The timing of the airstrikes may be significant. On 12 June, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced that Iran has been in non-compliance with its nuclear safeguards obligations for the first time in two decades, citing undeclared nuclear material and activities at multiple sites. In response to this censure, Iran announced the construction of a third enrichment facility and plans to install advanced centrifuges at its fortified Fordow site. Meanwhile, although US intelligence maintains that Iran is not actively building a nuclear weapon and has not made the political decision to do so, it also assesses that Iran has amassed sufficient 60 per cent enriched uranium—about 408.6 kg—to produce approximately ten nuclear warheads with additional refinement. The IAEA also reports that Iran is producing an estimated 33.5 kg per month of this highly enriched uranium using advanced centrifuges at Natanz and Fordow. While some Israeli leaders view this technical capability as an existential threat, many—including Netanyahu—invoke that claim strategically to maintain Israel’s technological and military dominance in the region.
Israel’s decision to strike now appears driven by the perception that Iran is weakened on multiple fronts. Regionally, Tehran’s two most powerful proxies—Hamas and Hezbollah—have suffered devastating setbacks. The fall of Assad has also disrupted key arms routes through Syria, sharply curbing Iran’s regional reach. Although elements of Iran’s ‘axis of resistance’ remain, they are fragmented and weakened. Domestically, Iran is confronting its most severe crisis since the 1979 revolution. Inflation surpasses 40%, the rial has plummeted, and chronic shortages of fuel, electricity, and essential goods have triggered waves of strikes across the country. Although the regime has brutally suppressed successive uprisings—most notably the 2022 ‘Woman, Life, Freedom’ movement—their enduring legacy fuels persistent civil disobedience and widespread public discontent. Against this backdrop of regional retreat and internal instability, Israeli leaders likely saw a rare strategic window to act.
Israeli strikes have inflicted significant damage on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Natanz—long a focal point of Israeli cyber and kinetic operations—appears to have suffered the most substantial blow. Historically protected by layers of underground fortifications, Natanz had been considered among the most hardened facilities in Iran’s nuclear programme. High-resolution satellite imagery has confirmed damage to much of the complex as well as ‘direct impacts’ on the underground cavern where enrichment takes place.
A strike on the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center also caused disruption. Israeli munitions targeted four surface-level facilities, including the Uranium Conversion Facility, Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant, and a central chemical laboratory. These above-ground assets are crucial in transforming enriched uranium into forms suitable for weapons use. The IAEA has reported no radiation leaks, suggesting that while infrastructure was damaged, containment remained intact. These strikes are tactically significant, though the long-term impact will depend on Iran’s ability to repair or replace affected components.
Another key target of Israel’s campaign has been Iran’s missile infrastructure, which would be essential for delivering nuclear-tipped warheads should these be developed. Airstrikes on bases in Tabriz and Kermanshah—linked to the Fateh-110 and Qiam-1 systems—have reportedly degraded Iran’s ability to launch medium-range ballistic missiles. These have been followed by strikes on missile launchers and military-industrial sites near Tehran, where precision-guided munitions are used to impair Iran’s deployment capabilities. In doing so, Israeli forces are not only weakening Iran’s retaliatory capacity but also diminishing the potential credibility of an Iranian nuclear deterrent, should it eventually materialise. Nevertheless, while these operations may buy Israel some strategic breathing space, Iran retains other launch options and could shift production to undisclosed locations.
Most notable has been Israel’s targeting of the programme’s intellectual and strategic core. The campaign has eliminated several senior nuclear scientists and military officials. Among those killed are key IRGC leaders responsible for nuclear defence planning and missile deployment. These include Major General Hossein Salami, the IRGC’s Commander-in-Chief; Major General Mohammad Bagheri, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces; Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, head of the IRGC Aerospace Force overseeing Iran’s missile programme; and Major General Gholamali Rashid, commander of Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters, the body responsible for Iran’s strategic military planning and wartime command coordination. More importantly, Israel has assassinated nuclear scientists such as Fereydoon Abbasi, Mohammad Mehdi Tehranchi, and Ahmadreza Zolfaghari Daryani—individuals believed by Israel to possess the technical expertise needed to weaponise enriched uranium. These assassinations will likely delay the programme by removing institutional knowledge and leadership continuity. At the same time, Iran has previously shown resilience in regenerating lost expertise.
Despite these tactical and operational successes, several factors limit Israel’s ability to destroy Iran’s nuclear programme. Most pressing is the challenge posed by deeply buried enrichment sites, notably the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Facility, which lies approximately 80 metres beneath solid rock and has been designed to resist sustained aerial bombardment. In recent years, it has become the cornerstone of Iran’s enrichment capability, hosting cascades of advanced IR-6 centrifuges capable of enriching uranium to 60% purity. In 2023, IAEA inspectors detected particles enriched to 83.7%—uncomfortably close to weapons-grade.
Penetrating Fordow with airstrikes poses a significant technical challenge. Even the most advanced bunker-buster munitions in Israel’s arsenal—such as the GBU-28 and the more modern GBU-72, reportedly supplied by the US for use with the Israeli Air Force’s F-15I—can penetrate approximately 5–6 metres of reinforced concrete but are unlikely to inflict lasting damage at the depths of Fordow. While Israel does possess some of these bombs, their numbers are classified—and most analysts believe the stockpile is insufficient to take out heavily fortified sites without external support. Israel also has BLU-109 2,000lb penetrators, deployable from F-35 stealth fighters, though their lower yield means multiple strikes would likely be needed. These were used in the October 2024 strike that killed Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in an underground bunker in Beirut, but that operation reportedly required multiple sorties.
