The option of last resort – the military – is also having to provide its services because the existing agencies cannot cope: there seems to be no surge capacity evident, no redundancy. This, though, is a system of state resilience that needs to change; it needs to be strengthened.

It needs to be strengthened because the character of peer-state warfare is itself changing and, indeed, has changed. It is now one where protagonists are thinking far more about how to actually generate crippling events in the homelands of their adversaries – but without using kinetic force. This is how future wars will, it seems, be won: a state is defeated because it is made to collapse from within after its critical national infrastructure (CNI) and societal cohesion have been put under extreme duress by the targeted activities of another state. Those countries that can cope with such duress will ‘win’; those that cannot will ‘lose’. This is the type of warfare that China and, more openly, Russia, are not just assiduously preparing for, but are also actually now conducting at a low level. Today, and fundamentally, the major target of peer-state warfare is no longer an adversary state’s fielded forces, it is state resilience.