science has been in the context of close elections, whose wins are “as-if” randomly assigned, to study the incumbency advantage (Lee 2008, Bach 2011, Erikson and Titiunik 2015, Eggers et al. 2014, Snyder et al 2015). The most relevant study has used a regression

discontinuity to study the causal effect of multiple office holding, in modern day France. Bach (2011) compares the behavior of politicians who win a mayoral election by a small margin with those of politicians who lose the a mayoral office by a small margin, to look at how multiple office holding affects national reelection and legislative productivity.

In order to estimate the effect of electing a dual mandate holder on district legislative outcomes, I employ a sharp regression discontinuity design. I analyze only national elections to the Chamber of Deputies; any local office held was obtained before the national election and is a pretreatment characteristic. I restrict the analysis to head-to-head races, in which only one candidate has a local office, in extremely close elections between two candidates. Using this research design, I compare the legislative behavior of local office holders who just won close national elections (against a candidate without a local office) to the behavior of legislators without a local office who narrowly won (against a dual mandate holder). In this case, the national *election of a candidate with a local office* is the treatment, and can be conceptualized “as if” randomly assigned. The close threshold of victory also allows me to control for the high quality of candidates and district characteristics found in close races, which are both potential confounders for identification.

My research design differs from Bach (2011), and from traditional incumbency advantage studies, in one significant way. In Bach’s study, the local office itself can be conceptualized as the randomly assigned treatment to study how it changed the behavior of an individual politician. In my study, the treatment is the *election* of a certain type of politician (a local office holder). This allows me to focus on a fundamentally different research question, which is not how the local office affected the individual, but how the choice of a district to elect a certain type of politician (instead of a counterfactual different type) affects legislative outcomes for that district.

This better reflects a real world choice that in a competitive electoral environment in a district, voters can choose to advance different types of candidates with various consequences for representation and effort. Particularly if we care about the tradeoff between representation and accountability, conceptually and empirically this distinction matters. In this, it

also resembles studies that have used regression discontinuity designs to estimate the effect of narrowly electing a female candidate in close elections between women and men (Balhota, et al. 2017), or electing a Hispanic candidate in narrow races between Hispanic and non-Hispanic candidates (Fang 2016), or exploiting close races to look at electoral outcomes in interracial elections in the US (Vogel, 2014).

This study takes a different approach for a number of reasons. First, once gained, a local office was also typically retained; in the context of the Third Republic, politicians could maintain the same local office for decades. If narrowly winning a mayoral race could be conceptualized as being initially randomly assigned, a decade of mayoral privilege could confound the estimation of the effect of a local office on an individual during his legislative service.⁹

Second, the features and data associated with this specific historical case rule out the design of prior studies. Mayoral and municipal elections in the 19th century were not synchronized across France, and since records were kept by local authorities (not the central government) this means systematic data is very difficult to obtain. Further, a regression discontinuity design that conceptualizes the local office as being randomly assigned requires a large number of competitive local elections.¹⁰ The results of mayoral and municipal elections that can be found also show that often, these races were not competitive (particularly in rural areas), severely limiting the implementation of the RD.

This section details the data and measurement, presents the estimation strategy, and discusses the relevant assumptions key to the research design.

⁹A study attempting this would be restricted to first time dual mandate holders and a much narrower timeframe, which is less insightful.

¹⁰Bach (2011) has a much larger sample because districts are much larger and more competitive today, and local elections rotate at specified intervals; thus there is a very large number of cases where local election results evolve around the majority threshold.

Data

The dataset contains information corresponding to legislators in the *Chambre des députés*, for eight legislative terms from 1881 to 1919, though the majority of the analysis focuses on the period of legislative activity from 1898 onwards. The basic unit of the dataset is deputy-term, with deputies indexed by i and time periods (legislative terms and their corresponding elections) by t .

The main explanatory variable of interest is DUAL MANDATE, an indicator variable for whether the deputy held a local office at the time of the national election, and throughout the respective term. Local office included mayors, departmental councilors, and municipal councilors. This information was initially assembled from the government-published election results, in the *Tableau des élections la Chambre des députés*, then was checked against a number of other sources.

Key to the analysis in this paper is the ability to record the specific party group of a deputy at a given time, opposed to his average ideological leaning – many of the studies of the Third Republic rely on party classifications that are ex-post, recording the career tendency of a deputy instead of term by term group membership (which inflates cohesion scores and other measures, see Sauger 2009). Instead, I provide an extensively researched set of partisan affiliations using primary sources of the era. Here I coded partisanship as specifically as possible, by term, and made sure to separate splinter and faction groups.

