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Introduction: ‘The Destiny of the International Order’?: The Ukraine War in its Global and Grand Strategic Contexts

Dr Zeno Leoni, Dr Maeve Ryan, Gesine Weber

One year ago, Russia launched an unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, initiating a war as savage and destructive as it has been senseless. At no point in the past year has this war seemed likely to deliver any desirable political goals for Russia; quite the opposite: the surprisingly united and sustained response from NATO powers has breathed fresh life into the alliance and galvanised diverse forms of support from across the international community, while Europe’s energy and security architectures are being transformed dramatically and in ways decisively contrary to Russia’s interests. Above all, the war has forged in fire a new kind of Ukrainian nation, electrified by the leadership of the president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and inspired by the courage, defiance, military prowess and resilience of its people.

As Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman has observed, this war has been "unusual in its moral clarity": built on a “flimsy and fabricated” case for invasion and conducted with a degree of cruelty and brutality nothing could justify. Repeating and building upon methods used in Syria, Chechnya and elsewhere, Putin’s strategy has been one of inflicting the greatest possible suffering on the Ukrainian population, explicitly targeting civilians, destroying vital infrastructure (including nuclear facilities), and terrorising Ukrainians through a litany of war crimes, such as torture, rape, mass executions, and the forced deportation of hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians, including at least 6,000 children. Russia has also shown a willingness to conduct military operations with little regard for the lives and welfare of its own soldiers and conscripts, amassing stunning casualty rates within its own forces through incompetence, carelessness, poor planning, and cruelty.

On 20 February 2023, welcoming U.S. President Biden to Kyiv, President Zelenskyy described ‘this unprovoked and criminal’ war against Ukraine as a war ‘against the whole world’, where ‘the destiny of the international order’ will be decided. Indeed, this war has already tested and transformed elements of regional and global order in profound and lasting ways. While historians are typically cautious about identifying a major historical inflection point at such close remove, it seems probable that 24 February 2022 will be marked as a major event in the making of the twenty-first-century world, with cascading consequences we are just beginning to comprehend.

A year of war: Reflections from the School of Security Studies, KCL

Over the past year, colleagues from the School of Security Studies, King’s Russia Institute, and across the university more broadly have played a vital role in shaping and informing commentary, analysis and debates about the war at the national and international levels, and ensuring that coverage of the war has been accurate and reliable. Between February and November 2022, King’s experts were cited in over 36,398 articles, including nearly 1,000 print articles and over 4,000 broadcast pieces. King’s experts have also emerged as prominent and internationally trusted sources of rapid, responsive analysis via social media, helping international observers make sense of the war’s operational, economic, political, legal, humanitarian, and other dimensions; and offering expert evaluations of wider implications affecting regional and global order. In recognition of this exceptional service, King’s was highly commended in the PRCA 2022 National Awards.

To mark the war’s first anniversary, the Centre for Grand Strategy invited this extraordinary community of scholars to reflect upon the year that has passed, to consider both change and continuity, and to provide insights from their own disciplinary perspectives on the likely implications for ‘world order’. We asked contributors to consider three questions:
- What has changed during the past twelve months?
- What did not change, or changed less than expected?
- What kinds of future trends seem likely?

We are pleased to present a volume of seventeen reports that draws on the diverse expertise of the School of Security Studies and beyond—from professors to PhD students, former practitioners, research staff, alumni, and friends—and covers themes from national security policies and strategy to regional and international dynamics situated in their historical and strategic contexts; from the complexity of strategic challenges governments face in the short, medium and long term, to the broader implications for geopolitics, statecraft, and world order in the years to come.

**Section 1: Strategic implications of the war**

The first section of this volume comprises seven reports, each examining the war’s implications across a number of key thematic areas, from intelligence to deterrence, food and energy security to health, information security, space, cyber, and the question of future Russian foreign policy and relations with the West.

Dr Zeno Leoni, Lecturer in Defence Studies, in *World Order and the War: Towards an Iron Curtain 2.0* discusses how the world order has evolved from the years that predate the war, and argues that the war in Ukraine has accelerated a process of decoupling between the great powers, especially the US and China.

The second report, by Dr Andrew Corbett, Lecturer in Defence Studies, titled *Lies, Damn Lies, Disinformation and Deterrence*, reflects on the interplay between deterrence and (dis-)information, arguing that both the failure and success of deterrence are defining features of this conflict.

Julia C. Baum, PhD student, and Eva-Nour Repussard, Policy Fellow at BASIC, in the third report titled *Space and Cyber Dimensions in Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine*, explore among other things the technological democratisation and privatisation of the conflict, arguing that this has been the first major conflict throughout which both sides have relied on space-based capabilities.

In the fourth report, titled *Back into the Cold: Putin’s Intelligence and Security Apparatus a Year into the Ukraine War*, Irina Borogan, Visiting Fellow, Elena Grossfeld, PhD student, Dr Daniela Richterova, Senior Lecturer, and Andrei Soldatov, Visiting Fellow, consider what we have learned about Russian intelligence, and predict a “cultural shift” that could bring Russian intelligence back to the modus operandi of the Cold War.

Kalina K. Damianova, PhD student, and Dr Thomas Froehlich, Visiting Research Fellow, in the fifth report titled *Between Green Energy and Fossil-Fuel: The Dilemma of Future European Energy Security*, tackled the question of European energy decoupling from Russia, and maintained that while war has accelerated steps towards the transition to green energy, immediate pressures for diversification will continue to make Europe reliant on fossil-fuel, in the near future.

In the sixth report, titled *Global Food Security Crisis: Contributing Factors and Possible Futures*, Prof Greg Kennedy (Professor of Strategic Foreign Policy) reflected on different emerging implications of the war for food security, arguing that while the future of food security is not rosy, it is difficult to single out a particular cause and to determine the responsibilities of the war as opposed to climate change.

In the final report of this section, titled *The Devastating Impact of War on Health and Health Systems*, Prof Martin CM Bricknell, Professor in Conflict, Health and Military Medicine, and Dr George Bundy, PhD student, provided a picture of the impact of the war on the health of citizens in Ukraine and on health services of the country, assessing that the war has undermined efforts by the Ukrainian health system to transition from a Soviet to a West European model.
**Section 2: National and regional perspectives**

The second section offers a series of national and regional perspectives on the war: in particular, how the war has affected the foreign and security policies of individual countries and groupings, and the implications for their various grand strategic outlooks.

Prof Andrew Dorman, Professor of International Security, and Prof Matt Uttley, Professor of Defence Studies, in the first report of this section, *Britain's Nuclear Quandary: Russia, NATO, and the Rise of China*, warn that UK’s nuclear capabilities have remained behind compared to the other five Permanent Members of the United Nations, and argue that the UK will need to inject more funding into its nuclear capabilities, especially to back up the Indo-Pacific Tilt.

In the second report, titled *Germany: Zeitenwende (slowly) in the Making?*, Dr Aylin Matlé, Research Fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations, acknowledges that Germany’s cooperative approach towards Russia has failed, and argues that the war has caused a ‘mentality change’ in the way the country sees the Kremlin.

Gesine Weber, PhD student in the Defence Studies Department, contributed the report titled *EU-UK Relations: Coming Together Under a Geopolitical Stress Test*, in which she reflects on the contribution of the UK to European security in light of the Indo-Pacific Tilt and AUKUS, highlighting how London’s response to the war has swept away any doubts about the commitment of the UK to European security.

In the fourth report, titled *The Trajectory of Russian Foreign Policy and Relations with the West*, Prof Tracey German, Professor of Conflict and Security, and Dr Natasha Kuhrt, Senior Lecturer in International Peace and Security, tackle the question of the implications of the war on the current and likely future relationships between Russia and its neighbourhood, the West, and regions such as the Middle East and Africa, concluding that the Kremlin’s foreign policy is not going to change its course of action.

In *A Beneficial War? How Russia's Invasion of Ukraine Has Enhanced the United States’ Strategic Position in the World*, our fifth report, Dr Kori Schake, Director of Foreign and Defense Policy Studies at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), and Joseph Tavares, Foreign and Defense Policy Assistant at the AEI, reflect on how, after the debacle of Afghanistan, the Biden administration is still capable of rallying international support, and argue that even if this war has cost the US only 5% of its defence budget, it has been beneficial so far for US interests and standing in the world.

Dr Walter C. Ladwig III, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, and Sumitha Narayanan Kutty, PhD student, in the sixth report of this section *Assessing India’s Response to the Ukraine Conflict*, deconstruct the Indian perspective about Russia and the invasion, and conclude that India’s close relationship to Russia is not going to wither, although what it might change is the way New Delhi represents its national interests.

In the seventh report, titled *South Korea: An Emerging NATO Partner*, Dr Saeme Kim, Visiting fellow at RUSI, and Dr Bence Nemeth, Senior Lecturer in Defence Studies Education, interrogate the implications of the war for South Korea, and show how since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, South Korea has emerged as a more visible player and an important partner for NATO by exporting arms and deepening institutional cooperation. However, the war in Ukraine has also had the effect of bolstering North Korea’s position, as will be explained below. As such, South Korea faces a difficult situation: it is seeking to broaden its foreign policy footprint, but is bound by the more immediate concerns on the Korean Peninsula.

*Are the Indo-Pacific Countries More Against Russia Since its Invasion of Ukraine?* is the question guiding the eighth report, written by Mauro Bonavita, PhD student at the King’s India Institute, and Prof Christophe Jaffrelot, Avantha Chair and Professor of Indian Politics and Sociology at the King’s India Institute. Assessing the voting behaviour of Indo-Pacific countries in the United Nations, they conclude that the policy of Indo-Pacific countries varies across the region, but that, in the end, the impact of the February aggression was moderate.
In the ninth report of this edition, *Marriage of Convenience? The Future of Gulf Monarchies’ relations with Russia*, Dr David Roberts, Senior Lecturer in Defence Studies, describes how the Gulf countries have been designing their relationship with Russia over the last year. Elaborating on energy and defence sales, he argues that the Gulf states “cannot afford to alienate Russia”.

The section on national and regional perspectives closes with the report by Folahanmi Aina, PhD student at the African Leadership Centre, *To be ‘Putinised’ or ‘Westernised’? Africa’s Strategic Choices and Relevance in the Russia-Ukrainian War*. Assessing voting behaviour in the UN and zooming in on the foreign policy of specific states, he concludes that “Africa is poised to play a vital role in equilibrating the emerging global rebalancing of power between the Western bloc and the Eastern bloc through its ‘new’ neutralism”.

You will find no uniformity of views across this volume—sometimes, even outright disagreement across a set of reports that emphasise very different aspects of this complex war and its multiple international consequences. We have also opted not to standardise terminology, so you will find the war referred to in different ways throughout the volume, depending on authors’ preferences, including ‘Russian invasion of Ukraine’, ‘Russo-Ukrainian War’, and ‘War in Ukraine’. You may be struck instead by the different perspectives of the many (and sometimes surprising) actors and interests who consider themselves stakeholders in this war, and by the sometimes counterintuitive forms of both continuity and change the conflict has created.

**Acknowledgements**

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SECTION ONE
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE WAR
ZHYTOMYR, UKRAINE – MARCH 4, 2022
The war in Ukraine is an international order problem

This analysis addresses the question ‘how has the world order changed throughout the first year of war in Ukraine’. While offering different insights as food for thought, it argues that the war in Ukraine has accelerated the making of an Iron Curtain 2.0, and much of what Chinese strategy-makers decide in the future will determine how deep this international bifurcation will be. The implications for western policy-makers, are that maintaining a stable relationship with China is even more important nowadays.

It has almost become rhetorical to sustain that the war in Ukraine is an important issue; yet, one might still wonder why it matters to the present and future of the world order. Current events in Ukraine have implications on different facets of the world order for different reasons. Firstly, the war in Ukraine might have something to do with an international order everyone thought to have left behind, such as the order of the Cold War. It has been argued that while the origins of the Cold War have been widely debated, the end of the Cold War and the causes that brought it to an end were quickly accepted when Fukuyama proclaimed the ‘end of history’. The war in Ukraine will likely lead future historians to reflect about whether the Cold War is over, or at the very least, why, after only three decades from the fall of Berlin’s Wall, Russia and the West are back to square one. The second reason why the war in Ukraine matters to the world order, has something to do with geography of Russia and its neighbours. Russia is a continent-sized state: from Eastern Europe to the Scandinavian region to Japan, countries have been wondering about what this means for their security, and whether they need to take action against it. Sweden’s and Finland’s application for joining NATO, and an acceleration of Japan’s rearmament, could have global repercussions; furthermore, the invasion of Ukraine has also caused speculations about whether this would have encouraged or discouraged China to attack Taiwan. Thirdly, the war in Ukraine also has implications on the relationship that Europe will have with Russia and the United States, and on the process – or lack of – of military integration within the EU or the continued support by European countries for NATO. There are also other reasons for looking at the war in Ukraine through the lenses of world order, for instance, when considering the global implications of decline in supply of energy and food; or, should a nuclear conflict be triggered. Considering all these implications is key for analysts and policy-makers alike to provide a comprehensive assessment of the war, rather than limiting their focus to operations in Ukraine or decisions taken in Russia.

Spheres of influence

The war in Ukraine is among one of the most dramatic historical events of the post-WWII era. To an extent, it was also a largely unexpected outcome, at least in such a violent and old-fashioned manner – an invasion with land forces and tanks is an image that takes us back decades in history. Yet, this conflict was a reminder that spheres of influence continue to play an important role in the international order. The existence of spheres of influence, or aspirations to establish them, signal that the world order has been less integrated than was believed at the end of the Cold War. Spheres of influence represent a challenge to that American aspiration for leading a Liberal International Order (LIO) where US interests are seen by the international community as international interests. As Henry Kissinger put it, in the international arena exist different orders, and to establish a dominant order, the latter would have to incorporate all other orders.

The trend towards spheres of influence has become more apparent in the run up to the war. The Obama and Trump administrations had already signaled dissatisfaction with current multilateral arrangements, at a time when the US command over international multilateral economic and diplomatic institutions has been eroding. But at the G7 in Cornwall, held in June 2021, the United States more explicitly embarked on a project of order geoeconomic
Above all, as the war has represented a sort of 9/11-moment for many governments in the West – where the message was ‘either against or with Russia’ – this has created pressures on countries to take a position about it.

Towards an Iron Curtain 2.0

The realisation that military operations in Ukraine were not going to be completed in a few days has made more evident, if not accelerated, a fracture within the international order. The continuing political and human tragedy of the war, with Russia unwilling to withdraw, and Moscow’s reaction to European sanctions have contributed to a substantial energetic decoupling of Europe from Russia, although the continent continues to be dependent on it. Above all, as the war has represented a sort of 9/11-moment for many governments in the West – where the message was ‘either against or with Russia’ – this has created pressures on countries to take a position about it. Subsequent votes within the General Assembly of the United Nations, with only a few countries siding with Russia but many others preferring neutrality, have depicted an international order where the liberal order within it is more uneven and narrowed than many in the West believed it to be, especially from the US. This has opened the eyes of the international community over what possible shapes might the new world order take. It appears clear that while the US hegemony has been declining in the last decade, the war – in addition to the chaos caused to China-bound supply chains during the Covid-19 pandemic – has strengthened US influence over its closest allies and the core of the liberal order in the short term. Meanwhile, China’s attitude towards Russia after the start of the war and subsequent votes within the UN have provided a picture of where China’s economic sphere of influence might be directed at a time of strategic push back: the Global South, and more importantly, non-democratic countries and emerging economies; including Russia. While Moscow and Beijing may have mutual concerns about one another, Liz Truss’ calls for a Global NATO and the insertion of China - in addition to Russia - into NATO’s list of threats in the summer 2022, has been giving the two great powers an additional reason for sticking by each other’s side. Indeed, a NATO projected towards the Indo-Pacific means that China and Russia will be facing the same rival in two different regions.

Between the Bali summit and the CCP congress: an Indo-Pacific order

Pace John J. Mearsheimer, one should assume that the reproachment with Russia that both the Obama and Trump administrations, to an extent, wanted, is unlikely to happen for a long time. Therefore, China holds the cards that will determine continuity or change compared to where we are today. On the one hand, from the G20 in Bali (Indonesia) one could infer that economic interdependence with the United States continues to play a role of restraint on both sides of the Pacific, despite all the frictions that characterise the relationship. While the West should not hope for China to join an anti-Russian alliance, there remains a question mark as to whether Beijing will pursue an improvement in the relationship with the West. On the other hand, from 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party held in late October 2022, and particularly from Xi’s opening report, one could infer that China could be more inward-looking, as emphasis on the Belt and Road Initiative decreases and the international strategic outlook looks increasingly hostile for Beijing. Yet, domestic tensions could always cause adjustments to policy, as seen with the zero-covid policy.

This is the short-term picture. However, as the great powers decide on what posture they want to maintain, the mid-term trend requires us to watch developments in the Indo-Pacific. An economic overview of the region not only shows that the future international order will have its pivot in the Indo-Pacific – this was notorious – but also that in an increasingly multipolar order, power will be more distributed and tri-polarity will end. The length of the war will have an impact on this rebalancing of the world order: should protracted hostilities weaken Russia, these could lead the US to an even greater commitment to the Indo-Pacific, where China’s economic sphere of influence and military power projections are more tangible.
The role of deterrence in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine

One year on, Russia’s ‘special military operation’ has singularly failed to achieve whatever its objectives were. The invasion has deteriorated into an attritional battle for territory, with neither side demonstrating any clear advantage, though the Ukrainian reinforcement with modern capabilities from western allies may prove influential in the coming months. In most modern of conflicts, the war of influence and coercion that is being waged precisely to sustain that reinforcement or deter it, may become the defining battlefield. Deterrence defines this conflict; its failures contributed to the decision to invade; its successes constrain the scale and geographic scope of the subsequent conflict, and the future trajectory depends substantially on how each side influences the coercive campaigns of the other.

