;

Recalibrating climate leadership at COP30: China's constructive role, Europe's ambition, and the US absence

19 November 2025

International

In COP30, ministers and negotiators marked the 10th anniversary of the Paris Agreement with a mix of cautious celebration and sober recognition that the world remains off track to some extent. Media coverage and civil society interventions circled around the same core themes: an ambition gap, a persistent finance divide, and a shared insistence that multilateral climate action must now deliver concrete benefits for people and planet. All of this unfolded against a distinctive geopolitical backdrop – including the absence of the United States at the federal level – which made the roles of other major players such as China, the EU, the UK, and emerging coalitions even more central.

The COP30 Presidency has framed this as an “Implementation COP”, and week one largely focused on turning past promises into practice. Across the negotiation rooms, plenary halls and side events I followed, one idea recurred: this is a “COP of truth”, where credibility depends less on new announcements and more on honest stocktaking of what is working and what is not. In what follows, I draw on high-level events from 14 to 17 November 2025, together with official updates and media reports, to reflect on the first week’s developments from the vantage point of an observer and policy researcher.

Inside the negotiation room: A “celebration with sobriety”

On 14 November, a high-level ministerial consultation brought together ministers, negotiators and observer constituencies for what was officially framed as a dialogue to mark ten years since the Paris Agreement. Following the session online as an observer, it was clear that the tone moved quickly beyond commemoration. As one EU representative put it, this had to be “a celebration combined with a bit of sobriety” – a formulation that captured the balance most speakers tried to strike between acknowledging real progress and recognising persistent gaps.

From developed countries, the United Kingdom set out an especially clear structure: using the anniversary to (1) celebrate what multilateralism has already delivered, (2) “go further, faster” to close remaining gaps, and (3) “collaborate to build the future” of climate action. Japan, in a similar spirit, underlined the importance of keeping the Paris “ratchet” mechanism alive and described COP30 as a turning point at the start of a decisive decade, particularly for major emitters that have yet to submit more ambitious plans.

Ministers from the Global South ensured that the “sobriety” component remained central. Several developing country representatives described the meeting as a “COP of truth” and called for “naming the elephant in the room”: collectively, the world is still far from the trajectories science deems consistent with 1.5°C. Speakers from groupings such as the Like-Minded Developing Countries and the African Group repeatedly referred to a threefold gap—on ambition, implementation, and means of implementation (especially finance and technology transfer). They stressed that higher mitigation ambition must be accompanied by credible commitments on support, grounded in equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR). The language of “not leaving anyone behind” appeared frequently, and support for vulnerable countries was framed not as charity but as a legal and normative obligation embedded in the climate regime.

Against this backdrop, China’s intervention was particularly notable. Speaking as the largest developing economy, the Chinese representative suggested drawing a clear distinction between the commemorative and stocktaking dimensions of the anniversary: the former, he argued, should rightly be “more optimistic, more positive than pessimistic,” highlighting shared progress and unity; the latter should focus on identifying concrete obstacles to implementation. He proposed four elements to uphold “in the spirit of celebration”: reaffirming multilateralism, fully implementing the Paris Agreement and its parent instruments, reiterating core principles such as equity and CBDR, and strengthening international cooperation.

On the more challenging side of the discussion, China identified two main problems: longstanding deficits in finance and support for developing countries, and emerging “new challenges” such as growing unilateralism and protectionism, which risk undermining trust and cooperation. Without naming specific policies, this clearly reflected wider concerns about climate-related trade measures that may function as de facto barriers. The underlying message was pragmatic: rather than focusing on blame, parties should identify the “missing enablers” – notably finance, technology and trust – and address them collectively through the multilateral system. From an analytical perspective, this positioned China as a constructive voice linking its traditional emphasis on CBDR and development space with a call to strengthen, rather than weaken, multilateral implementation.

