A cornerstone of space law – the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) – is potentially under threat as a result of Russia apparently developing – but having not yet deployed - an anti-satellite (ASAT) capability that incorporates a nuclear weapons component. The Biden Administration, commenting on the news in mid-February, after the matter was leaked by House Intelligence Committee Representative Mike Turner, has been unwilling to clearly define whether this new Russian capability is in fact a nuclear weapon in orbit, or possibly a nuclear-powered space-based electronic warfare capability. It has made it clear that the weapon system isn’t a direct threat to Earth, with White House National Security Communications Advisor John Kirby stating:
“We're not talking about a weapon that can be used to attack human beings or cause physical destruction here on Earth. That said, we've been closely monitoring this Russian activity and we will continue to take it very seriously.”
However, at the same press conference on 15th February, Kirby stated in regard to the nature of the weapon that “…it would be space-based. And it would be a violation of the Outer Space Treaty to which more than 130 countries have signed up to, including Russia.” That statement suggests that it is, in fact, an orbital nuclear weapons-based ASAT capability that Russia is developing. If this is the case, then such a weapon, if deployed, would directly violate Article IV of the OST, which states in part:
“States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.”
Were Russia to violate the OST by deploying such a weapon, the viability of the treaty would immediately become unsustainable as its most important article would have been deliberately flouted. A core principle of the OST would be rendered worthless, and with it, any constraint on subsequent deployment of nuclear weapons in space by other states, including potentially on the Moon and other celestial bodies. It would amount to state-based legal vandalism that would severely weaken any basis for future progress towards promoting norms of responsible behavior in space and preventing the large scale weaponization of space. Furthermore, the second part of that article would then be under implied threat. Article IV of the OST goes on to state:
“The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manovures on celestial bodies shall be forbidden…”
If the article’s key purpose – to prevent the deployment of nuclear weapons in space – has failed, then it would be much easier for adversary states to then flout the rest of the article, and with it, effectively tear up the Outer Space Treaty.
This threat to legal norms that have been largely respected for decades makes it difficult to understand why some space policy analysts have dismissed the importance of these latest developments by Russia. They argue that because both the United States and the former Soviet Union experimented with, and ultimately rejected, the idea of orbital nuclear weapons, and also chose to remove operationally deployed nuclear-tipped ASATs from service during the Cold War once the OST was signed, this latest development is ‘nothing new.’ Yet the implications of Russia now embracing such a weapon are serious, not only for the future of the OST, and with it the possibility of further progress in arms control in space, but also in terms of the practical military implications if Moscow does indeed choose to deploy such a capability.
The Biden Administration’s caution in going into detail on the nature of the weapon is understandable given the need to protect intelligence gathering methods and potential sources, but it hasn’t helped to stem growing concerns about any likely deployment of such a weapon. In particular, an orbital nuclear weapons-based ASAT capability could indiscriminately threaten large numbers of satellites simultaneously in one strike that would have grave implications for global economic stability and social order.
As of May 2023, there are 7,560 satellites orbiting Earth, of which 6,768 are in low-earth orbit out to a distance of 2000km in altitude, 143 in medium earth orbit between 2,000 km and 36,500km, and 590 in geosynchronous orbit at an altitude of 36,500km. A nuclear-based ASAT detonated in LEO would threaten any satellite within visual line of sight, whether they are located in LEO, MEO or GEO, by generating intense gamma radiation, though with the greatest damage being done to those satellites closest to the point of detonation given that the effects of the blast decrease with the distance squared. Furthermore, if detonated high enough, the explosion would energize the inner Van Allen belts that extend between 1,000km to 12,000km from Earth, expanding them by feeding additional charged particles and damaging satellites that orbit through this expanded belt. This was demonstrated during the 1962 orbital nuclear detonation of a 1.4 megaton nuclear weapon under the Starfish Prime test. In 1962 there were far fewer satellites in orbit than today!
So, what does this mean for western security? Such an attack on multiple satellites with a single nuclear weapon-based ASAT potentially could damage or disable large numbers of satellites simultaneously, and through a ‘Van Allen attack’, continue to see further damage to satellites as they orbit through an energized and expanded inner Van Allen belt. The third order effects then come into consideration as dead or damaged satellites create a rapidly spiraling risk of collisions in orbit, that in turn generate more space debris and greater risk of further collisions. With western economies heavily dependent on large mega-constellations of satellites for everything from internet access to communications, to positioning, navigation and timing, as well as Earth observation, and for defence and national security, the immediate impact on Earth would be the collapse of critical information services and supply chains, with the effect most pronounced for those states depending on such services. If such an attack were then coordinated with cyber-attacks, and attacks on submarine internet cables, the risk posed by nuclear ASATs would be of a rapid collapse of economic and social foundations of those states most dependent on such services, perhaps as a ‘first shot’ in a future high intensity major power war.
