Selective Autonomy: Strategic Principles for Emerging Countries

Defence by denial and technological asymmetry constitute the first two choices on this realistic path: the first seeks to prevent an adversary from achieving its objectives at an acceptable cost; the second uses accessible technologies, distributed systems, and data integration to amplify military effects. The third choice, developed in this essay, is selective autonomy. It answers a crucial question: what capabilities must a country control to preserve its freedom of decision during a crisis?

The answer is not absolute self-sufficiency. No contemporary state fully controls all the production chains, technologies, and knowledge necessary for its defence. Even the greatest powers depend on alliances, foreign suppliers, minerals extracted abroad, components produced by transnational companies, and global logistics networks. For emerging countries, trying to reproduce each link in these chains internally would consume scarce resources and divert investment from truly essential capabilities. The pursuit of self-sufficiency does not represent autonomy; instead, it often leads to technological isolation and creates a false sense of security.

At the opposite extreme, unrestricted dependence is equally problematic. A country that imports complete systems without controlling their maintenance, software, data or the supply of parts may possess sophisticated equipment in peacetime, only to discover during a crisis that it cannot operate that equipment for very long. Political restrictions, logistical disruptions, sanctions, changes in supplier priorities or simple component shortages can rapidly degrade military capacity. This scenario transforms decisions made abroad into national vulnerabilities. Between the illusion of self-sufficiency and the risk of technological submission, lies a more prudent path: selectively identifying where sovereign control is indispensable.

The Principle of Selective Autonomy

Selective autonomy is the ability to concentrate national resources on the bottlenecks that constrain the State's freedom of action. Its purpose is not to produce everything, but to control what, if unavailable, could paralyse defence, interrupt essential functions or give third parties veto power over sovereign decisions. It is about maximizing sovereignty while remaining economically realistic. The more limited the resources, the more rigorous the selection of capabilities that require national control, shared development or external acquisition must be.

This selection requires an explicit hierarchy of dependencies. Some capabilities must remain entirely under national control because they underpin political and operational command, protect sensitive information or ensure the continuity of operations. These include secure communications, cryptography, operational data, systems integration, critical maintenance and essential command mechanisms. Others can be developed in partnership, provided that the country retains sufficient knowledge to adapt, integrate, maintain and restore the acquired systems. There are also capabilities that can be acquired externally, with acceptable risk, especially when there are alternative suppliers and any interruption would not compromise vital functions.

Selective autonomy is not a fixed list of protected sectors, but rather a method that assesses threat, impact, replaceability, replacement time and cost. A dependence that is tolerable under normal conditions may become unacceptable following a geopolitical shift, while a secondary component may become a significant bottleneck. The criterion is not the formal origin of the final product, but the degree of effective control over its operation, adaptation and continued use.

Diagnosing Before Investing

Applying this principle begins with an ongoing diagnosis of national vulnerabilities. Governments need to map critical supply chains, irreplaceable inputs, single suppliers, replenishment lead times and single points of failure. This survey cannot be limited to arsenals or companies traditionally classified as part of the defence industrial base. Energy, telecommunications, digital services, transportation, health, agriculture and logistics also underpin the State's resilience. A failure in these sectors can compromise military operations without the adversary needing to directly confront the armed forces.

This mapping needs to be continuously updated as supply chains change, technologies become obsolete and geopolitical risks alter the reliability of partners. Governments must also monitor supplier concentration, the origin of components and the exposure of trade routes. They must also know who controls critical software, what licenses govern its use and how long it would take to replace each critical element.

This process should establish national indicators of autonomy, such as how long a country can sustain operations without external support, the speed of productive expansion, the availability of alternative suppliers, inventory levels and capacity for maintenance and integration. The goal is to give decision-makers a concrete view of the risks and prevent investment in projects that offer economic benefits but fail to address the vulnerabilities that threaten national sovereignty.

Technological Sovereignty and Industrial Priorities

The first material priority is the ability to sustain combat. Ammunition, explosives, military fuels, critical parts and strategic components need to be available in sufficient quantities and be replenishable during a prolonged crisis. Advanced systems lose their usefulness when a country cannot supply, repair or replace critical components. Domestic production does not need to encompass every type of equipment, but it must guarantee a minimum base that is scalable and compatible with operational needs. Industrial capacity thus becomes part of deterrence: an adversary must consider not only the means available at the beginning of the conflict but also a country’s ability to replenish them.