The European Union’s intervention illustrated the balancing act many developed countries are attempting. The EU representative agreed that any celebration must remain “balanced” by an honest acknowledgement of unresolved issues. She pointed to concrete achievements over the past decade, including the Katowice Rulebook, the progress towards the $100 billion climate finance goal, and new mechanisms such as the Global Goal on Adaptation and the Loss and Damage Fund. At the same time, she cautioned against “selective recitation” of individual articles or principles of the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement, advocating instead for a focus on outcomes and forward-looking implementation. This can be understood as an effort to avoid reopening entrenched North–South disagreements over historical responsibility, while still recognising that equity concerns remain politically salient. By the end of the session, speakers such as the Moroccan minister were calling for an “explicit affirmation of multilateralism over unilateralism,” a shared recognition of the triple gap (ambition, implementation, finance), and a positive signal that these gaps can be closed through cooperation—an agenda that aligns in important respects with China’s own emphasis on multilateralism and opposition to unilateral measures.

Observer constituencies – including civil society, youth, Indigenous peoples, researchers and business – were invited to speak at the end of the event. Their interventions functioned as a normative reference point. The Women and Gender Constituency stressed that without predictable finance under Article 9.1, gender-responsive and transformative climate action remains out of reach. Youth representatives reiterated that developing countries should not be placed in a position of choosing between development priorities and responding to a crisis they did not cause, and underlined that climate finance is an obligation under the Paris framework, not discretionary aid. Research organisations called for decisions to reflect the latest scientific findings, and business actors highlighted that roadmaps such as the “Baku-to-Belém” finance plan will only be credible if followed by concrete efforts to remove barriers to investment in emerging economies.

Following this discussion from the perspective of a Chinese PhD researcher and observer, what stood out was less confrontation than convergence on some core points: the centrality of multilateralism, the need to address finance and implementation gaps, and the continued relevance of equity and CBDR in structuring expectations of responsibility. The differences lay mainly in emphasis and framing, rather than in outright disagreement about whether these issues matter.

A changing leadership landscape: China steps up, US steps back

Stepping outside the negotiation-room narrative, the wider geopolitical context of COP30’s first week is difficult to ignore. For the first time in the 30-year history of the UN climate talks, the United States – the world’s largest historical emitter – had no official federal delegation on site. The new Trump administration chose not to send high-level representatives to Belém, removing one of the traditional power centres of climate diplomacy from closed-door huddles and high-level plenaries. “The US will not be officially represented at COP30,” a White House official stated, even as the rest of the world gathered in the Amazon. For many veterans of the process, it recalled the dynamics of the late 2010s, but in an even starker form: this time, the US was not slowing negotiations from within, it was largely absent from the formal process.

That absence, however, did not mean a complete US vacuum. In Belém’s corridors, delegations of US governors, mayors, legislators and activists were highly visible, many of them organised through coalitions such as the US Climate Alliance. California Governor Gavin Newsom, for example, emerged as a prominent spokesperson for subnational America, declaring that “while Donald Trump skips the world stage, California is showing up – leading, partnering, and proving what American climate leadership looks like.” Senators and city leaders repeatedly stressed that the federal position “does not represent the American public on climate issues,” and warned that stepping back from multilateral engagement risks creating more space for fossil fuel interests. Commentators and delegates from Europe and the Global South noted the symbolism of the US federal absence, but they also stressed that global cooperation should not stall because one major actor is missing; as one reporter put it, “global unity on climate change is still intact outside of the United States pulling away.”

Against this backdrop, China’s role attracted particular attention. With the United States not present at the federal level, several media outlets described China as “stepping into the limelight as a leader in the fight against global warming.” On the ground, China’s presence at COP30 was highly visible: its national pavilion at the venue entrance showcased electric vehicles, solar technology and other clean-energy applications, and was busy with English-language events that highlighted China’s recent achievements in renewable deployment and green industry.

