UK IAMD during the Cold War
Like its allies, the UK was prompted by the escalating tensions with the Soviet Union during the Cold War to invest in air and missile defence as technology advanced. It first invested in surface-to-air missile systems, notably Thunderbird and later Bloodhound missiles, in the 1950s and 1960s. Both systems were designed to counter the threat from Soviet bombers and, later, ballistic missiles. Thunderbird entered service in 1959 with the Royal Artillery following a proposal by English Electric to develop a ground-based air defence missile. Bristol developed Bloodhound simultaneously, and it came into service with the Royal Air Force in 1958. Once the RAF transferred its strategic nuclear deterrent role to the Royal Navy in the late 1960s, all UK-based Bloodhound systems were either withdrawn or redeployed to RAF Germany.
In the 1960s, the UK considered focusing its defensive efforts on protecting mainland nuclear bases vital to its deterrent capability. These included 9 ‘Class 1’ airfields, 16 Thor IRBM sites, and 7 US airbases. At the same time, the UK agreed to host a Ballistic Missile Early Warning System at Fylingdales, gaining access to early warning information from the US-North American Air Defence network in return for siting a radar on UK soil. The initial agreement was signed in 1960, and the site was later rebuilt with new technology between 1989 and 1992.
During this period, much of the UK’s focus was on coordinating with and supporting the US. This reflected its belief in a ‘special relationship’ and an implicit acknowledgement that, given its relatively limited defence budget, it relied on the US nuclear umbrella and its own deterrent—since deterrence was seen as more credible than active defence. The RAF has always played a key role in the country’s defence from air attacks, given that it was formed because of the demand to bolster home defence against air raids in the First World War. Fighter aircraft have long been used to intercept and destroy enemy bombers threatening Britain and its territories. Bomber aircraft were, until 1969, used to provide the strategic nuclear deterrent and maintained a tactical nuclear capability until the late 1990s. They have also been used—or positioned—to conduct offensive counter-air missions, striking targets to prevent or pre-empt enemy attacks.
Following the large early SAMs, Thunderbird and Bloodhound, described above, the RAF Regiment brought into service the Tigercat, the first land-based fully air portable short-range air defence (SHORAD) missile system, in 1967. This ‘put the [RAF] Regiment into a world lead in operational doctrine and tactics as well as engineering and logistics for a SHORAD missile system’. It was soon bypassed by the more technically advanced Rapier, which came into service with the RAF Regiment in 1974. This ‘was seen … to be moving out of the equivalent of biplanes to jets’. Rapier was notably employed to protect British forces from air attack in the 1982 Falklands War.
UK IAMD since the Cold War
The UK government conducted a Ballistic Missile Defence review in 1996, during which a Fundamental Issues Study gave Professor Neville Brown a remit to independently assess the approach Britain should adopt to BMD. The incoming Labour government, in its 1998 Strategic Defence Review, concluded that there was no need to procure a new land-based medium or long-range defence missile given the lack of a ballistic missile threat to the UK. This included a loose caveat that the option should remain open should the threat change. The post 9/11 SDR New Chapter did not consider BMD, possibly in light of a review in 2002 by the government estimating that a national defence system for the UK might cost between £5 billion and £10 billion.
During this period—and since—the UK invested little in missile defence, viewing the threat to the mainland as relatively low due to its north-western location in Europe and its reliance on the US-UK relationship as a form of strategic insurance should the geopolitical landscape shift. This underpinned the agreement in 2003 to upgrade the Fylingdales BMEWS site to allow it to be used as part of the US Missile Defence programme. This echoed much earlier UK policy: the Defence Review of 1960 said that, while important, air defence of the UK was difficult. It appeared ‘to be a particularly suitable one in which to be largely dependent on America’. The UK’s focus on nuclear deterrence in the Cold War was a product of the strategic partnership with the US and the fact that the UK’s conventional force was limited in size compared to the US.
RAF crews have continued to provide a Quick Reaction Force to protect UK airspace—and that of the Falkland Islands—with the Tornado F3 until the Typhoon replaced it in the early 2010s. All elements of the RAF, from Command and Control and Airborne Early Warning (AEW) to kinetic attacks, including SEAD/DEAD (Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defences), contribute to UK IAMD. However, the force is stretched: the UK is purchasing only three AEW E-7 Wedgetails, weapons stockpiles are limited, and their combat aircraft cannot tackle ballistic missiles with their current capabilities.
Regarding Ground Based Air Defence capability, in 2004, the review ‘Delivering Security in a Changing World’ announced a reduction in the number of Rapier units and the transfer of the remaining 24 from the RAF to the Army. Recently, Sky Sabre, capable of intercepting cruise missiles, replaced Rapier as the British Army’s Surface-to-Air Missile system. However, they are limited in number, and with systems sometimes deployed forward in support of NATO nations and the Falkland Islands, the capability is insufficient to protect the UK and deployed UK forces. The government have now committed to increasing that number to nine.