The second priority is control of digital architecture. Critical software, cryptography, data sovereignty, secure cloud computing and national data centres are all components of military capability. Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems depend on the integration of sensors, networks and data processing. If this architecture is controlled by third parties, a country may face limitations in modifying systems, connecting platforms, protecting information or operating in a contested environment. In this field, autonomy means having the teams, codes, protocols and infrastructure capable of ensuring continuity, updates and adaptation.

Artificial Intelligence applied to defence should follow the same logic. Models trained on national databases and adjusted to local conditions can support intelligence analysis, logistics, surveillance and decision-making. However, acquiring proprietary systems creates dependencies that can be difficult to identify and audit. The goal is not to develop all computational models and components domestically, but to control the data, understand how the systems work, test their results and preserve the ability to replace suppliers. Technological sovereignty depends less on slogans about innovation and more on the institutional capacity to evaluate, integrate and govern complex technologies.

Sensors, microelectronics, electronic warfare and systems integration form another core priority. Emerging countries may not be able to produce all advanced semiconductors, but they can develop skills in design, testing, maintenance and essential components. Mastering the integration of sensors, communications and weapons allows countries to combine equipment from different origins into a coherent architecture. In many cases, a national integrator provides more autonomy than manufacturing every platform domestically.

Autonomous air, naval and land systems, as well as low-cost guided munitions, deserve special attention. Recent conflicts have demonstrated the value of "precision mass": large quantities of relatively inexpensive assets, connected to sensors and controlled by software, that can impose high costs on more sophisticated platforms. For emerging countries, this combination strengthens both defence by denial and selective autonomy. Modular, repairable and mass-produced systems reduce dependence on exclusive suppliers and allow rapid adaptation to battlefield needs.

Independent space capabilities complete this set. Low-Earth orbit observation and communication satellites enhance situational awareness and reduce dependence on services that may be restricted. National space capabilities can be developed progressively, according to the country's resources and industrial maturity. The principle remains selective: it is not necessary to replicate the space programs of major powers, just to ensure that essential observation, communication and positioning functions have national alternatives or reliable and redundant arrangements.

Cyber Defence and Digital Infrastructure Protection

Selective autonomy loses its meaning if digital infrastructure remains vulnerable. Resilient networks, national cyber response centres and continuity mechanisms must protect both defence systems and the civilian services on which they depend. The threat is not only virtual. Data centres, ground stations, submarine cables, landing points and power grids can be targets of physical or digital sabotage. Protection, therefore, needs to integrate intelligence, surveillance, cybersecurity, physical defence and rapid repair capabilities.

Industrial counterintelligence is also an important element of technological sovereignty. Companies, universities and laboratories working with sensitive technologies need accreditation, security protocols and trained personnel to identify espionage and the improper transfer of knowledge. The challenge is to balance security with openness: closing the ecosystem would stifle innovation, but ignoring the risks could result in the loss of sensitive knowledge and compromise the secrecy of the systems the country is seeking to build.

Mobilization, Maintenance and Support

No autonomy policy will be effective if it is restricted to a small group of military manufacturers. Emerging countries need to identify a dual-use industrial reserve, composed of civilian companies capable of converting part of their production to support defence. The Chemical, metallurgy, energy, telecommunications, technology and aerospace industries can contribute to the manufacture of components, repairs, transportation and expanding production capacity. This conversion cannot be improvised after a crisis has begun. Industrial mobilization plans, contingency contracts and periodic exercises need to define responsibilities, technical standards, priorities and financing in advance.

Maintenance, repair, overhaul and modernization (MRO) are equally strategic. A country that buys advanced systems but sends equipment abroad for critical maintenance or repairs retains only apparent autonomy. National MRO capacity can extend service life, restore damaged equipment, adapt platforms and reduce downtime. It must be accompanied by legitimate reverse engineering, remanufacturing capacity and national testing and certification centres. National proving grounds and laboratories are not bureaucratic accessories: they allow countries to assess how systems perform in practice and whether they meet national needs.