The shift, however, goes beyond optics. Reports from negotiators indicated that Chinese diplomats were actively engaged in brokering procedural compromises and helping to smooth early adoption of the COP30 agenda. A senior Brazilian negotiator praised China for contributing to rapid agreement on the agenda, noting that in earlier years Beijing might have chosen to stay more in the background unless a core interest was directly involved. Now, as one emerging-economy diplomat put it, “little by little, China is acting as a guarantor of the climate regime,” reflecting both its investments in green sectors and its interest in a stable, predictable multilateral framework.

Public narratives around China’s role during week one were also notably positive. UN climate figures and the Brazilian COP30 leadership highlighted China’s clean-energy leadership, stressing how Chinese innovation and manufacturing capacity – from solar panels to electric buses – are “now allowing other countries to buy low-carbon technology at competitive prices,” as COP30 CEO Ana Toni observed. China is currently the world’s largest producer of solar, wind and batteries, and this industrial weight is clearly reinforcing its climate diplomacy.

Sessions at the China Pavilion repeatedly returned to the language of a “shared future” and mutual benefit. In one event, the vice-president of CATL, a major Chinese battery manufacturer, urged participants to “advance climate cooperation and build a clean, beautiful world together,” explicitly linking Chinese corporate success to a broader global vision. This framing resonated strongly with many developing-country delegates, particularly from Africa, Asia and Latin America, who see China as a partner combining an understanding of development challenges with the provision of concrete solutions, from affordable renewables to infrastructure investment. Compared with traditional donor–recipient narratives, this more partnership-oriented approach was frequently highlighted in side discussions.

There is, of course, debate about the nature and extent of China’s leadership. Some analysts argue that, if China wished to exercise maximal leadership on climate ambition, it could push its national targets further — for example, beyond its commitment to peak emissions before 2030 and reduce carbon output by 7% from that peak by 2035, which some experts consider cautious. Others counter that leadership in the current context is multidimensional: it includes not only headline targets but also the scale of investment in low-carbon technologies and the ability to lower global costs through manufacturing. As Li Shuo of the Asia Society has argued, “the most powerful country isn’t the one with the loudest microphone at COP, but the one actually producing and investing in low-carbon technologies.” On that metric, China’s contribution to bending the cost curve of clean energy is difficult to ignore.

Taken together, week one reinforced a perception that China and the European Union now function as central pillars of climate cooperation, working to sustain the Paris Agreement’s momentum at a time when official US participation is limited. Some observers likened this to a “G2 minus 1” configuration: a loose partnership between Beijing and Brussels helping to stabilise the regime during a period of uncertainty in Washington. The comparison is not exact – the EU and China have distinct interests and approaches – but it captures how closely their roles are now watched.

On the European side, the EU entered COP30 with a combination of ambition and internal constraint. Just prior to the summit, EU ministers agreed a 2040 climate target of a 90% net reduction in emissions from 1990 levels, including the option to meet up to 10% of that target through international carbon credits. This compromise reflected significant internal negotiations among the 27 member states, particularly those with coal-intensive energy systems. In Belém, EU officials were keen to emphasise that the Union remains “the world’s biggest donor of climate finance,” providing €31.7 billion in public climate funds last year, and that it is “staying the course” on its Green Deal objectives despite economic pressures. The European Commission also highlighted initiatives such as a new “Clean Industrial Deal” and a 2035 emissions-cut target of 66–72% below 1990 levels as evidence that Europe continues to see itself at the forefront of climate policy.

At the same time, civil society organisations and many developing-country negotiators took a more critical view of the EU’s position on some finance and equity-related items. A summary by Oil Change International, for example, argued that the EU and some other developed countries were “blocking progress” on proposals for a Just Transition mechanism supported by the G77 and China, which would provide structured support for workers and communities affected by the transition away from fossil fuels. From the perspective of many G77 countries, such a mechanism is a way to operationalise the “just transition” concept at the global level; from the perspective of some developed countries, it raises concerns about new long-term financial commitments.

Similar tensions surfaced around Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement, which states that developed countries “shall provide” financial resources to assist developing countries. In Belém, developing-country negotiators and observer groups called for greater accountability on this provision, including proposals for a dedicated agenda item to track delivery. Some developed countries expressed caution about reopening what they see as “old wounds” in the finance debate, preferring to focus on a forward-looking architecture that includes a larger role for private finance and innovative mechanisms.