Russia has not threatened the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine. It has repeatedly used rhetoric to raise the profile of nuclear weapons in public discourse, but the much touted ‘special regime of combat duty’ announced by Putin on 27 February 2022 resulted in no discernible change to Russian strategic forces’ posture. But the objective was achieved: western media were seduced into wide-eyed speculation about nuclear war in Ukraine; some politicians started talking about nuclear deterrence in terms of the Cuban Missile crisis, and the ‘west’ was encouraged to consider what stakes in defence of Ukraine it valued sufficiently to risk nuclear war.

The Ukrainian struggle against the Russian invasion, initially hailed in the media as a fight for western values—the rule of law, liberal democracy, the rules-based international order, etc.—has evolved subtly into being portrayed as the front line in a fight against an implacable aggressor. The public discourse shifted from an idealistic abstract ‘good versus evil,’ to a more visceral good-versus-evil threat to the western way of life. ‘Freedom will be protected for Ukraine, for all of Europe for each and every coalition country,’ President Zelensky said to the Ukraine Contact Group on 20 January 2023. Alongside discussion of reinforcement of Ukrainian forces, there is a parallel discussion of the need to ensure that the western deterrence strategy is sufficiently coherent to deter Russian escalation.

Russia has a long history of sophisticated manipulation of public discourse in its adversaries: the School of Military Deception was established in 1904; the Soviet Union was renowned for its ‘active measures’ programme during the Cold War; and the modern version is known as ‘reflexive control’. Based on the ‘Magruder’ effect, the objective is to influence the opinion of an adversary to be predisposed to believe subsequent deception. Simultaneous disinformation (deliberately spread to mislead) or misinformation (unwittingly spread and misleads) campaigns undermine the public ability to differentiate between fact and fiction, and are exacerbated by social media and highly partisan ‘news’ media. In particular, targeted disinformation campaigns seek to drive division between western allies and weaken the cohesion of the support for Ukraine. The western response to Putin’s comments on nuclear weapons is a good example of a successful misinformation campaign. Alternatively, it is an example of deterrence in operation; or in this case, probably both.

Deterrence and disinformation

From the outset, Russia has sought to deter western nations from involvement in Ukraine’s defence. As the invasion was mounted, Putin announced: ‘No matter who tries to stand in our way...they must know that Russia will respond immediately, and the consequences will be such as you have never seen in your entire history.’ This effort to deter western support failed, as much I suspect, because of the unexpectedly successful and gallant Ukrainian defence as any other factor. To be brutal, Ukrainian forces did not pose a credible enough defensive threat to deter Russian aggression; Russian planning seemed to indicate an expectation of a very rapid victory and the western defence commentariat had pretty much ruled out successful defence. The initial western responses to the pending invasion were very
much focused on NATO coherence and defence in the aftermath of anticipated Ukrainian defeat, not the defence of Ukraine. Similarly, although threats of western sanctions were made prior to the invasion, the scale of the sanctions was vague and the incoherence of diplomatic assertions, and economic and military reticence meant that the west failed to deter the invasion, not because deterrence failed, but because the west didn’t try.

However, as time went on, the interplay between continued successful Ukrainian defence, and western efforts to support evolved. Ukrainian requests for a NATO-enforced no-fly zone were politely rebuffed, with NATO and the USA citing the risk of escalation into a war between NATO and Russia. Russian efforts (including isolation of energy supplies) failed to divide European support; indeed, western support for Ukraine has developed over 2022 to include the provision of HIMARS and artillery systems capable of engaging Russian logistic capabilities. In January 2023, allies agreed to send modern main battle tanks: in particular, the German-made Leopard 2 from a number of European states, and the Abrams from the USA. The announcement—after a long period of resistance from Germany—might suggest some internal negotiation between allies, with Chancellor Scholz holding out for specific US engagement in what could be perceived as an escalatory step. The scale of these provisions suggests continuing resolve amongst western allies. Ukraine continues to press for more capable systems, and the focus is now provision of modern air defence aircraft such as the F16 to the Ukrainian air force.

One of Ukraine’s biggest challenges, however, is to sustain that coalition coherence. There are commentators who see a negotiated settlement as an inevitability and advocate immediate negotiations. Such a position might suit some, but until that reflects the Ukrainian position, it denies the core role of Ukrainian agency in both the conflict and its resolution. These views will be actively exploited and amplified by the Russians as they seek to divide support for Ukraine’s military effort. Even now, with its troops ejected from much of the territory initially seized, Russia claims substantial areas of Ukraine as Russian. The continued Russian campaign against Ukraine’s infrastructure and civil population seems less a struggle for military objectives than a ruthless campaign to coerce Ukraine to negotiate on Russian terms.

In 1926, Captain Liddell-Hart wrote: ‘The true aim in war is the mind of the hostile rulers, not the bodies of their troops; the balance between victory and defeat turns on mental impressions and only indirectly on physical blows.’ More recently, another retired army officer General Rupert Smith wrote: ‘The confrontation is resolved when one or both parties adjust their desired outcomes to accommodate the other.’ Only when both sides see a negotiated settlement as preferable to the risks and gains of further conflict will negotiations be viable. With the survival of Putin’s regime potentially at stake, such negotiations would only follow a dire military situation for Russia. Lawrence Freedman concluded that “[i]f Russia is losing this war, we are further away than ever from a Russian concession.”

Towards a modern understanding of deterrence?

Ever since President Zelensky’s Churchillian soundbite ‘The fight is here; I need ammunition, not a ride,’ he has energised western audiences and is pivotal to their sustained support. More recently he offered a ten-point plan at the November 2022 G20 which emphasised the humanitarian impact of the Russian invasion and aggression, but did not relent on the sovereignty of Ukrainian borders. This appears to be less strident than previous statements, perhaps reflecting an acknowledgement that Ukraine’s support from other states depends on him keeping that coalition strong, while continuing to shape the military outcome.

In the meantime, Russia is likely to do everything in its power to break Ukraine’s will to fight through more attrition in combat, and attacks on infrastructure and non-combatants. Russia will also exploit every tool of deception and disinformation in order to undermine and break the cohesion of the coalition of western governments supporting Ukraine. We can expect this to involve a degree of continued nuclear sabre-rattling, not to threaten nuclear war but to keep its spectre prominent in western media and thus keep the risks of escalation at the forefront of policy-makers’ minds. This will all be coherent, exploiting decades of
experience, with relentless disinformation campaigns in news media augmented through targeted misinformation on social media. Russia will seek to undermine the coalition and the Ukrainian government with half-truths interwoven with propaganda propagated by active Russian supporters and shared by the unwary. While the military effort to repel the Russian invasion in Ukraine continues, a key battlefield will be the public and decision-makers of the western coalition that sustains Ukraine’s armed forces.

Deterrence failed to prevent the Russian invasion; Ukraine failed to deter because it was not perceived to be credible; the west failed to deter because it didn’t try; and Russia deterred western intervention, but not western support to Ukraine. Deterrence continues to shape this conflict. The risks of escalation deter the west from direct intervention, and Russia from actions which might entangle NATO states; both sides fear nuclear war with each other more than they fear ‘losing’ in Ukraine. So nuclear deterrence emerges as a credible concept here; the fear of escalation to nuclear war is suppressing the willingness to exploit conventional war as a policy tool. To end hypothetically; if neither NATO nor Russia had nuclear weapons, would NATO now be embroiled in a Europe-wide conventional war with Russia?
Space and Cyber Dimensions in Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

Julia Balm and Eva-Nour Repussard

Space and cyber initiation

Approximately one hour prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a Russian government hacking operation targeted Viasat’s KA-SAT broadband service with destructive wiper malware called AcidRain. As the most salient and most strategic cyberattack since the invasion, it resulted in a significant loss of communication in the crucial early days of the war, notably as the Ukrainian military relied on Viasat for the command and control of their armed forces.

The potency of this cyberattack early in the invasion initially confirmed what many Western governments and analysts feared, that Russia would launch a full-scale cyberwar against Ukraine along with its kinetic campaign. Fear of a full-blown ‘cyberwar’ was however overblown. This belief was notably held as the Russian Federation had been fairly active in the cyberspace for the past decade, and had carried out many large-scale cyberattacks against Ukraine, not least the 2015 Ukrainians Power Grid Hack, which resulted in power outages for roughly 230,000 consumers. Similarly, the 2017 NotPetya, which originally targeted several Ukrainian ministries, banks and state-owned enterprises, but spread in France, Germany, Italy, Poland, the United Kingdom, and the United States resulted in more than $10 billion in total damages worldwide. Cyberattacks, including cyberattacks on space-based infrastructure, have always been an integral part of Russia’s strategy during its war against Ukraine.

This is the first major conflict where both sides have relied on space-based capabilities throughout the war. Despite having limited indigenous space capabilities, Ukraine has been able to operate US and European commercial space-based communications and intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) for battlefield support. ISR is also helping to hold Russia accountable, as exemplified by how satellite timestamps unravelled the truth about Bucha killings and UNESCO’s use of satellite imagery to monitor cultural heritage destruction.

Democratisation and privatisation of the conflict

No longer needing to rely on news reports or government leaks, the general public could engage with a full-scale war like never before. The presence of open-source intelligence (OSINT) in this war has made conflict accessible to a much larger audience due to the increasingly low barrier to entry for accessing information and data from satellite imagery. Space collected data proved useful for OSINT in tracking troop movement, displaced people/refugees, regional military buildup, commercial airline and vessel operations, and the progression of the invasion into new territories. On 27 February, Google Maps had to temporarily disable the live traffic overlay that helped track Russian movement and enabled researchers the ability to watch the amassing of approximately 150,000 troops on Ukraine’s borders in the early hours of the invasion. It also revealed the movement of civilians fleeing conflict, putting the safety of Ukrainian civilians at risk. With the advent of publicly available information, tracking real time locations on Google Earth helps reveal the movement of war, thus enabling quicker battlefield decision making.

On both sides of the conflict, ‘hacktivist’ groups such as Killnet in Russia and Anonymous in the West have carried out disinformation campaigns and/or anti-disinformation campaigns, website defacement, and denial of service (DDoS) attacks throughout the invasion of Ukraine, seemingly independently from state actors. Such attacks do not support strategic objectives, but rather seek to shape the narrative about the war.

The direct engagement of the private sector delivered a decisive difference to war. In October, Russia warned that commercial satellites ‘may become a legitimate target for...
retribution,’ citing that the Western satellites aiding the Ukrainian war effort were ‘an extremely dangerous trend.’ SpaceX’s Starlink service has been vital in keeping Ukraine online and has changed the pace of the war by enabling troop communication, keeping citizens in the know about developments while ensuring weapons systems remained operational. The delivery of Starlink satellites was a turning point that shaped Ukraine’s capacity to keep pace with Russian developments, especially in the early days of the invasion. However, when 1,300 Starlink terminals went offline in late October due to a lack of funding, it raised the question as to who is responsible for funding these capabilities. While negotiations on this issue between SpaceX and the US government continue, it reveals an unstable dynamic with commercial actor motivations rooted in the marketplace.

Private sector engagement in cyberspace has also been crucial since the invasion. Just a few hours before the invasion started, Microsoft’s Threat Intelligence Center identified a trojan horse wiper malware, ‘Foxblade’, directed at Ukraine’s infrastructure. Microsoft quickly updated its virus detection system and notified Ukraine’s authority. Microsoft then contacted Anne Neuberger, the White House’s Deputy National Security Advisor for Cyber and Emerging Technology, who facilitated Microsoft’s sharing of information about the malicious code with other countries, notably Poland and the Baltics, to prevent it from spreading. Microsoft’s intervention and coordination with state actors was the first public indicator of how important the private sector would become to both cyber defence and resilience during the invasion. The impact of the private sector during this invasion can also be seen with Amazon Web Services which worked closely with the Ukrainian government to provide them ‘access and resources for migrating to the cloud and securing critical information.’ Those two examples, out of many, highlight the ‘evolving and important role for the private sector in supporting governments,’ as noted by Microsoft.

**Influence operations and sanctions**

Despite cyber operations being conducted on a scale much lower than expected, Russia has continued to carry out cyberattacks throughout the invasion, which have not directly supported efforts on the ground, but have rather been carried out independently. This can partly be explained by Russia’s seeming lack of capacity to carry out cyberattack which would directly support kinetic objectives, but can also be explained by the fact that cyberattacks have other goals than to support on the ground efforts, namely influence operations. The cyberattacks observed during the invasion of Ukraine to disrupt their systems and infrastructure have been mainly conducted as a means to influence public opinion by showcasing Russia’s capabilities in cyberspace, hoping to instil fear in the general public or to get a reaction from Western governments.

Western sanctions have particularly targeted Russia’s space and technology sectors, as demonstrated by the UK’s ban on space related exports to Russia and the export blockade on advanced semiconductor chips. As a bargaining chip to counter sanctions, Russia has used its space assets, particularly the Soyuz rocket. To cite a prominent example, Russia’s space agency, Roscosmos, demanded that the ‘hostile’ UK government divest its stake in OneWeb, a satellite broadband company, and that OneWeb provide assurances that the satellites won’t be used for military purposes before agreeing to launch. After demands were rejected, the launch was scrapped, resulting in an impairment of $229.2 million with the satellites that were due to launch still not returned to OneWeb. Space cooperation has also been used to bargain against imposed economic sanctions. In April, Rogozin threatened to leave the International Space Station (ISS) early and even threatened to deorbit the ISS so that it might fall into the US or Europe. Russia’s response to sanctions has degraded space cooperation throughout the invasion and, although the inflammatory Rogozin was ousted and replaced by the less confrontational Yuri Borisov in July, consternation remains about how the invasion will impact the final years of ISS cooperation. A larger concern is that the invasion might rewrite the post-Cold War evaluation that cooperation in space must prevail regardless of political upheaval on Earth.

**The importance of space and cyber in future conflict**

High resolution satellite imagery and satellite radar data will continue to reveal the physicality of Russian movement from a bird’s eye view, especially as trench networks...
develop. Situational awareness supports eyes and ears on the ground, enhancing the agility and responsiveness of troops—a sustained necessity in high-intensity warfare. Aside from the value of space assets in providing transparency and accessibility to the conflict, Russia has gained little advantage from its space capabilities beyond manipulating its increasingly feeble space industry to threaten against sanctions. So long as Russia views space as something to use for negotiation, cooperation in space and collaborative missions will continue to dissolve. A host of cooperative space missions have already been suspended since the start of the invasion, such as those with the Guiana Space Center, Venera-D, and the ExoMars Rover. With shifting geopolitics, a closer space alliance between Russia and China is likely to grow instead, as already demonstrated by Russian partnership on China’s Tiangong space station and the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS).

Russia’s presence in cyberspace will likely not increase throughout the invasion of Ukraine, not least because Russia seemingly lacks the capacity to carry out large scale cyberattacks, but mostly because similar strategic objectives can be achieved through kinetic means at lesser cost, as seen with the shelling of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. However, there is no indication that Russia will stop carrying out non-strategic cyberattacks in an effort to manipulate public opinion in their favour. Furthermore, due to the low barrier to entry in cyberspace and the lack of repercussions for individual actors, ‘hacktivist’ groups, such as Killnet, will continue to grow, and increasingly take part in the conflict.

Looking ahead, Russia will use hindsight to recalibrate tactics according to what was most effective (strategically timed cyberattacks) alongside what was most surprising (unprecedented sanctions and commercial support). In space and cyber, pragmatic strategists will continue to assess where non-kinetic alternatives will offer advantage over kinetic force. Identifying future pressure points is difficult due to the nuanced line between domains, and the flexibility required by multi-domain integration (MSI). Despite this, the future will certainly see more information advantages integrated into other operational domains to achieve asymmetric advantage. While space and cyber capabilities alone cannot win a war, data and information gained from these domains provides significant intelligence for combatants to target and assess the real-time actions of adversaries. Although private actors remain largely separate from ground coordination, maintaining access to cyber and space systems from Western commercial firms remains integral to Ukrainian defence.
Towards a long war Putin never wanted to fight

It was meant to be a swift military victory. Several days after Russian tanks rolled onto Ukrainian territory, the Federal Security Service (FSB) was to help impose a new pro-Kremlin puppet government in Kyiv. Nevertheless, forecasts by Putin’s spies soon proved to be overly optimistic. They underestimated the Ukrainian population’s grit to oppose the foreign invasion, Ukraine’s armed forces’ capability and training, and the West’s uncharacteristically unified resolve to support Ukraine. A year later, Putin is waging a long war he never wanted to fight. The conflict has had a profound impact on Russia’s security and intelligence apparatus, which has inevitably been drawn into the war in myriad ways. Although on paper much looks the same, on the ground we are seeing fundamental changes in how Putin’s secret empire operates, both at home and abroad. In the long run, this could facilitate a much larger cultural shift, which could drag Russian intelligence and security services back into the cold – further into isolation and to the old repressive ways of its predecessors.

Changes on the ground: militarisation, increased repression and decimated spy networks abroad

The FSB – effectively the KGB’s post-Soviet incarnation responsible for civilian and military counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and border security – has stood at the forefront of Putin’s war on Ukraine. Unsurprisingly then, the invasion has had a profound impact on its mission. Prior to the war, the Security Service sported two departments dedicated to Ukraine – one focused on collecting intelligence in Ukraine, the other tasked with countering Ukrainian espionage efforts against Russia. Since the invasion, the FSB became almost fully consumed with the war, adopting an all-hands-on-deck approach. In practice, this means that today all departments are heavily engaged in supporting the Russian war effort – including the Department of Economic Security, now in charge of helping Russia survive Western sanctions; and the Unit for the Protection of the Constitution, which was recently charged with imposing the appropriate pro-war mood across academia, universities, and schools. The main goal is to ensure the stability of the regime during the biggest crisis Putin has ever faced. The scale of this shift is unprecedented, and cannot be compared to previous FSB support in times of crisis or war.