The dataset also includes covariates on legislator background, election results, and constituency characteristics for each term. This includes whether the deputy was an incumbent (had served the prior term), his age, whether he was landholding (proxying for wealth, specifically upper class), the district size (number of registered voters), whether the district was urban (measured by population density), and measures of how competitive his most recent legislative race was (measured by number of candidates and whether it was a second ballot).

4.0.1 Measuring Elite Partisanship

Preferences for party investment are measured in two ways. First, I measure the extent to which a deputy is independent using roll call voting cohesion. The dependent variable COHESION measures the percentage of time a deputy voted with his chosen party on key redistributive roll call votes (of the total votes he participated in), for the 1902, 1906, 1910, and 1914 terms. The variable ranges from 0 to 100, and the higher the score, the *more loyal* the individual deputy. Following prior and recent work on French legislative and budgetary politics,¹¹ I removed from the analysis uncontentious votes (with margins over 250 votes). Budget chapter votes not only had significant implications for redistribution in this era, but these bills occur annually in every term throughout the period studied, providing a consistent and comparable outcome variable.


Given the fluid nature of the party system, I conservatively code dissent as voting against a supermajority (66%) of the party. In a weak party system, a simple majority threshold is less reliable and less informative – at 51%, the party position is less clear and dissent is much less costly, confounding the analysis. Furthermore, independents are excluded; it was not necessary to nominally join a party to achieve legislative goals, meaning voting cohesion accurately measures only deputies who explicitly chose to belong to a group and then defected. Dual mandate deputies were no more likely to be independents.

Roll call votes provide a good measure of voting cohesion (Carey 2000, Eggers and Spirling 2014), and given the lack of discipline and weak party system, roll call votes can plausibly be considered informative. In voting on legislative bills, party groups as coded were relatively distinct and often small (from 50 to 150), so deputies established a reasonable pattern of cohesive voting – of the redistributive budget bills analyzed in this study, the average deputy only voted against his chosen party 17% of the time (with a standard deviation of 14%). As theorized, holding a dual mandate should have a negative effect on cohesive voting.

¹¹See Huber 1996 or Cox 2016.

Figure 2 provides evidence that deputies with dual mandates undermine party cohesion. It plots RICE¹² cohesion scores of each party against the percentage of dual mandates, for each party in each term. While not causal, it suggests that multiple office-holding negatively affected partisan voting patterns.

Figure 2: Party Voting Cohesion, by % of Dual Mandate Deputies



Parties are as follows: AL: Action Libérale, D: Droite, PRG: Rep. Progressistes, RAD: radical parties, GR: Gauche Radicale, ARD: Republicains de Gauche, RS: Radical-socialistes, SOC: Socialistes

I also measure preferences for strengthening parties using voting for or against key legislative reforms designed to give institutional responsibilities and selective incentives to parties. The dependent variable REFORM is a dichotomous variable that takes a value of 1 if a deputy voted in favor of party reform i occurring in term t . The reforms include the 1901 Associations law, which occurred in the 1898 term; the reforms giving partisan control over committee assignments in 1902 and 1910, occurring in the 1902 and 1910 terms; and the

¹²RICE scores are calculated as $RICE_{ij} = \frac{\|AY_{E_{ij}} - NAY_{i,j}\|}{AY_{E_{ij}} + NAY_{i,j}}$ for party i on vote j , averaged across all votes (Rice 1925, Carey 2009).

failed bill to switch to proportional representation in 1909, occurring in the 1906 term.¹³ As the unit of observation is deputy-term, the sample separately includes every time a deputy voted on a reform (the votes are not pooled or indexed).

4.0.2 Measuring Legislator Effort

I analyze legislator effort by looking both at legislator productivity, as measured by bill sponsorship and absenteeism in roll call voting, and representation. Legislative productivity is measured using time series data on bill sponsorship during the Third Republic. At the time, deputies retained individual initiative in proposing any type of bill to the floor, and had both legislative and electoral reasons to be proactive in drafting policy or pork legislation. I employ a dataset that lists every bill and its sponsors proposed to the Chamber of Deputies each year, covering a number of substantive topics (such as the budget, economics, social welfare), as well as agenda setting motions and votes of no confidence. I construct a continuous variable to measure the number of bills a deputy sponsored in a given term; on average deputies sponsor one bill a term. Absenteeism is coded as a continuous variable based on the same set of budget roll call votes used to construct voting cohesion, since these final votes were salient and would properly measure attendance. I examine participation rates by looking at the percentage of budget votes in which a deputy was present and voting; on average deputies were present and voting for 75% of budget bills in a term.