Across these discussions, one point of convergence was clear: without adequate and predictable public climate finance, a rapid and fair phaseout of fossil fuels will be difficult to achieve. Campaigners from organisations such as Oil Change International captured this succinctly: “Without public money, there is no fast, fair and funded fossil fuel phaseout.” In response, there is growing pressure on the EU and other OECD economies to increase their contributions and to support reforms – such as using international carbon market revenues or reforming multilateral development banks – that could help mobilise the $1.3 trillion per year in climate finance envisaged for 2035.

Overall, week one painted a nuanced picture. The United States’ federal absence has undoubtedly reshaped expectations, but it has not halted collective efforts. China’s role as a technologically and diplomatically active major developing country has become more visible; the EU continues to push high-level ambition while navigating internal and external constraints; and both are under scrutiny from developing countries and civil society regarding finance and equity. From a Chinese analytical perspective, what stands out is that debates over leadership are increasingly linked to concrete contributions – in finance, technology and implementation – and that strengthening multilateral cooperation remains the only viable path for addressing the climate crisis in a way that is both effective and fair.

Solutions in motion: From pledges to practice

Finally, it’s worth noting that week one wasn’t all about problems; it also showcased solutions being rolled out in real time. Under the COP30 Action Agenda – a series of voluntary initiatives and partnerships – ministers and non-state actors announced a slate of new commitments. A few highlights stand out:

• Global green industrialisation: In a ministerial declaration launched on Nov 14, 29 countries (including Brazil, Germany, South Africa, the UK, Indonesia and others) endorsed the Belém Declaration on Global Green Industrialisation. This framework puts green manufacturing and technology transfer at the heart of development strategy for emerging economies. It commits governments to cooperate on scaling up decarbonised industries – from clean steel to electric vehicles – with an emphasis on South–South cooperation and equitable supply chains. The idea is to enable developing countries to industrialise without following the high-carbon path of the past. Seeing countries of the Global South champion this felt like a meaningful pivot, blending climate ambition with the development and equity lens.

• Clean energy investments: Major utilities in the Utilities for Net Zero Alliance announced an increase in their climate investments to nearly $150 billion per year for clean power and storage, aiming to triple renewable generation capacity by 2030. At the same time, multilateral development banks launched new platforms to finance grid expansion in regions like ASEAN and Latin America. This is significant because inadequate grids and storage are often the choke point for scaling renewables. These initiatives show that some real money is being put on the table to address exactly those bottlenecks.

• Fossil fuel phase-out plans: Several coalitions unveiled blueprints for phasing out fossil fuels in a just way. The Powering Past Coal Alliance presented a plan to support coal-dependent countries in crafting transition strategies with financing and technical help. The Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance (BOGA), led by countries like Costa Rica and Denmark, proposed a mechanism for managing the decline of oil/gas production, including dialogues with major producers and “illustrative pathways” to wind down extraction in line with 1.5ºC. While these are voluntary efforts, they create political pressure and learning opportunities. Notably, new data was shared indicating that since 2021, some countries have cut public financing for fossil projects by 75%, redirecting billions into clean energy – a trend that aligns with a broader global shift of capital (2023 is projected to see $2.2 trillion invested in clean energy worldwide, roughly double the investment in fossil fuels). The momentum to “build a global roadmap to overcome dependence on fossil fuels” is visibly growing, even if consensus on wording is tricky in the formal text.

All these developments underscore a hopeful undercurrent: even as negotiations slog through text and brackets, the real-world transition is picking up speed. As the UN Secretary-General António Guterres declared at the start of COP30, “we have never been better equipped to fight back” against climate change – clean technology is advancing, and the economics are finally tilting in our favor. The sticking point, Guterres said, is “political courage”. And that, ultimately, is what week one of COP30 has been about: mustering the courage (and solidarity) to use our tools and meet our promises.

