The Review and Anglo-American Relations

The Integrated Review (IR), billed as the ‘biggest’ since the end of the Cold War, laid out the government’s vision for the United Kingdom’s (UK) role in the world over the coming decade. Crucially, the IR was an opportunity for Boris Johnson’s government to finally ‘breath…life and substance into “Global Britain”’. Central to this concept was, out of the European Union (EU), the UK would not retreat into isolationism, but instead become an active global player. Nowhere was London keener for this message to be heard than Washington.

Anglo-American Relations in Context

As successive UK governments struggled to deal with the fallout from Brexit, American politicians feared that London would withdraw into a period of insularity. Compounding matters, the impression in Washington was that the UK seemed preoccupied by securing trade deals, instead of formulating a plan to address an increasingly fractured international landscape. This perceived navel-gazing was set against a backdrop of cooling political relations between London and Washington. President Barack Obama devoted less attention to the ‘special relationship’ than his predecessor, George W. Bush, and considered Chancellor Angela Merkel, not Prime Minister David Cameron, as his European partner of choice. More broadly, this shift was also partly driven by Obama’s rebalance from Europe and the Middle East towards the Asia-Pacific region.

Anglo-American leader relations declined more sharply under Donald Trump’s presidency. Despite claiming that UK-US relations were ‘the highest level of special’, Trump and his officials continually disparaged Prime Minister Theresa May and undermined her Brexit policies.  

The political relationship was somewhat rejuvenated after Boris Johnson succeeded May as prime minister. Trump was an enthusiastic supporter of Brexit and respected Johnson for his key role in the campaign. He also believed that both men shared a similar populist outlook, praising Johnson as ‘Britain Trump’. On the other side of the Atlantic, Johnson was fascinated by Trump’s political achievements and had previously even suggested that the president could receive a Nobel Peace Prize. Notwithstanding close personal relations, both partners were at odds over important strategic issues: relations with Russia and China; the Iran nuclear deal; support for international organisations; climate change; and promoting free trade. That said, even under Trump, the core of the relationship – defence, security, and intelligence – continued to flourish. These core components, as a recently retired State Department official told me, make the relationship special: ‘Within the US…national security agencies…there’s a clear understanding that the relationship is…a. special one…Not only because of its history, but also because of its current structure and the way in which we…cooperate with each other, [such as sharing] information. From our point of view, in our special relationships… it starts with the relationship with the UK.’

Early evidence suggests that US President Joe Biden has established good relations with Boris Johnson. Concerns that Johnson’s closeness to Trump, critical remarks about Obama and Hillary Clinton, and support for Brexit would undermine his relationship with Biden have been overstated.

and international institutions. Both leaders enjoyed good atmospherics at their first meeting ahead of the Group of Seven (G7) summit in Cornwall in June 2021. After the meeting, the president acclaimed the ‘special relationship’, stating that it ‘is stronger than ever’. This tone has been welcomed in London, especially as post-Brexit, the ‘special relationship’ has taken on an extra layer of importance. Building on good leader relations, the IR provides a positive blueprint by which to align UK and US strategic priorities and strengthen the Anglo-American relationship.

The Defence of Democracy in a Competitive Landscape

Much of the IR corresponds with the main themes set out in the Biden-Harris administration’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (INSSG). Like its US counterpart, the IR recognises the fragmented and competitive strategic landscape in which the UK must now operate. Critically, the document states: ‘A defence of the status quo is no longer sufficient for the decade ahead’. Instead, the UK must ‘shape the international order of the future by working with others.’ Unlike his predecessor, Biden has highlighted the defence of open societies as a key pillar of his foreign policy agenda and has pledged to hold a Summit for Democracy to combat corruption, challenge authoritarianism, and promote human rights. The UK government has already demonstrated its commitment in this regard by offering Hong Kong residents a route to citizenship and implementing sanctions against human rights abusers and those seeking to undermine democracy.

After four years of Trump’s hyper-nationalism, disdain for the liberal international order, and his advocacy of economic protectionism, the UK should use its G7 presidency to work with the US to develop a collective approach to strengthen democracy, bolster multilateral organisations, shape global norms, and counter authoritarianism. So far, there have been encouraging moves in this direction as Johnson and Biden agreed a new 21^st century Atlantic Charter, updating the 1941 document that outlined the post-war liberal international order. The new charter commits the allies to cooperating on eight issues, including defending democracy, strengthening international institutions, improving cybersecurity and combatting climate change. It is unlikely that the new charter will be as impactful or long-lasting as the version agreed by Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Nevertheless, the key challenge will be ensuring that the charter is more than a symbolic gesture, and that the allies can turn its aspiration into concrete action to tackle 21st century challenges.

China and the Indo-Pacific ‘Tilt’

Core to this mission is developing a pragmatic, but robust approach to dealing with China. Both the IR and INSSG outline a broadly similar outlook to the challenges posed by China, although the former’s language is more muted and nuanced. The IR’s approach is a clear departure in substance and tone from the Cameron administration’s ‘Golden Age’ in Anglo-Chinese relations. On the one hand, the IR notes that the UK must ‘respond to the systemic challenge that [China] poses to our security, prosperity and values’. Of concern is Beijing’s repressive measures in Hong Kong, human rights abuses, and potential pitfalls of becoming too reliant on Chinese technology and digital infrastructure. But, on the other hand, the IR promotes the need to foster strong trade and investment links with China and engage Beijing on climate change. Whilst the UK has adopted a measured approach to relations with China, its decision last year to permit Huawei into its 5G network only later to reverse the decision (in part because of US pressure) illustrates the difficulty of balancing economic and security interests concurrently. Moreover, Beijing has a history of preventing countries from separating out individual strands of its bilateral relationships. It remains to be seen, therefore, whether the UK’s approach can withstand push-back from China or a further deterioration of US-China relations.

