The Integrated Review: a Brazilian perspective

Introduction

A few years ago, BRICS was a ubiquitous acronym in international documents, either economic or political. The acronym sounds today quite anachronistic. The countries it comprises, however, continue to be of global relevance – whether for environmental reasons, development, cyber security, or global health. The Integrated Review reflects well this relevance. At a glance, China is mentioned 27 times, India 17, Russia 14, South Africa 2 and Brazil… well, only once

This is revealing. It indicates the relative priority of the region – and of Brazil – to the UK. Even so, reading the Integrated Review alongside Brazil’s defence strategy and policy documents there are clearly many areas of common interest. In this essay, we explore these points of intersection and highlight what could be opportunities for collaboration between the two countries.

The title of the Integrated Review, ‘Global Britain in a Competitive Age,’ demonstrates its signature theme: creating the framework for the UK to pursue a leading global role at a time of significant inter-state competition, both economic and geopolitical. Within this strategic framework, whether focusing on trade and investment or aspirations for the UK to play a more effective role in regulatory diplomacy, effective bilateral relations with Brazil promise to be part of the formula to turn the Review’s aspirations into reality. In this respect, it is to be hoped that the practical implementation of the Review pays more attention to Brazil and South America than did the Review itself.

Similarly for Brazil, its relationship with the UK can be a force multiplier even though the UK is not a first-order player in Brazil’s priority strategic environments: South America, the South Atlantic, the states of the western coast of Africa, and Antarctica. Both Brazil and the UK stand to benefit from the mutual identification of synergies between their respective national interests in this strategic environment. As the UK develops the specific policies to achieve the Review’s broad objectives, it should intensify its strategic dialogue with Brazil to ensure that these mutual opportunities are realized.

The Review and South America

The Review emphasized the importance of continued development of ‘a strong set of partnerships’ in the region, ‘based on shared democratic values, inclusive and resilient growth, free trade and mutual interest in tackling [serious and organized crime] and corruption.’ The region’s importance as a ‘vital partner in tackling climate change and restoring biodiversity’ was also emphasized in the Review, supported by a series of facts: the region has a quarter of the world’s cultivable land; nearly a quarter of its tropical forests; and nearly a third of its freshwater.

– and Brazil in particular – become more important to achieving those strategic objectives.

The passage quoted above demonstrates that the Review sees the region as both a partner and an instrument to achieving its strategic objectives. This is mirrored from a Brazilian perspective, which readily endorses a similar list of priorities regarding democratic vitality; inclusive and resilient growth; enhanced trade relations; and improvements in countering serious crime and corruption. As the contemporary rise in ransomware incidents demonstrates, however, the fact that both Brazil and the UK prioritize countering cybercrime is offset by the reality that, despite significant effort and investment in both countries over the last decade, the problem currently appears to be getting worse rather than better. As a recent criminal case demonstrates, international cooperation between law enforcement agencies – including the Brazilian Federal Police and the UK National Crime Agency – is essential for reversing the global wave of cybercrime.

Just as the UK Prosperity Fund has allocated resources for trade facilitation projects in Brazil, so too should the National Security Council identify the priority of security capacity-building investments that will be of mutual benefit to Brazil and the UK.

There are therefore three tasks for the UK to cultivate an effective policy towards Brazil and the wider region: first, as accomplished in the process of developing the Review, to identify the strategic objectives the UK wishes to achieve and how these relate to the region; second, to understand the strategic outlook and policies of Brazil and neighbouring states and how these create an environment of challenge or opportunity for the UK; and third, to reflect on the dynamic interplay between the policy options available to the UK and those pursued in the region by other external actors, both allies such as the United States and strategic competitors like China. Strategic policymaking is a multi-dimensional process and if the UK is to understand the system effects of its choices it must invest in understanding – including listening to – Brazil and South America.

The Review and Brazil

From an economic perspective, the UK’s post-Brexit requirement to negotiate trade deals presents an opportunity for Brazil to increase market access for Brazilian products – a prospect perceived as realistic given a perception of the UK as less protectionist than the EU. There is surely room for growth in this relationship, with Brazil accounting for 0.4 per cent of total UK trade in 2020, 0.8 per cent of outward (and 0.1 per cent of inward) UK foreign direct investment. As recent bilateral ministerial discussions regarding agriculture highlighted, there is a broad agenda for improved and mutually-beneficial trade and investment relations. With both states looking for opportunities to boost growth and rebuild economically after the impact of the pandemic, this should be a prominent focus of the bilateral relationship in the immediate term.

