More sovereign capabilities in outer space and satellites’ critical contribution to multi-domain operations require a stronger deterrence posture in this domain. The protect and defend mission in the 2022 Defence Space Strategy is therefore a step in the right direction. The danger is that the MoD limits itself to properly attributing threats and investing in capabilities to respond to attacks. Credible deterrence, however, is as much about being able to impose overwhelming costs on the adversary as it is about denying the benefits of any aggression. Denying or degrading aggression can discourage the aggressor from launching an attack in the first place. This deterrence by denial should be a key focus of the protect and defend mission. For this, a resilient architecture that offers flexibility to perform different missions is important. Unlike deterrence by punishment, deterrence by denial needs to be factored in at the early stages of developing the future UK space architecture. My Freeman Paper investigates how the UK could strengthen its deterrence by denial posture in space.
Although Space Command plans on developing capabilities in a ten-year timeframe until 2030, its ambition depends on the current negotiations on the 2025 defence review. Therefore, it is the right time to consider how Space Command can design an architecture that maximises mission assurance within tight budgets. Assuming sufficient earmarked funding for its capability pillar, there are at least three challenges that the UK Space Command needs to consider for its strategic objective to ‘protect and defend’. Because the UK does not currently have many capabilities in orbit, Space Command has a great opportunity to integrate resilience into its space architecture. At the same time, these decisions are likely to generate path dependencies in the future capability planning process, so careful thought is the need of the hour.
The first challenge revolves around the United States. The United Kingdom has traditionally planned its defence space investments (or lack thereof) under the assumption that the United States will remain its primary ally in this domain. This resulted in two outcomes. The MoD has in the past abandoned various projects on sovereign programmes because the US was already providing sufficient space-based products. It has also developed capabilities to plug gaps into the US space architecture. For example, when the MoD was considering an ISR constellation in 1984, the idea was to invest on synthetic aperture radar and infra-red sensors to supplement photography-based US capabilities. Complementing US efforts with niche capabilities, rather than duplicating existing ones, has been the cornerstone of Britain’s defence space strategy until now. This resulted in a bargaining game, in which the UK seeks to be a valued partner rather than a valuable customer to the US in exchange for the provision of a broad range of space-based services.
Put differently, there are two approaches when developing space-based capabilities: Space Command can replicate what the US does at a smaller scale and add redundancies to the Combined Space Operations Initiative (CSpO) satellites’ network, or it can strengthen its bargaining power vis-à-vis the US by investing on niche capabilities. Up until now, it prioritised the latter strategy. The UK might be hoping that defence space cooperation with the US can be ring-fenced even against an isolationist Trump administration. If this is the case, then the niche strategy could continue with little risk of losing access to key space-based services. Yet, the MoD should assess whether this assumption might not be too costly in the long term if it proves to be incorrect. If the UK loses access to US space services, it might find itself with niche capabilities that do not satisfy a national operational requirement on their own. Therefore, the UK should plan for some duplications and undertake joint capability planning exercises with other CSpO countries to reduce its dependence on the US.
The second challenge that Space Command should consider resonates with the debates around Western air power and on the trade-off between exquisite capabilities and mass specifically. On sovereign satellite communications, the UK has historically relied on a handful of sophisticated Skynet satellites. In that spirit, the MoD has already awarded a contract to Airbus Defence and Space for Skynet 6A, and it will likely open a tender for a few more satellites in the upcoming years. Skynet military satellites are designed to have state-of-the-art technology against jamming, nuclear explosions and other advanced counterspace threats. They are therefore well equipped to support strategic missions such as securing communications between the Vanguard-class nuclear submarines and the command-and-control centres. For conventional military operations, however, Space Command should minimise critical points of failure and invest in a larger number of cheaper systems. Considering financial constraints, sovereign capabilities should not be based on a platform-centric model. Incorporating sensors in commercial or allied systems with bespoke agreements can cost less while still distributing missions across platforms. Following this payload-centric model, the new Istari constellation could be a combination of sovereign satellites, commercial satellites with hosted payloads, and satellites jointly owned by the UK and other allies.
The third challenge concerns the ‘access’ component of the own-collaborate-access framework. Several stakeholders in the government have a vested interest in outer space, including the MoD, the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, and the Department for Business and Trade. This means that there are various logics driving the space enterprise that can be occasionally at odds with each other. Financial return on investments and national security concerns are amongst these logics. The OneWeb constellation clearly epitomises this tension. The UK currently has a golden share in the company that guarantees priority access to its services for national security reasons and allows the UK Government to set security standards. The flip side of having golden shares is that the EU might prevent OneWeb from competing for EU contracts in the context of the planned Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnectivity and Security by Satellite (IRIS2) constellation, and hence miss out on additional revenue streams.
As Starlink’s role during the war against Ukraine has shown, commercial companies may not fully align with a national government’s strategy. As a result, the UK must ensure that national commercial providers deliver their services in a timely fashion, whilst restricting adversaries’ access to these services if it is in the UK’s strategic interest. To that end, Space Command could follow OneWeb’s model and acquire golden shares in key strategic space companies. This would ensure commercial services’ availability during a near-peer conflict, adding another layer of redundancy should sovereign or allied capabilities be degraded. Securing tasking rights from commercial capabilities would send a strong message to adversaries and might deter them from attacking British satellites in the first place. Although that could distort the space market, it might be the price to pay for strengthening the UK’s deterrence by denial in space.
As the next defence review cycle approaches, the UK Space Command should consider the extent it wants to rely on the US and how this informs its capability planning process; the balance between high-tech systems and mass; and how to ensure alignment across government and commercial actors. How Space Command decides to resolve these challenges will influence the deterrence posture of the UK.