Module description
Science is a source of a great deal of our knowledge about the world, but what gives it its claim to epistemic authority? Is there something special about the scientific method, or is it an extension of everyday reasoning? To what extent can science tell us about things we can't observe?
This module will also explore questions in the metaphysics of science concerning the nature of laws, explanation, and inter-theoretic relations.
Assessment details
Summative assessment 1: Review, 500 words (30%)
Summative assessment 2: Unseen written exam, 2 hours (70%)
Learning outcomes
- An understanding of certain central topics in contemporary philosophy of science
- An understanding of the place of these topics in wider philosophy
- An ability to use the techniques of philosophical argument to analyse and discuss questions arising from the study of these topics
Transferable skills:
- analysing arguments
- constructing a coherent and effective argument
- writing a clear and well-structured essay around an argument
Teaching pattern
One one-hour weekly lecture and one one-hour weekly seminar over ten weeks.
Suggested reading list
- Bird, A. (2007). What is scientific progress? Noûs, 41:64–89.
- Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988). Saving the phenomena. Philosophical Review, 97:302–52.
- Clark Glymour(1980) , “Why I am Not a Bayesian” in his Theory and Evidence, Princeton, PUP , pp. 63–93; also in Papineau (1996), pp. 290–313.
- Michael Huemer (2009) Explanationist aid for the theory of inductive logic. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60: 345–75.
- Fahrbach, L. (2011). Theory change and degrees of success. Philosophy of Science, 78:1283– 92.
- Magnus, P. D. and Callender, C. (2004). Realist ennui and the base rate fallacy. Philosophy of Science, 71:320–38.
- Hardwig, J. (1991). The role of trust in knowledge. Journal of Philosophy, 88: 693–708.