Israel’s current air superiority over Iran does provide greater operational freedom to conduct sustained, coordinated attacks with reduced risk from Iranian air defences. It could enable multiple waves of precision strikes, improving the chances of degrading hardened sites. However, this advantage does not overcome the fundamental limitations of Israel’s munitions or air platforms when it comes to reaching the deeply buried core of Fordow. The US-developed GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) is a 30,000-pound, precision-guided bomb specifically engineered to destroy such structures. It is capable of penetrating up to 60 meters of rock or reinforced concrete. However, the bomb can only be delivered by certain US strategic aircraft—primarily the B-2 Spirit stealth bomber—which Israel does not possess. As a result, unless the United States directly participates in a strike, Israel cannot independently employ the MOP, leaving a gap in its ability to neutralise sites like Fordow.
Even with US intervention, deploying the MOP involves significant operational challenges. To achieve maximum destructive effect, the B-2 would likely need to release multiple bombs on the same point, requiring it to loiter over the target area. This extended exposure increases the risk of detection and interception, especially since the B-2’s radar-reflective underside could be vulnerable to surviving Iranian air defences. A successful strike would also demand coordinated suppression of Iran’s radar systems, possibly involving cruise missile barrages or advanced electronic warfare. Most critically, the MOP has never been used in combat, and its actual effectiveness against ultra-deep, hardened facilities remains uncertain. This introduces a significant element of strategic risk into any operation that depends on it.
While Israel could also use stand-off weapons or ballistic missiles launched from fighter jets, potentially via Syrian airspace, these would likely damage Iran’s nuclear infrastructure but fall short of eliminating it. Some Israeli missile systems, such as the Jericho II ballistic missile or the air-launched version of the LORA system—reportedly equipped with a penetrating warhead—might offer deeper strike potential, particularly given the higher kinetic energy of ballistic trajectories. However, open-source information remains inconclusive regarding their availability for such missions or their ability to match the MOP’s performance.
A similar assessment applies to the Kolang Gaz La complex, a recently identified underground facility south of Natanz. Still under construction and not open to inspectors, this site may be intended to house centrifuge assembly or enrichment activities. Its location deep within a mountain and the presence of multiple tunnel portals suggest that Iran is pursuing a strategy of redundancy and concealment—dispersing nuclear capabilities across fortified, hardened sites to increase survivability. Such sites complicate efforts to eliminate Iran’s nuclear infrastructure in a single or even sustained strike.
Another constraint Israel faces is the resilience of Iran’s programme. Tehran has shown its ability to rebuild damaged facilities and adapt its tactics. Strikes on ventilation shafts or power lines may temporarily halt operations, but engineers can often repair the damage or implement workarounds. Iran has also become increasingly adept at dispersing its nuclear assets and expertise across multiple sites. Some enriched uranium stocks may have already been relocated to alternative sites, complicating verification and targeting efforts.
Israel’s campaign nevertheless holds some strategic logic. Even if outright destruction is out of reach, significant disruption can still achieve important objectives. Delaying Iran’s ability to reach weapons-grade enrichment, degrading delivery mechanisms, and eliminating leadership figures raise the cost of continued nuclear advancement. These actions also serve as a deterrent message to Iran and other regional states contemplating similar capabilities. Nevertheless, this approach may have diminishing returns, particularly considering Israel’s opposition to diplomatic alternatives like the JCPOA, which had effectively constrained Iran’s programme. Moreover, Israel’s reliance on force projection may reinforce the belief among regional powers that the only way to ensure deterrence is by pursuing nuclear capabilities of their own.
The international context also shapes the effectiveness of Israel’s efforts. The United States has significantly reinforced its military posture in the region—deploying carrier strike groups, advanced aircraft, and support assets. President Donald Trump has warned Tehran, calling for a ‘real end’ to Iran’s nuclear ambitions and signalling openness to military action. However, absent a broader diplomatic or coalition effort, Israel remains the primary actor on the front lines of this confrontation.
Iran can respond in several ways. Externally, it may lean further on its network of regional proxies despite recent losses suffered by groups like Hamas and Hezbollah. Increased activity by the Houthis—particularly through maritime disruptions in the Persian Gulf—or strikes against targets perceived as aligned with Israel or the United States are also plausible. Internally, the regime may face pressure from factions arguing for an accelerated ‘dash’ toward a nuclear weapon, believing that deterrence is the only effective shield against future attacks. Others may caution against further provocation, fearing direct US involvement. In either case, Israel’s actions have forced Tehran to reconsider both the pace and visibility of its programme. Whether this results in greater concealment, a diplomatic agreement, or escalation remains to be seen.
Israel’s campaign has inflicted substantial setbacks on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and military capabilities. However, technical constraints—particularly the difficulty of destroying deeply buried facilities—underscore the limits of airpower alone. Israel can delay and degrade Iran’s progress, but total dismantlement would likely require broader international cooperation and sustained strategic pressure. Whether these setbacks prove temporary or permanent remains to be seen—but Israel has undeniably reshaped the strategic calculus.
Disclaimer: This is a rapid analysis intended to highlight key emerging issues. Given the fluid nature of events, elements may become outdated and should be viewed as an initial framing, not a definitive assessment.