While COP29 was called the “Finance COP,” emphasising climate finance commitments reaching USD 1.3 trillion, COP30 has now become a “Coming Out Party” for a South-to-South coalition and the inclusion of non-state actors to help mediate the deadlock among traditional powers. The COP30 presidency has also adopted the term “Mutirão”, originally from the Tupi-Guarani language and translated as "Global Mutirão", meaning "collective efforts" as a slogan to promote climate action worldwide. It is also notable that this concept is recognised in other Latin American countries and beyond. In the Turkish village context, it is imece (collective work), for instance, thus not unfamiliar to local communities affected by climate challenges across the globe. “Mutirão” undoubtedly captures the essence of how we should approach climate issues. However, this vision faces significant challenges amidst political pessimism, geopolitical fragmentation, and a widening gap between rhetoric and reality. This is primarily due to great-power politics between China and the US, which is a key underlying dynamic of the troubled climate change regime and, indeed, 'global governance structures' in general (Terhalle and Depledge 2013).
Nevertheless, due to the dispersion of hegemony, new alliances are forming, not along old political borders, but along ecological lines. The “mutirão” ethos, rooted in the Brazilian tradition of cooperative labour, recognises that the climate struggle is too vast for any single hegemon to lead. Instead, it calls for an ecosystem of intersecting initiatives at the local, national, and transnational levels. The inclusion of Indigenous councils, feminist organisations, and youth coalitions marks a decisive shift from technocracy to pluralistic participation. Those who defend the Amazon join with those safeguarding the Congo Basin, united by their common concern for the Earth's ecosystems. In doing so, they embody Latour and Schultz's (2022) concept of an “ecological class,” uniting communities through their mutual reliance on the planet’s living systems. Likewise, “Urban Vectors” such as the C40 Cities network have become unofficial negotiation forums (Sassen, 2010). Mayors from large cities are taking action where national governments are slow, utilising collective purchasing to lower emissions and establish new standards. COP30 is therefore almost a form of transnational and subnational insurgency. Governors, mayors, regional ministers, Indigenous leaders, and young people from diverse backgrounds are there to make their voices heard and push for the implementation of climate action, challenging traditional Westphalian principles of state sovereignty within global governmentality. (Bulkeley et al., 2012). As a result, we can regard COP30 as a developing platform for interplurality rather than a venue for global consensus.
Yet, this interplurality is not without friction as power asymmetries prevail. Indigenous delegates may share platforms with ministers and CEOs, but they still have limited access to decision-making and finance. This is why, on COP30's second day, dozens of Indigenous protesters stormed the COP30 climate summit venue in Belém, clashing with security guards at the entrance as they demanded greater access to negotiations and a stronger voice in forest management. The network and market governance have thus far shaped current strategies to environmental issues, while also establishing transition management and adaptive governance (Evans and Thomas, 2023). The challenge, hence, lies not merely in inviting diverse voices but in redistributing epistemic and material power. Indigenous representatives, such as those from Brazil’s Roraima Council (CIR) have designed adaptation plans that could inform the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA). Their proposals, however, often remain sidelined within a system governed by procedures and the state competition. As Cavanagh and Benjaminsen (2017) observe, the green economy reproduces inequalities by commodifying nature and turning environmental protection into “big business.” This situation risks turning Indigenous lands and knowledge into tools for carbon offsetting instead of empowering them as a means of sovereignty and justice.
Moreover, the digital divide and the growing threat of climate misinformation present new barriers to genuine engagement. COP30’s inclusion of Information Integrity as a thematic focus recognises that disinformation weakens both policy coherence and public trust. Initiatives such as the Global Initiative for Information Integrity on Climate Change aim to address this through governance frameworks, digital accountability, and funding for truth-based communication. Yet, the very actors spreading disinformation, petrostates, corporations, and populist regimes, remain embedded within the COP process itself. The paradox of inclusion, therefore, is that activists must coexist with extractivist and authoritarian forces. The genuine driving force behind COP30 lies, therefore, beyond the negotiation rooms. Civil society, subnational governments, and Indigenous groups have redefined what it means to implement change. From Pará’s deforestation commitments to the Indigenous flotillas organised by Sumaúma and Health and Happiness, COP30’s landscape is characterised by action rather than words. This coalition of implementers illustrates a new form of agency: the ability to act despite stalemate. City leaders also play a role in promoting their city as a diplomatic agent, which makes a significant difference in the unfolding of world politics beyond the traditional Westphalian dimension of state-to-state relations (Acuto, 2013: 852).
Such transnational and subnational insurgency signifies a profound ontological and epistemological shift in climate diplomacy. The traditional view of nation-states as the sole guardians of planetary responsibility is being replaced by a network of agents whose legitimacy is based on outcomes rather than representation. These networks embody the “experimentalist governance” logic identified by Sabel and Zeitlin (2012). The Global Mutirão, the core metaphor of COP30 reflects an ethos of shared effort and moral reciprocity as each participant contributes according to their ability and sense of mutual responsibility. This approach recognises that climate change is not a simple negotiation but a global common, integrating knowledge systems, local ownership, just transition, and ecological solidarities. It also redefines what success entails. Instead of only measuring progress through emission reductions or financial pledges, the Mutirão views it through empowerment, achieved through jobs, education, and cultural renewal, which make sustainability a reality in people’s lives.
However, for this vision to endure, it must surmount structural barriers. Firstly, climate finance needs to be made more accessible. Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement requires developed countries to support developing nations, but implementation has been inadequate. [1] COP30’s debates on the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) highlight the importance of equitable burden-sharing and granting direct access to Indigenous and local groups. Secondly, inclusion must go beyond mere symbolism. Indigenous and community-led adaptation strategies require legal recognition and equitable funding to be effective. Thirdly, the epistemic framework of COP itself must transform, integrating traditional ecological knowledge not as an appendix but as a core element of climate governance. COP30 stands as both a critique and a reinvention of the climate regime.
In contrast to previous COPs marked by elite diplomacy and fossil-funded influence, Belém’s gathering envisions an interplural system anchored in justice and cooperation. It signals a silent dethroning of the 20th-century climate order, which is or should no longer be governed by the G7 or G20 but by networks of “Ecological Creditors,” “Emissions Debtors,” and “Implementation Laboratories.” The Global Mutirão unites these actors not under uniformity, aid, and/or development programmes, but through international solidarity. As Ambassador André Corrêa do Lago affirmed, "I think there is a strong indication that everybody who is here wants to show the world that multilateralism works and that we’re all together to prove that.” [2] The challenge ahead lies in translating this inclusive ethos into binding governance, ensuring that interplurality constitutes the basis for a shared planetary future.
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[1] The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). (2015). Paris Agreement, Article 9.1.
[2] https://cop30.br/en/news-about-cop30/cop30-evening-summary-november-12
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