In Brazil, about 6 million people (6% of voters nationally) were offered money for their votes in the 2000 municipal elections (Schaffer, 2007). Vote buying became the “top reason politicians are removed from office: 667 at the municipal level and 31 state and federal politicians” between 2000 and 2008 (Nichter, 2011). These impediments were only possible because of a popular legal initiative led by the Brazilian Catholic Church. This article discusses the Anti-Vote-Buying Law (Lei da Compra de Votos) and analyses it using process tracing techniques.
The Brazilian Anti-Vote-Buying Law of 1999, one of the fastest laws ever to be approved in the country, is an example of how perceived corruption fuelled public engagement. This, in turn, was essential for this specific electoral accountability matter. The author analyses the process identifying two sets of factors ranked according to their causal power (distal and proximal conditions) and rule out alternative hypotheses using process tracing tests.
Important to background of this story, and considered distal conditions, is the National Constituent Assembly, the 1988 Constitution and popular initiatives (a direct participatory mechanism). Key actors were able to gain experience and knowledge in combating corruption, triggering political participation and designing laws during this Assembly. Internationally, the scenario was an incentive for the mitigation of corruption. The Inter-American Corruption Convention, took place in 1996, organized by the Organization of American States (OAS) and a year later, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) held the Anti-Bribery Convention.
Corruption scandals covered by the Brazilian media rose in number from 1987 to 1999. Since the return to democracy in 1985, the establishment of the 1988 constitution, and the direct elections of 1989, Brazil has been plagued by corruption scandals. During President Sarney’s government (1985 to 1990) there were three corruption scandals; during president Collor’s and Itamar Franco’s mandate (1990-1995), five; in Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s first government (1995-1998), eight; and his second mandate (1999-2003) saw six corruption scandals. I have called this a rise in uninformed corruption perception because it was, not yet, accompanied by information on accountability.
Closer in time of the creation of the law, the Brazilian population, who perceived corruption at a high level, learned about the antidemocratic aspects of vote buying and how to curb it. This informed perception of corruption led people to politically participate by signing the popular initiative pushing legislative changes into Congress. The informed corruption perception was enabled by a national campaign chaired by the Catholic Church, who claimed “a vote does not have a price, it has consequences”. Brazilians now knew selling their votes was one way to enable crooked politicians into power.
The Brazilian Anti-Vote-Buying Law is a case that shows how corruption perception impacted positively on political participation. The article analysis the specific critical juncture, of which information formed a part. Two consecutive types of perceived corruption— uninformed and informed—stimulated people to sign the popular initiative. Brazil in this period (1987-1999) is one more example of the mobilizing power of perceived corruption.
These types of corruption perception in certain moments in time can stimulate participation among the mass population. Aside from the nature of the corruption perception, not all types of participation will be affected. The popular initiative was a low-cost form of mobilization facilitated by the social movement. Moreover, not all forms of information are able to elevate corruption perception into mobilization. Information about how corrupt a country is might push citizens away from politics, but it is still necessary to make the issue salient. After corruption became a relevant issue in this case, accountability information drove people to voice their complaints.
The mobilizing power of corruption perception was seen in the signing of the popular initiative. The paper argues that the mobilizing corruption perception was triggered by the spread of information on corruption scandals, culminating in accountability social pressure. Low-cost participation and accountability information were important variables in assessing the power of mobilization of corruption perception.
Some level of popular involvement is necessary for particular anticorruption legislative issues to take place, especially those which affect elections. Whenever institutional accountability mechanisms are limited by political will, political participation should be called upon to enact laws.
This post is a summarized version of a paper published at Südosteuropa- Journal of Politics and Society . For more details and references, see: Reis do Carmo, A., 2018. Turkeys Do Not Vote for Christmas. The Brazilian Anti-Vote-Buying Law. Südosteuropa, 66(3), pp.325-348.
Image: Carts filled with citizen’s signatures initiating Congress’ appreciation of the Anti-Vote-Buying bill