Dr Bowen’s paper, a tour de force of UK space power, contains clear and thoughtful questions and recommendations for the long-awaited Integrated Review. The purpose of this opinion is not to regurgitate or underline Dr Bowen’s assertions but to provide some perspectives based upon my own experiences of endeavouring to drive multi-domain and especially space conceptual thinking within the Ministry of Defence. I therefore offer five complementary considerations for senior policy makers on how to drive national security and build national prosperity: in, from and through space.
These are:
- Can we afford to address space in isolation? The pervasiveness of space-related capabilities and the associated ‘blurring’ between the space domain and the maritime, land, air and cyberspace domains mean that our national security and prosperity agendas must view the challenges and opportunities through a multi-domain lens. Does thinking and acting in domain terms hinder national security strategy?
- Are we already too far behind the drag curve for the current ‘race for space’? Technology is advancing at such a pace that we need to be looking beyond current approaches and perspectives on what Space is and what it is for.
- What are our strategic priorities– now and over the next 50 years? We need to think and act in integrated terms and this requires grand strategic prioritisation and emphasis.
- How do we maximise advantage in, from and through space ensuring a realistic and proportionate approach that meets national security and prosperity requirements?
- What should we be doing now to play a leading role the next race for space nationally and how are defence, security and prosperity agendas aligned? What are our immediate-, medium- and long-term aiming points and what is the blueprint to reaching them?
Blurred Domains
The UK defines domains as: The sphere of interest and influence in which activities, functions and operations are undertaken to accomplish missions and exercise control over an opponent in order to achieve the desired effects. We recognise five domains – the three classical domains of maritime, land and air power and the recent addition of space and cyberspace. The pervasive nature behind the application of effects in, from and through cyberspace and space is changing the way in which we view dominion. Such is the breadth and reach of these new domains that we can no longer see the achievement of sea control, holding terrain or control of the air in the same way the classical strategists had originally envisaged. All the domains are blurred and one might therefore contend that the generation of capability for pure self-domain advantage is inefficient and unlikely to achieve the effective multi-domain integration we seek – for example: control of the sea can no longer be achieved by maritime power alone; holding key terrain cannot be achieved solely by land power … you get the picture! I do envisage MOD colleagues emphasising the successes of generating joint capabilities: carrier enabled power projection being the obvious one with benefits for dominion at sea, on the land and in the air. But do these go far enough? How do classical single-Service hard power capabilities deliver dominion across all domains? Does thinking and acting in domain terms hinder national security strategy? Given the blurred nature of the domains do we need to think and act in a more integrated way – looking at the challenge in terms of dimension (below the surface, on the surface and above the surface of the earth as well as through the ‘ether’ of space and cyberspace) and the integration of five-domain capabilities rather than the preserve of a Service? If, for no other reason, agile command and control will be almost entirely dependent upon space and cyberspace capabilities to enable our ability to sense, understand, orchestrate and act. Thus, space and cyberspace are more than enablers. They constitute the hidden wiring that enables 21st century life – including conflict and competition – as well as the primary domains through which effect or outcome might be achieved (especially below the threshold of armed conflict).
What do we need space for?
If we look back at space-based capability development, the fundamentals have largely remained the same: a need for satellites to enable precision navigation and timing (PNT), provide exo-atmospheric surveillance and monitoring and to enable various forms of communication. A need for satellites is unlikely to diminish in the next 30 years, but how might we supplement core space-deployed systems with inner atmosphere solutions for surveillance, PNT and communications? This chimes with Dr Bowen’s emphasis on the need for aligning space and terrestrial priorities. But to look beyond our current horizon requires a more integrated approach to the alignment of service and domain priorities. This needs to be led through a rigorous process of Head Office-directed experimentation to prioritise the ‘hidden wiring’ benefits of an integrated approach. In such a way, it may address the demands of the dimensions outlined in the previous section and those of the other instruments of national to develop a truly integrated approach that transcends domains and boundaries, and exploits the blurring that naturally exists.
Leap-frogging the current ‘race for space’
We are living through the most dynamic period during which the tempo of technological advancement is more rapid and more diverse than it has been at any other time in history. At the same time space, as a global common, is more attractive to commercial enterprise. With technology more accessible and exploitable by large corporations and an increasing number of states, competition for low and medium level orbits is increasing. When viewed through the lens of congestion, how sustainable or necessary is a continued race for low and medium level orbits? The previous section outlined the contemporary space capability paradigm. Yet, if we accept that we may be able to do things more effectively through greater focus on inner-atmosphere capability or for enhanced alignment between the air and space domain over the next 20+ years, we may not need to make the considerable investment in capabilities that may only offer limited durational enhancement. Only through detailed experimentation and analysis will we be able to answer this question and make informed multi-domain and multi-dimensional balance of investment decisions.
