Towards a 'bastion of the north': The UK and a new northern security architecture

The Western response has surprised many as it has been unified, strong, and concentrating on constraining Russia’s ability to achieve its goals. Yet, while helping to stop the invasion of Ukraine, the West also needs to focus on safeguarding its unity from Russian influence. The likely accession process of Finland and Sweden to NATO will be a touchstone for the alliance, which maintain its "Open Door" policy to European states who share its values.

At the time of writing, the increasingly expected membership of Finland and Sweden in the alliance provides a once-in-a-generation opportunity for the Northern countries to cooperate even more intensively than before.

Having all the Nordic countries in the alliance would constitute a basis for a strong, combined force that would change the force posture in the North.

After the possible accession, the defence planning of the Arctic, Nordic and Baltic regions could, for the first time, be coordinated as one. All the military elements for this increased cooperation are already in place and the existing defence cooperation structures would help facilitate and speed up this process.

Given that the United Kingdom shares historical, cultural, and geopolitical ties with the Nordic countries, the UK would benefit from having all Nordic countries within NATO. As relatively small countries, the Nordics would certainly benefit from the UK’s support, especially related to logistics, intelligence sharing, and the security provided by the nuclear umbrella. If combined with the UK’s capabilities and focus, this unified North would outrank any other European force structure and would help secure both the Eastern and Northern Flank of NATO.

In this essay, we will discuss how the United Kingdom could take on an even stronger role in than it already has in creating a “Bastion of the North” as part of a new security architecture in northern Europe. With a close relationship with all Nordic countries, the collaboration between the United Kingdom and the Nordics would establish a formidable force structure to strengthen NATO’s eastern flank and with potential to ease transatlantic burden-sharing.

Nordics next – but not the way Kremlin planned

Even before Russia launched its invasion, Kremlin demanded in December 2021 that the alliance would have to agree to halting any future enlargement. This was seen as a direct threat especially towards Finland and Sweden, as the traditional policy of both countries has been to keep the option to apply for membership open.

So far, Russia’s threat seems to have backfired. This is due to the facts that first, the war has led to the deployment of more NATO troops on its eastern flank, and second, both Sweden and Finland have seen a huge, sudden rise of public support for Swedish and Finnish membership in NATO. Both Helsinki and Stockholm have, at the time of writing, effectively abandoned their historical approaches towards the Alliance and have started to signal their desire to join it.

The accession process is expected to proceed, and the negotiations presumably could be expedited. Still, the time that is required to obtain unanimous acceptance from all thirty current members is unknown – and risky. The longer this takes, the more time Russia has to undermine the accession process. This is not only a risk for the membership of Finland and Sweden, but for the cohesion and credibility of NATO itself.

UK taking the lead within the European theatre

The United Kingdom’s response to Russia’s revisionism has been to act as one of the spearheads of the pan-European effort to arm and support Ukraine. Leading by example, the UK has managed to polish its role among western security providers and is building up its role in the European security framework.

This leadership is even more important now when Germany, in comparison to the UK, is taking its time to reinvent its role within the European security architecture. Further, the French, with President Macron’s leadership, have tried to balance between Macron’s continued diplomatic efforts and the provision of support for Ukraine. Now that Macron is re-elected, chances are that the French position might be clarified, but Paris seems to be looking to the South as well as to the East and dividing its focus.

Given these ambiguities, the UK’s leadership is welcomed in the North, as Russia tries to close NATO’s open-door policy and warns Finland and Sweden against NATO membership. As a strong show of solidarity, the UK’s defence minister Ben Wallace has already commented that it would be "inconceivable" that Britain would not defend Finland and Sweden if either of the countries were attacked, whether they had joined NATO or not.

his message was reinforced by PM Boris Johnson on May 11th when he “signed security declarations with Sweden and Finland, pledging UK support should their militaries come under attack”.

From NORDEFCO to JEF and beyond

Within the Nordic region, there are already a plethora of bilateral and regional defence agreements and exercises that have bound the Nordic countries closely together. The Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) is the most important and well-known arrangement for regional military cooperation, consisting of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. The overall purpose of NORDEFCO is to strengthen the participants’ national defence and explore mutually beneficial synergies whenever feasible.

It is relatively easy for the UK to integrate into these groupings: the UK and all the Nordic countries already share the same security challenges in northern Europe. The previous chief of the defence staff, Gen Sir Nicholas Carter, already in 2018 commented how Russia is the most significant state-based threat to the UK since the end of the Cold War, warning that hostilities could begin a lot sooner than the UK expects. The shared threat has only grown after that, as both the UK and the Nordics continue to provide weapons for Ukraine to help them in their war efforts. The Kremlin has forcefully condemned these efforts and warned of the consequences of these actions.

In the Arctic, the UK shares the Nordic threat assessment and has taken a more substantial role in defending the region. In its updated Arctic policy framework, the UK holds to a vision of a Global Britain that is engaged in the world and working with its international partners to advance prosperity and security in the Arctic. The 2021 Defence Command Paper makes clear that security in the High North and the defence of the North Atlantic remain of great importance to the UK. The MOD envisions to continue to ensure that it remains capable of protecting the UK’s interests as the polar region opens for increased activity in the coming years.

Post-Brexit Britain has also set an important role for itself in the Baltic security debate. UK Armed Forces already have a leading role in NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) in the Baltic States. The eFP was created to enhance Euro-Atlantic security, reassure UK’s Allies, and deter its adversaries. About 900 British personnel rotate on a continuous basis alongside Danish, French, and host-nation Estonian forces.