The FSB’s overconcentration on the war in Ukraine has inevitably led to the second key change in the way it operates: the militarisation of Russia’s domestic civilian service. This transformation is perhaps best exemplified by the FSB’s involvement in the so called ‘filtration’ of Ukrainian citizens. Set up either on Russian or occupied Ukrainian territory, many of these filtration facilities – some of which are camps – are said to be run by the FSB. Their ultimate aim is to identify members of Ukrainian armed forces and police, recruit collaborators, extract potentially useful intelligence, and collect ‘testimonies’ about Ukrainian war crimes. Here, FSB officers have been reported to interrogate, torture, take fingerprints, mine personal phones for data, and inspect social media accounts as well as personal messages of Ukrainian civilians. In some cases, Ukrainians are being forced to record disinformation videos accusing Ukrainian neo-Nazi regiments of committing war atrocities. Overall numbers are hard to establish: State Department figures from July 2022 estimate that between 900,000 - 1.6 million Ukrainians have been interrogated, detained, and forcibly deported by Russian authorities; Ukrainian estimates from December 2022 are citing at least 2.8 million. Even if the more conservative estimates are true, it is not surprising that all FSB officers are now eligible to be deployed for three-months-long tours in Ukraine. Although the Security Service engaged in such filtrations in previous conflicts – most recently in the Chechen wars – the scale of its current engagement is unprecedented.
The third transformation of the FSB relates to its operations within Russian borders. Since the outbreak of the war, Putin’s Security Service has increasingly clamped down on political opposition and public dissent. Since Spring 2022, a growing number of Putin’s most prominent critics have been incarcerated; while mass arrests at demonstrations have shown what will happen to those willing to take to the streets to protest against the war. New draconian media laws have effectively introduced censorship and landed prominent journalists on the most-wanted list, or in prison. Although the FSB has been the flag-bearer of these oppressive policies from the very beginning, its remit has recently been expanded. In December 2022, on the occasion of the Security Services Day, Putin ordered the FSB to step up its surveillance, alleging increased threats from foreign intelligence services and traitors. Although in the latter half of 2022, Kyiv had indeed mounted a handful of symbolic covert operations against Russian citizens and infrastructure, Putin’s very public announcement of increased FSB powers signalled what could be seen as a step back into the cold - a return to the era of Stalinesque tactics directed against the population and civil society characterised by increased surveillance, censorship, purges, and large-scale arrests.

At the moment, the impact of the war on Russia’s two other key spy agencies – the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and its military equivalent, the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (GRU) – is more difficult to decode. It is clear, however, that in 2022 Russia’s foreign spy agencies suffered significant blows. In the early months of the conflict, Moscow’s intelligence officers were expelled in unprecedented numbers from across European capitals. What is more, in some cases, governments exposed their identities, effectively preventing future service abroad. Several weeks into the war, Slovak media released video footage of a clandestine meeting between a GRU officer and his Slovak asset recorded by one of the country’s counterintelligence departments. This forced exodus of hundreds of Russian intelligence officers from Europe arguably brought Putin’s secret empire further back into isolation, significantly impacting its ability to maintain existing networks of agents on the continent, as well as its ability to recruit new ones.

Arrests of Russian agents across Europe have also notably increased, many of which were placed at the heart of the countries’ security establishments. Most recently, the German government uncovered a Russian mole within its Foreign Intelligence Service (BND). Over the past year, a number of so-called ‘illegals’ (deep cover officers sent abroad to infiltrate institutions of strategic interest) have also been arrested in the West. The Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) arrested an aspiring intern at the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Hague, who turned out to be a GRU officer deployed to infiltrate the war crimes tribunal currently investigating Russian conduct in the war in Ukraine. These arrests do not automatically signal a shift in Moscow’s strategy or scale of operation. In fact, most uncovered assets had been working for Russia well before the invasion. They do, however, show the depth of Russian penetration of numerous strategic and security targets across Europe. Moreover, they signal a shift in the mindset of European governments. While for years some states have opted for a softer-touch approach to Russian espionage, recent arrests indicate that those days are a thing of the past.

**Continuity on paper: intelligence failures and old structures**

Amidst all this change, some key characteristics of Russia’s intelligence and security empire remain the same. Crucially, Russian strategic and tactical intelligence analysis seems to be in as dire a state as it was during the Cold War. A year into the conflict in Ukraine, it is increasingly clear that Moscow’s invasion was paved with a variety of policy, military, and intelligence failures – ranging from misreading Ukrainian geography and terrain, to misjudging the strength of popular and military resistance. Although little is known about the actual analytical interactions between Russian producers of intelligence, their spymasters, and the ultimate consumers of their intelligence, intelligence failures of such magnitude typically lead to leadership decapitations or institutional shake ups. However, we have not seen any such strategic shifts aimed at punishing or rectifying this blunder. Although in the early days of the conflict a furious Putin sacked the chief of the FSB’s Ukrainian Directorate, indicating that heads of other key spy departments may begin to roll, we have not seen any other significant institutional or leadership changes within the Russian secret state. Holding off on such major changes might be a strategic decision on the side of the Kremlin: in an effort not to rock the boat while on rough seas, Putin might be looking to pretend like all is business as usual.
Towards a cultural shift?

Structurally, the Russian security and intelligence apparatus looks much like it did a year ago. It is made up of the same institutions and led by the same chiefs. Nevertheless, the conflict in Ukraine has fundamentally changed the way Putin’s secret state operates. Most notably, the FSB’s mission has become entirely consumed by the war effort and by containing dissent at home. This, in turn, has militarised the service and its officers who will soon all have first-hand experience of operating in a warzone. This may facilitate a long-term cultural shift impacting the way the Russian security apparatus will function for decades to come - a transformation that could see Putin’s Security Service regress to the darkest times of Stalin-era repressions. The war might also impact the culture within Putin’s foreign intelligence apparatus which suffered unprecedented blows during the first year of the war. At the moment, however, it is unclear how SVR and GRU will react to the gradual decimation of their officer and agent networks across Europe. Will they cut their losses and focus on Ukraine, or will they revert to their Cold War playbooks, which contain elaborate plans for sabotage and other covert operations aimed at western European targets?
One of the most significant results of the war in Ukraine has been the dramatic erosion of Russia’s role as a key energy supplier to Europe. This abrupt shift in the regional market led to an unprecedented energy crisis that has disrupted Europe’s social, economic, and political dynamics. In this turbulent situation, despite internal divergencies, the West presented a united front, accelerating green energy transition initiatives and achieving greater energy diversification. Nevertheless, pre-war fault lines in Europe continue to exist, making its unity fragile. Despite the EU’s ambitious green energy pledges, immediate pressures of energy supply diversification will likely extend the shelf-life of traditional fossil-fuel sources.

European energy dependence on Russia

After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Europe found itself in a difficult situation. Naturally, Russia’s aggression was to be condemned and Ukraine supported in every possible way. Russia, however, was not only an aggressor and irresponsible actor in international affairs, but also the single largest provider of energy sources for the Europeans.

Russia had been delivering oil and gas to Western Europe since the later years of the Cold War, and even in that situation of global tension, still kept its contractual commitments. For years, consecutive US governments as well as some Eastern European partners had warned against an over-reliance on Russian hydrocarbon imports. These warnings, however, were regularly brushed aside.

By 2021, Europe was heavily reliant on Russian oil and especially gas imports. That year the country accounted for almost 40% of European gas imports and 8% of total energy consumption in the EU. The controversial Nord Stream 2 project – a direct gas pipeline from Russia to Germany – had been completed and was undergoing the final licensing processes alongside another round of warnings and resistance from the US and Eastern European countries. At the same time, the largest European gas storage facility in Rehde (Germany) was being kept empty at a time when storage was usually replenished (a significant share of the storage facility was sold to Gazprom in 2015).

In conjunction with the overall inflationary tendencies of the first post-pandemic autumn, this shortage of gas supplies in Europe led to an increase in natural gas prices never seen on the continent.

While some suspected foul play by Russia, many maintained that Gazprom was playing by the rules and simply optimized its business within a market environment. This changed when Russia attacked Ukraine in February 2022, and it became clear that the low levels of gas storage reflected a signal from the Kremlin that it was willing to use energy as a geopolitical pressure tool.

The reaction of the West was swift and resulted in a continuation and expansion of the sanctions that had been imposed on Russia after the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. While the EU was putting plans in motion to wean itself off from Russian hydrocarbons, the Russian economy started to suffer severely under the sanctions, especially the exclusion from the SWIFT banking system and the freezing of Russia’s central bank reserves.

When the EU did not comply with demands for hydrocarbon payments in Russia’s own currency, rather than Euros or Dollars as stipulated in the contracts, the unthinkable happened: Russia cut gas supplies to Poland and Bulgaria in April 2022.

After more than 40 years Russia is no longer a reliable supplier: implications for Europe
For a long time, the EU has been vocal about its plans to diversify gas supplies. Nevertheless, even after the 2008 Russo-Georgian war and Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the EU did not take decisive actions to alleviate its reliance on Russian fossil fuels. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – partially due to EU’s greater commitment to reducing Russian energy supplies and to Russia’s unilateral halt of gas deliveries to several EU countries – EU’s imports of Russian gas decreased dramatically. While in 2021, Russia was the largest supplier of natural gas to the EU, its share of 39.3% dropped to 15.0% in the third quarter of 2022.

Thus, in the span of about a year, Europe witnessed an historic shift in its relationship with its main natural gas supplier, Russia, and the unfolding of an unprecedented energy crisis.

In the past, there have been other energy shocks with international consequences (such as the oil shock of the 1970s), but the contemporary energy crisis is maybe the first one whose far-reaching impact has had a domino effect on almost all aspects of life.

On an individual level, many people in Europe had to face a cost-of-living crisis accelerated by the rise in fuel and domestic energy prices. For instance, in the UK, domestic gas prices increased by 129% and domestic electricity prices by 66% in the span of a year (October 2021 to October 2022).

On an economic level, the high energy prices led to the bankruptcy of key European energy companies (e.g., the UK’s Bulb Energy). At the same time, the pressure that the rise in energy prices put on large industries, such as the steel manufacturers and chemical companies in Germany, led to a spillover effect to other sectors of the economy which relied on the strategic products that these industries produce.

On a political-economic level, the energy crisis has triggered a shift in Europe’s traditional free-market approach to energy market governance and led to greater involvement of the state in the energy industry (e.g., the nationalisation of Gazprom Germania and Uniper by the German state). Additionally, the multi-faced direct and indirect impact of the energy crisis contributed to the fall of governments in European countries, such as the UK and Bulgaria.

The West holds together (barely) while fossil fuels still rule for now

As Russia’s war against Ukraine continues, the West is showing no significant signs of splitting. Nevertheless, the EU members states’ different energy mixes and historical perceptions of Russia continue to foster pre-war divergencies within the EU.

While Nordic countries have successfully de-coupled from Russian energy deliveries, and countries with lower levels of Russian energy dependence and diverse access to liquified natural gas (LNG), such as Spain and Portugal, emerged as “energy islands” within the common EU energy market, big importers like Germany struggle, and have therefore advocated a softer approach.

Due to the lack of alternative suppliers, countries like Bulgaria and Croatia have received exemptions from the oil boycott. Hungary has continued to rely on Russian energy imports, as its Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has remained keen to signal his political friendship with Putin to the EU; while Poland’s pre-war efforts to diversify away from Russian energy has allowed the country to successfully free itself from its over-reliance on Russia.

The most vulnerable European (although not an EU member) country to Russia’s use of energy as a foreign policy tool remains Ukraine. Russia has been targeting strategic energy infrastructure, leaving parts of the country without electricity or gas.

The war has also accelerated the EU’s plans for the green energy transition. While the European Green Deal was already present before Covid, Russia’s war demonstrated the need for a speedier energy transition. The EU has responded in multiple ways, such as when in April 2022, it dedicated €1 billion of the European Innovation Fund towards accelerating the energy transition.
Although many European states reiterated their commitment to the green energy transition, the crisis triggered a reversal in some areas: European oil and gas producers, such as the UK and Norway, accelerated investments in their fossil fuels industries; large energy consumers, such as Germany and Italy, negotiated new long-term gas supply deals (e.g., with Qatar and Algeria, respectively); and Poland and Germany slowed down their coal and nuclear phase-outs, respectively.

Deepening of the energy crisis or a green energy transition?

The 1970s oil crises ended with a long recession and diversification of suppliers. It is plausible that this is how the current crisis will end as well. Europe has been quick to reduce demand through energy savings, while new gas suppliers have been identified and LNG terminals planned and built. The roll-out of renewable energy as a strategy for energy supply diversification and greater resilience against external shocks has been put on the top of the EU’s agenda.

But Europe’s progress is fragile: it also depends on external factors outside Europe’s control, such as seasonal temperature fluctuations and the global LNG demand.

Crises accelerate change. The optimistic scenario would be the acceleration of the green energy transition in Europe. Nevertheless, the rise in fossil fuels investments (both in terms of supply and infrastructure) will add to the already existing technological, infrastructural, and institutional lock-ins in Europe. Consequently, one possible outcome of this war is that it could considerably prolong Europe’s energy transition.
As the first year of the war in Ukraine draws to a close some serious implications of this war for global food security are becoming clear. More importantly, under appreciated implications are now emerging, shedding particular light on the interconnectedness of our food supply system to other parts of our life. The links to this war were already in place with the disruption to food supplies created by the COVID-19 pandemic. Amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, global demand created higher than normal food prices and poor harvests in some critical countries such as India and Australia. The broader relationship between the environment and the war, and specifically what the implications will be for climate activities represents another important issue for some time to come. All in all, what the above means is that it is getting increasingly harder to assign causes for global food security: is it the “normal” environmental change issues, or the war in Ukraine, or a mix of both? Moreover, what are the linkages and for how long and to what extent will the impact on global food supplies, supply chains and food security be affected? Ultimately, the future prognosis is not bright. Disruptions, shortages and inflationary prices all combine to keep food security at a dangerous level for many countries. What is certain is that food security as a global issue will not disappear any time soon. The question is whether the impact of that insecurity can be managed well by the global community or whether such insecurities will cause frictions that fracture and fragment the international community to an even greater dangerous degree.

**Associated factors become clearer**

High prices, food shortages, distribution concerns, and related problems with fertiliser supplies, the availability of agricultural equipment due to a shortage of microchips, as well as rising fuel costs will all together play a role in the future price and type of food supplies available globally. The overall impact of these factors is evident in the World Food Program’s (WFP) difficulties in purchasing cereal grains for redistribution to less well-off nations. This lack of capacity due to increases in price could be made worse if nations continue to divert WFP targeted funding to increase the aid provided to Ukraine or other crisis areas.

Shortage of fertiliser from Russia due to sanctions has not had an immediate impact on food security. However, when the realities of the shortages of fertiliser become more apparent in spring 2023 farmers will be faced with no alternative but to grow fertiliser intense crops with the additional costs associated and pass those costs on to consumers, thereby raising or at least ensuring continued high food costs. Surely, farmers could choose to not grow the cereals and other crops that require as much fertiliser but instead turn to planting other types of crops, such as peas and soya beans, that require less fertiliser - although these types will place nitrogen back into the soil. Thus, despite shortages in specific types of supply such as wheat and other very specific cereals, the overall reality will be that there is generally adequate food supplies available. To be clear, the popular demand for those specific types of grain continues to drive the higher food prices in key sectors such as bread, flour and pasta.

The labour shortages created by the war in Ukraine adds question marks that hover over what next year’s crop will look like. Grain in Ukraine can be stored, with some assistance from the West and if Russia does not actively target those concentrations of grain, for some years. In that case there is a product available when an agreement or cessation of hostilities allow some sort of system of shipping to resume and distribution to begin. However, what is not grown cannot be distributed or purchased, and the question is therefore how much grain has been planted and will be available to harvest in the Autumn 2023? There are many factors, however, which could conspire to create a low yield in the autumn of 2023. Increased Ukrainian military operations requiring vital manpower; a reluctance on the part of Ukrainian farmers to grow crops that will not be exported in 2023; fertiliser shortages; bad weather delaying the harvest of winter crops and also forcing the planting of less productive varieties of grains due to the then decreased growing period, and the impact of...
military operations in farming areas, all could conspire to create a lower than expected yield in 2023. Such a future would have a knock-on effect that will be even greater in terms of exacerbating and extending the high cost of food even if the war were to cease or at least reach an impasse by next autumn.

The availability of Ukrainian port facilities in any “peace” that arises is also going to be a critical factor. 95% of Ukrainian grain exports are sent through Odessa, Mariupol and Kherson, all of which have suffered significant damage. If Russia launches attacks on the grain handling facilities and port facilities (in the same way it has attacked electricity grids and supply in Eastern Ukraine), then the ability for any food stuffs, grains and sunflower oil will be severely degraded. This will in turn create both market competition and fear of availability, raising prices abnormally high. This situation combined with the Russian sanctioning of “unfriendly” nations regarding food stuffs will exacerbate the global food-supply problem and will likely create a very serious threat of food insecurity for hundreds of millions of people world-wide.

**Shortages and availability issues dominate thinking**

In terms of continuity, shortages and availability issues mostly revolve around the impact upon developing countries. At its root, the food security problem is a question of whether poorer countries will be able to afford to buy the cereal grains required for their diets due to sharp, sustained increases in prices, rather than a lack of products available. Food prices reached an all-time high in the spring and summer of 2022. Bad weather, either drought or too much rain in other key producing countries compounded the supply shortages caused by the war in Ukraine. Those shortages are not equally distributed around the world. The Middle East, North Africa and Horn of Africa regions had the highest level of direct impact from the war, while Pakistan and India suffered more from drought effects. Europe too suffered crop failures from drought, adding to supply problems. Overall questions of supply due to multiple factors remain constant; it is the combination and therefore scale of that shortfall which is a more worrying concern.

