The war in Ukraine has acted as a stark catalyst; all but a small handful of NATO countries are now at or are budgeted to reach the 2% of GDP spending target this year. Ambitious discussions are already looking far beyond this. With figures like NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and Germany’s CDU leader Friedrich Merz advocating for a new benchmark – 3.5% of GDP on "real defence" complemented by 1.5% on cyber, intelligence, and resilience, making a formidable 5% total – the bar for commitment is set to rise dramatically.
While the summit’s final communiqué will project collective resolve, the reality is one of a complex and increasingly fragmented continent, and this fragmentation is no longer just a European dynamic. Now, it is shaped by a shifting transatlantic security landscape. NATO can no longer assume the United States will automatically turn up to underwrite European security in crisis. Five years ago, this question would have been unthinkable; today, it is a reality. This changing dynamic doesn't so much forge new national positions wholesale as it lays bare the profound consequences of Europe’s fragmenting defence landscape – an emerging multi-track NATO where the character, urgency, and substance of defence investment differs markedly between member states.
First, there are the star performers. Predominantly on NATO’s eastern flank, nations like Poland and the Baltic states are not just meeting current targets but exceeding them with urgency, driven by a perceived immediate existential threat from Russia. Their substantial, front-loaded spending translates directly into accelerated procurement and enhanced readiness, setting a pace others struggle to match.
Then comes a more ambiguous category: the aspirational committers. These are often larger economies making significant pledges that warrant closer scrutiny as Europe contemplates future, higher targets. Germany’s landmark €100 billion Zeitenwende fund, for instance, has inevitably faced the friction of entrenched bureaucracy slowing its translation into tangible capability, though significant procurement reforms are now underway. The United Kingdom’s recent pledge to reach 2.5% of GDP on defence is a welcome signal, but it offers only a modest uplift towards potential new targets, and the new money is back-loaded, becoming available only from 2027 onwards.
For these nations, already grappling with the complexities of fulfilling current commitments, the prospect of significantly higher targets, such as a 3.5% "real defence" threshold, only underscores the severity of existing obstacles and raises questions about the practicalities of such an accelerated ambition. Their path from pledged billions to deployed battalions is fraught with challenges. While many aim to devote a significant share of budget uplifts to new equipment, this ambition faces intense internal budgetary tensions. The rising costs of personnel, the urgent need to replenish depleted ammunition stocks, build logistical capacity, and continue substantial materiel support to Ukraine will result in fierce competition for the same funds – a pressure that will only intensify if a 5% total target becomes the new benchmark.
Furthermore, the absorption capacity of Europe’s defence ecosystem presents a formidable bottleneck. Industrial capacity, shortages of specialised components and the availability of a skilled workforce all act as speed limits. Defence companies, accustomed to decades of lean years and stop-start procurement, are understandably cautious about making the significant upfront investments needed to ramp up production. Without the surety of demand that only long-term contracts can provide, this creates a difficult investment impasse between governments and industry.
Finally, there is a cohort of nations that, for a variety of reasons, are lagging behind. These countries may face domestic political opposition to increased military expenditure, competing fiscal priorities, or a different perception of the immediate threat, meaning their contributions fall short of the alliance’s goals.
The danger of this multi-track reality – amplified by the shifting US posture – is not simply one of uneven capability, but of a more fragmented alliance where collective planning, procurement, and operations become increasingly complex and awkward to manage. Headline spending percentages, even at 2%, mask these deep-seated structural issues and the very real delays in delivering combat-ready forces capable of independent European action if necessary.
As leaders convene, it is crucial to look beyond the top-line figures. A genuine strengthening of European security requires more than meeting spending targets; it demands a fundamental rewiring of national procurement to provide industry with the long-term certainty it needs to invest. The uncomfortable truth is that while the trajectory for defence spending is undeniably upwards, the path to a genuinely more capable European pillar within NATO is far steeper and more uneven than the summit communiqués will suggest.