Like the INSSG, the IR highlights the Indo-Pacific’s economic and geopolitical significance and, as such, promises to enhance the UK’s economic, diplomatic, and military presence in the region – although from a defence and security viewpoint, the ‘tilt’ is less pronounced than expected. Much of the UK’s engagement will focus on economic and trading opportunities – such as acceding to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and becoming an Association of Southeast Asian Nations Dialogue Partner – and increasing cooperation with the region’s key players. Nevertheless, the IR, and subsequent Defence Command Paper, make clear that

not least demonstrated by the fact that Russia is judged to be ‘the most acute direct threat to the UK’.

Notwithstanding the government’s commitment to the Euro-Atlantic area, questions have been raised about the strategic wisdom of increasing the UK’s defence and security posture in the Indo-Pacific, especially the value of temporarily deploying a carrier strike group, led by HMS Queen Elizabeth, to the region this year. An enhanced UK presence in the Indo- Pacific will only be valuable to the US if it can be maintained on a consistent basis. A more prudent strategy, according to former Chief of the Defence Staff, General David Richards, is for the UK to focus on the Euro-Atlantic region, which will ‘free... up US assets to…do their stuff on our behalf in the Indo-Pacific. To my way of thinking, that is a more coherent strategy that plays to our strengths… It is still militarily, materially useful to the Americans.’

From Shared Priorities to Points of Friction: Climate Change and Brexit

Another shared priority between the UK and US is combatting climate change. Despite early inaction on the issue, the IR has reaffirmed the Johnson administration’s climate credentials by emphasising that ‘tackling climate change and biodiversity loss [is the UK’s] number one international priority.’ Biden, for his part, has placed climate change at the forefront of his international agenda, having already re-joinied the Paris Climate Accord and hosted a Leaders Summit on climate change. Building on the commitments made at the G7 summit, the UK’s presidency of COP26 affords London an opportunity to work closely with Washington to shape the international climate change agenda and develop an ambitious programme for success.

One key area where the IR falls short is the lack of detail on foreign and security cooperation with the EU. Despite the conclusion of a trade deal in late 2020, relations between the UK and EU are still fractious and several issues remain unresolved. Of particular note is the impact of Brexit and the implementation of the Northern Ireland protocol on the Province’s delicate political balance. The situation has been exacerbated by the UK’s decision to unilaterally override elements of the UK-EU agreement, and its threat to invoke Article 16 of the protocol. The UK’s relationship with the EU and, more broadly, the issue of Brexit has complicated Anglo-American relations.

and argued that with the UK outside of the EU, US interests on the Continent have been ‘diminished’.

Just as tension over Northern Ireland soured relations between Prime Minister John Major and President Bill Clinton in the 1990s, friction over the Northern Ireland protocol has the potential to strain relations between Johnson and Biden. The president, proud of his Irish heritage, has already warned the UK about the potentially destabilising impact of Brexit on the Province. In response to the UK’s threat to breach the Northern Ireland protocol in September 2020, Biden cautioned that: ‘We can’t allow the Good Friday Agreement that brought peace to Northern Ireland to become a casualty of Brexit’. Since assuming office, the Biden-Harris administration has pressed the UK to reach an amicable solution with the EU. Days before the G7 summit in Cornwall, Yael Lempert, chargè d’affaires at the US Embassy in London, was reported to have informed Brexit minister, Lord Frost that the UK was ‘inflaming’ tensions in Northern Ireland. Lampert also suggested that the UK may have to accept ‘unpopular compromises’ to reach a settlement with Brussels. Friction over Northern Ireland could have practical ramifications for London: Biden has already warned the UK that undermining the Good Friday Agreement will stall the completion of a UK-US trade deal.

Conclusion

After years of strategic disconnect under the Trump administration, the IR provides a confident, if overly ambitious, plan to coordinate Anglo-American priorities, especially in areas such as strengthening democracy and combatting climate change. Johnson and Biden’s first meeting also augurs well for a positive personal relationship. However, it remains to be seen whether the UK, pursuing its ‘Global Britain’ agenda, can generate sustained traction with the White House. Prioritising the ‘special relationship’ will not be at the top of the Biden-Harris administration’s to-do-list; strengthening ties with London will take place in a broader framework of repairing relations with the US’s main European allies, including Berlin and Paris. It may also be the case that Biden will treat the EU, not the UK, as the US’s main interlocutor on a range of important issues. Furthermore, a UK-US trade deal, seen by UK politicians as a key prize of Brexit, will take years to conclude. With President Biden’s immediate attention focused on addressing the Covid-19 pandemic, revitalising the US economy, attempting to heal a deeply divided US political landscape, reasserting the US’s global leadership role, and competing with China, the Anglo-American relationship may suffer from, in the words of Alan Dobson and Steve Marsh, ‘American benign neglect’.

Dr Philip A. Berry is a Lecturer in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London and Assistant Director of the Centre for Defence Studies. He is the author of The War on Drugs and Anglo-American Relations: Lessons from Afghanistan, 2001-2011 (Edinburgh University Press, 2019).

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