Measuring representation is challenging; it requires a reliable measure of voter preferences, and a situation where a deputy would have to explicitly choose to pursue those local preferences over national partisan platforms. I attempt to exploit a historically significant event in French history, in which plausibly both these constraints hold. I analyze the passage of one of the most significant sets of French legislation in the 20th century: the separation of church and state in 1905. This was a highly contentious event, which ended state funding of religious groups and confiscated church property. In fact, not only did this formally established secularism (*laïcité*) in France, but this law has remained virtually unchallenged

¹³If the bill was a blocking amendment; it is rescaled such that the value 1 is in support of the party reform.

to this day. It is also a plausible test of a partisan versus constituency tradeoff. This was one of the defining issues of the Third Republic, and party groups had clear stances on the issue of secularism (Hanley, 2006). Catholic district variables can also provide a clear proxy for voter preferences – Catholic voters would be firmly against this legislation.

Put together, I can estimate if a dual mandate holder facing Catholic constituency demands would be more likely to vote against his party on this defining piece of legislation. As a measure of constituency pressures, I use number of Catholic personnel employed by the Catholic church in 1902 (from clergy to clerk) in a department as reported in the *Annuaire statistique de la France*. Population data on Catholics in 1905 isn't available; the most reliable measure on number of Catholics in a district dates back to 1872, which I include as a control. Importantly, deputies with a local office were not more likely to preside over Catholic districts. The outcome variable is an indicator for voting *against* their party's position on the 1905 legislation (note, this does not measure voting for the reform itself). This is an individual measure of breaking ranks, in order to represent the preferences of voters in a deputy's district.

Regression Discontinuity Design and Assumptions

The regression equation for the RD is as follows:

$$y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{DualMandateWin}_{i,t} + f(\text{Margin}_{i,t}) + \chi_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t} \quad (1)$$

where *Dual Mandate Win* is the treatment variable, equal to 1 if the candidate with a local office i won the national election for the legislative term at time t . Then y_{it} is the legislative outcome variable for deputy i (and also his district, since France had single member districts) in time t , and is either a continuous measure of voting cohesion or a dichotomous measure of voting for reform. χ_{it} includes term fixed effects.

The term $f(\text{Margin})$ is a function of the forcing variable, the winning margin of victory for the candidate with the local office. This is defined as the vote share of the candidate

with the local office minus the vote share of his strongest opponent (without a local office), over the total vote share. Thus the threshold for the treatment is 0; if the margin is positive, the district elected a local office holder, if negative, the district elected a candidate with no additional office. Both first and second rounds are included.¹⁴

In order to identify the causal effect of a dual mandate, it is essential to subset the data to those elections involving a candidate with a local office competing against a candidate without (this provides the as-if random assignment). This is the most challenging aspect of data collection; information on losing candidates is restricted to their surname, vote share, and district. This means archival research is required to identify the losing candidate, as well as whether they have a local office and whether they were the incumbent deputy. Fortunately, politicians constantly ran for office, meaning about half of losing candidates enter the dataset at one point in time (allowing for clear identification). Also, the RD sample is of very close elections, which are more likely to be covered in the local newspapers or parliamentary debates of the time, which were accessed through archival research. I also only use races with two candidates. The single member districts and second ballot electoral law, however, means that the overwhelming majority of races had only two candidates.

In doing so, the RD sample excludes races in which two local office holders competed against each other, and races where neither candidate had a local office. Relying on head to head races does limit the sample size; of all races, 48% of them were head to head, 20% saw no candidates with local office, 18% saw two local office holders compete, and the rest were unable to be determined. In the set of specifications presented in the next section, the sample consist of 101 elections at the lowest bandwidth, and 208 at the highest. In terms of external validity, head to head races weren't systematically different from the other types of races within the competitive RD sample (a 5 percentage point margin). Table 9 in the appendix shows summary statistics for the three types of races, across both district and

¹⁴In France, while the majority of elections during this period were decisively decided in the first round at a 51% threshold, around 30% of races were decided by a plurality second round. Yet during this era both rounds had on average 2.1 effective number of candidates and plurality winning vote shares close to 50%, and the risk of hiding heterogeneity in candidate competition across first and second ballot is low by pooling rounds (Cattaneo et al, 2015). Covariate sensitivity specifications control for second ballot.

candidate characteristics.