Integrating: multiple domains and instruments of national power
The MOD is seized with multi-domain integration which has a working definition of ‘…the posturing of military capabilities in concert with other instruments of national power, allies and partners; configured to sense, understand and orchestrate effects at the optimal tempo, across the operational domains and levels of warfare.’ This definition provides a very useful handrail to guide a new way of thinking and action across all domains. Yet, I contend that the very pervasive nature of space and cyberspace all but renders perceptions of domain-generated advantage obsolete – maritime, land and air domains are no longer sufficiently distinct not only because of their dependencies with other but because of reliance on space and cyberspace. This doesn’t, however, render the Services obsolete. They are still required to generate their specific capability based upon their expertise, yet how are they integrated and how are space and cyberspace are fused with them to deliver multi-dimensional advantage? This conundrum will become more acute as technology enables greater interaction with space and cyberspace technologies. The question that I would posit is whether the current delegated model of command force development is sufficiently robust to achieve the inter-service, inter-domain, pan-dimension prioritisation and capability alignment across the military required to realise the aspiration of multi-domain integration?
Fusing National Security and National Prosperity
Space power and where it interacts across the blurred seams between domains or across the vertical slice of dimensions is, as Dr Bowen emphasises, critical to both our national security and our prosperity. This co-dependency must therefore be at the heart of how we develop an integrated strategy for space going forward. If we therefore accept this, and the observations made in the previous three sections, we need to determine what functions need to remain sovereign, what might be delivered with allies and partners and what can we take risk on. These are three very simple statements to make but we must think clearly about what aspects of space power are critical to national security and prosperity now and into the near future – again a transparent programme of experimentation is key here.
Developing a Space Blueprint
Our national security and prosperity are dependent upon space and I have already emphasised that our strategy for both must be integrated with clear definitions of what is non-discretionary and what can be developed through our sovereign entities – work on hypersonic engines, autonomous platforms and high-altitude pseudo satellites are three areas of space-related innovation that we are already global world leaders in. These three areas also emphasise the ability to work through the current domain boundaries and exploit exciting new technologies for integrated, cross-domain and multi-dimensional effect, and potentially within the same mission. To do this could be game changing – the UK has probably never achieved such an approach at integration across domains and with an aligned security and prosperity approach at the same time. To get this right will require significant coordination and alignment from the outset. Harnessing this sovereign strength will leverage dividends to both our national security and our prosperity, yet to realise this, we need a Blueprint to map strategy, conceptual thinking and technological delivery into a realistic design for implementation.
Concluding Remarks
Dr Bowen’s broad ranging paper for the Freeman Air and Space Institute was a timely critique on space and some of the considerations for the ongoing Integrated Review. His paper is a welcome addition to our space debate. But that debate must not stop there. In this short ‘viewpoint’, additional context and analysis has been offered to prick the conscience of readers to look deeper into what space really means for both our national security and prosperity simultaneously. The UK is a collection of small islands with global influence and we have used this as a strength to lead international thinking on maritime, land and air power – we can do the same for space power too. But to do so requires greater engagement from practitioners, academics, industry and innovators alike to push the boundary and view space through a different lens. We cannot continue to view either space or cyberspace as mere enablers of the conventional domains. They are not; they are both pervasive and inextricably linked to our security and prosperity. As I close this ‘viewpoint’ I offer one final thought. If we remove the word ‘domain’ from our military lexicon and replaced it with the word ‘dimension’ might we be better set to achieve the integration that we seek? The continued used of ‘domain’ retains an element of stove-piping when ‘dimension’ encourages the integration we seek out with Service and domain stove pipes. If we start to think and act in these ways now, we are more likely to achieve the integrated effects we seek – for security and prosperity: below the surface, on the surface, and above the surface of the earth including in, from and through space and cyberspace.
Phil Lester is the former Head of Doctrine, Air, Space and Cyber in the Defence Concepts and Doctrine Centre.
This piece was responding to the paper 'British Spacepower and the Integrated Review: The Search for Strategy', written by Dr Bleddyn Bowen and published by the Freeman Air and Space Institute, King's College London.