Strengthening security practice to combat insider and other threats through targeted education, training and the assessment of security culture
Recent incidents have shown that technological solutions alone cannot provide complete protection against the complex array of threats to nuclear materials, facilities and related sensitive information. Carefully consideration must also be given as to how to foster the human component within security systems.
Chief amongst these threats are insiders – employees with authorized access and malicious intent that can bypass many of the security measures put in place within nuclear and other organisations. CSSS staff have explored the nature of this threat through a series of real-life case studies, drawn from nuclear and other critical industries, presented in two case study handbooks on Insider Threats and Radicalization and Preventative Measures.
Research is also on-going into concept and implementation of security culture at the organisational level and how the implementation of security can be undermined by poor leadership practices, ineffective management systems, and unsuitable beliefs and attitudes in relation to security. In a handbook on Security Culture, real-life cases where adversaries have exploited weaknesses in the implementation security systems are outlined. CSSS has also been funded by the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) to undertake a study into how security is implemented within the UK nuclear industry. Performed under clearance this project took a relatively unique interview focused approach to security culture assessment, identifying a number of areas where security practice could be improved.
CSSS currently serve as the technical implementing lead for the UK’s International Nuclear Security Culture Programme. Working internationally with governments and industry around the world to promote and support the development of robust nuclear security place. More information about our international work in this area can be found here.