The self-interests of nations continue to encourage the hoarding and stockpiling of foodstuffs around the world, in Western as well as non-Western states. China is hoarding food on a vast scale to prevent anticipated shortages, maintain internal calm and minimise reliance on imports. China now holds over 60% of the global maize reserves, 60% of rice and 51% of wheat. This is roughly a 20% rise over its normal needs in the last decade. This scale of hoarding generates similar behaviour in other nations as they assume China is doing this because it expects the war in Ukraine to be ongoing for some time. This selfish, self-interested, unregulated behaviour by states all contributes to a vicious cycle that is the core cause of higher food prices which drives the food shortage crisis.

**The dilemmas of future food security**

Policy makers need to consider several upcoming issues related to food security.

Regulation and price controls: in the same way that the gas and oil question created the political need for some sort of capping/regulation system to be put in place, capping profits and prices of food globally might be necessary in order to reduce the impact of a long period of high pricing denying many nations access to enough food. As far as food scarcity is concerned, production is not the problem but rather distribution and access, which are linked to financial and economic issues. If one accepts that there will be a need for controls over critical commodity and food product markets and related industries such as fertilisers and chemicals, in conjunction with regulation and direction of traditional free market forces in these areas, and direction of these traditional free market forces, then how does the international community do that if agreements and implementation is to be achieved in an expedient manner: through the UN, G7, and/or G20? What are the best policies, both nationally and internationally, for such controls and restrictions (rationing, forced changes to diet expectations so those accustomed to wheat as core cereal will need to use oats, barely, rye, etc)? Furthermore, how can we ensure that by making decisions for one problem - say moving corn or land used to grow corn to cereals or other consumption crops instead of the ethanol industry being the prime consumer - we are not creating a new problem.
somewhere else? This is a possible risk. The unintended consequences of these reactive policies being implemented without damaging critical food infrastructures and markets in the long-term deserve serious analysis and modelling by national governments. Commodity speculation is a serious factor in food price rises, particularly wheat. Massive amounts of investor capital into specialised agricultural funds from speculators with nothing to do with the production or distribution of wheat (often American-based firms) have seen an opportunity to make fast profits. Can that sort of behaviour and war profiteering be allowed to continue?

Yet, despite the problems noted above, there could be benefits from the strategic global shock this food security crisis is creating. Will long-term development of integrated global food systems be disrupted due to countries attempting to create food security through greater levels of self-sufficiency and control thereby adding to established global market norms and supply chain confidence? And would that outcome be a better situation for the environment, local economies, more distributed development globally, etc? Will the need to look for alternative protein sources accelerate the search for resilience by nations in their food security systems through a great reliance on such alternatives? Such developments would force highly damaging animal farming practices to be reduced, a situation which could be considered an environmental win?

As for the war in the Ukraine, fears over food insecurity will create increased pressures for a quick resolution to the war. That desire for a quick peace may introduce frictions in the Ukrainian/West strategic relationship as a quick peace may not be the peace envisioned by Ukraine. It will, however, be the peace required by the nations that enable Ukrainian resistance to Russia. Such a strategic disconnect in agreeing the nature of any peace process will just exacerbate the food security problem due to the war dragging on until an agreed vision for peace is arrived at.
The Devastating Impact of War on Health and Health Systems

Professor Martin CM Bricknell and Dr George Bundy

This paper summarises the impact of the Russian invasion on the health and health services of the population of Ukraine. The war has resulted in large numbers of military and civilian casualties. It has undermined progress in the transition of the Ukrainian health system from a Soviet model to a West European model. The war will result in a substantial burden of physical and mental injury that will require a considerable investment in money and human capital to mitigate.

The fragility of health in war

The invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces in February 2022 is a stark reminder of the consequences of war on the health and health services of affected populations. Although Russia annexed Crimea and invaded the Donbas region of Ukraine in 2014, until February 2022, the conflict was relatively restricted in territorial ambition and the conduct of war, and did not produce the systemic effects and wider consequences seen throughout 2022. However, the Russian intervention in the Syrian civil war in 2015 provided a foretaste of the true nature of unrestricted warfare on civilians, and gave warning of the types of health impacts now playing out in Ukraine. Just as witnessed in Syria, sustained sieges, the use of modern weapons in urban areas and the illegal use of chemical weapons has had catastrophic humanitarian consequences in Ukraine. Similar to the war in Syria, the displacement of large numbers of civilians has had a devastating impact on the overall health of the Ukrainian population. Furthermore, the health system has been severely affected by the direct targeting of health facilities by Russian forces and the emigration of health professionals.

Impact of war on the health of the Ukrainian population

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources provide independent, publicly available data on military or civilian casualties because this information has strategic value to both parties. The US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff estimated on 9 November 2022, that Russia and Ukraine have both suffered around 100,000 military personnel killed or wounded. UNOCHR estimated that, as of 16 January 2023, 7,031 civilians had been killed and 11,327 injured. It is believed that the actual figures are considerably higher. The distribution and the types of wounds reflect modern warfare with the majority being caused by artillery and missiles, resulting in multiple severe injuries including extensive tissue destruction. Non-combat injury, disease, and environmental injury (cold and heat) also cause significant numbers of casualties. The residual risk of death or injury from the unexploded remnants of war (including landmines and booby-traps) is likely to persist long after the fighting stops.

In addition to the direct health consequences of weapons, the war in Ukraine has led to the largest population displacement in Europe since World War 2. The IOM estimated that, as of 27 October 2022, 6.5 million people are displaced across Ukraine. The UNHCR estimated, at 6 December 2022, there were 7.8 million refugees recorded across Europe. According to the WHO, refugees and migrants are often the most vulnerable members of a society. They are exposed to infectious diseases resulting from overcrowding and poor sanitation; accessing healthcare will be difficult; they will have missed routine health protection programmes (immunisation and disease screening); and they will have mental health issues arising from physical and social upheaval. Refugees with chronic conditions may have difficulties accessing drugs and medical oversight of their medical conditions.

Impact of war on health services in Ukraine

The healthcare system originates from a highly-centralised Soviet model. Life expectancy and government expenditure on healthcare has been one of the lowest in Europe. Since 1991 there were multiple attempts to improve access to care by financial reform, strengthening
primary healthcare, and reducing personal out-of-pocket expenses. The public health system was already tenuous due to the pre-existing tensions with Russia, particularly in the Donbas region, with further disruption from the COVID-19 pandemic. Since 2014 the military health system has aligned to NATO rather than Russian doctrine with substantial assistance from NATO and bilateral partner countries.

The war in Ukraine has re-aligned the whole national health economy into a trauma-focussed system prioritising the treatment of war casualties from the battle lines and from missile attacks deeper within the country. The military health system has created an efficient system of casualty evacuation from the front line to forward surgical facilities, often in basements and bunkers. Patients have then been transferred by ambulances and converted rail carriages to receiving hospitals in metropolitan centres away from the fighting. This has required an unprecedented level of civil-military cooperation across the Ukrainian system.

As of 9 December 2022, the World Health Organisation Surveillance System for Attacks on Healthcare reported 715 attacks on the Ukrainian health system by Russian forces, primarily by heavy weapons. Health facilities, medical transport and medical warehouses have been targeted and at least 100 people have been killed and 129 injured. Attacks on other civilian infrastructure, including the power and water systems, have also affected healthcare. Even though it seems that healthcare system was not explicitly and directly targeted by cyber attacks, it received collateral damage from the outages in other supporting services such as general telecommunications, financial applications, and data services. Despite recent reforms of Ukrainian healthcare system, much health data is still kept offline in paper records which probably provided some resilience to electronic attack. In May 2022, the Ukrainian Parliament banned medicines from Russia and Belarus, as well as restricting the exports of pharmaceuticals. Its goal was to limit the sale of Russian and Belarusian-made medicines in Ukraine, but it has contributed to a significant reduction in the availability of medicines leading to price rises of 20-40%. The Ukrainian government has subsidised critical medicines by providing direct reimbursement of extra costs directly to pharmacies. Beyond this, reform of health financing has been delayed with monthly allocations to regions being based on the pre-war budget. This does not reflect the mass movement of population westwards which has shifted the location of actual expenditure on health services. Furthermore, many healthcare workers have joined the Ukrainian military health system and so have left civilian practice. Those healthcare workers who have fled the occupied territories have had trouble finding employment elsewhere in Ukraine or have left the country, thus further reducing numbers available.

The international community has mobilised to aid Ukraine and its displaced populations. The UNOCHA health cluster reports 138 implementing partners including 48 international non-government organisations. Regional countries have provided some support to referrals for specialist care outside Ukraine with the opening of a medical evacuation hub in Poland and coordination of medical evacuation flights to receiving countries by the European Union. Over 1500 Ukrainian patients had been transferred to European hospitals by 15 November 2022. The provision of healthcare for Ukrainian citizens in captured territory is also a challenge. Some health specialists are providing free consultations online or by telephone; and hotlines have been set up covering specific medical conditions such as HIV/AIDS and mental health.

Has the impact of war on health changed?

This is the first sustained peer-on-peer conflict of the 21st century utilising the full destructive power of modern weapons. The number of casualties, particularly military casualties, is a closely guarded secret for both sides as this data is a key measure of the performance of the military campaign. The war has seen implicit threats that Russia might use tactical chemical or nuclear weapons or might deliberately damage Ukrainian nuclear power facilities (particularly the Zaporizhzhia site) to cause substantial casualties over a large area and deny territory. There are many examples of Russian forces contravening the Geneva Conventions and other sources of international humanitarian law, most particularly the direct targeting of civilian infrastructure to harm the civilian population. There have been allegations of atrocities committed by Russian forces against Ukrainian...
prisoners, though there is no public information about the treatment of Russian prisoners by Ukrainian forces including the wounded. Overall, the catastrophic impact of war on the health of the Ukrainian population and the Ukrainian health system is not new, was entirely predictable, and shows the unchanging and devastating nature of war on health and health systems.

**Challenges ahead for both Ukraine’s and Europe’s health systems**

The cumulative number of deaths and injured from the war will continue to rise until both sides agree to a ceasefire. The Ukrainian health system and the health services of regional countries will continue to face an increased demand from war wounded and refugees. The capacity of the health services to care for non-war casualties is likely to continue to deteriorate, and to be affected by the interruption to the healthcare education that provides the next generation of healthcare workers. The planned healthcare reforms will be delayed and stressed by the wider impact of war on Ukraine’s economy. When the fighting stops, there will be a substantial demand for rehabilitation for the war injured and support for their wider social recovery. This will be compounded by the psychological and social harm to the whole population from the sustained threat from long range drones and rockets. Recovery from the damage to the health and health services of Ukraine will require substantial investment in money and human capital.

The Ukrainian war is a stark reminder of the health consequences of war. NATO, the European Union and European countries need to consider this as they refresh their security strategies – to increase resilience to both pandemic risks (in response to the COVID-19 crisis) and the risk of widened confrontation or conflict with Russia. It is almost certain that the medical support capacity of the armed forces of European nations is insufficient to match the demand in the event of war. It is also important to ensure that civilian health systems are resilient to forms of indirect attack, including cyber threats. Although not attributed to the Russian state, the cyber-attack on the NHS 111 out-of-hours system software might foretell the disruption that can be caused to health systems in war.
SECTION TWO
NATIONAL AND REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES
Britain’s Nuclear Quandary: Russia, NATO, and the Rise of China

Professor Andrew Dorman and Professor Matthew Uttley

At the end of the Cold War, the United Kingdom (UK) possessed a range of nuclear capabilities. These went from nuclear depth charges, to free-fall nuclear warheads carried by both Tornado and Buccaneer aircraft, to its four Polaris nuclear-armed submarines, equipped with the Chevaline delivery system. Since then, the UK has relied solely on its four Trident equipped submarines for its nuclear deterrent. In 2010 it pledged to further reduce its nuclear arsenal, with warhead numbers set to fall from 225 to 180 by the mid-2020s; and the deployed submarines carrying no more than eight Trident missiles equipped in total, with a maximum of 40 warheads (the targeting of which has remained unspecified). These historical choices mean that the UK is currently the only United Nation’s five Permanent Member reliant on a single nuclear delivery system.

This contribution analyses the quandaries that the UK confronts in reconciling its contributions to NATO and non-NATO nuclear deterrence commitments in the context of Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, and China’s increased assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region. The first section reviews extant UK policy outlined in the 2021 Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy (IR). The second focuses on nuclear deterrence issues relating to the UK’s “Indo-Pacific tilt” announced in the IR. And the third addresses nuclear domain quandaries arising from the ongoing Ukraine conflict. The final section discusses the resultant post-2021 dilemmas that the UK confronts in balancing its investment in nuclear and conventional military capability.

The UK Integrated Review’s nuclear tweak

The 2021 IR continued the narrative present in successive previous government reviews, emphasising the ongoing significance of nuclear deterrence and the UK’s role as NATO’s second nuclear guarantor behind the United States, while noting that France has not committed its nuclear forces to NATO. The IR also confirmed the government’s commitment to replacing the UK’s current force of four Vanguard-class nuclear submarines, equipped with a similar number of Dreadnought-class submarines, and initially with the same Trident missiles.

Controversially, the Johnson government also announced in the IR that the UK has abandoned its 2010 commitments on warhead and missile numbers. Instead, the nuclear stockpile is to be increased to a maximum of 260 warheads. More significantly, the government also announced that previous limits on the number of missiles and warheads on the submarines at sea would also be abandoned. The justifications provided for this included the need to respond to improvements in anti-ballistic missile (ABM) technology by potential adversaries, thereby preserving the UK’s minimum deterrent capability. In practice, this was an acknowledgement that improved Russian ABM capabilities necessitated an increase in the number of missiles and warheads to maintain the same level of threatened destruction to preserve deterrence – the so-called “Moscow criterion”.

The Indo-Pacific tilt’s omission

The IR also spoke of an “Indo-Pacific tilt”, with China referred to as both a key trading and economic partner, and a systemic competitor threatening UK interest in maintaining the so-called US-led liberal international order. As part of this “Indo-Pacific tilt” the IR announced the UK’s commitment to the AUKUS defence/technology partnership with the United States and Australia, clearly aimed at China; the “Five Eyes” intelligence alliance comprising the US, UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand; the Five Power Defence Accords aimed at protecting Malaysia and Singapore; and the UK’s growing defence links with Japan and South Korea. The sub-text in the IR was that the UK was looking to deter a growing China from exerting its increasing military capabilities.
Measures contained within the IR included the permanent stationing of two small offshore patrol vessels to the Indo-Pacific region with the pledge of more capable Type 31 frigates to follow later; along with the periodic deployment of a UK carrier group to the region. Implicit in this approach is the assumption of an ability to deter by threatening to escalate Britain’s military capabilities in the region. In some respects, this approach echoes the UK’s deployment of Force Z to Singapore in 1941 as an attempt to deter Japanese aggression. Centred on the battleship HMS Prince of Wales and battlecruiser HMS Repulse, Force Z lacked deterrent credibility and was subsequently destroyed a few days after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

The significant omission in the IR’s military commitment to the Asia-Pacific region was the nuclear dimension. For deterrence to work the conventional forces would also need the ability to threaten to escalate to the nuclear level if the UK was not itself to be subject to potential nuclear threats from China. Ironically, this was part of the justification for the UK’s initial plans to acquire five Polaris nuclear submarines in the 1960s to provide a nuclear guarantee to India and discourage India from developing its own nuclear capability.

This raises the question of whether the UK should consider purchasing an additional one or two Dreadnought-class submarines on top of the current planned force of four to maintain a nuclear deterrent within range of China, potentially based at Diego Garcia alongside some form of support ship. This would clearly have significant political implications, but before such a step could be entertained the more fundamental question that UK policy makers would need to consider is “what would the ‘Moscow criterion’ equivalent be for Beijing?”

**Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the consequences for the IR**

In the nine months since Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, the nuclear dimension has raised its head on several occasions. Setting aside the potential consequences to Ukraine’s civil nuclear programme, three aspects stand out. The first is that the UK and US guarantee to Ukraine under the Budapest Memorandum, which led to Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament, has ultimately proved worthless. This raises the question as to whether Ukraine was wise to disarm, and reinforces potential credibility issues surrounding the nuclear guarantees provided by the US and UK to the other NATO members.

Second, there have been several Russian threats regarding the possible use of so-called ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons. This raises questions about the extent to which the UK and NATO’s limited nuclear options provide a credible deterrent to such actions. With a single delivery system, the UK essentially has only one nuclear option – the use of the ballistic missiles in deployed Trident submarines – which would be a disproportionate response in the context of a potential Russian use of a small tactical nuclear weapon, thereby undermining the credibility of its deterrent effect.

Third, concerns remain about the future of the US nuclear commitment to NATO, especially considering Donald Trump’s decision to seek re-election as President. It is noteworthy here that Poland has already called for US nuclear forces to be based on its territory for additional reassurance. Moreover, the credibility of NATO’s existing force of armed strike aircraft as a deterrent is questionable given the potential vulnerability of the current aircraft and their dependence on the US for the provision of their free-fall nuclear weapons.

All three elements reinforce the importance of the UK’s nuclear commitment to NATO, especially given France’s continued policy of excluding its nuclear forces from NATO. From a NATO perspective, the lack of nuclear options that the UK provides, and its continued dependence on a single delivery, is a cause for concern. A possible resolution might be for the UK to resurrect an air launched system initially equipping its Storm Shadow missiles with a nuclear warhead deployed on either additional Typhoon or F-35A aircraft. In the longer term, some form of collaboration with France along the lines of the cancelled 1990s programme to co-develop an air-launched missile might provide a viable approach to increasing the credibility of NATO’s deterrence posture.
Britain's nuclear dilemma

If the logic of the role of deterrence is to be followed through in the IR’s Indo-Pacific tilt and/or the need to provide additional nuclear options for NATO, then the UK will need to increase the amount of funding it allocates to its nuclear forces significantly.