The Integrated Review suggests another area for mutual benefit and strategic cooperation: upholding environmental conservation and peaceful scientific research in Antarctica. The Review proudly cited the UK’s status as the first signatory of the Antarctic Treaty, as well as more recent contributions to Antarctic research, including the new Polar Research vessel RRS Sir David Attenborough. These strategic priorities for the region are shared by Brazil, which emphasizes as a national defence objective the need for Brazil to increase its participation in international decisions about Antarctica. Bilateral environmental diplomacy may fluctuate to some extent, modulated by incumbency in the Planalto (Brazil’s presidency) or Downing St (the UK premiership), but its strategic priority for both states will only intensify in the coming years.

The South Atlantic, in contrast, is a strategic issue that requires further dialogue between Brazil and the UK. This fact long predates the Integrated Review, but it was still striking for a Brazilian readership that the Review made no mention of the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS). This is a cornerstone of Brazil’s strategic diplomacy in the South Atlantic, uniting states across South America and Africa, and providing a forum to address a variety of transnational environmental, maritime and wider security issues relating to the South Atlantic. Brazil even foresee ZOPACAS as a possible platform for an institutional engagement in the Maritime Security of Gulf of Guinea, a concern for both Brazil and the UK. Instead,

emphasizing pledges ‘to defend the UK’s sovereignty of the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands’. Whilst Brazil and the UK have different views about this issue, neither state wants this disagreement to undermine the broader bilateral relationship. And there is a clear regional benefit from the permanent UK maritime presence in the Atlantic and Caribbean, contributing to operations against trafficking as well as to deliver humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. These are yet further examples of areas of practical cooperation between the two states that can benefit each state and the wider region.

The Review and Brazil: The Out-of-Area Dimension

As the potential for cooperation against global cybercrime demonstrates, the security partnership between Brazil and the UK transcends any one region. At one level, this demonstrates the transnational nature of the security threats facing both states. At another level, it also highlights the prevailing role conceptions of both states’ respective political elites, perceiving a geopolitical role that is wider than the immediate region in which either is situated. In this respect, both states contribute to a broad range of global security initiatives. One example is the international effort to improve maritime security in the Arabian Gulf. The Review noted the UK’s longstanding – and recently incrementally growing – role as a security partner in the Gulf. Brazil shares this strategic objective and has been a full member of the region’s Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) since 2018. Indeed, a senior Brazilian naval officer has recently taken command of Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151), a multinational naval task force focusing on maritime security and counterterrorism that operates under the CMF.

In addressing these transnational security challenges, Brazil has explored a diverse range of international partnerships, particularly in the area of science and technology, with a range of partnerships including the United States, France and China. There are also opportunities for the UK, for example in cybersecurity and law enforcement capacity-building and information-sharing partnerships. Given the transnational networks and supply-chains of organised crime groups, the improvement of security partnerships between states must be part of the strategy to counter these groups. And as the Integrated Review emphasized the UK’s status as a leading ‘responsible, democratic cyber power’, enhanced cyber capacity-building and cyber diplomacy could form a mutually-beneficial component of bilateral relations with Brazil as the latter faces a severe cybersecurity challenge.

Conclusion

The Integrated Review may not have prioritized South America, or Brazil specifically, but it is clear that the Review’s strategic ambitions cannot be achieved without a range of policies that reflect understanding of the region’s importance and underlying dynamics. As the region’s largest economy and its most influential political, defence and security actor,

Where the strategic priorities of the respective executives do not necessarily align – for example, in contemporary global environmental diplomacy – there is a need to explore innovative solutions, including by recognizing that the bilateral relationship is broader than that between the two governments, encompassing business and civil society.

For Brazil, this historical moment in UK strategy should be an opportunity to develop and enhance the existing bilateral relationship, pursuing something more than a series of transactional deals – a truly strategic partnership of mutual benefit. Both governments should support initiatives to share knowledge and develop ties between citizens of both states. The skeletal blueprint of the Review suggests that much work is still to be done to achieve this ambition. The impact of the pandemic – and indeed the politics of the pandemic – increases not only the scale of the challenge, but also the imperative for both states to make progress quickly.

Dr Vinicius de Carvalho is the Director of the Brazil Institute at King’s College London and a Senior Lecturer in the Department of War Studies. Dr de Carvalho is an Associate Researcher at the Centre for Strategic Studies of the Brazilian Navy. He is also the founder and editor of the journal Brasiliana – Journal for Brazilian Studies and the editor of the Anthem Brazilian Studies Series.

Dr Joe Devanny is the deputy director of the Centre for Defence Studies at King’s College London and Lecturer in National Security Studies in the Department of War Studies. He is an associate of the Institute for Government, a member of the King’s Cyber Security Research Group and an affiliate of the Brazil Institute at King’s.

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