This research design also successfully identifies the effect of electing a local office holder, the local average treatment effect (LATE), on a very specific subsample of close elections. Yet competitive races were a significant portion of total races; 50% of races were decided by 15% margin, and a quarter were decided by a 7% margin. This is also theoretically the most relevant population; at the tails of the distribution, deputies winning by immense margins are most likely indifferent to partisan behavior or reelection, given the safeness of their seat, while deputies in close races will have a vested interest.

Specification and Bandwidths

The primary specification is a local linear regression estimated separately on each side of the discontinuity, with a triangular edge kernel and robust standard errors and confidence intervals. I use a set of bandwidths commonly used in the literature on regression discontinuity in close legislative elections (see Eggers, et al. 2014), presenting specifications with 5 percentage points and 3 percentage points.¹⁵ I also include a specification with an optimal bandwidth estimated using the method by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) (hereafter referred to as the IK bandwidth). Local polynomial estimations, both quadratic and cubic, are included as a robustness check, and the partisan results are plotted under varying bandwidths in Figure 10.

RD Assumptions

Identification under this research design requires that variation in treatment near the discontinuity is random, as if from a randomized experiment, and also requires that individuals cannot manipulate or selectively sort across the threshold. First, this means that all relevant pretreatment covariates should be similar on either side of the election threshold, and all other unobserved determinants of legislative behavior are continuously related to the forcing variable. In particular, given the research design, it is important to show that district-level

¹⁵At 2 percentage points my sample is unsustainably small.

covariates are continuous. Variables relating to electoral competition are restricted by definition in the RD design, for all races involved two candidates within a small margin of victory. While the treatment isn't identified at the individual level, I also show that many individual candidate covariates are continuous across the threshold.

Figure 3 and Figure 4 graphically plot pretreatment covariates. In addition, following the RD literature (Caughey and Seton 2011, Eggers et al 2014), I present covariate balance tests in Table 7 and Table 8 of the appendix. The sample is well balanced save for two variables: incumbent and age are significant with respect to reforms, and incumbency and age are correlated. As a robustness check, these are included in specifications controlling for deputy characteristics, and I also separately estimate the effect of electing an incumbent on behavior.

Furthermore, there is also no evidence of sorting. The McCrary test, testing that the difference in the log heights of the density of the forcing variable at the threshold is zero, and graphical analysis of the density of the observations at the threshold show no evidence of manipulation (see appendix Table 9). However, given the fact that local office holders controlled district administration, as well as new research documenting the extent of electoral fraud in 20th century Europe (Mares 2015), sorting may be more of a concern in this context than in modern day RD designs. In the appendix, I find no evidence for fraud at the threshold.




Figure 3: Pre-treatment Covariates, District




Figure 4: Pre-treatment Covariates, Individual

5 Results

Partisanship

In this section, I present RD estimates for the effect of electing a legislative candidate with a local office (over a candidate without) on his rate of voting cohesively with his party, and the probability he will vote for party-strengthening reforms. As hypothesized earlier, dual mandates should have a negative effect on both outcome variables, which is precisely what we see in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Discontinuities in Main Outcomes




Table 4 presents the main results, for both outcome variables. All specifications are local linear, using bandwidths of 3%, 5% and the IK optimal bandwidth for each outcome. It clearly demonstrates a negative and statistically significant effect of multiple office-holding on partisan legislative behavior. As shown in columns (1)-(3), electing a candidate with a local office results in an 8.2 to 10.2 percentage point *decrease* in the frequency with which a deputy votes cohesively with his chosen party. Given that the average individual cohesion is 83%, the magnitude of this coefficient is meaningful. More generally, a degree of voting dissension is normal, even in systems with strong parties (Kam, 2011). But systematic voting dissension by a specific group of legislators is not, and this shows that districts that

elected dual mandate deputies consistently saw lower levels of cohesive behavior, across a meaningful number of roll call votes and across different terms.