Therefore, the White House’s comment that Russia’s nuclear ASAT capability – if deployed – could not cause physical destruction or attack human being on Earth, needs to be challenged when considering the vulnerability of western states to disruption of their key information systems and critical infrastructure, and the resilience of their societies. There would be serious effects, and debates over the effects, or lack of effect, of electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) that have noted the terrestrial impact of exo-atmospheric nuclear detonations also would need to be examined more deeply to explore how a modern information-based society would be affected by such an event.
However, a Russian nuclear ASAT is an indiscriminate weapon, affecting not just the satellites of Russia’s opponents, but likely Russia’s allies as well. For example, Chinese satellites would be under just as much threat from Moscow’s deployment and potential use of such a weapon, as would those satellites belonging to ‘Global South’ states. Even if Russia minimized its reliance on space-based services, it too would be adversely affected if it used the weapon, with key Russian defence satellites affected either directly by the gamma radiation produced by the blast, or as a result of those satellites entering energized Van Allen belts. The rationale for developing and deploying such an indiscriminate mass-effect counterspace capability is therefore somewhat mystifying and raises the question of whether it could ever be used except in a last-ditch act of desperation by Moscow – perhaps as a means to ‘escalate to de-escalate.’ That tends to run counter to the scenario of pre-emptive use to leave Russia’s opponents deaf, dumb and blind at the outset of the next war.
Yet, in considering the operational use of such a weapon, the implication is that Moscow has reached a point where it is ready to consider nuclear weapons. Certainly, one possible justification would be to counter commercial mega-constellations such as SpaceX Starlink – and in the future, the defence focused ‘Starshield’ – with the former having been used to support complex military operations and enable new military technologies such as use of autonomous systems early in the war in Ukraine. It is ironic that Russian forces now use Starlink in the war too. Russia and China have indicated that they see such western commercial satellite mega-constellations as a legitimate target in a future war. But with mega-constellations like Starlink potentially growing to 42,000 satellites, and others such as Amazon’s Project Kuiper also launching their own mega-constellations, and with China launching its own Guo Wang mega constellation as an answer to Starlink, the challenge facing states such as China and Russia is how to defeat western mega constellations, whilst preserving their own systems.
It is becoming clear that the trend is emerging for ‘proliferated LEO’ (or ‘pLEO’) mega constellations to replace traditional large, complex and vulnerable satellites with large numbers of small satellites, with the latter impossible for traditional anti-satellite capabilities, such as that tested by Russia in 2021, to counter. Such a challenge is only going to grow as more states become dependent on pLEO architecture to ensure their economies and societies function effectively. Holding at risk such a developing architecture would give Moscow or Beijing immediate coercive power, but it is only credible as an option if they can ensure resilience of their own economies and societies, and protect their own space capabilities, against the effects of such a weapon being used. Its not clear that that is possible.
As such, the Russian nuclear ASAT, if it were deployed, would likely be a seen as part of a new generation of nuclear threat, akin to Russia’s other projects such as the Khinzhal air launched ballistic missile, the Tsirkon ship launched hypersonic missile, and Burevestnik nuclear powered cruise missile as well as the Sarmat heavy ICBM, Avanguard hypersonic glide vehicle and Poseidon nuclear armed and powered uncrewed underwater vehicle. Development of a nuclear weapons-based ASAT would fit neatly with a Russia increasingly determined to re-focus on nuclear weapons as the key means of deterrence and coercion and it would align with a demonstrated willingness by Moscow to rattle nuclear sabers throughout the Ukraine war to coerce and deter NATO support for Ukraine. The fact that President Putin prioritised new generation nuclear weapons – though he denied a nuclear-ASAT capability – in his most recent State of the Union speech is itself significant. Perhaps the real significance of a Russian nuclear weapons-based ASAT is not the weapon itself, but that it signifies a Russia that is increasingly relying on nuclear weapons for its security. It implies a Russia willing to actively consider the use of such weapons in future wars.
This suggestion can be taken to imply both weakness of Russia and also threat. Russia’s initial failures in Ukraine have undermined its military credibility in the eyes of the world, though there is a risk that western indifference may yet allow Moscow to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat. Putin sees nuclear weapons as a way to compensate for less than effective performance by the Russian military, and thus promotes a new generation of nuclear weapons as a means to that end. A nuclear weapon-based ASAT would take Russia’s ability, and perhaps willingness, to coerce and deter to a new level, by threatening the future basis for western economic and societal cohesion whilst avoiding the risks inherent in actual use of nuclear weapons on Earth. In effect it’s a weapon for the nuclear grey zone, even if the intent is to deploy and coerce through implicit threat rather than actual use. The weakness of such a weapon is its indiscriminate nature, and that any use of such a weapon would threaten the interests of key Russian allies, notably China. There’s no real way to harden satellites against a nuclear based ASAT, or its indirect effects such as a subsequent Van Allen attack, and the risk of cascading collisions producing something approaching a Kessler Syndrome.
A nuclear ASAT thus may be highly threatening as a coercive tool, but for practical warfighting, it’s not that usable. Yet, the damage it will do along the way to deployment, including effectively shredding the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, should not be dismissed as inconsequential.