It lures insects with sweet nectar, but once inside, escape is impossible. Some expert communities work in a similar way. They promise meaning and impact, drawing people in with the hope of shaping a better future. Over time, members adopt the rhythms and rituals of this world, investing years of effort.
The annual COP climate summits are the meeting ground for such a community. They are full of good intentions, yet criticism often feels unwelcome. And like the pitcher plant, these spaces can trap participants in a self-referential knowledge system, limiting their ability to see alternative approaches.
The closing session at COP30 in Belém offered a sobering example. After two weeks of negotiations, the final package felt negligible. The gavel came down on texts that avoided any explicit commitment to phase out fossil fuels, despite calls from more than 80 countries. Instead, the presidency announced voluntary “roadmaps” for fossil fuel transition and deforestation, to be developed outside the formal UN process at a new conference co-hosted by Colombia and the Netherlands.
Belém was notable for what it left out: no binding plans, no clear implementation pathways, and very little money.
What was agreed?
- Fossil fuels: No binding phase-out of coal, oil or gas. The text reaffirmed the COP28 language of “transition away” but deferred real decisions. Major producers resisted citing national sovereignty and development rights. The Arab Group, backed by others from the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC) Group, and Russia, resisted any connection between phasing out fossil fuels and climate change mitigation. A perfected diplomacy of affective solidarity with the Group of 77 and China, the LMDC group, and the Africa Group, framed opposition to phase-out as a defence of self-determination and resistance to European pressure. Yet the cost of delay, in a biopolitical management of climate risk, can be measured in more human lives lost.
- Climate finance: Parties pledged to triple adaptation finance by 2035 to around $120 billion annually, but without clear baselines or enforcement. This joins a growing list of future targets for climate finance, including the COP29 commitments to the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) which set a floor of $300 billion annually by 2035. The Baku-to-Belém Roadmap was adopted as a route toward the aspirational goal of $1.3 trillion per year by 2035, (also proposed at COP29), but again, details are vague.
- Global Goal on Adaptation: The Belém Adaptation Indicators were adopted—59 voluntary metrics to track progress to eleven global adaptation targets, across sectors such as water, food, and health. These were weaker than earlier drafts and came without new finance.
- Loss and Damage Fund: Operationalised with direct-access channels for vulnerable nations (US$5–20 million per year), but pledges remain under $1 billion against estimated needs of $400 billion annually.
- Just Transition Mechanism: Established as part of the Belém Package, prioritising labour rights and Indigenous protections. Yet operational details and funding are postponed.
Outside formal talks, coalitions launched voluntary initiatives such as the Tropical Forests Forever Facility, with $5.5 billion pledged, and sectoral plans like the Belém Health Action Plan and the Belém 4x on sustainable fuels. These voluntary efforts offer hope, and many commentators have been quick to note the positive atmosphere that enabled them, lauding the ‘COP of Truth’, the ‘Cop of Implementation’, and the power of the indigenous concept of ‘mutirão’ to affect collective action. But relying on them as proof of COP success risks false optimism. Admiring the flower next door does not free us from the pitcher plant.
Signs of change?
Despite the disappointments, Belém hinted at a paradigm shift.
For decades, COP debates have focused on allocating responsibility for past emissions and negotiating voluntary pledges for the future, treating climate governance as separate from broader regulation, trade and finance. But this year, discussions on ‘non-market mechanisms and cooperative approaches’ (Article 6.8 of the Paris Agreement) gained traction, including proposals for taxes on high-emission activities like aviation. Such measures would target the wealthy who consume disproportionately.
There was also debate on linking climate goals to trade, with references to the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (a unilateral trade measure). Could similar tools emerge elsewhere, such as an African Union export tax on green minerals to capture the mitigation potential they embody?
If adaptation finance remains elusive, structural changes in trade and taxation could open new revenue streams. Mainstreaming climate into global economic systems may hold more transformative potential than the annual COP spectacle, generating many future worlds of possibility outside the pitcher plant.
Photo: Rapha Wilde via Unsplash