Why societal resilience matters for NATO's deterrence and defence

Unpredictable love for NATO in Ankara

From tension to love, the 2026 NATO summit in Ankara took an unexpected turn. On the sidelines of the Summit, Donald Trump berated European Allies for failing to meet their defence spending commitments and for their lack of support for his war on Iran. He also threatened Spain with a trade war, renewed calls for the annexation of Greenland, and once again floated the possibility of withdrawing all US troops from Europe. Coupled with expressing dissatisfaction with Germany, France and the UK, this would have been enough to derail the summit and weaken NATO’s deterrence and defence posture.

Yet, the summit ended on a positive note. Trump acknowledged the Canadian and European Allies’ increased defence spending and made a surprising promise to President Volodymyr Zelensky to licence Ukrainian production of Patriot missiles. However, he later backtracked on that promise. Unexpectedly, Trump remarked that “[t]here was a lot of love in that room, a lot of unity” during the closed-door session in Ankara. The final communiqué confirmed the gradual ease of tensions across the two-day summit. It reiterated the credibility of Article 5, stated the Allies’ commitment to defence investment and confirmed NATO’s military support for Ukraine, largely financed by European and Canadian Allies without US contribution. However, the extent to which solidarity can be bought with money remains to be seen.

Deterrence and defence at NATO: What is the role of societal resilience?

At the 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague, Allies agreed to increase defence spending to 5 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) annually, with 3.5 per cent allocated to core defence requirements and up to 1.5 per cent allocated to defence- and security-related investments, including resilience and critical infrastructure. Article 3 on national resilience expects Allies to prepare for, respond to and withstand a crisis, including an armed attack, to ensure the survival of NATO. A whole-of-society approach is needed to do so.

In Ankara, however, Allies linked resilience to investments in the defence industrial base, thus failing once again to account for the relevance of societal resilience for deterrence and defence.

Symbolically, this failure is underscored by the discrepancy between the Summit’s location and the content of the final communiqué, which described NATO as an “[a]lliance of free and democratic nations.” In Türkiye, Erdoğan has weakened civil society and supressed freedom of expression and the right to protest, including in the run-up to the Summit. Moreover, anti-gender equality discourses and a pro-natalist policy were mobilised to consolidate his authoritarian regime.

There are similar political patterns across the Alliance. Populist and far-right parties have blended anti-gender equality discourses with pro-Russian narratives while questioning NATO’s relevance to secure political gains. Civil society has also been weakened by years of austerity, while Allies like the UK have reduced foreign aid in the name of defence spending. Iran, China and Russia have waged a persistent hybrid warfare campaign against NATO to sow division and undermine societal cohesion across the Alliance.

Without gender equality, freedom of expression and a vibrant civil society, societal resilience is in peril. And without societal resilience, the credibility of NATO’s deterrence and defence posture – and its readiness to uphold Article 5 – is called into question.

Learning lessons from Ukraine

As NATO steps up war preparations for potential Russian aggression, Moscow has increasingly utilised the full spectrum of hybrid attacks against the Alliance, from sabotage and violations of airspace to disinformation and misinformation, including through gendered narratives. In any possible war scenario, societal mobilisation – from answering the conscription call to keeping schools, banks and bakeries open – will be key to national resilience. While the armed forces focus on repelling an attack, the collective will of society will provide the necessary lifeline for the state to endure war.

Ukraine’s experience underscores this reality. After 12 years of fighting Russia’s aggression, Ukrainian society offers significant lessons in societal resilience for NATO. Non-governmental organisations, volunteer groups and ordinary people have stepped up to support the national effort – civilians and military alike. From the delivery of military and medical supplies to frontline troops to the evacuation of civilians from war-torn cities and villages and providing support for veterans and victims of conflict-related sexual violence, the Ukrainian collective determination has sustained the state in the face of Russia’s aggression. Civil society organisations have raised awareness about gendered disinformation and channelled foreign aid into rehabilitating and building underground schools to protect children and the right to education. Amid strikes on energy infrastructure, hospitals continued to treat patients.

Societal resilience will not simply materialise when crisis hits. NATO Allies must take decisive steps to reverse the rollback on gender equality and women’s rights, including by redefining the Women Peace and Security agenda as a strategic enabler of deterrence and defence. Allies must also develop a whole-of-society approach to defence by strengthening horizontal and vertical cooperation between different state agencies, actors and non-governmental organisations, including by taking advantage and further supporting civil society and media expertise in fighting (gendered) disinformation. Finally, Allies must invest in democracy and promote active civic participation – from the community level to the highest public offices – to develop an inclusive security and defence strategy.

Military power alone cannot guarantee effective deterrence and defence. Their success also depends on societal resilience. For NATO Allies, this is no longer a theoretical proposition – it is a strategic necessity.