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The UK Integrated Review One Year On

As the one hundredth day of the war in Ukraine came and went, Britain’s role in the conflict came into focus once again.

The UK’s material support to the Ukrainians has remained consistent since the invasion began, building on a training partnership that has steadily strengthened since Russia first attacked in 2014. The assistance shares cross-party support in the UK, and is largely supported by the electorate. And the visibly strong relationship between the British Prime Minister and Ukrainian President has been an important boon to morale.

 

And yet in the current context of British politics, a premiership dogged by controversy struggles to reassert itself, and to shake off suspicions that its Ukraine policy is sometimes used as a shield to protect the current administration. A policy being popular in parliament and amongst the public does not normally lend itself to being politicised; and yet in the context of a Prime Minister struggling to maintain the support of the country, let alone his peers, it has at times become a calling-card for those arguing against a change in government leadership during ‘wartime’.

 

While predictions as to the future duration of the conflict vary, they pessimistically agree that the conflict will likely drag on for months. Given that consensus tends to weaken over time (something that Putin is acutely aware of), it is of the utmost importance that Britain’s policy towards Ukraine does not become further politicised. Better understanding the policy, and placing it in the wider grand strategic context of Britain’s aspirations as a world power post-Brexit, is crucial. Britain’s 2021 Integrated Review offers an intellectual framework around which these discussions can be organised.

 

It is in this context that the Centre for Grand Strategy has so far hosted two out of a three-event series on the Integrated Review a year on from its publication in March 2021 (the final event takes place tonight.) The first event saw Prof. Alessio Patalano, Dr. Basil Germond and Prof. Rob Johnson historically reassess British grand strategy from first principles. In an attempt to transcend long-standing debates regarding Britain as a continental versus maritime power, Dr. Germond examined the fundamentals: what it means to be a modern ‘sea-state’; the global nature of the ‘maritime order’; and the need for Britain to remain maritime, while retaining flexibility dependent on the nature and needs of its allies. The panel agreed that the Integrated Review was about bringing together levers of national power, while recognising the era of contestation that we now lived in. The focus, as described by Prof. Johnson, had to be on threats and opportunities, not the past. Britain must therefore address its resource gaps and deficiencies. Though the Integrated Review did look forward, Prof. Patalano was right to point out that one cannot detach the document from its context: a time of political debates in the UK over the Indo-Pacific tilt and Brexit, which created a false dichotomy between land versus maritime.

 

The panel concluded that while the Integrated Review has stood up well in the context of Ukraine, the war has shown the need to reassess capacities as described in the accompanying Defence Command Paper. This concluding point offered the context for the second event, where Prof. Patalano chaired a panel of Dr. Louise Kettle, AM (Retd.) Edward Stringer, and Dr. Natasha Kuhrt, and who gave their historical, military, and strategic perspectives on how the Integrated Review has held up to scrutiny in light of Ukraine.

 

The consensus was that the Integrated Review had held up well. As Dr. Kettle pointed out, it identified the ascendent threats from states, rather than insurgents; identified Russia as an acute threat; and was realistic about the UK’s power, and need for strong alliances. A clear alignment was visible between the Review’s recommendations and UK action – alliances and partnerships had been central, particularly with the US and NATO; a renewed sense of Britain’s leadership role in the world was forthcoming, particularly vis-à-vis the Joint Expeditionary Force, as well as through the giving of material support. All of this pointed towards a United Kingdom seeking to assert itself internationally in shaping the new world order.

 

While AM Stringer shared these conclusions, he was more sanguine about how the Defence Command Paper had held up. While offering some ‘nice phrases’, it retained an ambiguity regarding next steps, particularly vis-à-vis spending. (Prof. Sir Lawrence Freedman expanded on the manpower question in his evidence to the International Relations and Defence Committee’s evidence session on defence concepts and capabilities in May. And the bulk of Prof. Freedman’s essential analysis on the Ukraine Crisis far can be found here.) It also retained some conceptual limits – ‘persistent engagement’, for example, could have been more fully fleshed out, particularly in the context of how to develop civil-military cooperation. Precision of language was also important: to talk of a ‘failure of deterrence’ is fine in context of Ukraine-Russia, but not NATO-Russia; and while the Integrated Review did well to identify Russia as an acute threat, parts of the British military – Airforce, submariners, intelligence etc. – had retained a long-standing awareness of Russia’s aggressive aims that predated the latest Review.

 

While the Review identified and described the threats that Russia and China pose, Dr. Kuhrt argued that it failed to properly dissect and discuss the Russia-China relationship itself. Indeed, both the UK and NATO have been slow to recognise the synergy of Russia-China, and while that’s not to say that a wedge can be easily driven between them (China will not abandon Russia as a partner in the foreseeable future) initiatives like AUKUS and the Joint Expeditionary Force do well to shake both countries out of any complacency. Indeed, Dr. Kuhrt was bullish on the UK’s ability to help contain China in the Indo-Pacific. To do this, AM Stringer argued that certain government departments would need structural reform, and to overcome a certain inertia that existed over their current understanding of China’s role, aspirations and capabilities in the world. Prof. Patalano further elaborated on some of these themes during his recent evidence to a UK Defence Committee inquiry on the Indo-Pacific.

 

The final event happens tonight, and will see a panel of Dr. Aylin Matlé, Dr. Helen von Bismarck, and Gesine Weber, chaired by Prof. Christoph Meyer, discuss Germany’s historic announcements and moves to transform its defence posture. As legislation passes from the Bundestag to the Bundesrat for final approval, will a substantial change in military capacities over time really be delivered, given past inefficiencies, legal constraints, and bureaucracy? Will this change in spending be backed-up by a broader shift in mindset and structures, for example less restrictive rules of engagement, or greater public support for riskier deployments? If it lives up to its commitments, Germany will have the largest military budget in Europe: what is the political significance of this for European partners, and should Britain see competition or opportunities for co-operation in Germany's changing defence posture?

 

To find out more about this and future events, click here.

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