From the maritime perspective, the Type 45 provides the primary air defence capability with its Sea Viper anti-air missile system and Aster surface-to-air missiles. This will be augmented by Sea Ceptor and upgrades, giving it a medium-range anti-ballistic missile capability by the decade's end. Sea Ceptor, developed from the air-launched ASRAAM, was designed to replace the Navy’s Cold War-era Sea Wolf missile, which entered service in 1979 and was used during the Falklands War. A recent RUSI paper calls the Navy’s ORBAT a ‘robust maritime air defence capability’. However, while the Type 45s are highly capable, their limited number—just six, despite an original requirement for twelve—constrains their ability to protect the full range of potential targets both on UK territory and during deployments.
The National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 outlined the evolving threat to the UK from ballistic missiles. It committed to invest in a ground-based BMD radar to ‘enhance the coverage and effectiveness of the NATO BMD system’. Yet this remained an aspiration in the 2023 Defence Command Paper Refresh, referencing ‘our voluntary commitment to contribute a UK BMD Radar to enhance the protection of NATO’ in a small section which offered the lukewarm commitment to ‘step up our efforts’ to deliver an IAMD approach. Even the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and subsequent war, with air and missile defence a vital capability for the survival of Ukraine against that aggression, were not enough to stir the government beyond a stance that was lukewarm at best. The promised ground-based BMD radar was not mentioned in a recent update from MOD Minister Lord Coaker.
Up until the announcement by the new Labour government in July 2024—just a fortnight after the General Election—that they would be conducting a Strategic Defence Review, concerted interest and investment in IAMD has been in short supply. As one military participant in the Royal United Services Institute’s 2024 IAMD Conference commented: ‘We are in an endless state of aspiration’. Whether that will change depends partly on the UK defence’s ability to communicate strategically and coherently about the importance of IAMD in deterring Russia and in the event of a deterrence failure. NATO countries more proximate to the Russian border are demonstrating serious intent, purchasing systems to bolster their defences. Yet, although geography has some relevance, the UK is still vulnerable to attack. As Watling and Kaushal wrote: ‘under current plans, the UK will have no ground-based BMD or counter-hypersonic capability, creating a capability gap which will need to be addressed as part of a wider IAMD strategy’.
Recent debates about Israel’s Iron Dome approach to defence have been erroneously translated to the UK context. This is where geography and differences between Israel and the UK are relevant. The comments sprang from the 14 April 2024 Iranian attack on Israel consisting of over 220 suicide UAVs and cruise missiles and more than 110 ballistic missiles. Almost all the missiles were shot down by the Iron Dome system, with around five landing outside Israel’s core defended zone. Politicians—including Penny Mordaunt, James Heappey, and Tobias Ellwood—called for an Iron Dome-style system for the UK. This missed the point that the Iron Dome is designed to protect densely located centres in a small geographical area (Israel, from a short-range threat. The UK’s CNI and major population hubs are widely spread around the country, and providing such an ‘umbrella’ over all would be the wrong solution in the context of the threat.
In Ukraine, we have witnessed remarkable achievements in the face of sustained Russian missile bombardment. The Ukrainians have integrated GBAD, residual and non-standard sensors—including a network of civilians providing information on incoming attacks—creating a remarkably resilient and effective integrated air defence system. These have included ‘mobile fire groups’: air defence units equipped with anti-aircraft guns, man-portable air defence systems, heavy machine guns, and other novel approaches. These defences have successfully challenged Russia’s air forces for extended periods. The threat landscape has also expanded to include one-way attack drones and loitering munitions, in part because neither side has gained air superiority.
Since the change of government, there have been several relevant developments. These include the Prime Minister’s Trinity House security agreement with Germany—which outlines plans for cooperation on missile defence—the DIAMOND initiative, aimed at connecting European capabilities into a more integrated system, and the European Sky Shield Initiative, which the UK has signed a letter of intent to join. However, recent crises within NATO, most obviously the temporary suspension of US military aid to Ukraine, demonstrate the increasing need for European nations to strengthen their collective defence through both deterrence and protection. At the same time, collaborative efforts across Europe—and within the UK specifically—risk being diverted by the pressing demands for increased support for Ukraine.
To Follow…
The assumptions underpinning previous UK capability decisions, as outlined above, no longer hold. The threat from Russia—alongside an increasingly Indo-Pacific-focused US—means that the UK and its European allies can no longer rely on rhetoric alone when it comes to air defence. Instead, firm financial and policy commitments are essential. Russia has demonstrated, in the most destructive terms, its willingness to use strikes against Critical National Infrastructure as part of its aggression. The next and last viewpoint in this series will consider the role of communication in educating politicians, the media, and the public about the importance of air and missile defence.