The main barrier to this – which has been a consistent issue for British defence and security policy for much of the Cold and post-Cold War periods – is money. Whilst the IR promised much in terms of new equipment and additional funding it was also accompanied by cuts in equipment in the short term. The one constant in UK defence and security reviews since 2010 has been the adoption of a “quasi-10-year rule” based on the commitment to have Britain’s armed forces ready to meet the challenges of a decade hence. Whilst this approach made some sense in the apparently more benign times of the 2010 review, since 2015 the defence and security reviews have consistently said the threats to the UK are immediate, with the 2021 IR adding China to the list; all whilst pledging to develop the requisite defence capabilities a decade later. For the 2021 IR the timeframe was 2030.

The latest Conservative government’s 2022 Autumn Statement revoked earlier commitments to increases UK defence spending, and refocused assumptions on 2% of national GDP rather than the previously discussed 2.5% or 3% of GDP. At the same time the most recent National Audit Office Report on the MoD’s Equipment Plan continues to emphasise its lack of affordability. This is likely to be exacerbated as personnel costs look set to rise significantly to meet the challenge of inflation, whilst the lack of investment over the last 12 years has led to a neglect of the defence estate.

Therefore, the quandary the UK confronts is that increasing its nuclear capabilities can only occur at the expense of its existing and planned future conventional forces. This is the dilemma confronting Whitehall, which points to the need for a debate on the future of the UK’s nuclear capabilities, and the optimal balance of investment between nuclear and conventional capabilities.
Germany is slowly waking up from a deep slumber

Germany’s cooperative and interdependent approach towards Russia has blatantly failed, as evidenced by Putin’s wholesale attack on Ukraine. For too long, Berlin (and this is true regardless of political party affiliation) has fostered and willingly given in to the illusion that ‘Wandel durch Handel’ (change through trade) would eventually turn Russia into a stable, democratic country shaped by a market economy. Yet, Germany’s political elites could and should have known better. Since 2014 at the very latest, Russia began infringing upon Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Instead of realising that Putin and those surrounding him were on an anti-Western path, Germany chose to favour cheap energy over security concerns (most loudly aired in NATO’s Central and Eastern European member states) through the construction of projects such as, for example, Nord Stream 2. Only the latest Russian aggression against Ukraine has finally ushered in the beginning of a mentality change in Germany towards the Kremlin. The majority of the country’s political elites and society-at-large have come to realise that Russia under its current leadership is a malign actor that is not only affecting Ukraine’s survival, but also the security of Germany and the rest of Europe.

Moving in the right direction

Germany has fundamentally changed its security, defence, and energy policies in reaction to Russia’s renewed and fully-fledged war of aggression against Ukraine. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced in his so-called ‘Zeitenwende’ speech delivered on 27 February 2022 that the country would break with some long-standing policy tenets. First and foremost, the German government decided to set aside a long-standing principle of not sending arms into conflict zones by sending lethal weapons to Ukraine (Berlin had last deviated from this norm in 2014, when it had provided the Iraqi Kurds with weapons in their fight against the Islamic State). While Germany has been criticised domestically and internationally for not supporting Ukraine quickly and substantially enough, the country’s track record suggests that this is not quite fair. By late 2022, the ‘Ukraine Support Tracker’ (a tool set up by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy to measure different countries’ commitments to Kiev) ranked Germany third among individual donor countries in terms of total commitments – including humanitarian, financial, and military aid – including weapons deliveries. In total numbers, Germany has supported Ukraine’s fight against Russia with arms worth €2.34 billion while the equipment delivered to Ukraine has included highly sophisticated and efficient weapons such as the Howitzer 2000 artillery system, the anti-aircraft system Iris-T, the anti-aircraft cannon tank Gepard (including ammunition), hand weapon ammunition and grenades. After weeks of domestic and international discussions and pressure, Germany also agreed to provide Kiev with its main battle tank (MBT), Leopard 2, which Ukraine had requested many months ago.

Second, Germany adopted a special fund worth €100 billion to modernise its own armed forces – a decision long overdue considering that necessary investments have been delayed in the years past. While the fund will not suffice to catch up on all adjourned investments, the special asset is a helpful initial stimulus. The biggest chunk of the so-called ‘Sondervermögen’ is dedicated to air defence, including the acquisition of the F-35 fighter aircraft to ensure Germany’s continued contribution to NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangement, as well as the heavy lift helicopter Chinook. Another major bulk worth €20 billion is earmarked for updating the Bundeswehr’s communication systems. While the other branches of Germany’s military services – army and navy – will receive less money, they too will benefit from acquisitions that are logged as items allocated to the air domain (for instance the heavy lift helicopter, which will be of service to the army). Closely connected to the special fund is Germany’s renewed vow to finally, and ‘year after year’ commit, two per cent of the country’s GDP to defence.

Third, Germany has ushered in steps to end its self-inflicted energy dependence on Russia at record speed. Accordingly, the country is no longer importing coal or gas from Russia. To
compensate the loss of Russian energy imports, Berlin has decided, among other things, to extend the operation of three nuclear plants, invest into building the necessary infrastructure to use liquid natural gas, and to speed up the country’s green energy transformation to rely more heavily on renewable energy sources.

**... but the necessary changes are not quick and substantial enough yet**

While the changes Germany has heralded in reaction to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are commendable, some well-known problems remain that overshadow the progress that has been achieved.

One of the overarching challenges amounts to German bureaucratic and ministerial processes and (political) mindset still being stuck in a peace time modus operandi. Turning to the expenditure of the Bundeswehr’s special fund, the ponderous speed at which Germany is moving ahead becomes evident. Only very late in 2022 did the German Bundestag approve of the first acquisitions that were logged at the cost of the special fund. It took as long as mid-December to prepare the procurement agreements for the Parliament’s budget committee, whose members must approve every purchase that exceeds €25 million. Although the special fund originally worth €100 billion – which is shrinking in real-terms monetary value due to inflation and sharp rises in costs of military equipment – does represent a hefty sum, the money is used to reach NATO’s two per cent-goal. In other words: Germany does not intend to increase its regular defence budget permanently to meet its long-standing Alliance commitment; the current mid-term fiscal planning freezes military spending at €50.1 billion. Even with the resources flowing from the special fund, Germany will most likely reach the two per cent target only in 2024 and 2025. Conversely, Chancellor Scholz’s promise to spend at least two per cent of the country’s GDP on defence henceforth rings hollow in light of Germany’s financial planning.

Lack of strategic anticipation further underlines how slowly Germany is coming to recognise Europe’s new security realities. Accordingly, ammunition for the anti-aircraft cannon tank Gepard ran very low in November last year, which could and should have been foreseen given the well-known, frequent use of the system by Ukraine. It is surprising that those responsible for the planning and coordination of aiding Ukraine militarily did not plan for the long-term in this respect; equally, Germany did not adequately prepare to organise replacement parts for the Howitzer 2000 artillery system.

One explanation for the above comes down to Germany lacking a strategic culture and mindset, which is especially prevalent among many decision- and law-makers. This is illustrated by the tedious debate about whether to deliver Leopard 2 battle tanks to Ukraine. While the Chancellor finally agreed to the donation after the US promised to deliver its MBT Abrams, the domestic discussion in the run-up to the decision took bizarre turns in that numerous reasons (or rather excuses) were put forward by members of the government and some parliamentarians on why not to provide Ukraine with the requested assistance. Such walking on eggshells vis-a-vis the Leopard 2 matter contrasts quite starkly with the proclamations of the German leadership, as aired by both Chancellor Scholz and his Defence Minister Christine Lambrecht. Ironically, Berlin could have matched its words with deeds by organising the delivery of battle tanks to Ukraine on a European level, as proposed by a group of German think tankers.

**What is next?**

In a recently published piece in Foreign Affairs, Chancellor Scholz has once more underpinned Germany’s leadership aspirations: ‘Germans are intent on becoming the guarantor of European security that our allies expect us to be.’ Despite such grand claims, it is unclear how Germany is going to translate this objective into practice. Undeniably, the country has come a long way since 24 February 2022. Yet, in order to be a leading power in the European security, defence, and military realm, Germany is still punching way below its weight. The long-awaited, first ever German National Security Strategy may shed further light on whether and how Germany plans to turn itself into a (military) leader for European security. As of now, the country’s self-asserted aspirations do not match its deeds – despite the introduction of necessary and overdue changes.
“Unequivocal” commitment to European security in times of “Global Britain”

Until early 2022, the UK’s engagement in the future of European security and defence left European partners with more questions than answers. The Integrated Review, published in March 2021, emphasised the UK’s “unequivocal commitment” to European security and defence, and formulated the aspiration to be “the greatest single European contributor to the security of the Euro-Atlantic area to 2030”. Yet, the “tilt” to the Indo-Pacific also led Europeans to question the further involvement of the UK in European security. By mid-2021, relations with the UK’s closest ally in Europe, France, significantly suffered from the UK joining the trilateral AUKUS pact with the US and Australia, which aims to contain China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific mostly through tech and security cooperation. For Paris, the participation in this format, which also blew up a multi-billion bilateral deal on submarines with Australia, confirmed the fears that the UK might pursue its quest for “Global Britain” mostly in the Indo-Pacific, and, if beneficial to broader British foreign policy goals, delegate concerns of European security and cooperation with the Europeans to second place.

Within this context, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the UK’s answer to the war has eliminated doubts on its commitment to European security. When Russia was still building up troops on the Ukrainian border, the UK started delivering weapons, including heavy weapons, to Ukraine. Furthermore, the UK has been training more Ukrainian soldiers than any other European country, and started to do so in July when EU member states were still discussing the issue. The UK’s extensive engagement within the JEF (Joint Expeditionary Force), a defence cooperation grouping of 10 Northern and Eastern European states, reinforced London’s significant contribution to European security, and demonstrated the overlap of threat assessment and strategic priorities with these states.

Moving closer: the EU and the UK

The UK’s commitment to European security has not only moved it closer to its Northern and Eastern European partners, but also to the European Union as a whole. There was little doubt in London and Brussels that demonstrating cohesion among European partners was crucial to respond to Russia’s war on Ukraine. While the EU appreciated the UK’s quick and determined reaction, appreciation for the EU’s substantive contribution, particularly through instruments that NATO does not have, such as sanctions or massive financial aid, grew. An important political signal only a few weeks after the start of the invasion was then-prime minister Boris Johnson’s participation in the European Council, where the EU presented its Strategic Compass, its guiding document for designing European defence until 2030.

In other words: the necessity to cooperate created the political opportunity. Another milestone for further cooperation between the EU and the UK was laid in October 2022 in Prague, when European countries gathered for the first meeting of the European Political Community. This format brings together European states, regardless of their membership status to the EU, to “strengthen the security, stability and prosperity of the European continent”. Taking place right before the European Council in Prague and with participation of all EU members, the organisational synergies between the meeting of the European Political Community and EU leaders could not be denied. However, the format has a “light legal structure” and does not set up any permanent institutions, leaving engagement as purely intergovernmental. Ultimately, the UK did not only attend the meeting, but will also host the fourth summit of the European Political Community in the first half of 2024. The exact scope of this format remains to be seen, but London’s willingness to exert leadership in this context was unanimously welcomed in other European capitals.
Most importantly, Russia’s war on Ukraine has been a catalyst for very practical cooperation between the UK and the EU. A key advancement in EU-UK cooperation since the start of the war is clearly the UK’s decision to join the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation, PESCO, on a project on military mobility. In this context, the UK will cooperate with the EU member states, as well as non-members Norway, the US, and Canada to standardise cross-border military transport procedures. While other non-EU countries had already joined the project in 2021, London had been hesitant to do so. From an operational perspective, this decision makes sense as it facilitates practical cooperation, and because it is consistent with the UK’s engagement with the JEF countries. Yet, more importantly, it shows London’s capacity to overcome the politics of Brexit at least to the extent that cooperation with the EU has become possible i.e. where it is technical, barely politicised, and clearly mutually beneficial.

**Lingering differences and looming challenges**

Nevertheless, all these advances in EU-UK cooperation and the UK’s engagement for European security cannot hide some persistent differences between the UK and its EU neighbours. Despite the constructive cooperation in the field of security and defence over the last year, both sides are aware of the looming challenges of designing cross-channel relations. The trade and cooperation agreement between the EU and the UK does not include any provisions on security and defence, and it seems highly unlikely that this is going to change, given that the appetite for formalisation of relations with the EU is relatively low in London. Beyond security and defence, where cooperation has been clearly fuelled by necessity rather than choice, challenges of Brexit in other areas continue to complicate the relationship between London and Brussels. With disputes over the Northern Ireland Protocol still unresolved, it remains to be seen whether the UK and the EU manage to compartmentalise their relationship, and prevent their divergences on the Protocol from overshadowing the possibility of advancing in other areas.

Furthermore, the debate on European strategic autonomy remains challenging for the UK. For London, cooperation in the field of security and defence in Europe should ideally run through NATO, and different visions of the right institution to pursue certain projects of cooperation could complicate cooperation between London and Brussels in the near future. The ‘refresh’ of the Integrated Review will most likely reconfirm London’s commitment to European security, but any divergence from the UK’s traditionally atlanticist strategic culture seems highly improbable, so that the question of long-term security and defence integration in Europe will remain a source of difficult discussions between the UK and the EU.

**Looking ahead: major opportunities for bilateral and flexible European defence cooperation**

The next few months offer London considerable opportunities to maintain the positive dynamic that exists in security and defence cooperation with its European partners and the EU. This path can first and foremost lead through Paris. As the UK’s most important partner in Europe, France largely shares the British assessment of the geopolitical environment and the responses to global challenges; the focus of both countries on the Indo-Pacific is just one of many examples. Indeed, Franco-British relations have been warming up again since Rishi Sunak assumed office, and the Franco-British summit in March offers a key window of opportunity to advance on concrete bilateral initiatives.

France’s support for flexible formats of European security and defence cooperation may offer a particularly useful stepping-stone for London into more engagement with other European partners. In the past, London has, for example, joined the European Intervention Initiative, an initiative founded in 2017 by France, which aims to “develop a shared strategic culture, which will enhance our ability to carry out military missions and operations under the framework of the EU, NATO, the UN and/or ad hoc coalitions”. Similarly, the UK’s participation in PESCO military mobility is clearly project-based, underlining London’s openness to these flexible intergovernmental formats. Seizing these opportunities will be key for the UK’s further engagement as a credible player in European security.
This rapprochement with the Europeans could also be favoured by the political climate. Recent surveys show that a majority of Britons now believe that leaving the EU was a mistake. This change in the mood of the British public may enable a deeper shift from “politics of Brexit” as a paradigm guiding UK relations with the EU towards a more pragmatic approach.

The future of UK-EU cooperation in the field of security and defence depends on political willingness in London and Brussels, and particularly on London’s willingness to signal its openness to work with Europeans or the EU. Seeing the EU as a complement to NATO’s core tasks, particularly deterrence and defence, instead of a concurrence, can help London navigate future relations in security and defence from a pragmatic perspective. On both sides of the Channel, political communication will be crucial, as public fights could incentivise hostile states to exploit rifts between London and Brussels. However, first steps and the political willingness in Downing Street look like a promising start to finding a common answer to the strategic challenges for European security.
Even if (and when) fighting in Ukraine comes to an end, Russia is going to continue to be a very difficult neighbour – both for the West and those states in its neighbourhood.

Moscow’s failure to achieve a decisive victory over Ukraine has damaged its (self-)image as a great power, threatening its position as the regional hegemon, as well as its ability to act as an effective mediator and security guarantor in its near abroad. Much of an actor’s status depends upon how it is perceived by other states and their acceptance of it as the dominant power. If Russia is perceived to be weak and unable to protect its position, as a result of the ongoing war in Ukraine, other actors may strive to further their own positions, which could lead to a change in the constellation of power across the post-Soviet space. Furthermore, Russia’s aspiration to be accepted as a global great power is dependent upon its status as a regional hegemon across the post-Soviet space; and its ability to prevent strategic rivals usurping its power. After all, if a state is unable to act hegemonically in its own ‘backyard’, it is implausible that it will be able to exert influence on a global scale.

The invasion has created a climate of uncertainty in Russia’s neighbourhood. In Central Asian states, for example, Russia’s role as regional security provider has been placed in doubt. Despite the intervention by Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation...
(CSTO) troops in Kazakhstan in January 2022, this now appears to be the exception rather than the rule. For example, Kyrgyzstan requested Russian intervention/mediation over the border clashes with Tajikistan in September 2022, yet there was no sign of Russia or the CSTO. At the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Samarkand that took place during the clashes, there was no mention of the violence. The renewal of violence this year between Armenia and Azerbaijan around Nagorno-Karabakh is further indication of Russia’s apparently dwindling power and influence in its own neighbourhood: a weakened Russia that is both distracted by, and heavily engaged in, military operations in Ukraine, is deemed to be incapable of coming to the aid of Armenia, a key ally and strategic partner. As with the Kyrgyz-Tajik case, the CSTO has confirmed its impotence, refusing to aid Armenia when Azerbaijan’s forces shelled its territory in September 2022, despite the organisation’s mutual assistance clause. This refusal has drawn the ire of Armenia’s president Nikol Pashinian, who has interpreted it as a sign of abandonment of Yerevan.

