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What the Trump-Putin summit could mean for global diplomacy

Dr Ruth Deyermond

Senior Lecturer in Post-Soviet Security

14 August 2025

The Trump-Putin summit in Alaska is attracting enormous attention, some hopes, and a great deal of scepticism and anger. It’s an important moment in the US’s relations with Russia, with Ukraine, and with their NATO allies, and a significant one for broader questions of international stability and the global balance of power. None of this is likely to be because of anything that is agreed, but because of the meeting itself and what it tells us about the direction of the US-Russia relationship and the diplomatic credibility of the Trump administration.

This will be the first meeting between US and Russian presidents since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 (the last meeting was between presidents Biden and Putin in Geneva in 2021).

The focus of the summit will be the war in Ukraine, which Trump claimed he would end within 24 hours of becoming president, but which has continued uninterrupted since his inauguration. Details of what will be discussed are unclear, but reports suggest that any agreement between Russia and the US would focus on issues such as some form of recognition of continued Russian occupation of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. Israel’s occupation of the West Bank is reportedly one suggested model; there has also been discussion of an agreement relating to mineral resources, including the mineral resources of occupied Ukraine – an idea that recalls treaties between the 19th century colonial powers that divided the territory and assets of other peoples.

Whatever is agreed, it is unlikely to make a significant difference to the war in Ukraine, as the attempts by the White House to play down expectations around the summit indicates. There are several reasons for this.

One is that although summits have traditionally involved months of careful negotiation and planning, this appears to have been a last minute invitation (one that was announced on the day Trump had promised to take action against Russia for failing to halt the war). It does not appear to be well-organised or carefully considered – consistent with the chaotic, incoherent character of foreign policy during this Trump presidency and the previous one – which decreases the likelihood of success.

Another reason is that the US’s traditional allies in Europe don’t share the White House’s view that the war can be ended by cutting Ukraine out of the negotiation process. The most important sign of the division between Europe and the Trump administration on Ukraine is the way that European diplomatic and material support for Ukraine has grown since the start of the Trump presidency, aiming to fill the gap created by the US’s abandonment. Two days before the summit, the UK Prime Minister posted on X that “there should be no decisions about the future of Ukraine without Ukraine”; that view is shared across almost all of European NATO and the EU (not including Russia-aligned Hungary).

Most importantly, though, a US-Russia summit cannot end Russia’s war in Ukraine because Russia has no interest in stopping its aggression and Ukraine is unwilling to destroy itself by capitulating. In the absence of a Russian withdrawal from occupied territory, Ukraine is not going to accept any suggestion of permanent settlement that comes out of the summit. A ceasefire is possible, but in the absence of an agreed end to the war it is very unlikely to last.

But although the summit is unlikely to achieve its supposed goals, it will be significant in other ways.

It tells the world that the Trump administration does not consider the Russian government to be an adversary, but a partner and perhaps a friend– Dr Ruth Deyermond, Senior Lecturer in Post-Soviet Security

US-Russia summit meetings are important for their symbolism as well as their substance. Before Russia’s war against Ukraine, it was normal for new presidents to meet in order to try to establish good relations and work through the issues of most importance to Washington (after the collapse of the USSR, as the much weaker state, Moscow rarely set the agenda). After that, they would meet fairly regularly, sometimes at stand-alone summits, sometimes in the margins of other events such as UN or G20 meetings.

Since the end of the Cold War, the most significant summits have taken place in either Russia or the US. Hosting, or being hosted, has always been a sign of friendship and recognition. When the US president has welcomed the Russian president to American soil, it tells the world that the White House considers the Kremlin to be a partner, not an adversary. This was the message when George H. W. Bush invited Mikheil Gorbachev to Camp David in 1990, signalling the end of the Cold War; and when presidents Clinton, George W. Bush and Obama have hosted the Russian president. After Russia’s 2014 occupation of Crimea and the start of its war in Eastern Ukraine, no US president has given Putin the gift of an invitation to meet on US soil.

So the decision to roll out the red carpet for the Russian president, a wanted war criminal, is a hugely significant one. It tells the world that the Trump administration does not consider the Russian government to be an adversary, but a partner and perhaps a friend. It is showing this recognition to Putin as Russia continues its war of unprovoked aggression, targeting civilians with drones in a ‘human safari’, and creating adoption catalogues of stolen Ukrainian children. The White House press secretary has said that Trump is “very honoured and looking forward to hosting President Putin on American soil”.

There is no precedent for this summit in the history of US-Russia relations. It is a dramatic example of how the Trump administration has up-ended decades of US policy on democracy and human rights, of their abandonment of a decade of support for Ukraine, and of the way that they have realigned the US away from its NATO allies and towards Russia. It is further evidence of a fundamental shift in relations between the US and Europe – a shift that many European states have been reluctant to acknowledge and act on, but which it may now be harder for them to ignore.

It is also evidence of the sharp change in the relative political power of the US and Russia. Russia looks stronger as a result of the US’s shift towards it and in the context of the Trump administration’s undermining of NATO. Moving away from its allies and values and appearing determined not to do anything to directly harm Russian interests makes the US look weaker. That, in turn, risks emboldening Russia and other states that see themselves as the US’s competitors. The Alaska summit is a sign of America adrift and a dangerously destabilised world.

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Ruth  Deyermond

Ruth Deyermond

Senior Lecturer in Post-Soviet Security

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