The Integrated Review as Strategy

The differences between good governments and poor governments are many but one characteristic of good governments is they have a strategic plan and manage events within the plan. A poor government just manages events. A strategic plan, though, requires careful planning and thought and the integrated review is a good example of a government at least trying to do that.

As Australia’s foreign minister, one of my first acts was to commission Australia’s first ever White Paper on foreign policy. Satisfied as I may have been with this exercise – and there have been two subsequent foreign policy White Papers – it did not give sufficient weight to other related aspects of Australia’s international engagement. It did not incorporate a broad security strategy by engaging both the Department of Defence and the intelligence community. Nor did it incorporate the Australian aid program.

It also has had the advantage of getting each of the relevant departments and agencies to think through what their broad strategic objectives are. As with the Australian White Paper, part of the strength of an exercise like this is the impact it has on the internal focus of government departments and agencies.

Where the Integrated Review has succeeded is not just in developing a medium-term plan for the UK’s international engagement but in doing so has incorporated most of the strands of that international engagement. It identifies international trends, it spells out where the UK has specific strengths and leading capacity and it outlines a plan for implementing a strategy for the future.

The IR makes several perceptive observations. The most notable is that the UK and its allies must move from the Cold War mentality of defending a status quo to understanding the new and shifting geopolitical power structures and trying to shape the international order taking those shifting structures into account. To quote the document:

Geopolitical and geoeconomic shifts: such as China’s increasing power and assertiveness internationally, the growing importance of the Indo-Pacific to global prosperity and security, and the emergence of new markets and growth of the global middle class.

Yet for the past 40 years, British diplomacy has overwhelmingly focused on Europe. There have been exceptions, not least the participation by the Blair government in Iraq and Afghanistan. But for the FCO and other major government departments, Europe has been the principal preoccupation of policy.

Outside of Europe, there had been an expectation that the UK would play a bigger role than it has. After all, Britain is the fifth biggest economy in the world, is a nuclear weapons state, is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and has one of the most versatile and effective defence forces in the world. The UK is also a country with very substantial soft power born out of its history, it’s economy, its research excellence and its media and arts.

If the UK is to play a more significant role in shaping the international order, then the UK needs to be a global activist. That means it needs to be prepared to deploy its various diplomatic, economic and military assets globally not just regionally.

Unsurprisingly, the integrated review emphasises that the Indo Pacific region is the growing region of the world economically and politically. It is also a region struggling with the consequences of China’s increasing political, military and economic power. Indeed, outside of Europe, most foreign policy analysts would see the rise of China is the single most important geopolitical issue in the world today. If the UK wants to contribute to restructuring and consolidating a revised international order, it needs to be a significant player in the Indo Pacific region.

To do that the UK should take advantage of the footprints it already has in the region and try to find ways of expanding its role and influence.

Looked at

Because the UK is perceived to be remote from the region, its influence is limited. It is no longer integrated into the mainstream architecture of the region. The UK is not a member of the East Asia Summit, it is not an ASEAN dialogue partner, it is not a member of the ASEAN regional forum, it is not a member of APEC and so the list goes on. Yet the UK is seen as one of the great champions of liberal democracy and an upholder of the rule of law.

It can only assume a significant role in the Indo Pacific gradually. It must begin by rebuilding its equities in the region and strengthening those diplomatic and economic investments it already has.

The UK does have a sound foundation in the Indo Pacific. It’s historic legacy as an imperial power may carry the incubus of paternal colonialism but it also has benefits. The English language is widely used throughout the region, British designed institutions play an important role in the constitutions of countries as diverse as Australia and India, the common-law legal system is entrenched in parts of the region and, importantly, there is a residual respect for the UK and its own institutions.

In addition, the UK has very specific equities: it is a member of the Five Power Defence Arrangements with Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia and this is an institution which could be upgraded if the UK were prepared to invest more energy and resources in it. Furthermore, the UK has a very clear legal obligation to Hong Kong through the treaty level Joint Declaration with China.

Given this foundation of equities in the Indo Pacific region and the Integrated Review’s ambition for the UK to play an active role in crafting the international order, the UK will have to invest further in the region. It is not enough however for the UK simply to say that it will trade more with the region.

That is not to say trade and investment are not important. They are. What is more, trade and investment agreements say a lot more about a relationship than just the dollars and cents of trade. They do have geopolitical significance. The UK is already negotiating free trade agreements with countries in the Indo-Pacific region. With Australia and New Zealand, that should be fairly straightforward. With Japan and South Korea, existing EU agreements have already been transferred with slight modifications into bilateral UK agreements. The government has wisely and ambitiously propose joining the comprehensive and progressive transpacific partnership. All members of that partnership are in principle happy for the UK to join. The question will be on my terms. Then there is India. The British government will find it very difficult to conclude a free trade agreement with a country so politically fragmented, ethnically diverse and traditionally protectionist as India.

