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Germany, Weapons for Ukraine, and Jus ad Vim 2 ;

Germany, Weapons for Ukraine, and "Jus ad Vim"

Defence-in-Depth
Dr Christian Braun

Lecturer in Defence Studies

24 June 2025

The concept of jus ad vim— the just use of force-short-of-war—has become an important topic in just war theory. [1] Embraced by some, rejected by others, this emerging ethical framework seeks to make sense of uses of force that seem markedly different when compared to the large-scale uses of force typically associated with conventional warfare.

DiD Germany, Weapons for Ukraine, and Jus ad Vim

In a new article, published in International Affairs, I apply the frame of jus ad vim to Germany’s ongoing debate about the moral limits of sending weapons to Ukraine.[2]  The article concentrates on the Chancellorship of Olaf Scholz, who recently left office. However, the debate remains highly relevant, as evidenced by the reported openness of the new chancellor, Friedrich Merz, to deliver Taurus cruise missiles if certain conditions have been met.[3]

In this post, I summarise my main argument, which seeks to advance the theoretical debate about jus ad vim and to identify the ethical challenges associated with supplying weapons to Ukraine in support of its war of self-defence against Russian aggression.

Scholz’s Cautious Approach

Chancellor Scholz’s decision-making process regarding Germany’s role in the conflict was primarily driven by a concern about escalating the war, particularly the risk of a nuclear confrontation between NATO and Russia. His stance was grounded in a perceived moral obligation to assist Ukraine, but he repeatedly advocated a careful weighing of the probability of escalation—a principle central to jus ad vim scholarship—before deciding which weapons to provide and when. Scholz’s strategy aligned with what Daniel Brunstetter, a leading jus ad vim advocate, calls the “Rubicon assessment.” This assessment is meant to inform the process of deciding whether to cross the line into full-scale war or to opt for force-short-of-war.

In the article, I demonstrate how Scholz’s policies sought to avoid an escalation to direct war with Russia, which, time and again, required adjustments to previous policy decisions. In particular, early hesitancy to supply lethal aid gradually shifted as the war progressed, reflecting a reassessment of the risks. Step by step, the Scholz government decided to increase quantity and quality of weapons supplied to Ukraine. At the same time, Scholz, until the very end of his chancellorship, declined to supply Taurus cruise missiles, which he considered too risky. This approach, I argue, highlights the dynamic nature of the escalation principle, suggesting that continuous evaluation of the risk of escalation is necessary in situations like Ukraine.

Chancellor Olaf Scholz
Chancellor Olaf Scholz

The Threshold of Escalation

While Scholz’s caution was evident, one question I raise in the article is: when, if at all, should the presumption against escalation be overridden? Brunstetter argues that in some cases, such as in the Balkans in the 1990s, exceptions to the escalation principle might be justified. However, the situation in Ukraine is unique, with significantly higher stakes, particularly due to the threat of nuclear war. Scholz’s careful balancing act reflected the concern about crossing what Jürgen Habermas calls a risk threshold, a point beyond which escalation becomes uncontrollable.[4] Nevertheless, the need to extend this threshold, rather than viewing it as fixed, also appears to be an important consideration. For example, Sir Patrick Sanders, the former Chief of the General Staff, has argued that the West has sometimes overestimated Russia’s reaction to its support for Ukraine.[5]

The Moral Challenge of Force-Short-of-War

There is another important jus ad vim concept that seems to apply to the supply of weapons to Ukraine, namely, Brunstetter’s concept of moral truncated victory. He argues that force-short-of-war cannot achieve the same moral goods as a full war, which might bring about decisive justice. Rather, the best one can hope for is to contain the conflict or create a limited form of order. In the case of Ukraine, this might mean limiting Russia’s territorial gains without achieving full restoration of Ukraine’s sovereignty.

