As I outlined in my book on UBI released last year, this reflects long-held concerns about the impact of the wider digital economy on labour conditions in the twenty-first century. The advent of global digital networks in the 1990s enabled the rapid scaling-up of business activity from local to global markets. Commentary on the nascent Internet celebrated the opportunities that it afforded to small, innovative companies.
In actuality, the biggest beneficiaries were large corporations. While some of these were the Internet start-ups that characterised this supposedly more equitable economy, the most successful of these (Alibaba, Tencent, Baidu, Google, Apple, and Meta) developed monopoly powers even greater than the dominant corporations in pre-Internet societies. These types of companies employ relatively small numbers of people relative to their revenues. Given the range of economic sectors that these large tech companies are involved in, the Silicon Valley model of small numbers of people accruing vast amounts of profit has spread to the wider economy. The shift largely explains why in the period 2000-2015, half of the total increase in global wealth was accrued by the richest 1%.
Alongside the pulling away of the global 1% from everyone else has been a significant diminution in the global workforce from 1991 to 2024. In the latter year, around 62% eligible to work in the global workforce were in employment; by 2024 that had fallen to 58%. These two global trends are important because of the way in which new technologies usually map onto existing economic structures rather than subvert them. In this sense, the exponential growth of advanced generative forms of AI is taking place in a period where inequality, at least insofar as it relates to the global 1%, is increasing dramatically and employment levels are falling.