Table 4: RD Estimates of the Effect of Electing a Dual Mandate Candidate on Partisan Outcomes, National Assembly 1898-1919

	(1) Cohesion	(2) Cohesion	(3) Cohesion	(4) Reform	(5) Reform	(6) Reform
Dual Mandate Win	-8.22* (4.49)	-10.16*** (3.62)	-9.72*** (3.48)	-0.46** (0.20)	-0.39** (0.16)	-0.44** (0.18)
Observations	109	184	208	101	176	134
RD Bandwidth	.03	.05	IK=.056	.03	.05	IK=.039


Specification is local linear with triangular edge kernel and robust confidence intervals. Specifications include term dummies. Voting cohesion covers years 1902-1919, Reform covers years 1898-1910. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

There is also a negative effect on reform voting. Estimates in columns (4)-(6) show a 39-46 percentage point decrease in the probability a dual mandate deputy votes in support of party reform (an indicator variable), significant across all bandwidths. Consistently during the period of reform responsible for spurring party development, from 1898-1910, dual mandate deputies were strongly against legalizing parties, giving them control over the legislative committee system, or moving to an electoral system that gave parties control over the nomination process. This finding also confirms historical analysis of multiple office holding in the Third Republic (Marrel 2003). Furthermore, this is substantively a very large effect. Thus politicians with independent political resources resoundingly reject partisan institutional constraints on behavior.

Legislator Effort

In this section, I present RD estimates for the effect of multiple office holding on legislative effort. One concern with the institution of dual mandates relates to rates of absenteeism. It is possible that deputies with a dual mandate, by focusing their efforts on two levels of government at once, were more likely to have lower participation rates in legislative activity. In fact, Bach (2011) used a regression discontinuity design to show this was the case in present day France. I also use the RD to estimate participation rates, using the same empirical strategy and participation as the outcome. When doing so, there are absolutely no significant effects of electing a dual mandate candidate on participation, as shown in Figure 6.


Figure 6: RD Estimates of Roll Call Voting Participation



Specification is local linear with triangular edge kernel and robust confidence intervals. Specifications include term dummies. Participation covers years 1902-1919. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Next, I consider sponsorship. If deputies can get reelected using their local patronage networks, they may not need to expend effort producing national legislation. Figure 7 examines whether dual mandate holders are more likely to sponsor a bill. Yet there is no difference in national legislative productivity associated with local office holders, compared to non local office holders. Overall, dual mandate holders are no less likely to attend or sponsor legislation, indicating multiple office holding did not affect legislative productivity.

Figure 7: RD Estimates of Bill Sponsorship



Specification is local linear with triangular edge kernel and robust confidence intervals. Sponsorship covers years 1881-1914.
 *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Finally, I test whether multiple office holding affected local representation. I examine to what extent the institution of multiple office holding fosters an even closer constituency link, such that politicians will prioritize their local machine over their party. If the mechanism driving dual mandate deputy behavior is stronger constituency links, then an ideal test would be a situation in which partisan organizations took a clear position on an issue that conflicted with constituency demands. Theoretical predictions indicate that deputies holding local office should be more likely to prioritize their constituency over their party affiliation.

I use a 1905 law reflecting the separation of church and state, which forced deputies to choose whether to support their party or their district preferences. This was a significant and contentious historical event, that provides clear party positions and voter preferences as a function of the Catholic presence in a deputy's constituency. In the case where a political party and deputy's district were in conflict, I can estimate which the deputy chose to support. Will a dual mandate deputy in a Catholic district be more likely to break party lines?

This result cannot be estimated in the RD framework, given that it is a cross section of the 1902 term. Instead, I use a logistic regression with a full set of controls. Table 5 regresses dual mandate status, Catholic constituency, and the interaction between the two on breaking party ranks. There is no independent and direct effect of either dual mandate or Catholic district on a deputy voting against his chosen party's position. Instead, the interaction term is positive and statistically significant though small: the association between being a dual mandate holder and voting against their party depended on the Catholic presence in their district.

Table 5: Dissension in 1905 Church and State Law

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	BROKE RANKS	BROKE RANKS	BROKE RANKS
	1905 VOTE	1905 VOTE	1905 VOTE
Dual Mandate	1.27 (0.293)	0.42 (0.278)	0.34 (0.226)
Catholic District	1.84 (1.775)	1.54 (1.477)	1.52 (1.426)
DM*Catholic		1.26* (0.164)	1.29** (0.167)
Cath 1872?	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls?	No	No	Yes
Observations	486	486	486

Logistic regression with robust standard errors, odds ratios reported. Dependent variable is voting against chosen party on 1905 law. Catholic district is measured by # of Catholic personnel by department in 1904. Controls include district size, incumbent, age, second ballot, and Catholic population in 1872. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Admittedly, this is an interesting but noisy exercise. Even though party policy positions were still quite weakly enforced, the separation of church and state was a highly divisive issue. As a result, only a quarter of the assembly chose to vote against their party for this bill, though empirically we see that the majority of those were dual mandate holders. While not causal, this tentatively suggests that dual mandate deputies, opposed to other legislators, might be particularly accountable to constituency pressures.