In the article, I argue that Germany's approach aligns with this idea of moral truncated victory. Scholz’s rhetoric, particularly the notion that “Russia must not win, and Ukraine must not lose,” acknowledged that the best achievable outcome in this context may be a containment of Russian aggression, rather than a complete victory. However, this brings its own set of challenges. The more the war drags on without resolution, the more morally problematic the concept of jus ad vim becomes, as it risks leading to a regime of vis perpetua, or perpetual force, —a situation in which limited force becomes a long-term strategy without a clear end.

Jus ad Vim and the Risk of Perpetual Conflict

The risk of vis perpetua is a significant critique of jus ad vim. Christian Enemark has warned that limited force could become a method of ongoing risk management, leading to a situation where the war never truly ends.[6] Scholz’s strategy, while designed to prevent escalation, risked contributing to such a perpetual conflict, where force is continually applied without resolving the underlying issues.

This challenge was compounded by comments from Western officials like former U.S. Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin, who have argued that weakening Russia through the war in Ukraine might reduce future threats to NATO.[7] However, if the West, following Scholz’s framing, continues to send weapons to Ukraine solely to prevent Russia from winning without seeking a long-term solution, it risks turning Ukraine into a proxy conflict—a form of perpetual force aimed at containing Russia. This would echo the concerns about preventive use of force, which is often criticised as being incompatible with just war principles.

The Expiry Date Dilemma

Another concern I identify is what I call the expiry date dilemma of jus ad vim. The question of how long Western nations, including Germany, will continue supporting Ukraine militarily remains uncertain, particularly with potential changes in leadership in countries like the U.S. At the time of writing, a second Trump presidency was still a possibility only; now we are discussing the potential fallout of this dilemma on a daily basis. I point to the problematic nature of the expiry dilemma and how it might affect Ukraine’s war effort and lead to the rewarding of Russian aggression if support dwindles over time.

In conclusion, while Scholz’s approach to supporting Ukraine with weapons is morally grounded in the principles of jus ad vim, it faces serious ethical challenges. These include the risk of moral truncated victory, the potential for a regime of perpetual conflict, and the uncertainty surrounding the long-term sustainability of Western support. The balance between avoiding escalation and seeking a just peace remains a delicate and ongoing moral dilemma.

 
[1] Daniel R. Brunstetter, Just and unjust uses of limited force: a moral argument with contemporary illustrations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021); Jai Galliott, ed., Force short of war in modern conflict: jus ad vim (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2019); Christian Nikolaus Braun, Limited force and the fight for the just war tradition (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2023).

[2] Christian Nikolaus Braun, ‘Weapons for Ukraine as force-short-of-war’, International Affairs 101:1, 2025, pp. 291-308, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiae285.

[3] Laura Pitel, ‘Germany willing to send Taurus missiles to Ukraine, says Friedrich Merz’, Financial Times, 13 Apr. 2025, https://www.ft.com/content/c8c53a95-fbad-440a-bc57-5802e85c5328.

[4] Jürgen Habermas, ‘War and indignation: the West’s red line dilemma’, Reset Dialogues on Civilizations,

6 May 2022, https://www.resetdoc.org/story/jurgen-habermas-war-indignation-west-red-line-dilemma.

[5] George Grylls, ‘Former army head: we must give Ukraine “decisive” weapons to win’, The Times, 21 Aug.

2024, https://www.thetimes.com/uk/politics/article/britain-zelensky-ukraine-war-weapons-m2xv6xgs6.

[6] Christian Enemark, ‘Drones, risk, and perpetual force’, Ethics & International Affairs 28: 3, 2014, pp. 365–381, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0892679414000446.

[7] Julian Borger, ‘Pentagon chief’s Russia remarks show shift in US’s declared aims in Ukraine’, Guardian,

25 April 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/25/russia-weakedend-lloyd-austin-ukraine.

In this story

Christian  Braun

Christian Braun

Lecturer in Defence Studies

Defence-in-Depth

Defence-in-Depth is a research feature series from the Defence Studies Department at King’s College London that analyses defence-related issues.

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