Baltic states are widely seen as “the frontline of NATO security”, dependent on the support of the larger NATO members. Since the Alliance lacks a standing military of its own, the Baltic countries have long demanded a more permanent force presence. The defence of this region could be improved substantially if Finland and Sweden would be accepted as members.

The main tool for Nordic-UK military cooperation has been the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), comprised of 10 Northern European countries. Since it includes the Baltic states, the framework is also a link between Baltic defence and the changing Nordic security environment. Launched in 2012, the Joint Expeditionary Force is seen as an agile provider of a rapid military response should Russia attack one of its members.

JEF can already be seen as the embodiment of the shared challenges of the Nordic countries and the UK, and it is precisely these threats that this force is preparing for. During the ministerial meeting in summer of 2021, ministers from JEF member states signed the JEF Policy Direction document, which provided an overarching policy framework for the Joint Expeditionary Force. Further, it set key principles for cooperation, such as the principal geographic area of interest in the High North, North Atlantic and Baltic Sea region.

The bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation between respective Nordic countries and the UK has also contributed to the interoperability of the armed forces. The latest example of this is from May 2022, when British land forces participated in the ARROW 22 exercise in Finland.

The Bastion of the North

A challenge, thus far, has been that all these defence arrangements have had to take into consideration all the defence solutions and allegiances that the Nordic and Baltic countries, as well as the UK, have. This has limited the depth of defence cooperation to some extent, but at the same time, it has emphasized and arguably increased the interoperability of these armed forces and paved the way for even closer cooperation.

With advanced militaries, Finland and Sweden would be net contributors to NATO security in the North. If all Nordic countries were members in the Alliance together with the UK, NATO would be able to cover both the Northern and Eastern flanks in Europe. Moreover, the Nordics would, together with the UK, be able to increase the stability and security in the Arctic, Nordic, and Baltic regions.

The UK has capabilities that would help to secure the region and deter Russia. It could be an invaluable partner for the Nordic countries, supplementing their strengths.

Taking into consideration the proximity of these countries as well as their cultural and historical ties, this Northern group (Nordics + the UK) could form a well-functioning force structure that would outrank any other European power.

Norway, Denmark, and Finland will have almost 150 F-35 stealth multi-role fighter jets alone, in addition to 138 F-35s planned to be acquired by the UK. Moreover, Finland would provide one of Europe’s biggest land forces and single biggest artillery, and Sweden and Norway their advanced maritime capabilities.

A combined Nordic force with interoperable, well exercised, and equipped troops could possibly even lead a new Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) North. This could form one of NATO’s strongest force compositions and offer a unique possibility for the UK to contribute to the safety and security in the Northern Europe, in addition to its own.

From the UK's perspective, this type of integrated northern approach could be a formidable tool with which the UK could engage its national strategic challenges in the future.

Conclusion

Security challenges that lie ahead are likely to be complex and far reaching. Even if Russia is deterred from escalating the war beyond Ukraine, and even if Ukraine itself succeeds in defending itself against the invasion, Russia will remain a threat for the West in the foreseeable future.

The Nordic-Arctic-Baltic region will have to prepare for this challenge in an environment that is in many ways more precarious than the collapse of the Soviet Empire.

Having all the Nordics in the North Atlantic Alliance would constitute a basis for one of NATO’s strongest combined force structures. With the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, the UK could be the actor solidifying the Northern bastion. The UK providing logistical support, intelligence capability and coordination, this combined force would outrank any other European force structures and make it hard, if not impossible, to exert pressure against countries in the European north.

Moreover, a strong ‘Bastion of the North’ with the UK in it would potentially ease transatlantic burden sharing, that is, a Nordic Bastion would ease the commitment needed by the US in the North.

A strong force posture in the North would not only ease the number of physical military resources needed by the US from a purely military economics perspective, but it would also help in gaining domestic political support in the US. A ‘Bastion of the North’ would clearly be a security provider, not a security consumer.

Building the bastion could start quickly since the UK has already politically committed itself to defending Finland and Sweden, the only non-NATO members in the Nordics, joint planning of the new northern security architecture with a potential Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) North could start already in the summer of 2022.

Moreover, having strong UK involvement would also provide added stability in the region which, at times, has shown concern over the polarization of US domestic politics and its potential spill-over to military affairs.

Finally, should the UK take on such a role, it would certainly impact current doctrine, detailed in the most recent Integrated Review which currently particularly emphasises the UK’s global ambition, China as systemic threat, science and technology as means for projecting power, and the cyber and space domains over multinational and interoperable conventional forces in the North. Instead of committing to all available efforts and every region, this moment in history calls for clear prioritizations of regional focus.

This should be reflected in an updated Integrated Review.

Author biographies

Samu Paukkunen, Deputy Director, Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA). Before joining FIIA, Mr Paukkunen served as Counsellor of International Affairs at the Finnish Parliament and as Foreign and Security policy expert at the Office of the President of the Republic of Finland. He has several years of work experience also from the field of intelligence and Foreign Affairs.

Dr Valtteri Vuorisalo is a Senior Visiting Research Fellow at King’s College London, Department of War Studies. Dr Vuorisalo is also the Professor of practice for National Security and Security Policy at Tampere University, Finland, and member of board at the Scientific Advisory Board for Defence in the Finnish Ministry of Defence (MATINE). His research focus revolves around the theme of flow security, and the security impact of data and information flows especially. He holds a PhD from the University of Tampere.