Personal versus Partisan Resources

While not eliminating the need for political organizations entirely, I argued that dual mandates diminish the reliance of an individual politician on a central party organization and his willingness to endure its party discipline. This paper already demonstrated that deputies with dual mandates were less likely to vote cohesively with their chosen party and vote against party strengthening reforms. But, thanks to the timing of legislative reforms, we can examine what happens to voting cohesion when party organizations gain control of a key political asset – committee assignments. If the mechanism driving dissension is independent resources, then this effect should weaken when parties can offer competing and exclusive partisan benefits.

Parliamentary groups gained full control over committee assignments in the 1910 term, meaning 1914 was the first term in which parties had true selective incentives in which to discipline. Here I replicate the main RD analysis in Table 4, but separately look at two time periods – before 1914, when parties had no resources, and then 1914, when they did. Here there is a significant change, as can be seen in Table 8.

The effect of electing a candidate with a local office pre-1914 is still negative and statistically significant, but even stronger – new estimates show a 11-12 percentage point drop in cohesion, significant at 1%. However, during 1914, this effect disappears. This suggests that parties quickly began using committee assignments to induce cohesion. Further, such powerful incentives countered the effect of independent political resources. This evidence is

Figure 8: Party Voting Cohesion, Before and After Committee Reforms



Coefficient plot of voting cohesion before 1914 (first panel) and for 1914 (second panel). Bandwidths are .03, .05, and IK, respectively.

only available for one term, for 1919 saw the switch to proportional representation and the end of WWI, which significantly changed the party system in ways outside the scope of this analysis (Hanley, 2002). Also, while 1914 was different in that it was during wartime, any push for national unity with the *Union sacrée* within the first years had dissolved mid-term (Passmore 2012). Further, only a couple of the final budget chapters related to war, allowing for reasonable analysis of general cohesion.

This suggests that in the case of weak parties, dual mandates are more likely to undermine cohesion; yet if parties have selective incentives, this may be able to mitigate the negative effects of multiple office-holding. This, taken with the earlier results, has important implications. If we care about fostering strong parties in contexts where they are weak, then dual mandates are problematic. Yet this institution is often ignored, for better or worse, when considering party development. The evidence presented here indicates multiple office holding may not be a viable policy tool for a new democracy; and if a system of dual mandates already exists, then empowering partisan institutions may be the only solution to once

more even the playing field.

Robustness Checks

In this section, I explore an alternative explanation for my main findings on partisanship, using the same empirical strategy as in the main analysis, relating to incumbency effects. It may be that local office holders, as a result of their electoral advantage, are more likely to be legislative incumbents and that previous experience or electoral security is driving legislative partisan behavior. In particular, incumbent politicians may have different preferences for party investment, outside of any local offices they might hold.

At first glance local office holders weren't particularly more likely to be a returning deputy, even though their races were less competitive – from 1881-1919, only 45% of incumbents also held local office at the time of the national election. Also, as discussed previously, main results are robust to controlling for incumbency status. Table 6 separately estimates the effect of electing an incumbent on cohesion and reform voting, using a similar RD framework. This time I compare districts that narrowly elect an incumbent to districts that narrowly elect a newcomer, in races with an incumbent versus a new challenger. There is no effect of incumbency on preferences for reform, and there is a positive effect on cohesion – incumbents are more likely to vote with their party group, the *opposite* effect than that of dual mandate deputies. As a result, it's unlikely that dual mandates are proxying for incumbency effects.

Table 6: RD Estimates of Incumbency on Partisanship Outcomes

	Cohesion	Cohesion	Cohesion	Reform	Reform	Reform
Incumbent Win	7.57* (4.08)	8.72*** (3.31)	9.09** (3.57)	0.22 (0.16)	0.17 (0.13)	0.16 (0.12)
Observations	159	263	216	153	246	253
RD Bandwidth	.03	.05	IK=.041	.03	.05	IK=.053

Specification is local linear with triangular edge kernel and robust confidence intervals. Specifications include term dummies. Voting cohesion covers years 1902-1919, Reform covers years 1898-1910. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Second, in the Appendix, I replicate the main analysis in order to perform a series of robustness checks. First, I assess the sensitivity of the estimates to the inclusion of pre-treatment covariates in Table 11, which includes a variable that measures the independent wealth of a deputy using landholding. Results remain significant at the 5% level, and coefficient magnitudes remain unchanged – electing a candidate with a local office is associated with a decrease of about 9-10 percentage points in voting cohesion, and are 28-40% more likely to vote against party reforms.

