Quo Vadis Europe?

On 15 March Sir Kier Starmer announced a ‘coalition of the willing” to defend Europe and deter against further Russian aggression: “Supporting Ukraine is not just the right thing to do, it’s essential for delivering security at home. …But as we continue to prepare for peace, our focus must also be on making it happen.” Peace is both the value and the strategic interest that stand in the foreground of a pan European resurgence.

As Europe risks becoming squeezed between an aggressively transactional USA and a revanchist Russia, it is imperative that Europe, defines not only what is it against, but what it is for. Are “national interest” and “national security” about values or tangible security; a blend of both? What is worth fighting for?

The contested meanings of ‘national interest’

‘National interest and ‘national security’ are two of politics’ most slippery terms. Putin cites national interest and national security almost every time he talks in public about his invasion of Ukraine. Since taking office President Trump has cited ‘national security interests’ for threatening to annex Greenland and Canada, imposing tariffs on partners and relaxing fiscal regulation to encourage investment.

Two experts recently argued that national interest is again trumping ‘values’ in security policy. The Cold War theorist, Hans Morgenthau wrote that security is the definitive consideration of national interest; ‘… [if a] nation does not take care of its interests, nobody else will.’ [1] Academics identify four types of national interest: the explanatory and polemical ‘…to prove oneself right and one’s opponents wrong…’, the ‘aspirational’ such as US President Reagan describing the USA as a ‘shining city on a hill.’ and the ‘operational;’ short term, usually expedient objectives pursued by governments.[2] The Trump administration’s view seems ‘operational’: “Does it make America safer? Does it make America stronger? Does it make America more prosperous?”

Morgenthau and the defence of Europe

Morgenthau suggested American national interest was directly related to the security of Western Europe and containment of the USSR.. Alternatively, his ‘inside-out’ interpretation suggests American national interest included the democratic health of the western European states themselves. Either suggests an imperative to defend western Europe against Soviet aggression and thus dealing with a revanchist Russia remains a key mutual interest; the front line for US security really is in Europe. But is this Trump’s understanding?

NATO as a community of values

NATO regards itself as a community of values: “united in their commitment to parliamentary democracy, individual freedoms, human rights and the rule of law” posing a philosophical challenge to Trump’s transactional approach. NATO was created by states “to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.” 75 years later, NATO’s Strategic Concept states: “[NATO’s] key purpose and greatest responsibility is to ensure our collective defence... We are a defensive Alliance.” The Russian invasions of Ukraine despite its assurances in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum is a case in point. In the anarchic international arena, there is no recourse other than preventative self-help; diplomacy, and ultimately deterrence and defence.

Deterrence and defence strategies are inextricable; an effective deterrence strategy would reduce the defence budget, but requires an effective defensive capability. Deterrence and assurance are psychological processes, more about allies’ and adversaries’ perceptions than hardware

Europe’s values and interests on the global stage

The primary aim of the European Union is; ‘to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its citizens’ and its primary aim within the wider world is to “uphold and promote its values and interests.” Understanding the imperatives of values and interests in global security is fundamental in responding to the challenges of 2025; Russia, China, and the Trump administration. What values determine the current postures of deterrence and defence in Europe (including the UK), the USA, Russia and in China? Do these values translate into common – or adversarial – interests? Do values or interests dominate? If China, Russia and the USA have predominantly interest-driven policies, what are their anticipated outcomes? If they perceive Europe as a competitor it would not matter how many concessions Europe makes, the current transactional US administration and an enabled / encouraged Russia will demand ever greater concessions.

Rebuilding European security capacity

In order for Europe not to be caught in such a vice, its existing frameworks, including NATO’s European flank, the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy and Permanent Structured Cooperation must be shored up in terms of; articulated, shared values; communication; and interoperability within the EU / European frameworks and within NATO. While the value of US engagement in NATO is not (yet) in question, the Trump administration’s commitment to NATO is, and planning must incorporate reliable options that function in the interests of the Euro Atlantic without the US. The Euro Atlantic community comprising the continental powers, and the UK (and to an increasingly obvious extent, Canada, need to plan accordingly. Although details are vague; Anglo-French co-operation over nuclear policy, capabilities and operations is a good start.

From spending targets to practical readiness

The recent NATO summit declaration focused almost entirely on the allies’ commitment to increase the percentages of GDP spent on defence, (mostly at the behest of President Trump). This is not in itself sufficient for the situation in 2025. Europe must collectively ask itself what deterrence and defence needs it has right now, and how to finance and deploy these jointly. Such effective deterrence and defence means systems must be interoperable – and available in the immediate future, not just orders delivering a decade away. Increased budgets must focus on deterrence and defence readiness now, and into the future: national specialisation; burden sharing; framework nations; mass, critical infrastructure and logistic resilience; and interoperable capabilities deployable in the short term, not order catalogues full of exquisite capabilities deliverable after 2035. Anglo French production lines for Scalp and Storm Shadow re-open this year and Germany is reported to be about to order up to 1000 more Leopard II main battle tanks. These extremely capable systems are already deployed, and more will immediately and significantly enhance European defensive capabilities and resilience.

Choosing what Europe is willing to defend

Europe need not choose between values and interests; as Macron said to Parliament; “We will never accept the theory that might is right.” A liberal democratic Europe whole and free is worth fighting for and Europe must decide what to fight to defend. A good first step would be an effort to understand the current interests of the present US administration, Russia, and European states. Once Europe’s own vital interests are understood and defined, appropriate policies can be remodelled and strategies reformulated to achieve them; before Europe’s interests are squeezed and its values dictated externally.

[1] Morgenthau, Hans J. ".
[2] Joseph Frankel, National Interest (London: Pall Mall, 1970), 35 (others pp30-61)

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About Dr. Annamarie Bindenagel Šehović

Dr. Annamarie Bindenagel Šehović is a political scientist whose research focuses on security and human security, including health security. She is an Associate Fellow at the Potsdam Center for Policy and Management (PCPM), where she was also Acting Professor of Politics and International Studies in 2017–2018. Prior to that, she was a post-doctoral Research Fellow at the University of Warwick’s PAIS (Politics and International Studies) and a lecturer at the University of Erfurt, Germany. She holds a BA (Honors) from the University of Notre Dame, USA, a Master of Policy and Public Management from the University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa, and a PhD in Political Science from the Freie University, Berlin.