To engage more heavily in the Indo Pacific region will require more than trade agreements. It will require engagement with the region’s various and diverse institutions.

Looked at from London, becoming an ASEAN regional partner doesn’t sound very important. It is. ASEAN is at the heart of East Asia diplomatic architecture and the UK will not be able to participate in that architecture if it is not, as a first step an ASEAN dialogue partner. Through that process it will become a member of the ASEAN regional forum. If the UK can achieve that, it will be able to exercise more credible influence in the region because it will be seen to be part of its architecture.

If the UK wishes to participate more fully in the broader security arrangements of the region, it will have to be prepared to deploy assets to the Indo Pacific. Amongst the assets that should be deployed is technology and intelligence. In those fields, the UK has particular strengths and using its technology and sharing intelligence with trusted partners will make a solid contribution to regional stability. This component of security engagement is frequently overlooked but within the halls of foreign and defence ministries there is a rich understanding of the benefits a country like the UK – which has such sophisticated and forward leaning intelligence capabilities – can bring to relationships.

More conventionally, the Indo Pacific nations would expect to see an enhanced UK military presence in the region. It is understood there are serious financial limitations to what the UK can do but serious contributions to Five Power Defence Arrangements exercises as well as bilateral naval exercises with the armed forces of liberal democratic countries such as India, Australia and Japan would help to enhance the standing at the UK in the region.

Once the UK has re-established itself as a serious contributor to the Indo Pacific region, then it can contemplate strengthening relations between those liberal democracies in the region which are working to balance the power of a growing and more assertive China. For example, as the Quad arrangements between Japan, India, Australia and the United States continue to develop, the UK could become involved in Quad military exercises. Membership of the Quad by the UK would probably be seen as impractical but nevertheless contributing to the Quad and more broadly contributing to their collaboration between liberal democracies in the Indo Pacific region will ensure that the UK makes a serious contribution to the stability of the region.

There will be those who argue that it’s not the responsibility of the UK. It’s responsibility is to deal with the transatlantic relationships and in particular to deter adventurism by Russia.

There is no doubt that the UK needs to do those things. But if it wants to be taken seriously as a country which is helping to re-shape disrupted global governance and to contribute to global security and stability – particularly as it is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council – then the UK needs to be active in the fast growing and increasingly important in the Pacific region.

If the UK is not prepared to contribute to this task, then who is? There is no doubting China’s enthusiasm to restructure the global order. The internal divisions within the United States have weakened it’s authority globally. The European Union struggles to gain policy consensus amongst 27 disperate countries and frequently is reduced to the lowest common denominator on foreign policy. The UK has a roll it can play in helping to lead liberal democratic societies in meeting the challenge particularly of a growing China.

As the Integrated Review states:

China’s increasing power and international assertiveness is likely to be the most significant geopolitical factor of the 2020s. The scale and reach of China’s economy, size of its population, technological advancement and increasing ambition to project its influence on the global stage, for example through the Belt and Road Initiative, will have profound implications worldwide. Open, trading economies like the UK will need to engage with China and remain open to Chinese trade and investment, but they must also protect themselves against practices that have an adverse effect on prosperity and security. Cooperation with China will also be vital in tackling transnational challenges, particularly climate change and biodiversity loss.

For the UK that means it needs to continue to engage with China.

and this would in many respects lead to a new Cold War. As the UK engages with China it must make it clear to China the nature of that engagement. Constructive trade relations, diplomatic engagement, collaboration over common issues such as climate change and even international terrorism need to proceed. At the same time, the UK needs to protect its interests. That means pushing back against cyber attacks from China, rejecting any interference by China in political processes in the UK, protecting British companies from theft of intellectual property and guarding critical national infrastructure. The UK also has a responsibility to uphold the terms of the joint declaration on Hong Kong and to make it clear to China that all countries are expected to adhere to international norms on human rights and to respect the sovereignty of other nations as defined by international law.

Some commentators have said the British government ‘wants to have his cake and eat it’ on China. That is unfair.

and stick to its principles and the outline of the relationship.

The integrated review acknowledges this. It’s an aspirational document and it will be interesting to see how the FCDO, the Ministry of defence and other departments and agencies measure up now that the government has directed them to change the emphasis of Britain’s global engagement.

Alexander Downer is Executive Chair of the International School for Government at King’s College London. From 2014 to 2018, Mr Downer was Australian High Commissioner to the UK. Prior to this, he was Australia’s longest-serving Minister for Foreign Affairs, a role he held from 1996 to 2007. Mr Downer also served as Opposition Leader and leader of the Australian Liberal Party from 1994 to 1995 and was Member of the Australian Parliament for Mayo for over 20 years. In addition to a range of other political and diplomatic roles, he was Executive Director of the Australian Chamber of Commerce and the United Nations Secretary General’s Special Adviser on Cyprus, in which he worked on peace talks between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. He is currently Chairman of the UK think tank Policy Exchange and a trustee of the International Crisis Group.

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