Looking ahead: Engaged solidarity to bridge the gaps

Reflecting on the whirlwind of COP30’s first week, I am struck by an overarching theme: engaged solidarity. Unlike some past climate conferences that were marred by finger-pointing and inertia, the tone in Belém – both inside the negotiations and in the broader media discourse – has been one of constructive, if critical, engagement. There is a palpable sense that all hands are on deck – from Indigenous activists blocking a gate to ministers hashing out text until midnight – and that no one wants to see this COP fail. The world faces sobering truths (as Guterres said, “we have failed to stay below 1.5°C…this is a moral failure”), but there is also a refusal to sink into despair. “The 1.5°C limit is a red line for humanity. It must be kept within reach,” Guterres insisted, and “scientists tell us this is still possible.” That mix of realism and resolve captures the spirit of COP30’s debates so far.

Key countries and blocs are playing their parts in this unfolding story. China has presented itself as a bridge-builder and techno-enabler, showcasing how solutions can confer diplomatic leadership. The European Union has doubled down on being the ambition driver – trying to “keep 1.5 alive” with new targets and urging others to follow – even as it grapples with living up to expectations on finance and equity. The United Kingdom, no longer in the EU but very much aligned with it on climate, has embraced a narrative of optimistic leadership, reminding everyone of how far we’ve come in 10 years and urging unity for the road ahead. And the United States, in an odd twist, is a story of two Americas: the official retreat of the federal government versus the on-the-ground presence of Americans who refuse to give up global engagement. One cannot ignore the shadow that US non-participation casts – as one Reuters analysis noted, the will of major economies to keep fighting climate change is being tested in the face of US pullback. But rather than derailing the talks, this test seems to be galvanising others to forge ahead and maybe even inspiring new alliances (witness the Beijing-Brussels partnership stepping up).

Looking forward to week two, the hardest bargaining is yet to come. Issues of finance – especially how to realistically mobilise that promised $100+bn per year scaling to $300bn and up to $1.3tn by 2035 – will require compromise and creativity. The developing world’s message to the rich world has been respectfully firm: deliver on your promises so we can deliver on ours. There is talk of innovative funding (special drawing rights, debt swaps, global taxes) that could feature in a COP30 decision. Similarly, on fossil fuels, the exact wording might be finessed (whether it’s “phase-out” or “transition away” or “unabated” qualifiers), but there is intense pressure to not leave Belém without advancing the goalpost set in Dubai. The human element – equity, justice, leaving no one behind – will be the moral compass guiding those technical arguments. I recall one line from a Tanzania trade union representative (TANGO) during the observer session: “There are billions of people outside this room who do not have the luxury to look away…They are just hoping not to get trampled.” It’s a vivid reminder that what’s decided here matters far beyond the conference walls.

In my capacity as an observer and researcher, I feel a cautious optimism. COP30’s first week has shown that countries are still capable of finding common ground – whether in celebrating a decade of imperfect but real progress, or in acknowledging the work ahead with candor. The ground-level solidarity – from youth activists to policy wonks – has created an atmosphere of shared purpose. There’s a Brazilian Portuguese word that I learned here, “mutirão”, which means a collective effort where everyone pitches in to achieve something together. In many ways, COP30 so far has embodied mutirão: it’s messy, it’s passionate, and it requires everyone’s labor, but it’s moving things forward.

As week two begins, ministers and even some heads of state will take the stage, trying to hammer out a credible “course correction” for the next phase of climate action. They would do well to carry the spirit of Belém’s first week with them: a spirit of engaged solidarity, truth-telling with hope, and solidarity with those most in need. The Paris Agreement’s anniversary is not just a time to reminisce – it’s a time to recommit ourselves to its goals with the humility earned by a decade of learning. If COP30 can deliver that recommitment – through both words and deeds – then the “COP of Truth” may also become remembered as the COP of renewed trust and resolve. And that, in a world of uncertainty, would be a milestone worth celebrating.