Russia leverages its global influence

Russia’s power within Europe (and the West more broadly), and even vis-à-vis China, may be perceived to be dwindling, but it has continued to seek to build and consolidate relations with the non-Western world, exploiting power vacuums triggered by US and Western withdrawal or inaction. States such as Venezuela and Cuba have been the most vocal in their support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, blaming the US and NATO for the crisis. Vladimir Putin has sought to position Russia as an anti-colonial power, appealing to the Global South to join its “emancipatory, anti-colonial movement” against unipolar hegemony and Western ‘colonisers’.

Its growing presence across Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere is an attempt to expand its global influence, using a wide range of tools ranging from arms sales to energy deals, diplomacy, and political and military advisers. However, it is unclear how enduring Russia’s relationships are with the Global South: its influence is premised in many respects on Russia’s role as a niche security provider rather than on an enduring Russian presence, with relationships driven primarily by weapons sales and military training.

China is still supporting Russia, but not explicitly. Both have worked together in the UN, using economic incentives to keep Global South countries on side and on the same page regarding the dilution of human rights provisions in UN peacekeeping mandates. But Russia’s ejection from the UN Human Rights Council means it has lost a valuable means of carving out alliances with like-minded states on human rights issues.

The split with the West will not end any time soon

There should be no expectation that the Russian government will change its current course of action. Putin has acknowledged that the war may be protracted and there is determination in Moscow to stay the course in Ukraine. Though the war is likely to be disastrous for Russia in the long-term, Russian officials believe they are in a fight with the West and need to fight. The West should therefore not be counting on Russia being unable to sustain the war. Moscow is likely calculating that Western interest and support for Ukraine, as well as its unity, will run out far before its natural and military resources. There will be an extended period of rupture in relations between Russia and the West, which are virtually non-existent now. China is expected to become Russia’s main economic partner by 2024; there is continuation of pre-existing partnerships with China, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and to some extent India, although relations with India have been placed under strain by India’s gradual move into the US security orbit.

The situation across Russia’s neighbourhood is likely to remain very tense and unstable. Moscow has vital national interests across the neighbourhood, and is focused on safeguarding its own national security and strategic interests, including its regional hegemony. The war has accentuated existing divisions both within the domestic politics of Russia’s neighbours, and between political elites and society – cleavages which can be exploited by Moscow. Kazakhstan, as well as Armenia and Georgia, are also having to deal with the influx of large numbers of Russians fleeing mobilisation in their home country. These influxes are creating tensions which – along with doubts over Russia’s continued commitment to regional security and the sovereignty of its neighbours – create a dangerous mix of challenges.
Russia’s savage invasion has been a devastating tragedy for Ukrainians, who are suffering war crimes and depredation. Less sympathetically, it’s also been a tragedy for the people of Russia, revealing so many of them as supporters of a genocidal campaign, with others forced to flee to avoid participation, all amid a darkening of the country’s economic outlook. But speaking crassly and strategically, this terrible war is likely to prove beneficial for the United States.

Benefits of the war

As a result of Ukraine’s determination and Russia’s terrorising blunders, the US is stronger than it has been in at least twenty years relative to its adversaries, and safer than it has been in generations. For the expense of just five percent of the US defence budget, Ukraine has fought a war that has decimated the Russian military and deflated its reputation. As the joke goes, before the invasion, we believed Russia had one of the best militaries in the world; we now know they don’t even have the best military in the former Soviet Union. Russia has been taken off the board as a major adversary. Zero Americans died to produce that outcome; Ukraine has paid that butcher’s bill for us — something we should never forget. Even China is weaker as a consequence of the war because Beijing has shackled itself to a weak and snarling Russia; and despite professions of unlimited friendship, it is fearful enough of Western sanctions to restrict loans and arms to Russia. The performance of Russia’s military may even give China’s leaders pause about the prospects for their own military ambitions.

The Biden administration has shown that it understands the nature of the threat to the liberal international order, and can rally international support to uphold it – something the same administration’s choices about Afghanistan had called into question. The U.S. developed a model for assistance to Ukraine that’s drawn widespread and sustainable support (what the Defense Department’s “by, through, and with” partnerships had hoped to produce in less fortuitous circumstances). The Defense Department is displaying its proficiency in training, arming, and convening, while the Secretary of Defense holds monthly meetings of fifty countries with Ukraine to identify and provide weapons. Our partnership with Ukraine is yielding Russian, Iranian, and North Korean weapons to learn their vulnerabilities, and the remarkable innovations propelling Ukrainian military success will be schoolhouse subjects for our own military improvement. The National Security Agency and CYBERCOM have been assisting Ukraine in successfully defending its networks and working in concert with U.S. allies to prevent cyber being a debilitating new tool of warfare. The U.S. intelligence community, meanwhile, restored its reputation by penetrating Russian policy and operational councils, trusting its tradecraft to share information widely with partners to facilitate a common threat perception that gives time for governments to craft supporting policies, while publicly releasing information ahead of Russian efforts to cloak their actions or mislead international public opinion. The Treasury and Commerce Departments dreamed up creative new tools to confiscate Russian Central Bank holdings and impose economic sanctions, coordinated quietly with allies, and produced a united front the Russian government is struggling to contain the effects of. America’s diplomats, meanwhile, have kept allies informed and on side in NATO, while more broadly negotiating agreements to get Ukrainian grain to market, and orchestrating the repudiation by China and India of Russian nuclear threats. It’s been a welcome reminder after the irresponsible chaos of the Trump years, and some enfeebling choices by the Biden Administration, of what the U.S. is capable of when it chooses to care.

American power relies fundamentally on voluntary participation by allies, and there, too, the U.S. position has strengthened. Russia’s threats precipitated two countries of long-
standing neutrality to apply for alliance membership. Australia and Japan are now participating in NATO summits, leaping the geographic boundary to include non-European countries of the West. NATO allies have mostly put aside the narcissism of small differences that characterises interactions in peacetime, presenting a strong and united front, condemning Russia and helping Ukraine.

The most reticent governments like Germany are being pushed by their public to do more. Changes of government in Italy and Sweden have not diminished commitment, which indicates the depth of public support. While free societies are caricatured by Russia and other adversaries as too self-indulgent to shoulder any burdens, allied countries in Europe and beyond have accepted with stoicism increases in gas and food prices, energy conservation, major changes in economic policy, and welcomed enormous numbers of Ukrainian refugees into their homes, economies, and social welfare networks. NATO’s Secretary General has been a stalwart and impassioned spokesman and an effective manager. Not even Russian threats of escalation to extend the war to NATO countries or use nuclear weapons have shaken U.S. or western resolve.

Yet another advantage Ukraine’s courage has provided the U.S. is a low-cost revelation of our own shortcomings. We have dramatically under-invested in quantities of weapons and munitions for them, to such an extent that many in the Pentagon begin to worry about sending more to Ukraine. But even if we’d sent nothing to Ukraine, our stockpiles would be inadequate. Seeing the rate of expenditure in this war, which is likely to be much less intense than our own rates would be especially if fighting China, should cause militaries in the West and their political overseers to dramatically increase our spending. It cannot be the right answer for replenishment to take years; and businesses will understandably not expand their production without a more reliable contractual basis. It is an eminently fixable problem, and we need to fix it. We should also deeply investigate whether our militaries are capable of the rapid innovation that has made Ukraine successful, and adopt practices that increase our agility.

The continued ideological battle

The war has also sharpened the ideological argument about international order – this is indubitably a war of good versus evil, which clarifies the stakes of what Russia and other countries seeking to subvert or corrode the liberal international order the U.S. and its allies have created are doing. Russia has shown what an authoritarian order would be, and China’s stance on the war is causing some countries, such as Poland, to view Chinese actions more suspiciously than prior to the Kremlin’s brutal invasion of Ukraine.

The Ukraine war has also benefitted the US ideologically by situating Ukraine unequivocally in the West. Russia claims brotherhood with Ukraine, but the brutality of the invasion and subsequent fighting have utterly demolished that argument, even as tenuous as it was to begin with after a previous eight years of fighting in Eastern Ukraine. We have seen forged a strong, positive national identity in Ukraine and the power that unity has given their war effort, enabling the extent and durability of Western support to them. Ukraine is a Western country now, and that will have institutional repercussions for both the EU and NATO that will further strengthen the West after Ukraine succeeds in reclaiming its territory.

And the war has illustrated the super-power of freedom, which is voluntary civic activism: Microsoft has committed more than $400 million in network assistance to Ukraine; the hacker’s group Anonymous is active against Russia (even penetrating and exposing the personnel roster of Russia’s security agencies); Chef Jose Andres and his World Central Kitchen colleagues have provided millions of meals to refugees; and even Elon Musk performed valuable service making Starlink terminals available. While there is a pro-Putin rump of Republican hardliners in the House of Representatives and the disgraced former U.S. President, that advocacy has been politically damaging to their standing.

Areas still to be addressed

Although the war has benefitted the US by increasing our safety, augmenting our relative strength, drawing greater support from allies, revealing our adversaries’ and our own...
weaknesses, and clarifying the threat posed by authoritarian regimes while underscoring the benefits of free societies, there are still important considerations for policymakers. Where we in the West, and especially the U.S., do need to worry is the indifference of much of the rest of the world to Ukraine’s plight. They rightly point out that we avert our eyes from other wars and other war crimes, and that our sanctions on Russia create major shortages and cost increases for their economies. Russia is down but not out, and may yet have success with mercenary support to authoritarians – and even with struggling democratic governments whose security needs we are ignoring. China, which may well be learning that nuclear deterrence works since it has prevented direct involvement of U.S. and Western forces to fight alongside Ukraine, is further accelerating its nuclear and conventional force modernisation that will require expansion of our own forces.

We will also need to think carefully about Russia’s role in a post-war European order. Pressures will rise for concessions by Ukraine to prevent Russian humiliation; we should instead consider what concessions we can offer those who support Ukraine, are beneficiaries of the war they have so valiantly fought, and are living with a much wider margin of safety. Perhaps the U.S. and its allies should find paths for Russian accommodation exclusive of Ukraine.
Assessing India’s Response to the Ukraine Conflict

Dr Walter C. Ladwig III and Sumitha Narayanan Kutty

The debate

India’s unwillingness to publicly condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine, or to support subsequent UN resolutions to that effect, attracted surprise and outcry from European observers. They questioned the degree to which the country was committed to the preservation of a rules-based international order. Now a year into the conflict, what can we glean from India’s response to the crisis? Are there elements of change or continuity in its interests?

Although in the short-term the Modi government’s actions reflected the need to evacuate some 20,000 Indian students from Ukraine, New Delhi’s behaviour in this episode was consistent with their past responses to Soviet/Russian military interventions. Dating back to the Hungarian uprising of 1956, Indian leaders have repeatedly refrained from publicly condemning – and in some cases tacitly defended – Soviet interventions in Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, as well as later Russian adventures in Georgia, Syria and the Crimea. Moreover, it reflects a calculated desire not to alienate and isolate a country that is a key supplier of defence hardware, and a state that India seeks to maintain as a partner in a future multi-polar world order. Indian strategic elites and the general public maintain a positive view of Russia as India’s longest standing strategic partner and did not leap to assign blame to Moscow for the crisis. Despite enhanced engagement with Quad countries, since the end of the Cold War Indian Prime Ministers have made more bilateral visits to Russia than any other country. New Delhi’s 50-year-old strategic partnership with Moscow has been subject to growing tensions as Russia has moved closer to China, which has emerged as India’s leading security concern. Russian criticism of India’s effort to forge partnerships with the Quad is a clear sign that New Delhi’s ‘time-tested’ partner will not be an asset in managing growing tensions with Beijing. Consequently, India has taken a more critical stance on this conflict than in the past. Some observers have gone as far as suggesting that the Modi government now seeks to manage the decline of the Indo-Russian strategic partnership, since the Russia that will likely emerge from the Ukraine war will struggle to fulfil India’s future strategic ambitions.

India’s autonomy vis-à-vis its relationship with Russia

The war in Ukraine has accelerated several pre-existing trends with respect to India’s strategic behaviour. For Indian leaders, the pandemic highlighted the risks of economic interdependence and the costs of not having diversified and resilient supply chains. In the defence realm, India’s position as one of the world’s largest purchasers of conventional weapons over the past decade-and-a-half has been seen as an indictment of indigenous weapons production capability. The desire for self-reliance in defence is long-standing and the Modi administration had previously taken steps to promote a ‘make in India’ agenda. In the specific case of Russia, the extremely large share of front-line combat systems procured from Moscow has been a concern for some time, as have frustrations over cost overruns and delays in the delivery of key platforms like the Indian navy’s flagship INS Vikramaditya. Fears that the Ukraine war will result in large scale disruption to Russia’s defence industry – which will be stretched by a lack of access to key Western components and a need to re-capitalise Russia’s own armed forces – have given greater impetus to self-reliance efforts. Despite some domestic concerns about its viability, the Modi government has set out ambitious targets for indigenous development of a range of systems and components.

The economic disruptions associated with Russia’s invasion also led to an increase in the price of oil and gas, thereby negatively affecting the Indian economy. India has experienced inflation in the cost of food stuffs – particularly since Ukraine supplied nearly 70 per cent of the country’s edible oils. The Modi government’s plans to ‘feed the world’ were also put on
hold as the world’s second largest wheat producer opted to ban exports in favour of domestic food security.

In the energy sphere, India has behaved opportunistically. Over the past decade, Russia has not been a major supplier of oil to India, accounting for less than one per cent of the Indian market. With Urals Crude trading at one-third less than the oil price benchmark (Brent Crude) as a result of western sanctions, however, New Delhi moved aggressively to take advantage of the opportunity. Russian oil imports thus hit an all-time high, as the country emerged as a top hydrocarbon supplier in 2022, totalling 21 per cent of Indian imports.

India and its western partners have long differed over Russia, meanwhile. Traditionally, Indian observers would accuse Western policymakers of having pushed Russia into China’s arms—suggesting instead that engagement with Moscow was the best way to weaken the Sino-Russian partnership. Such arguments have become significantly less common in the wake of the Russian invasion. Although India has not vocally condemned Russian actions in Ukraine, the government has taken a number of nuanced positions that convey displeasure with Moscow on the matter in a manner which goes further than in the past. In abstaining from the 25 February 2022 UN resolution on the situation in Ukraine, the Indian permanent representative to the UN issued an explanation which included language deemed critical of Russian actions—particularly violations of international law and respect for the territorial integrity of states. More recently, Prime Minister Modi directly told Putin that ‘today’s era is not of war,’ urging him to ‘move onto a path of peace’. This was followed by foreign minister Jaishankar’s statement at the UN with respect to alleged atrocities carried out by Russian troops that ‘there can be no justification for a violation of human rights or of international law.’ India stands with those who are pushing for a quick resolution to the conflict largely out of a desire to control the negative global impact in terms of inflation in the cost and fuel, among others.

The past year has seen enhanced Indian engagement with Europe, despite disquiet in some European capitals about India’s stance. Trade, climate change and defence manufacturing are some focus areas of these new partnerships, while on the security front, NATO has begun exploring a political dialogue with New Delhi much to Russia’s consternation. Again, such a direction in engagement predates the Russian invasion, but there is no doubt that this event has accelerated activity. Another interesting development is an effort to expand relations with the European Union (EU) as an institution – which India had traditionally downplayed in favour of bilateral relations with key member states – as well as an effort to move beyond the twin ‘pillars’ of France and Germany to build relations with alternative centres of power in Europe.

**Between Washington and a multipolar order**

From New Delhi’s perspective, despite a couple of rough patches, they have managed to successfully navigate relations with the west on Ukraine, and believe there is a much better understanding of India’s strategic interests, the fundamentals of which have remained intact throughout this conflict. New Delhi’s cooperation with Washington continues to be underpinned by their shared interest in countering Chinese actions within the Indo-Pacific, which facilitates greater engagement with India in sensitive arenas of emerging technologies, defence, cyber capabilities and joint R&D. There was also visible momentum within the India-France partnership with joint consultations to mitigate the conflict’s effect on global food security, including a working group on the ‘operational, military-logistics and political lessons’ from the war.

At the same time, the enduring strategic logic of keeping Russia amongst its friends so as to bolster a multipolar world order remains alive. India views the re-emergence of a bipolar system (a US-China G2) as detrimental to its rise.

India views the re-emergence of a bipolar system (a US-China G2) as detrimental to its rise.
India’s relationship with Russia is not going away anytime soon. What stands to change is how India vocalises its interests as it watches the possible decline of a critical security partner. The rhetoric signals an India that has become a more confident interlocutor in terms of its national interest in a world where the conflict – coupled with the devastating effects of the pandemic – have left significant economic challenges in its wake. India’s increased willingness to align with western partners on certain issues, while maintaining its core interests and strategic partnerships, will challenge its friends in the West as New Delhi’s policies do not fit neatly into the archetype of either the challenger or status quo state – as reinforced by its responses to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Attempts to directly wean India away from its partnership with Russia — either through threats or inducements — are likely to backfire. There are structural issues in the relationship that raise questions about its long-term health, however. Britain can attempt to foster Indian self-reliance efforts in a manner that reduce Russia’s importance as a defence partner. The age of big defence deals with India is likely over, but Indian desires for joint development and co-production of defence technology through the ‘make in India’ agenda can be met by British firms that have expertise in key areas like jet engines, maritime propulsion, and missile seekers. A second area would be expediting collaboration on energy initiatives and technology, which was discussed during former Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s visit in April 2022. This would help an India that is looking to move away from reliance on fossil fuels, even as its reliance on Russian crude temporarily grows.
South Korea: An Emerging NATO Partner

Dr Saeme Kim and Dr Bence Nemeth

South Korea’s support for Ukraine

South Korea has proactively supported Ukraine since the Russian invasion started in February 2022. Seoul has condemned the invasion and participated in international sanctions, provided over $100 million worth of humanitarian assistance, and $3.5 million worth of lethal and non-lethal military aid to Ukraine. It has also delivered support through the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) for the safe operation of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants.

