More recently, however, relations between Trump and Putin have turned sour. Trump responded to strong statements by former Russian president Medvedev by deploying nuclear submarines positioned to strike Russia.
This makes it necessary to question the validity of the “reverse Kissinger” argument. The Trump administration’s flirtation with Russia led some commentators to speculate that Trump might repeat what Kissinger and Nixon did in 1972 with the opening to China. Back then, the US aligned with a hostile China to counterbalance the Soviet Union. Could the US now align with Russia to counterbalance China?
This idea has sparked anxiety across Europe. If the US seeks détente with Russia, what happens to NATO, to Ukraine, or to America’s broader security guarantees? Could such a move rupture the transatlantic alliance – and strengthen the growing Russia–China axis instead?
In a recently published academic analysis for the policy-oriented journal Survival – of the think tank International Institute for Strategic Studies – we argued that the historical analogy behind the “reverse Kissinger” thesis is flawed. While Nixon’s 1972 opening changed the course of the Cold War, the circumstances today are fundamentally different. History, in this case, does not offer a helpful guide, and the latest developments in US-Russia relations may confirm that, at this stage.
Geopolitical realignments: then and now
Alliance shifts are not new. The 1756 Diplomatic Revolution saw France align with Austria, once its arch-rival. In 1939, Nazi Germany and Stalin’s USSR signed the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, shocking the world. After 1989, former Soviet allies rushed to join NATO. History shows alliances can and do shift – often quickly – under the pressure of geopolitical change.
Yet the idea that the US can drive a wedge between China and Russia misunderstands the nature of their current relationship. In the early 1970s, China and the Soviet Union were on the brink of war. There were border clashes, deep ideological hostility, and mutual distrust. Mao Zedong, founder of the People's Republic of China, feared Soviet aggression far more than American imperialism.
In contrast, today’s Russia and China have cultivated a partnership that – while not without tensions – is far more stable. Their militaries train together, their economies are increasingly intertwined, and they share a worldview that resents Western liberalism and US hegemony. There is no open rivalry to exploit – no version of 1969’s bloody Zhenbao Island clashes to leverage diplomatically.
No Mao, no Nixon
Moreover, in 1972, both sides made big strategic concessions. Mao abandoned China’s global revolutionary posture in favour of détente with the West. Nixon, despite his Cold Warrior credentials, recognised the People’s Republic and sidelined Taiwan diplomatically for the sake of winning the Cold War and opening the Chinese market. That gave each side a win.
Could Putin and Trump make similar concessions? This is unlikely. There is no sign that Putin is willing to compromise on Ukraine or scale back his antagonism toward NATO. Meanwhile, Trump’s rhetoric may be conciliatory toward Moscow, but US institutions –Congress, the Pentagon, the foreign policy establishment – remain wary of a pro-Russia pivot.
Even Trump’s first presidency, for all his admiration of Putin, increased funding – with the 5% agreed at The Hague – for NATO operations and expanded US troop deployments in Europe. The reality of foreign policy, as history often shows, tends to be more constrained than leaders promise.
A misread of history
Nixon’s rapprochement worked because it was grounded in geopolitical necessity and diplomatic realism. It responded to a triangle of tensions between the US, USSR, and China, and succeeded because each player saw mutual benefit. Today’s talk of a “reverse Kissinger” ignores that logic.
Russia and China today are not competitors for US favour. They are co-strategists – working in tandem to revise the global order. Unlike Mao, Putin is not seeking US protection from Beijing; if anything, he values Chinese backing as he confronts the West in Ukraine and beyond.
Worse, the “grand bargain” model implicitly assumes the US can offer Moscow spheres of influence in Europe in exchange for neutrality or support against China. That would mean abandoning Ukraine, undermining NATO’s eastern members, and betraying American allies. It would be a geopolitical gamble with no guarantee of reward.
The dilemma of Europe and lessons from the Cold War
The implications for Europe are profound. Trump’s talk of making peace with Russia, while pressuring Ukraine to accept territorial loss, has shaken European capitals. The fear is not just abandonment, but strategic chaos: a US less committed to NATO, more erratic in leadership, and more likely to strike short-term deals with long-term rivals.
Some European leaders are now exploring what a post-American security order might look like. Defence spending is up. Calls for “strategic autonomy” are louder. And there is even talk – once unthinkable – of closer ties with China if US policy becomes unpredictable. That outcome would be the opposite of what a “reverse Kissinger” is meant to achieve. Instead of weakening the Russia–China partnership, it could isolate the US and force Europe to hedge its bets.
Ultimately, Trump may think he’s learning from history, but his lesson is flawed. Nixon’s diplomacy worked because it took advantage of real divisions and clear, mutual interests. Today’s world is very different – Putin is not Mao, Xi is not Brezhnev, and 2025 is not 1972. Trying to replicate that Cold War strategy oversimplifies the complex realities and risks weakening the US. Instead, America may focus on strengthening alliances, supporting Ukraine, and managing competition with China. Anything else could reinforce the very Russia–China partnership it hopes to break.