Finally, I examine whether the estimates are sensitive to the functional form of the running variable, winning margin. Appendix Table 12 replicates the main analysis except with local polynomials, specifically quadratic and cubic specifications. Reform results are robust to all higher order polynomials. For voting cohesion only there are no significant effects for a cubic specification, however, polynomials of the third degree or higher are less reliable for RD estimates (see Gelman and Imbens, 2015, for a discussion). But overall, there is consistent evidence to suggest that narrowly elected deputies with a local office were much less likely to vote with their co-partisans and support party strengthening reforms.

6 Conclusion

The use of dual mandates speaks to an important debate in political science regarding politician accountability. There is an inherent tension in multiple office holding – this institution could increase local representation for a district, but at the expense of either legislator effort or partisan attachments. In the formative years of party development in the French Third Republic, this paper provides consistent evidence that independent but institutionalized political resources mattered for investment in political parties. I showed that deputies with dual mandates were much less likely to vote with their co-partisans or vote in support of reforms meant to empower fledgling parties, and explored a number of mechanisms and the rationale behind these results. In addition, I provide suggestive evidence that dual mandates increase a national politician’s accountability to the voter, using the passage of the separation of church and state law in 1905. Multiple office holding also has no measured

effect on productivity or absenteeism, indicating that legislators with local offices fulfilled their legislative duties in ways indistinguishable from their peers.

At the time, the dual mandate system was considered to be ‘pro-democratic’, promoting local linkages and helping to stabilize the Republican regime (Marrel, 2003). Modern research also argues the prevalence of the dual mandate system stems directly from weak parties in France (Dewagolhere et al. 2006, Knapp 1991). Yet this paper uses historical evidence to demonstrate it may be the other way around – dual mandates had a negative influence on the consolidation of the party system in the Third Republic. Further, while exploratory, this paper also provided non-causal evidence that in the case of weak parties, dual mandates are more likely to undermine cohesion; yet if parties have control over selective incentives within the legislature, this may be able to mitigate the negative effects of multiple office-holding.

This has important implications for our understanding of the use of this practice today. Dual mandates are an understudied institution, but whose operation is based on a logic of vertical linkages that relates directly to a growing literature on multi-level governance and centralization. A number of studies have shown that party systems benefit both when voters focus their attention nationally and when partisans at multiple levels of government are co-dependent (Chhibber and Kollman 2004, Bednar 2011). Myerson (2006) argues in a federal system, independently elected local office can develop qualifications for national leadership. Multiple office-holding, on the other hand, could undermine the ability of parties to hold members accountable in new democracy.

Dual mandates are being increasingly advocated for new democracies or those with weak party systems, as an institutional solution to promote accountability. Despite benefits of representation, without explicit efforts made to strengthen fledgling party institutions, any benefits of dual mandates may come at the cost of undermining political parties.

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7 Online Appendix

7.1 Covariate Balance

Table 7: Covariate Balance Tests: Placebo Regressions

	COHESION	COHESION	REFORM	REFORM
Incumbent	-0.133 (0.168)	-0.299 (0.188)	-0.458*** (0.177)	-0.503*** (0.178)
Age	-0.812 (4.273)	0.887 (4.021)	6.408* (3.311)	3.522 (3.820)
Landowner	-0.0211 (0.107)	-0.0250 (0.0935)	0.0312 (0.145)	-0.0937 (0.194)
District Size	-786.7 (1,465)	-532.2 (1,576)	-1,106 (1,792)	-661.5 (1,688)
Urban	-181.8 (210.0)	-183.2 (210.6)	69.90 (301.0)	130.0 (327.3)
Second Ballot	-0.00195 (0.191)	-0.0414 (0.170)	-0.167 0.159	0.0345 (0.194)
RD Bandwidth	.5	IK=.056	.5	IK=.039

Specification is local linear with triangular edge kernel. Even columns use a 5% bandwidth, odd columns use the Imbens-Kalyanaraman optimal bandwidth for each outcome.

