Using counterintelligence case studies from the past several decades, this webinar will demonstrate how motivations and characteristics of prominent spies are potentially applicable to insider threat analysis in nuclear facilities.
The presentation will provide insights from a comparative analysis of insider threat mitigation and counterintelligence, including a discussion of its impacts on potential improvements to insider threat programs at nuclear facilities across the globe.
Insider threats pose an elevated threat to nuclear security although the lack of publicly available insider case studies involving nuclear facilities makes causal analysis and pattern recognition difficult. To address this challenge, some insider threat researchers and practitioners have leveraged lessons from other disciplines, including the casino and pharmaceutical industries.
One untapped discipline with conceptual and practical similarities for eliciting insider threat mitigation insights is counterintelligence, defined by United States Executive Order 12333 as “information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations.”
Both counterintelligence and insider threat mitigation seek to protect high-value assets from malicious, intentional human actions. Each discipline must identify perpetrators from individuals with access rights that give them a privileged position compared to a traditional ‘outsider’ threat. Additionally, the consequences of failed counterintelligence and insider threat mitigation activities can both result in grave damage to national security.
About the speaker
Noelle Camp is a Member of the Technical Staff in the Center for Global Security and Cooperation at Sandia National Laboratories, where she facilitates international workshops and conducts research on counterproliferation topics.
Selected as a 2020 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Project on Nuclear Issues Scholar, Noelle’s research interests include insider threat mitigation and East Asia studies.
Noelle has worked and studied extensively in China, including with the Press Office of the U.S. Embassy Beijing, and is proficient in Mandarin at an “Advanced Low” skill level. She has presented her research on insider threat mitigation at CSIS and the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management.
Prior to coming to Sandia, Noelle held positions in public and legislative affairs across the government and nonprofit sectors.Noelle holds a Master of International Affairs from the Texas A&M Bush School of Government and Public Service, where she was named a 2019 Robertson Scholar. Additionally, she received a Bachelor of Arts in Global Politics from Washington and Lee University, a Certificate in Data Analytics from Cornell University, and a Certificate in Insider Threat Program Management from Carnegie Mellon University.