This political stance incurred political and security costs for South Korea. Russia designated South Korea as an ‘unfriendly’ state, and Seoul’s New Northern Policy ended, which was designed as outreach towards Russia, Central Asia, and the two Koreas through cooperation in various sectors, including the economy, energy and infrastructure. Furthermore, Russia is less likely to play a constructive role in reigning-in North Korea’s provocation. Indeed, Vladimir Putin stated that South Korea’s provision of weapons and ammunitions to Ukraine will ‘destroy’ South Korea’s relations with Russia, and posed the question of how South Korea would react if Russia ‘resumed cooperation with North Korea in that sphere.’

At the same time, a tough stance against Russia is consistent with South Korea’s desire to become a ‘global pivotal state’, a vision announced by President Yoon Suk Yeol, where South Korea supports freedom, peace, and prosperity through promoting democratic values and cooperation. Given South Korea’s penchant for strategic ambiguity, the rhetoric from the Yoon administration indicated South Korea would no longer resort to hedging, and would instead clearly stand with liberal democracies in supporting Ukraine.

As a result, since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, South Korea has emerged as a more visible player. South Korea has also become an important partner for NATO by exporting arms and deepening institutional cooperation. However, the war in Ukraine has also had the effect of bolstering North Korea’s position, as will be explained below. As such, South Korea faces a difficult situation: it is seeking to broaden its foreign policy footprint, but is bound by the more immediate concerns on the Korean Peninsula.

Seoul becoming a significant NATO partner

The most significant change the war in Ukraine has generated for South Korea is that almost overnight, Seoul has become one of the most significant non-European military partners for NATO members. First, South Korea signed a series of huge defence contracts with Poland that solidified Seoul’s position as a key defence exporter to Europe. Second, Seoul has significantly strengthened institutional cooperation with NATO. These developments unexpectedly accelerated the realisation of Seoul’s ambition to increase its global relevance.

In July 2022, Poland and South Korean defence companies signed a defence contract worth $5.8 billion, and if all of the contract’s options were exercised in the following years, the deal would be worth $15 billion. According to the agreement, South Korea delivers 180 K2 Black Panther main battle tanks to Warsaw by 2025, and an additional 800 will be built in Poland in the second half of the decade. Furthermore, Poland also decided to buy 672 K9 self-propelled howitzers and 48 FA-50 fighter planes from Seoul. On top of that, in November 2022, Warsaw signed another contract with a South Korean company to procure 288 Chunmoo multiple rocket launchers. In the same month, Norway bought more South Korean K9 Thunder 155mm self-propelled howitzers and K10 ammunition resupply vehicles, which was an option of a previous defence contract between Oslo and Seoul.

South Korean defence companies have already successfully sold weapon systems to European NATO members for the last few years. For example, Poland, Norway, Estonia, Finland, and Turkey have bought K9 self-propelled howitzers. At the same time, the
UK procured four South Korean tanker ships for the British Royal Fleet Auxiliary of the Royal Navy. However, the success of South Korean defence companies in Poland in 2022 indirectly resulted from the war in Ukraine. European NATO countries who wanted to improve their defence capabilities quickly had to realise that neither European nor US defence companies could deliver key weapon systems rapidly. Only South Korea could do this quickly. Indeed, Seoul delivered the first batches of main battle tanks and artillery systems to Poland a few months after the contracts were signed. This impressive effectiveness surprised Western defence analysts and generated some anxiety in Washington DC and European capitals. In this vein, Seoul is emerging as a significant defence industrial competitor that could rapidly deliver high-quality products compatible with the NATO and US systems. At the same time, the already signed and potential future defence deals have made Seoul a significant defence partner for European NATO members over the next decades.

Seoul has also significantly increased its cooperation with NATO since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In May 2022, the South Korean National Intelligence Service joined NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Estonia, becoming the first East-Asian nation to join a NATO Center of Excellence. In June 2022, the South Korean President attended the NATO Summit in Madrid for the first time. And in November 2022, Seoul opened a diplomatic mission to NATO to coordinate its efforts with the Alliance more closely. These developments are not purely the result of the war in Ukraine. South Korea has been cooperating with NATO since 2005 and from 2010 to 2013 contributed to the Alliance’s mission in Afghanistan, deploying almost 500 personnel. Furthermore, NATO has recently engaged more with its partners in the Asia-Pacific region. Thus, the increased institutional cooperation between Seoul and NATO is not a surprise per se and is not a direct result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, the war has accelerated and significantly deepened the collaboration between Seoul and the Alliance.

Compounding the North Korea problem

While the war in Ukraine has allowed South Korea to take on a more globally oriented foreign policy posture, South Korea cannot escape its geopolitical reality surrounding North Korea. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has emboldened North Korea and strengthened North Korea’s relations with Russia. For South Korea, this questions the extent to which it can look beyond the immediate theatre of Northeast Asia, and the sustainability of a globally oriented foreign policy posture.

If the likelihood of North Korea’s denuclearisation was slim prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, prospects for this appear even more unlikely after North Korea has observed Ukraine’s fate, having given up its nuclear weapons in 1994. In fact, North Korea’s recent passing of the Law of Nuclear Forces, authorises pre-emptive nuclear strikes in case of certain threats. This law indicates that the Kim Jong-un regime sees nuclear weapons as the bedrock of its security. Indeed, taking advantage of a distracted West, North Korea has tested a record number of missiles. This include more than 60 ballistic missiles in 2022 alone, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM), hypersonic missiles, and cruise missiles, with some flying over Japan, and some landing in the disputed inter-Korean maritime border.

Furthermore, the war in Ukraine has consolidated North Korea’s ties with Russia. Kim Jong-un has shown full support for Putin, and has recognised the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces in Ukraine as independent republics. In return, Russia, as well as China, have shielded North Korea from additional sanctions. Not only have the two vetoed resolutions that would strengthen UN Security Council sanctions, but they argued that the US-led military drills are the cause of North Korea’s provocations. North Korea is also keen to extract economic benefits from supporting Russia, such as the selection of North Korean workers to reconstruct the Russia-occupied territories in Ukraine, allowing North Korea to earn foreign currency.

In these ways, the war in Ukraine has compounded the North Korea problem for South Korea. The conservative Yoon Seul Yeol government has put forth its brand of North Korea policy termed the Audacious Initiative, which seeks to induce North Korea to denuclearise.
by offering economic compensation and aid. However, backed by Russia and China, North Korea has no incentive to come to the negotiation table and has even fewer reasons to commit to denuclearisation. Indeed, Kim Yo-jong, Kim Jong-un’s sister and vice-director of the Workers’ Party of Korea, has commented that the Audacious Initiative was ‘height of foolishness.’ Despite the Yoon administration’s desire for South Korea to take on global roles and become a global pivotal state, the North Korean problem will continue to assume a central position in South Korea’s foreign policy agenda.

**Between NATO and East Asia**

South Korea has been pursuing an increasingly active foreign policy in Europe, and the effects of the Russian invasion of Ukraine have elevated its role significantly in European security. As the institutional foundations have been laid down in 2022, we should expect to see Seoul develop even deeper cooperation with NATO in several areas, especially in cyber defence, non-proliferation, technology and the Asia-Pacific region. Furthermore, the vast defence contracts between Seoul and Warsaw made South Korean defence companies major actors in the European defence market. As a result, South Korea will likely be able to sell more arms to several NATO countries. About half a dozen Central and Northern European states are considering procuring South Korean weapon systems at the moment. For instance, Slovakia is negotiating to buy South Korean FA-50 fighter planes, while Norway is choosing between the German Leopard 2A7 and the South Korean K2 Black Panther as its next main battle tank. The Polish procurement of South Korean weapon systems are important indirect results of the war in Ukraine, and they will increase the chances of South Korean companies winning future defence contracts in Europe. These two dynamics – deepening cooperation with NATO, successful arms sales in Europe – might trigger a virtuous circle where South Korea might engage more and more with European partners.

However, South Korea cannot escape its geography entirely, and the most relevant foreign and security policy issue will remain North Korea for Seoul. Despite this structural issue, South Korea demonstrated a willingness to take political costs regarding North Korea during the Russian invasion of Ukraine and acted responsibly despite Russian pressure. Thus, we can expect that the North Korean problem will also put fewer limitations on Seoul’s foreign policy, and South Korea might be more assertive on global issues in the future.
Are the Indo-Pacific Countries More Against Russia Since its Invasion of Ukraine?

Mauro Bonavita and Professor Christophe Jaffrelot

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and the resulting, highly violent ensuing conflict, has had global consequences. An energy crisis followed the European Union’s strong support for Kiev, with high prices and inflation aggravating a global economy already heavily shaken by the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the most relevant consequences of Russia’s aggression were registered at the political level: the deepening of the West-East divide, within the framework of the already tense relations between the United States and its allies; and the People’s Republic of China, Russia and their supporters. The emerging Indo-Pacific region is, after Europe, the most affected area by the political consequences of this war. This is particularly in respect to issues like sovereignty, the international rule of law, historical claims against neighbours, and great power competition, which shape everyday interactions among resident and external actors. However, the concept of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ is itself not evenly shared by powers. Ukraine’s war has dramatically – and sometimes reluctantly – pushed the region towards a more polarised divide between Western-friendly countries, who share basic values as well as an Indo-Pacific vision; and more reticent powers, unwilling to openly condemn Russia and embrace Ukraine’s case for its own independence.

In this article we answer the question of how important regional, though non-US allied powers (i.e. not including Japan, Australia, and South Korea), have expressed their choice between supporting Ukraine and the West; and abstention (or, more rarely opposition) in their voting patterns on relevant resolutions in the United National General Assembly. We have considered all relevant votes since the 2014 Russian illegal occupation of Crimea, up to the latest resolutions votes in Autumn 2022. Our sample is composed of Brunei, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam.

The result is that Russia seems to have alienated most of the secondary players, while most of the big ones remained neutral. The trends indicate that this pattern will likely remain unchangeable moving forward, further deepening the divide in the region, and preventing any coherent and structured Indo-Pacific approach to the political consequences of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The sub-regional divide following Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014

After the 2014 invasion of Crimea, on 27 March, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) passed a resolution affirming “its commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty, political independence, unity and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders”. While no country voted against this resolution, only Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore supported it. The situation was different two years later, however, when a resolution denouncing the “Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol” was put to vote: none of the IP countries in our sample voted in favour of this text, Cambodia and India voted against it and all the others abstained.

Two years later, another issue emerged: the militarisation of Crimea. In December 2018, a resolution against this process was passed by the UNGA, with 66 votes in favour (with 19 against, and 72 abstentions). The countries in our sample did not contribute much to this achievement. Only one country – Singapore – supported the resolution: Cambodia and Myanmar voted against, and all the others abstained. Four days later, another resolution on the human rights in Crimea was passed with, respectively, 65 for, 27 against, and 70 abstentions votes. Again, that was in spite our sample countries as none of them were in favour of such a text: India, Myanmar and Cambodia were against it, and all the others abstained.

One year later, the militarisation question was debated again, and only Singapore supported a resolution in which the UNGA expressed “grave concern about the Russian Federation’s militarisation and reports of its continuing destabilisation of Crimea through the transfer of
weapons to Ukraine, [and] urged it to stop such activity”. The resolution was passed with 63 for and 19 against (66 countries abstained), but again, only Singapore supported this resolution, whereas Cambodia and Myanmar voted against it and all the others abstained. Ten days later another human rights-related resolution was passed in spite of our countries: Cambodia, India and Myanmar voted against it and all the others abstained.

In December 2020, the militarisation question was discussed again and only Singapore favoured the December 7 resolution – Cambodia and Myanmar were against, while all the others abstained. Eleven days later a human rights resolution gave exactly the same results of those in 2019. In December 2021, another resolution on the militarisation issue gave also the same results as the year before, so far as the voting pattern of our countries was concerned – like a new human rights resolution (only change: Sri Lanka voted against it). Less than three months later, Russia invaded Ukraine.

After the 2014 invasion of Crimea, the United Nations General Assembly successively debated and voted resolutions concerning three key elements that pertain to Russia’s actions. Enshrined by the UN Chart, the UNGA considered the defence of Ukraine’s sovereignty and integrity, the human rights situation in occupied Crimea, as well as the consequent militarisation of occupied territories by the Russian armed forces. The first resolution, approved on March 27th, affirmed the UN “commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty, political independence, unity and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders”, and was adopted unopposed. However, behind this apparent global unity, when it came to the Indo-Pacific countries, an already divided stage emerged, with only Indonesia, Myanmar, and Singapore voting in favour, while the rest chose to abstain from the vote.

An even more problematic scenario emerged during the vote of the first human rights-related resolution in 2016. Denoting a sensitivity in the wider region to accept the United Nations interventions in terms of human rights protection, no Indo-Pacific country in our sample voted in favour of this resolution, choosing to abstain, while Cambodia and India openly opposed it. A similar pattern followed in the 2018 human rights-related resolution, which was welcomed by a new wave of abstentions from our countries, and a renewed contrary vote of Cambodia and India, with the addition this time of Myanmar. Little difference can be registered in the votes of 2018, 2020, and 2021 on the resolutions called to condemn Russian militarisation of Crimea and the other occupied territories. This topic, particularly sensitive in a region where long-standing contentions are still unresolved, saw just Singapore’s continuous support for the UN resolution. While most of the other Indo-Pacific countries chose to abstain, Cambodia and Myanmar opposed it. When the last vote on a Ukraine-related resolution occurred just a few weeks before Russia’s invasion (in December 2021), the absence of any significant voice on the 2014-2022 Russian-Ukrainian conflict from the Indo-Pacific region; and the strong attitude of local non-Western powers to read the conflict through the political lenses of domestic and regional interests, had become clear.

What difference can an invasion make?

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 did make some difference to the voting behaviour of our eleven IP countries, though more so in degree than in kind. In fact, the pattern observed in 2014 after the annexation of Crimea showed some resilience: ASEAN countries supported the UNGA resolution ES-11/1 condemning the aggression against Ukraine on 2 March 2022, whereas most of the South Asian countries continued to abstain – minus two exceptions. On one hand, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Cambodia, Brunei and Nepal supported the resolution; while on the other, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Vietnam abstained. Note that during this emergency meeting, only 35 countries abstained and 5 voted against: 141 out of 193 member states supported this resolution.

The same divide was repeated three weeks later when a resolution on the humanitarian consequences of the aggression against Ukraine was put to votes (with one exception: Brunei preferred to abstain). The anti-Russia coalition was further diluted when, in April, the UNGA was asked to vote on the suspension of the rights of the membership of Russia in the Human Rights Council: only Myanmar supported it, Vietnam opposed it, and all the others abstained.
Six months later, the post invasion repartition was restored when the UNGA passed a resolution defending the territorial integrity of Ukraine in respect to the principles of the Charter of the UN: all the ASEAN countries supported it, whereas India and Pakistan abstained. In November all the countries in our sample abstained from yet another vote at the UNGA that called for reparations to be paid by Russia for the war in Ukraine. Singapore and Myanmar alone supported it.

**India, Russia and the UN**

The case of India needs to be investigated further for two reasons: during the 2021-2022 UN Assembly, it was a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, while at the same time found itself in a very peculiar geopolitical situation. On one hand, India’s relations with Russia have strong historical roots in the aftermath of Independence, even while it attempted to traverse the Cold War international order as a democracy handling a strong anti-colonial sentiment. This drove New Delhi to accept the Soviet Union’s anti-Western rhetoric, making Moscow its first armaments supplier, and supporting in in the United Nations, as during the 1953 vote on Russian intervention in Hungary. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, relations with Russia remained consolidated, if less political and more transactional, but still exclusive in respect to other bilateral relationships. In more recent times, the rise of China as a regional power with expansive ambitions, has driven India closer to the coalition of Indo-Pacific countries led by the United States, which is seen as a counter-balance to China. Already burdened by an un-marked land border in the Himalayan area, and Beijing’s claims over Arunachal Pradesh (Northeast India), India’s fears of Chinese dominance over the maritime Indo-Pacific, increasingly a strategic area for India’s developing economy, saw Delhi joining the Quad, as well as strengthening its contacts with the United States government (even if not always with successful results).

India has almost systematically abstained in the UNSC when issues related to the Ukraine were raised. *It did it on 26 February 2022 on the resolution deploring Russian aggression against Ukraine* – along with China and the UAE, whereas Russia naturally vetoed the resolution.

In October 2022, *India, again, abstained in the UNSC* - along with China, Gabon and Brazil – after Albania introduced a resolution condemning the referenda organised by Russia in eastern parts of Ukraine in order to legalise their annexation. India’s attempt at remaining equidistant to Russia and the US continued till the end of 2022. In November, four days after India abstained from yet another vote at the UNGA that called for reparations to be paid by Russia, Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Vershinin, during his visit to Delhi, met India’s Foreign Secretary and other Indian officials, *who agreed that both countries should “enhance bilateral coordination” at the United Nations*, where India was to assume the presidency of the UNSC in December.

**What’s next for 2023?**

Three lessons can be drawn from our review of the voting pattern in the UN of the eleven Indo-Pacific countries we have selected vis-à-vis Russia, before and after February 2022. First, only one country, Singapore, has rather constantly supported resolutions condemning Russia since 2014. Secondly, ASEAN countries have been more supportive of such resolutions than South Asian countries. Thirdly, the February aggression made only a moderate impact on voting patterns, a clear illustration of the ambivalent attitude of the global South.

India is a case in point. While this country takes part in Quad meetings, it has never supported a US-sponsored resolution in the UN, while taking part in the *Vostok military drills*, and becoming the *number one customer of Russian oil*.

If several western countries – including the US – have conceived their Indo-Pacific strategy as a way to balance China, they cannot rely on it fully for balancing Russia, at least in the UN.
Marriage of Convenience? How Gulf Monarchies are Navigating Relations with Russia

Dr David Roberts

Changing the external guard?

