From a scientist’s viewpoint investment is therefore required to investigate a wide range of potential ‘exponentials’ to see which of them might support an ‘invented future’ for military aviation.
It was in this spirit of investigation that the UK government issued contracts for heavy jet bombers in the late 1940s, resulting in the Short Sperrin (which was not put into full scale production) and the Vickers Valiant, Avro Vulcan and Handley Page Victor (all of which were). Although it is questionable whether all three of the V Bomber types needed to be produced, the development and test flying of the four competing designs allowed informed judgements to be made about the risks and potential benefits of each of the candidate platforms.
Such a grand approach is unlikely to be affordable today, nor would Industry have the capacity to deliver four different prototype aircraft in a short period. However, even if such an approach were feasible today, it is unclear whether politicians and project managers would find it acceptable to invest resources in technology demonstration that may not be progressed. From a scientific viewpoint a technology demonstration that fails, because fundamental limitations in the technology are discovered, is a complete success as knowledge about that technology has been materially increased and better informed decisions can be made about it in the future. However, from a project management viewpoint where the aim is to ‘achieve specific project objectives according to the project acceptance criteria’ such an outcome would appear to be a disaster.
The expectation that every project should successfully deliver the project outcomes tends to drive managers to expect that research should behave like a game of golf, where each shot can be expected to travel straight down the fairway, with the measure of success being how far the ball travels. In fact research projects are more like cricket or baseball, where it is accepted that the majority of balls or pitches will not result in any score, but where one hopes that it will not result in dismissal either. The ‘dot’ balls must be regarded not as failure but as part of the overhead involved in building a winning score.
Perhaps the most pithy expression of why a broad range of research activities is required is attributed to Ice Hockey legend Wayne Gretsky who (reportedly) said ‘you miss 100% of the shots that you don’t take’.
Whilst ‘Inventing the Future’ offers scientists and technologists the opportunity to invent the next big thing (or even the one after that) this can be hazardous in a military context. David Jordan, in his conclusion, recognises that there is danger in ‘placing too great an emphasis on these areas at the expense of the items necessary to provide the suite of capabilities to deliver effective air power’. The impact of the enemy having a vote is explored in Arthur C Clark’s short story Superiority and other historical examples exist, where becoming obsessed with a future super weapon may distract from more immediate concerns.
The story concerns a war in a space faring future, where one side has a distinct technological advantage. The Chief of the Research Staff is convinced that new technology will offer a speedy end to the conflict opining What we want are new weapons – weapons totally different from any that have been employed before.
New weapons are developed and show great promise, so all effort is placed on producing them and all offensive action is suspended until they can be made available. However there are considerable delays in fielding the weapons What we did not appreciate was the magnitude of the task we were attempting, and the length of time it would take to get the revolutionary super-weapon into battle.
There are several iterations of new weapons, each more obviously war winning than the last, but each with its own difficulties, during which time the enemy has been busy constructing a multitude of low-tech space ships, with which they attack and win the war as the new weapons never quite work as expected.
Therefore, whilst ‘inventing the future’ gives a great opportunity for technological superiority to be established, there are risks involved and one must be careful not to lose today’s battle whilst preparing for one in a decade’s time.
Mr Tim Jefferis is a Senior Principal Engineer at Defence Science and Technology Laboratory
This piece was responding to the paper 'Invented and Predicted Futures: Britain and the Challenge of Air Defence, written by Dr David Jordan and published by the Freeman Air and Space Institute, King's College London.
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