It was not long after great armies fought over continental Europe, Africa and beyond, defending lands and building Empires in the classical period, that the sea on the horizon emerged as the final frontier which could unlock strategic or tactical advantage over enemy or rival nations. The bravery of what today seems rudimentary, trireme boat warfare in fact set the path––that would take over a millennium––to develop skill and mastery of sailing that eventually opened the globe through exploration and trade. Using the seas to further national goals transformed them into the commons for diplomatic relations and trade; the professionalism of navies was a step guaranteed to flow from this development. The demands of trade and diplomatic relations instigated the choice to build a navy, in whatever form chosen, by continental nations and elsewhere force island nations, like Britain, firstly in self-defence and then to maximise its far more limited power and resources to act.
Insights from history enhances government decision-making
Over the centuries, historians have studied, debated and argued about naval history and its role in nation-states. Seapower’s scope to influence events in peacetime, war and conflict, has been analysed, as has different countries’ use of naval force both at sea and to influence what happens on and over the land. Thus, island nations have no choice but to be the best at sea and invest their limited resources into maritime power. This means civilian and military activity through multiple avenues on the seas, acting both defensively - to guard against invasion – and proactively – to secure trade pathways for national survival. For Britain, the result of experience was a national strategy, maritime at root and core. It was a pure product of centuries of experience from land and on the seas, which effectively positioned the Royal Navy as central to British culture, nation and defence. It earned widespread public admiration and centrality in island culture and national policy while the people’s faith in the White Ensign to deliver was rarely misplaced: such was the untarnished British naval record that home soil remained free from foreign invaders and goals beyond her shores were made possible and even realised.
Further admiration was garnered elsewhere, like the City of London who were content to pay taxes to fund naval programmes because of the need to defend trade, which was the best prosperity generator and stabiliser for national and international affairs. Today, from the seabed which cradles digital pathways to the sea’s surface on which civilisation depends for transporting physical resources and goods — which cannot be matched in the air or orbit –– this entity must be protected from interference and aggression. For islands like Britain, it is not a question of the freedom of the seas but that good order at sea is non-negotiable to ensure national security and global stability.
Understanding and education of seapower in Britain has been taken for granted. In the past that knowledge was not the sum of national arrogance, nor glitzy displays of public relations or manipulation of battles and myths, but by hard-won experience. This experience has formed the basis of how to think effectively and efficiently about defence strategy and policy, analysing the trends of the past, which forces leadership to face harsh realities rather than invent fanciful ideas based on ideologies. Britain, vulnerable to global events, resource-strapped and financially constrained, must think carefully about its strategic posture, which time and again seapower has delivered when the nation asked. Experience is all that can be relied on for guidance.
Fundamental change: The death of a national strategy by continental commitment
Naval power’s centrality to government and culture was not to last. The de-prioritisation or maritime culture and navies was one of the most fundamental changes in the history of the British government. After 1945, a growing problem of understanding the changing face of the Navy and its effort during the Second World War to save Britain from invasion and capitulation was accelerated by relentless inter-service rivalry, delayed technological responses to tactical warfare developments and the manipulation of the record of the war by extremist civilian and military theorists. These threads of debate became part of a greater whole which focused on the higher organisation of defence.
The creation of the Ministry of Defence in 1964 enabled a hostile contradiction to what Britain’s national strategy is, i.e. maritime, not a land posture. Since then, there has been only endless reform to British defence. This suggests, from inception, that something is rotten at the heart of the national strategy-making process. Ejecting the centrality of the Navy or, more specifically, the concept of ‘maritime strategy’ being core to policy, was akin to the start of the spread of a terminal disease. Ultimately, the abolition of Admiralty was representative of the new ethos entering British defence policy: short-termism, and the greatest betrayal of hundreds of years of experience. The message was that Britain is a continental land power perpetrated through its army and the Air Force.
Fortunately, a century ago, British historian Sir Julian Corbett studied centuries of British tactical and strategic experience, developing and educating about national strategy. His reading remains as relevant as ever but after 1914, this understanding of national strategy was degraded, if not outright ignored, only to be expelled after 1945 by lesser scholars with different agendas. They feared that applying Corbett’s approach would result in unpalatable results that would disrupt and shatter the MoD-established defence culture beyond recognition. Corbett’s analytical tools can support this point. The trend is clear: nation and governments have desperately sought better solutions to defence; one only has to look to foreign and defence policy debates in recent decades, let alone endless defence reform, to see that answers have not been forthcoming. The irony is that Britain did know how to do it; the question remains: what is blocking it from doing so again, beyond educating itself?
Britain is not Europe’s protector as is commonly believed today: the idea of a continental commitment to the European mainland is entirely manipulated and misplaced. Britain is a guarantor for the process of continental Europe seeking its own defence solutions. This is because Britain knows how to help Europe best, not on land but by sea, trade and other levers like finance: working around the edges, while European countries focus on their land forces. Britain used to know its strategy, one by sea that saw close coordination between an expeditionary army with a globally capable Royal Navy: a strategy applied from seabed to space, through submarines, aircraft carriers, marines, and the capability to support the army, striking from anywhere at any time. This approach helps Britain’s allies best, for islands have limited power and must always look to their defence first, along with a hefty dose of realism acknowledging Britain’s position in the 21st century. This would see the limited deployment of British troops, relying instead on the success of a naval strategy and our allies taking the lead on land.
Britain’s Seapower guards the freedom of us all, from seabed to space
Britain must look more closely at the future of the Royal Navy. Britain’s naval past and future result from a bespoke set of national circumstances demonstrating what national defence strategy should be. To think about the Royal Navy is to think about national strategy; they are intrinsically tied together. It is no coincidence that deprioritising one— seapower—has impacted the other and, from it, endless problems and questions flow. Reinventing the wheel and following distractions that have no basis in experience wastes taxpayers' money and precious time that ought to be used to prepare for war and conflict; neither is ultimately in the interests of an island.
The Royal Navy cannot be a continental navy which mimics that of more powerful nations whose priorities for the use of naval power inevitably differ to Britain’s. Although there are those who would relish the approach of consigning navies to niche roles, ignorant to the broader arguments which encompass understanding of the world we live in, Britain must rebuild its navy. Navalists may hide in technocratic discussions and ignore the failure of their attempts to persuade the nation of the navy’s role, they must wake up to accept and promote the fact that seapower is the method in which to have a broader conversation about national defences, acknowledging that this may entail tough conversations within defence and for the taxpayer.
Today, Britain needs bespoke solutions for national defence rather than copycat ones of nations with different geographic boundaries and who focus on regional issues. Issues like the security of shipping may seem remote, but they impact every Briton today, and good order at sea cannot be a task handed to nations that are not sea-dependent. History has demonstrated time and again since the 1500s that islands have a different approach to defence policy and relationships with allies. Bland generic outputs, ignorant messaging and irrelevant discussions alien to national circumstance should be consigned to history. The state of the world in 2025 serves as a warning that the time is ripe to think again: effective progression means taking guidance from the past.
British seapower today and the Royal Navy aren’t any more or less relevant than they once were. The issue is that questions over its future are tied to the fate of a national strategy, often resulting in them being ignored because they lead to uncomfortable questions and the exposure of recent failures. Britain’s national strategy was ultimately devalued long ago, because politicians and the centralisation of defence organisation had little time for nuanced answers which didn’t fit political cycles or quick decisions by pressured, unelected, opaque bureaucrats. This can no longer continue in an increasingly darkening world. The future of British seapower rests, as it always has, on understanding and educating that British national strategy with maritime at its core is the best course for the nation. It is that which ultimately did and still can make island nations, great.