Strategic stockpiles offer an additional layer of resilience. Fuels, ammunition, semiconductors, electronic components, optical fibres, strategic minerals and spare parts need to be stockpiled based on plausible disruption scenarios. Medical equipment, food and agricultural inputs are also part of this equation, as national defence depends on the continuity of society. Stockpiles, however, do not replace production. They buy time for industry to be mobilised, alternative suppliers to be activated and logistical routes to be reorganised.

Infrastructure, Energy and Supply Chains

Operational continuity requires resilient and redundant infrastructure. Energy networks, secure communications and alternative navigation, positioning and communication systems must ensure that the loss of a single service doesn’t paralyse the state. Essential institutions need tested protocols for operating during prolonged disruptions. Energy autonomy is part of this effort: diversifying the energy mix and ensuring supply during conflict reduces vulnerability to external coercion and sustains both the economy and military operations.

The security of global supply chains complements, rather than contradicts, selective autonomy. Since self-sufficiency is unfeasible, resilience depends on supplier diversification, identifying alternatives in advance and for some critical goods, sourcing closer to home. Nearshoring and friend-shoring – sourcing from geographically close or politically aligned countries – can reduce risks to the supply of crucial inputs, provided they do not simply replace one dependency with another. Reliable partnerships must coexist with stockpiles, domestic adaptability and sufficient knowledge to identify vulnerabilities.

Human Capital, Innovation and Selective Partnerships

The capabilities described above cannot be built without people. Engineers, scientists, technicians, data analysts and specialists in strategy and defence constitute a strategic resource as important as facilities and equipment. Training and retention programmes need to offer attractive careers, continuity of funding and mobility between universities, research centres, companies and government. The loss of talent can transform physical investments into empty structures, incapable of innovating or adapting acquired technologies.

A national innovation ecosystem must connect operational problems with entrepreneurial capacity to develop solutions. Defence start-ups, funds dedicated to critical technologies, government procurement focused on experimentation and prototyping contracts can reduce the time between identifying a need and developing a solution. This ecosystem, however, requires predictable, multi-year funding. Budgetary fluctuations destroy teams, interrupt projects and increase costs. Stability does not mean protecting inefficient initiatives, but rather allowing strategic programs to be evaluated on their results and given sufficient time to reflect their complexity.

International partnerships remain indispensable. The difference lies in negotiating them according to clear national objectives. Technology transfer only produces autonomy when there is effective capacity to absorb it: trained personnel, access to the necessary knowledge, participation of local companies and freedom to maintain and adapt systems. Joint programmes should contain realistic provisions for learning, integration and continuity. Cooperation with regional partners and other emerging countries can strengthen supply security, share development costs and expand the scale of production.

Exports also support the industrial base, as domestic markets rarely offer sufficient demand to maintain production lines, specialised teams and continuous innovation. Exports can expand the scale of production, distribute costs and, with appropriate controls, transform the defence industry into an instrument of foreign policy.

Governance as State Policy

Selective autonomy requires ongoing coordination. A national industrial resilience body could bring together defence, industry, science, technology, energy, infrastructure, foreign trade and intelligence to assess vulnerabilities and establish priorities. An appropriate legal framework should provide for national mobilisation, defence procurement, export controls and industrial compensation policies. Without coordination, each body risks protecting its own budget and projects, while critical dependencies persist across bureaucratic boundaries.

Continuity depends on political consensus and communication with society, as industrial capabilities, vocational training and infrastructure transcend electoral cycles. Selective autonomy is not indiscriminate protectionism, but rather a form of strategic insurance and a technological development policy. Its long-term investments cannot be evaluated solely in terms of immediate financial returns.

Ultimately, selective autonomy transforms defence into state policy. It integrates military planning, industrial policy, innovation, energy, infrastructure and foreign trade around a common goal: preserving the national capacity to decide and act under pressure. This requires continuous adaptation, as bottlenecks change with technology and geopolitics. Today's priority may cease to be critical tomorrow, while a seemingly marginal dependency can quickly become an instrument of coercion.

The third strategic choice does not promise absolute independence. It promises something more useful: sufficient control over decision-making capabilities to prevent external actors from constraining national decision-making. Combined with defence by denial and technological asymmetry, it allows emerging countries to adopt a posture consistent with their resources and risks. A state does not need to manufacture everything to be sovereign. It needs to know what it cannot afford to lose control of, invest consistently in those priorities and organise partners, industry and society to support its decisions in times of crisis.