NATO IAMD from the Cold War to the Present Day
Following the end of the Second World War, the emerging Cold War ushered in a new era of air and missile defence, and technical developments continued to extend the reach and capabilities of both aircraft and missiles.
In the mid-1950s, NATO document MC 48 gave political approval for planning to defend NATO nations using nuclear weapons. MC 48/1, approved the following year (1955), included calls ‘for additional priority improvements such as the provision of adequate early warning, modern alert systems and air defence.’ At the time, it was considered feasible that technology would develop sufficiently so that ballistic missiles could be detected, intercepted, and engaged.
As technology advanced, it became increasingly evident that effective defence against a nuclear attack would require highly sophisticated missile defence capabilities. Consequently, a broad consensus emerged—formally codified in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty—that national survival in the face of a large-scale and technologically advanced nuclear or ballistic missile threat could only be assured through the threat of reciprocal retaliation: MAD. The ABM Treaty thus institutionalised not only strategic stability but also the principle of mutually assured vulnerability.
Throughout this period and into the 1980s, the United States maintained its focus on strategic offensive capabilities, with nuclear weapons remaining the cornerstone of deterrence against the Soviet Union. It should be noted that Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) and IAMD are linked but separate in NATO doctrine. IAMD includes ‘all objects assessed to be capable to put the Alliance at risk from the air … ranging from small, low- and slow-flying UASs to all types of cruise and ballistic missiles’. BMD is thus a subset of IAMD, traditionally viewed—until recently—primarily in the context of nuclear deterrence.
Meanwhile, Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (TBMD) became a higher priority in Europe with the Soviet Union’s early 1980s development of new short-range ballistic missiles as well as the 5000km range intermediate SS-20, which had a greater range, carried more payload and were more accurate than their predecessors:
These systems meant that Europe faced a more numerous, and shorter-notice, nuclear threat than did the United States, and also that there was a significant ballistic element to the non-nuclear air threat. Moreover, not being ‘strategic’ weapons, defence against them was not prohibited by the ABM Treaty.
Some NATO European nations judged the US’s Patriot system the best option for addressing that threat.
Then, the 1991 Gulf War elevated the importance to the US of TBMD with Iraq’s use of Scud missiles against Israel. The deployment of Patriot squadrons from the Netherlands to Southeast Turkey under Article 4 of the NATO Treaty supporting Operation DESERT SHIELD demonstrated the training and readiness inculcated in the Cold War era. They deployed nearly 4000 km from their original locations in Western Europe and were at ‘battle stations’ within 5 days of the initial alert. However, the loss of 28 soldiers due to a software error with Patriot, focused American minds on additional investment to avoid blue-on-blue casualties in future theatres. In 1993, the US gave the ‘lion’s share’ of the missile defence budget to further develop land and maritime-based theatre air defence systems.
The post-Cold War era of ‘expeditionary operations’ drove an increased focus among NATO nations on TBMD and Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD). In concert, attention was thus diverted from strategic missile defence due to the dynamics of the period as relations with Russia thawed somewhat, meaning the nuclear threat receded—and with it, the proliferation of Russian missiles.
From NATO’s perspective, the early post-Cold War period of the 1990s placed limited emphasis on air and missile defence in Europe. The perceived threat was minimal, and the Alliance’s primary focus was on enlargement and integrating new members. In 1999, NATO signed the first contract with industry to implement the Air Command and Control System (ACCS) to provide a unified and integrated air command and control structure.
Later, in December 2001, the US formally notified its intention to withdraw from the ABM Treaty to pursue research and development into future missile defence technologies. The focus then was on non-Russian missile capabilities with the proliferation of missiles, potentially with the ability to carry WMD, beyond the original Cold War protagonists. In the post-9/11 climate, the US government had designated an ‘axis of evil’ (Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Libya), and the acquisition of increasingly capable missiles amongst those nations was of most concern. The US Missile Defence development programme would have breached the Treaty in several ways and sought to protect the whole territory of the US. Since then, of course, the number of nations that have the resources to build or buy ballistic missiles has increased, as have nations and non-state actors with access to a variety of other attack systems such as drones—as seen in Red Sea engagements and the war in Ukraine.
Writing in 2009, Micheal Codner assessed that although NATO had debated air and missile defence in the post-Cold War climate, ‘any real progress will … be dependent on the emergence of a vivid and direct threat in the view of European nations who have not generally shown any real commitment in substance to missile defence’. In 2010, NATO published its new Strategic Concept, which notably referenced Russia as a Euro-Atlantic ‘partner’. In the context of other non-Russian threats, however, it committed to developing BMD capability as a ‘core element of our collective defence’, declaring an interim capability. As one defence analyst commented: ‘This marked the culmination of more than a decade of cautious, incremental development of a NATO-wide policy towards Ballistic Missile Defence’.
However, during this period, NATO’s investment in GBAD and Air C2 declined dramatically, especially relative to the expansion it was undergoing in membership and geographical size, with C2 nodes of NATO’s Integrated Air Defence System (NATINADS) rapidly dismantled. NATO’s Air Command saw its number of Combined Air Operations Centres (CAOCs) reduce from nine to two. A recent paper quoted NATO officials as having calculated that the alliance ‘currently has fewer than 5 per cent of the air defence capabilities necessary to protect central and eastern Europe against a full-scale attack’.
The Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 seemed to provide ‘the vivid and direct threat’ Codner referenced. Still, progress has been mixed since then, with different levels of commitment across the NATO community. Geography has understandably played its part as those countries closest to and perceiving the highest level of threat, such as Poland, have invested substantially in IAMD.
At the Washington Summit in July 2024—the most recent meeting of NATO Heads of State and Government—the ongoing war in Ukraine was the focus, with the subsequent Declaration stating that ‘Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has shattered peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and gravely undermined global security. Russia remains the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security’. The Declaration singled out the importance of further investment in IAMD but still echoed the sentiment of the previous summit in Vilnius:
We are resolved to deter and defend against all air and missile threats by enhancing our Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD), based on a 360-degree approach. We have updated NATO’s IAMD Policy and will continue to increase our readiness, responsiveness, and integration through various initiatives, such as the implementation of the IAMD Rotational Model across the Euro-Atlantic area with an initial focus on the Eastern Flank. Allies remain committed to enhancing the effectiveness of IAMD and taking all steps to respond to the security environment. We are pleased to declare NATO Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) Enhanced Operational Capability.
As mentioned above, some nations have made explicit commitments to spend more on IAMD in the face of the Russian threat. Additionally, the Iranian attacks on Israel using cruise and ballistic missiles, along with drones, have further focused minds within NATO on the escalating threat as the post-Cold War peace dividend fades into history. That said, NATO’s post-Cold War history has often been marked by strong rhetoric unaccompanied by tangible investments in hard capability. In February 2025, NATO released a public summary of its IAMD Policy which stated that ‘Russia is the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security’. Time will tell whether the changing nature of the US-Europe relationship will catalyse further commitment beyond that spurred by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
To Follow…
The UK has, understandably, mirrored the journey of NATO to some extent since the Cold War. As the next viewpoint in this series will explore, the UK’s long interconnected security and defence relationship with the US has had a marked influence on developments both before and after the end of the Cold War.