Foreign nations have long played an outsized role in the history of the Gulf monarchies, which comprise Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). While the US has dominated the landscape in the Gulf for decades, increasingly the Gulf Monarchies reject US leadership, striking out evermore on their own, looking to rekindle (or just kindle) more diverse international relations. In this mix, however, Russia plays a comparatively small role. Its importance as an energy supplier gives Moscow an unalterable relevance in that sphere. Only a few years ago, Russia’s military and its vaunted leading technologies enjoyed a strong reputation. However, this image as a military power has taken a profound beating with its debacle in Ukraine. Certainly, the Gulf Monarchies will not round on Russia, following the Western line. Equally, it is difficult to see – aside from some cheap investments or niche military trade – how the Gulf Monarchies could significantly benefit by enhancing their relations with Moscow.

Historically, local rulers sometimes fought or, perhaps even more often, arranged a modus vivendi with external powers. Such relations often benefitted leaders and their nearest and dearest, by throwing the might of Empire behind their claims to leadership. In the seventeenth century, it was the Portuguese empire that held sway intermittently over towns and city-states mostly on the south and east coasts. Subsequently, the Ottoman and British empires exerted significant influence across swathes of the Peninsula into the 20th century. As the final Gulf states emerged to independence in 1971 – Bahrain, Qatar, UAE – no external power replaced the departing British.

In 1990, Saddam Hussain’s Iraq invaded Kuwait, and the US led a mostly Western military coalition with Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm to protect Saudi Arabia and liberate Kuwait. Baked in by the scale of the walloping the coalition dished out to the vaunted Iraqi armed forces, Gulf leaders bought in hook, line, and sinker to the pax-Americana. US military forces moved into vast military bases up and down the Gulf, some of which were created for this very purpose. Under pressure, the Gulf monarchies reluctantly made (small) steps towards loose democratisation, such as drawing up constitutions and enacting low-level electoral reforms, feeling that, in the post-Cold War world where the US model was so palpably dominant, there was no option.

Three decades later, two core elements have changed.

First, there is another option. China shows the Gulf monarchies that an autocratic, highly controlled, security-orientated but economically competitive and technologically savvy state modus operandi is available. No longer was it just democracy that could deliver economic results, and the monarchical autocrats in the Gulf were generally, to say the least, receptive to this development. Undergirded by huge energy trades, significant bilateral visits and the vast take up by the Gulf Monarchies of Chinese technologies – like 5G – speak to a closing of relations.

Second, monarchs would put up with what they thought to be arrogant, orientalist hectoring by US leaders, and they would genuflect to the importance of democratic ideals, so long as, at the very least, their expensive investments into the U.S. politico-military industrial complex – which for some states were entering their seventh decade – were delivering results. However, on 14 September 2019, missiles and drones, believed to have been fired by Iran or Iranian proxies, whistled through expensively assembled missile defence systems and struck Saudi Arabia’s (and the world’s) largest oil refinery with stunning accuracy. For Gulf leaders, this was a stunning failure in US deterrence and technology. The reaction of President Trump was little more than a shrug. And with this attack, arguably at least,
the faith of Gulf leaders in the US was fatally punctured. Consequently, there is, from the perspective of the Gulf monarchies at least, potential for Russia to exploit as they – if not frantically then at least with purpose – diversify their international alliances. Notably, niche Russian military systems, like air defence and next generation fast-jet technologies, increasingly interest the Gulf Monarchies.

**Military Humiliation Resonates**

Shorn of its great power status after the post-1990 implosion, the central element to Russia’s contention that it remained any kind of a core and important actor in world affairs rested in many ways on its military forces and its allied nuclear arsenal. In recent years, the much-covered Russian military modernisation process caused much ink to be spilled, resulting in a broadly favourable image of the Russian state having got to grips retooling its forces after the nadir of the 1990s. Seemingly highly advance technologies matching anything the west could put on in the field, such as its T-14 Armata main battle tank and its SU-57 fast jets, led the Russian PR campaign. Russia also proved its capabilities on occasion. Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 was seen, albeit via cursory examinations, as impressive and ominous, particularly in the use of cyber elements to destabilise the tiny state. The incremental little-green men invasion of Crimea, culminating in March 2014, similarly reflected a canny and effective Russian approach to hybrid warfare. Lastly, it was in Syria where the Gulf monarchies really began to pay attention to Russia’s military prowess with Moscow’s active military support of President Assad in Syria from 2015, which definitively turned the tables on the rebels, entrenching Assad’s power, while demonstrating Russia’s reach, resolve, and effectiveness.

Many if not most of these gains have been destroyed by Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine and the astonishing scale of the ensuing military debacle. Russia as a conventional military power seems finished for a generation. Few states will want to buy Russian kit today given that the country cannot manage its own supply lines, or that it’s proved to be far less effective than promised. Moreover, as western states redouble their efforts at strangling Russia of the myriad near-irreplaceable western-sourced components found throughout Russia’s materiel, more supply blockages are sure to appear.

Russia has never been a military supplier of note to the Gulf monarchies, and, even without the Ukraine disaster, nor was it likely to supplant Western nations. Nevertheless, amid Gulf states looking to diversify from dependencies on the West generally and the US specifically, Russia was well placed to jostle in future defence sales markets. Previously, Saudi Arabia and Qatar sought at one time or another to purchase Russia’s S-400 air defence system, while the UAE sought to co-develop a fifth-generation fighter jet. These deals may yet be resurrected, but more searching questions will be asked of their real utility and capabilities.

Aside from these piecemeal putative engagements, the broader sense is that Russia simply defenestrated itself as a serious, top-tier nation with its debacle in Ukraine. The Gulf Monarchies see themselves as masters of their own destiny, no longer at all beholden to Western nations. Saudi Arabia’s refusal to meet President Biden’s request to ease the oil price in 2022 and 2023 were interpreted as but the latest example of key Gulf monarchies following their own line. Engagement with Russia will continue on an issue-by-issue basis, but the once world-spanning state has definitively lost its luster.

**A Persistent if Limited Presence**

The enduring sentiment towards Russia from the Gulf monarchies is that while they might not like Russian policies, such as their support of Assad in Syria, they can trust Russia to do what it says and say what it will do. This simplistic formula marks Russia out in contrast to the US and the changeable nature of its politics. The latest example of this perennial US tendency is President Biden’s reverse on de facto Saudi leader Mohammed bin Salman, from remarking in 2019 that he would make him a ‘pariah,’ to then beseeching him for help with the oil price in Winter 2022.

This aspect of Russia’s reception in the Gulf will remain intact. Enduring Russian diplomatic engagement will remain, and the Monarchies seem unlikely to break relations or...
even punish Russia that much. Again, this is at least partly linked to their desire to eschew following a Western line. So far, Gulf investment in Russia has dropped off. Equally, the monarchies are cash rich after a bumper oil price in recent years and are perennially looking for bargains. It seems likely they will dip back into the Russian market sooner rather than later.

Furthermore, the Monarchies will have to engage with Russia on energy matters. These relations are in a difficult alignment. Both sides want a higher oil price, as a rule. However, Saudi Arabia and Russia struggle to agree how this can be achieved as cuts need to be made in oil output, and neither side wants to bear that particular brunt. Russia faces acripplingly large economic bill from the war it launched in Ukraine, and it needs oil receipts to pay it. Faced with a litany of sanctions and European customers turning the taps off, inter alia Russia struck a modus vivendi with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Duly, a key decision on 5 October 2022, OPEC Plus members agreed to cut production, even as prices were high. This was interpreted as a demonstrable slight against President Biden and his antagonistic Saudi policies, and support of Russia. While the former is almost certainly true, it does not necessarily follow that the monarchies were eager to support Russia. Yet support Russia they did.

Russia has long enjoyed strong relations with Iran, a fact that irritates the monarchies, but something they realise they can do nothing about. However, this trend, from the perspective of the Arab side of the Gulf, is worsening. Iran appears to be surprisingly involved in Russian efforts to deploy drones in Ukraine. In addition to the supply of drones, Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) instructors are present in the Ukrainian theatre.

The potential for quid pro quos irritates and worries the monarchies. First, Russia will be injecting money into the Iranian war economy by buying this equipment. Second, fielding this equipment will provide Iran with lessons on how to improve its drone technology. Third, some reports suggest Russia may in-kind help Iran with its nuclear programme; hardly an outrageous suggestion given its history doing precisely this. Alternatively, upgrading Iran’s S-400 air defence systems with S-500s would also deeply concern the monarchies.

**Can the Gulf really afford to alienate Russia?**

Counterfactual history is a difficult if interesting methodology to deploy. Certainly, it seems from the Gulf ‘demand’ side, there is appetite for as broad a realignment as it is practicable given that existing contracts, say, in the military sphere with the US necessarily entail decades of engagement to come. In essence, where possible, the Monarchies are ever more shopping around to develop deeper alliances elsewhere. On the ‘supply’ side, the UK, South Korea, Turkey, Germany, and certainly China are states often touted as enjoying an uptick in their Gulf engagement. Russia was in this bracket of states where there was a possibility of a significant levelling-up of engagement. Mostly, however, the art of the possible now between the Gulf monarchies and Russia has narrowed.

One of the shiniest baubles on the Russian politico-foreign policy tree, its defence sales, has been hammered by the decrepitude and incompetence of the Russian military in Ukraine. Shorn of a key feature that would have enticed perhaps considerable Russian-Gulf engagement in the near future, relations remain solid, if on shakier ground. Russia’s enduring reputation as a comparatively straight-talking and trustworthy state (in its own way) remains intact. And certainly, Russia is in courting mode, near desperate to engage with as many important states as possible across the world in a bid to demonstrate that the West’s attempts to isolate it have failed. This might give the monarchies something of the whip hand, but the question is what can they do with it? It remains unclear what the Gulf monarchies might want to leverage with Russia. Energy alignments, while fragile, are often aimed in a similar direction: towards a higher oil price. Russia’s ever deeper engagement with Iran will give the monarchies pause for thought. Yet, they realise that in a world where US protections are ephemeral, they will actually have to accommodate and otherwise deal with Iran themselves. In essence, the Gulf states cannot afford to alienate Russia, lest it significantly enhance its relations with Iran. Thus, in all likelihood, Russian-Gulf relations will bumble along, a sporadic investment here, an oil deal there, well into the future.
Every state within the international system, whether big or small, has a grand strategy. In Africa, this has mostly been reflected by a ‘new neutralism’ in the current war in Ukraine, as the war is being perceived mostly as an European war.

Africa’s ‘new’ neutralism in a (multi)polarized world

The War in Ukraine has fundamentally altered the global balance of power within the international system. The War has not only redefined contemporary theories of inter-state conflicts and warfare, by challenging the principles of state sovereignty and the respect for territorial boundaries; it has also brought to the fore the essence of the grand strategies adopted by different states. Every state within the international system, whether big or small, has a grand strategy. In Africa, this has mostly been reflected by a ‘new neutralism’ in the current war in Ukraine, as the war is being perceived mostly as an European war. During the Cold War, whereby the international system was characterised by bipolar divides between capitalist and communist states, African states largely maintained a neutral posture. This positionality was formalised with the adoption of the non-aligned movement (NAM) which essentially saw newly independent African states choosing to avoid any form of direct involvement, particularly through military alliances, in the contest between the Western bloc led by the United States of America and the Eastern bloc, led by the Soviet Union. It is important to note that non-aligned or neutral states have always played a significant role within the international system, attempting to ensure some form of equilibrium. This form of balancing has allowed them to pursue and secure their national interests in a way that minimises the risk of being drawn into hostilities. With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the Soviet Union in 1991 marking the end of the Cold War, neutrality as a foreign policy posture would continue amongst several states, albeit in a less pronounced way. Despite the adoption of a neutral position on the current War in Ukraine, most African states have been affected. This is particularly so in terms of food shortages, and increased food prices, given their dependence on grains from Ukraine and disruptions to the global supply chain. These realities also explain the recent decision by Kyiv to launch the “Grain from Ukraine” initiative, given that the war has aggravated pre-existing food shortages in some of the poorest states in Africa. In addition, the war in Ukraine is poised to have implications for the engagement of African states in the international system.

Africa’s strategic relevance in a shifting global order

The implications of the war in Ukraine for Africa, as reflected in its “new neutralism”, can be evidenced from the voting patterns of African states at the United Nations. During the 11th emergency session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on 2 March 2022, member states collectively voted against Russia’s decision to violate Ukraine’s territorial integrity through the Resolution on Aggression Against Ukraine. African states played a significant role on the voting outcomes given that there are 54 states on the continent, representing 30 per cent of the total votes cast. Prior to this, a meeting of the twelve-member states of the United Nations Security Council on 25 February 2021 had taken place, which consisted of three African states, Gabon, Ghana, and Kenya all voting in support of the resolution. What is interesting to note is that regarding the voting pattern of African states, 28 of them had voted in favour of the condemnation of Russian aggression, while one African state voted against this condemnation. Furthermore, a total of 17 African states chose to refrain from voting, while eight other African states did not participate. This represents 52 per cent of African states in support of the resolution, two per cent against it, 31 per cent choosing to abstain and 15 per cent not participating at all. The 27 African states which had voted in favour of the resolution all had one thing in common: they are Western allies, with some having military bases, and others engaging in
States include Benin, Botswana, Gabon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, and Zambia. Of all the 35 countries that had voted to abstain, a total of 17 were African countries. Most of these 17 African countries are known to have either authoritarian regimes or hybrid regimes, which include Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. Some of these countries also have close military and political ties to Russia that date back to the Cold War. Eritrea, which was the only country that voted against the condemnation, is a prime example of this.

What this says is that we can expect to see more authoritarian African states aligned with Russia in 2023 as the war rages on and more Western allied states appear to be ‘cautious’, in their active involvement. This is reflected, for instance, in the extent to which the West continues to show willingness to arm Ukraine with the weaponry it requires (a development which President Macron of France has described as ‘too much hypocrisy’). The conditionalities often attached to foreign aid from Western democracies has left most autocratic regimes less comfortable, and more inclined to turn towards other “great powers” such as China for support. Russia’s growing influence on the African continent is likely to illicit similar overtures. By comparison, pro-Western African states have adopted a more liberal institutionalist approach as a preferred posture towards the war in Ukraine. This is not to discount that significant pressure from the West and the European Union might see some of these liberal African states adopting a more decisive stance, given their dependence on the West for military and economic aid. This is a power-dynamic which the West is likely to exploit without hesitation as it builds support against Russia in the coming year.

‘Old’ habits manifested in ‘new’ ways

Most African states are expected to show their continued support for Ukraine’s sovereignty while advocating for a peaceful resolution of the war through diplomatic and political channels. South Africa, a regional hegemon on the continent and the only Sub-Saharan African country with a resident ambassador in Kyiv, was one of the few African countries which had condemned Russia’s invasion in strong terms. The South African president Cyril Ramaphosa had stated that: ‘The war could have been avoided if NATO had heeded the warnings from amongst its leaders and officials over the years that its eastward expansion would lead to greater, not less, instability in the region.’

While this submission appears to put the blame for the war on the West, it does not in any way portray a significant shift in South Africa’s posture towards it. The same could be said of most Western allied states across the continent. Kenya, for instance, has reaffirmed its respect for the territorial integrity of Ukraine since the beginning of the conflict. This position was articulated by its ambassador to the United Nations who had harshly criticised Russia’s invasion, while drawing inferences to the ongoing situation in Ukraine with the colonial legacy bequeathed on Africa.

Most post-independent African states have enjoyed cordial relations with the West which they are careful not to jeopardise. Even amongst some of the continent’s most controversial leaders, such as Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni, the case remains the same. African countries who have therefore traditionally aligned themselves with the West are expected to continue doing so; while those who have made their anti-Western stance known are likely continue along this path in 2023. Zimbabwe, for instance, has refused to acknowledge Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as an ‘act of war’, choosing Russia’s phrasing of ‘special military operation’ instead (as seen regularly in its state-run newspaper The Herald.) The African Union, meanwhile, has urged both Russia and Ukraine to establish a ceasefire and embrace political negotiations through the United Nations.

As the war continues to unfold, ‘change’ emanating from Africa can be expected to reflect a desire by the continent’s autocratic rulers to ensure that neither they nor their countries are used by the West, as was the case during the Cold War, in pursuit of strategic objectives. Rather, they would be more inclined to support Russia, albeit discreetly for fear of isolation.
by the international community, in its pursuit of Putinism – unbridled political adventurism in Ukraine. ‘Continuity’, on the other hand, is likely to be manifested through Pro-Western African states’ preference and calls for diplomacy over militarism, in bringing an end to the Russia-Ukraine war. A position which it mostly adopted with the formation of a burgeoning, new non-aligned movement.

**Africa and the Global (Re)balancing of Power from the Ukrainian War**

With its ‘new neutralism’, Africa is poised to play an equilibrating force as pro and anti-Russian blocs attempt to reshape the global balance of power. This has the potential of reigniting a new ‘scramble’ for Africa whereby both blocs would be keen on intensifying their political and diplomatic overtures to states across the continent. For the West, the current war signals a need to look more closely at Africa’s gas reserves, including offshore liquified natural gas, as an alternative to protracted dependency on Russia. In the short-term, the war has the potential to trigger a shift in global markets and on Russian dependence in this regard, with a significant number of African states benefiting from this. Some of the greatest beneficiaries would include Tanzania, Senegal, and Nigeria. Ukraine’s survival is vital to Africa’s, with over $4 billion in exports at stake. Other countries like South Africa, which accounts for the world’s second largest producer of palladium, and remains a major exporter of gold, would also benefit significantly. The war in Ukraine puts Africa in a unique position to shape and affirm its strategic relevance in a changing world.