Table 8: Covariate Balance

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	VOTING COHESION		
Incumbent (0/1)	0.03	0.01	0.02
Age	-2.40	-3.07	-1.99
Landowner (0/1)	0.01	-0.03	-0.03
District Size	1,778	1,214	859
Urban	109.27	79.10	60.46
Second Ballot (0/1)	0.02	0.04	0.04
RD Bandwidth	.03	.05	IK=.056
Observations	109	184	208

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	REFORM VOTING		
Incumbent (0/1)	0.04	0.07	0.08
Age	-4.04*	-3.95*	-3.56*
Landowner (0/1)	-0.03	-0.08	-0.05
District Size	1,474	1,165	1,581
Urban	-3.62	-9.17	-49.39
Second Ballot (0/1)	0.02	0.07	0.03
RD Bandwidth	.03	.05	IK=.039
Observations	101	176	135

T-tests of covariates across the cutpoint. Each column represents the sample for each respective bandwidth listed, for both outcome variables. District size is measured by number of registered voters, and Urban is measured using population density (person per sq. km.). * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

7.2 Type of Race


Table 9: Variable Means, by Type of Race (Within 5% Margin)

	NO LOCAL OFFICE	HEAD TO HEAD	BOTH LOCAL OFFICE
<i>(Mean)</i>			
Returning Deputy (0/1)	0.41	0.43	0.38
Age	45.52	47.67	47.59
Property Owner (0/1)	0.10	0.11	0.12
District size	19,308	19,683	19,307
Urban	118.35	117.75	113.23
Second Ballot (0/1)	0.60	0.59	0.50
Margin	2.85	3.17	3.22

First column shows data for races where neither candidate had a local office. Second column is when one of the candidates had a local office, and is the RD sample. Third column is when both candidates had a local office. District size is measured by number of registered voters, and Urban is measured using population density (person per sq. km.). Table only shows data for races with margins within 5%. Excludes Paris.

7.3 McCrary Test and Sorting at the Threshold

Figure 9: Density of the Forcing Variable, Margin of Victory



7.4 Electoral Fraud

Table 10 shows t-test differences in means, using three variables: the absolute difference between reported votes and candidate vote shares, the number of districts with above average vote total discrepancies, and the number of districts at the 90th percentile of vote discrepancies. Average fraud is an indicator variable for if the district had above average difference in vote totals, and 90th Fraud is an indicator if the district was in the 90th percentile. There is no evidence that dual mandate districts had electoral fraud.

Table 10: Fraud Evidence, Difference in RD Sample Means

	(1)	(2)
Fraud	7.36	4.10
Above Average Fraud (0/1)	0.12	0.09
90th Fraud (0/1)	-0.02	0.00
N	119	197
Bandwidth	.03	.05

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

7.5 Sensitivity to Pretreatment Covariates

Table 11: RD Estimate Sensitivity to Pretreatment Covariates

	Cohesion	Cohesion	Cohesion	Reform	Reform	Reform
Dual Mandate Win	-10.27** (4.733)	-9.65** (3.971)	-9.22** (3.775)	-0.39** (0.188)	-0.28* (0.147)	-0.40** (0.163)
N	109	184	208	101	176	135
RD Bandwidth	.03	.05	IK=.056	.03	.05	IK=.039

Specification is local linear with triangular edge kernel and clustered standard errors. Specifications include term dummies. Voting cohesion covers years 1902-1919, Reform covers years 1898-1910. Covariates include indicator variables for property ownership (wealth), second ballot and incumbency, as well as deputy age. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

7.6 Sensitivity to Higher Level Polynomials


Table 12: RD Main Estimates with Higher Level Polynomials

ROLL CALL VOTING COHESION SCORE						
Dual Mandate Win	-9.447 (6.320)	-8.823* (5.022)	-9.936** (4.605)	-11.913 (7.898)	-7.615 (6.462)	-8.298 (5.592)
Observations	109	184	222	109	184	235
RD Bandwidth Specification	.03 Quadratic	.05 Quadratic	IK=.062 Quadratic	.03 Cubic	.05 Cubic	IK=.072 Cubic
REFORM VOTING						
Dual Mandate Win	-0.587** (0.260)	-0.513** (0.222)	-0.495** (0.214)	-0.521* (0.315)	-0.525** (0.266)	-0.533** (0.246)
Observations	101	176	196	101	176	219
RD Bandwidth Specification	.03 Quadratic	.05 Quadratic	IK=.056 Quadratic	.03 Cubic	.05 Cubic	IK=.066 Cubic

Quadratic and cubic local polynomial regressions with triangular edge kernel and robust confidence intervals. Specifications include term dummies. Voting cohesion covers years 1902-1919, Reform covers years 1898-1910. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

7.7 Results Under Varying Bandwidths

Figure 10: Results Under Varying Bandwidths



Forcing variable is margin of the local office candidate. First panel is voting for a party reform, second panel is individual voting cohesion. Bandwidths plotted are .03, .04, .05., .06, .07, .09